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This chapter develops various propositions on the dynamics between informal groups of states and the UN Security Council by applying the analytical framework of exit, voice, and loyalty. It argues that informal mechanisms may enhance SC governance if they are able to strike a balance between inclusiveness, efficiency, informality, transparency, and accountability.

State capacity depends, most of all, of its democratic institutions. Only a strong and legitimate state will be able to provide good governance, individual and social justice, the guarantee of property rights and contracts, the protection to political and social rights, the defence of the national interests. An effective and efficient democratic state depends also on a good state organization and on competent government officials, able to make trade-offs between their legitimate personal objectives and the public interest. Public management reform is the contemporary form of assuring this kind state organization. In modern democracies, government officials–public managers as well as elected politicians–although also looking out for their own interests, are supposed to share republican virtues, to be committed to the general interest and to the protection of the public patrimony. Democratic institutions make them accountable for that.

The first part of this chapter briefly explores the history of international administrations since the early 20th century, including administrations under the League of Nations and in the context of decolonization during the cold war. It provides the historical context in which contemporary international administrations are embedded, identifying precedents, ideas, and traditions on which contemporary international administrations draw. The second part discusses the sources of authority of international administrations. Drawing on the discussion of authority in the preceding chapter, it identifies five sources of authority, and analyses to what extent they are reflected in the mandates of the international administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor. It concludes by discussing the issues of accountability and liability of international administrations.

This last chapter brings together the findings from the analysis, and raises a range of theoretical and practical questions that arise from the analysis of the normative framework underlying statebuilding. Part One discusses the implications of the findings for our understanding of the role of sovereignty in international society. Part Two considers the implications of the book's findings for the governance and development efforts of international administrations. It examines whether international administrations possess the legitimacy and authority themselves that they try to establish in the territories they govern and restructure, and how their authority could be strengthened. It also looks at some of the pathologies of international administration, and concludes by discussing what the book's findings suggests for exit strategies of international administrations.

This chapter poses some of the conceptual choices that need to be made in the process of defining accountability, which is not synonymous with either democracy or the rule of law. It analyzes different dimensions of civil society influence on public accountability, ‘unpacking’ accountability politics by recognizing the interaction between local, national, and international arenas. Building on O'Donnell's distinction between vertical and horizontal dimensions of accountability, the chapter emphasizes the mutual inter-dependence and interaction between them.

This concluding chapter explores several general conceptual propositions, in an effort to contribute to future research that will ‘map’ accountability pathways with greater precision. Empowerment is distinguished from rights, defined in terms of enforceable claims. The chapter also details the problems of ‘low accountability traps’ and the ‘positioning’ of accountability agents in terms of their relationships to state and society. The difficulty of launching pro-accountability ‘virtuous circles’ is addressed with the proposed concept of ‘accountabilities of scale’, drawing on an analogy with ‘economies of scale’. The ‘vertical integration’ of civil society actors takes into account the challenge of scale, followed by a questioning of the ‘power of sunshine’ to leverage accountability outcomes. These concepts offer analytical tools for understanding when voice can change the balance of power by embedding accountability reforms into the state. Meanwhile, millions of citizens are weighing the decision of whether to pursue exit instead.

Because public management reform involves more autonomy and more accountability, it maybe successful only in democracies. On the other hand, there is not a trade-off between efficiency and democracy. Instrumental rationality and the consequent economic criterion are obviously important in capitalist societies, but, in democracies, there is a prior and more important criterion: the democratic constraint. Economists often use the word ‘constraint’ to mean the limitations that policy-makers face. They speak of an efficiency constraint. Another as important, if not more important, constraint faced by policy-makers is the democratic constraint: they cannot and should not ignore the voters’ will. And we should not forget the morality constraint. In political life, this is a central constraint.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion on the challenges of democratic accountability in Latin America. It then presents the three main themes that run throughout the book. These are the controversies about the definition of accountability, the relationship between electoral accountability and mechanisms of control and oversight of public agencies, and the shortcomings and advances of non-electoral forms of accountability in contemporary Latin America.

This chapter is concerned with an indefinite but fundamental: what purpose lies at the heart of the company's cause of action which justifies the use of derivative actions? Section 1.2 firstly identifies the limitations of the traditional view of the derivative action. Subsequently it explicates the relation between the derivative action and two concepts, namely ‘control’ and ‘agency costs’. Section 1.3 outlines some major techniques of accountability, which share the goal of reducing agency costs. Section 1.4 focuses on one such major alternative as it examines whether it is true that the market for corporate control may constitute an effective functional substitute for litigation. As will be seen, from a governance perspective (as opposed to a narrowly legal one), the interaction of the derivative action with the market for corporate control raises some interesting issues.

The basic idea is that activities that use state power should be within the state organization; the state should mainly finance social, cultural, and scientific activities involving externalities and dealing with basic human rights, and public non-state service organization should execute them. Additionally, public management reform is concerned with the democratic character of government officials’ decisions. Thus, while it emphasizes more autonomy for government officials in their decisions, given the complexity of the problems that government faces today and the speed required for some decisions, it demands, as a trade-off, greater transparency and accountability in the decision-making process. Finally, public management reform’s objective is not just to make the state organization more efficient but to build state capacity.

This chapter presents accountability as an inherently vertical relationship. It discusses the conflicts between vertical accountability, horizontal exchange, and superintendence in presidential systems. It is argued that the relations between agents of the state are a function of their connections to the ultimate principal — the citizenry. The proliferation of superintendence agencies may raise expectations that cannot be met without an overhaul of the institutions of vertical accountability in Latin America.

This chapter examines how elite political actors are held to account. It examines collective responsibility, individual ministerial responsibility, and their personal accountability for actions not directly related to their duties as ministers. Governments confronted the dilemmas posed by the arrival of ‘responsible party government’. The constitutional conventions creaked under the impact of party self-interest. The shared responses to improvise to meet whatever political exigencies confronted the government. So, notions of cabinet solidarity were relaxed to accommodate dissent, ministerial resignations became prime ministerial tactical calculations of political dispensability, and prime ministers found other ways to renew their ministries to ensure turnover. However, such improvization prompted outrage, and calls for a return to responsible government. So, governments sought refuge in new codes. Today, we still operate with ‘heroic’ notions of ministers, yet they are embedded in a web of accountabilities, constantly negotiating their way through overlapping and multiple demands.