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This chapter examines the roles that metaphor might play in conceptual representation. Lakoff's conceptual metaphor theory argues that abstract concepts, such as “theory”, are understood in terms of concrete concepts such as “buildings” via the metaphor “theories are buildings”. Such metaphors underlie our ability to talk about theories in terms of buildings, e.g., “His theory has a weak foundation” or “The theory has a leaky roof”. Conceptual metaphor as a theory of conceptual representation is critically analyzed and found wanting on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Conceptual metaphor as a theory of metaphor and idiom comprehension is also critically examined. The available evidence is that people ordinarily understand metaphors and idioms without recourse to conceptual metaphoric mappings. However, when novel expressions such as “His bloated ego gobbled up his integrity and used the airwaves as a toilet” are encountered, then people may infer a metaphorical mapping between arrogance and digestion. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis in the context of theories of metaphor comprehension.

This chapter argues for three points: First, it denies that nonhuman animals or human infants lack the capacity to represent abstract concepts. In particular, it argues that the initial state includes several systems of core cognition with long evolutionary histories. Core cognition includes abstract concepts with conceptual content. Second, nonetheless, there are discontinuities in conceptual development at two different levels of generality. At a general level, most human concepts differ from those embedded in core cognition in many ways, and, at a specific level, core cognition does not have the resources to represent most specific abstract concepts. Third, it characterizes one class of learning mechanism that underlies the discontinuities of interest: Quinian bootstrapping. With this analysis in hand, the chapter speculates on some aspects of conceptual representations unique to humans. These points are illustrated with a single case study of the making of the human capacity to represent natural number.

This chapter examines the criticism of semantic sting in Herbert Hart's definition of law in his The Concept of Law. It discusses Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law as an alternative to theories that suffer from a semantic sting in his Law's Empire. It suggests that an account of the use of language should dissent from two elements of Dworkin's semantic theory. These are the claim that no paradigm of an abstract concept is secure and that the claim that vagueness is a semantic defect of words like bald and is not a feature of words like courtesy or cruel.

This chapter focuses attention on issues pertaining to abstract concepts in the conceptual system. Modal, or experientialist, theories of conceptual systems have a problem: If abstract concepts are not based on perceptual experience, they cannot be embodied, and if they are not embodied, we cannot have a fully perceptual, modal, or experientialist model for conceptual systems either. Three ways of creating abstract concepts (abstraction, metaphor, subjectivity) are examined. Abstract concepts resulting from all three cases are shown to be based on perceptual experience, that is, to be embodied. Just as importantly, the chapter shows that the conceptual system is not exhausted by a stable “representational” system of concepts; it relies heavily on the environment of communication and draws a large portion of its conceptual materials from it.

The beauty of Catholic heritage inspires immense religious awe in the mass psyche and enables adherence to faith. Beauty, by way of brief introductory description, is a dimension of an object, event, or person. Religion does not speak in abstract concepts, religion speaks in stories, in the language of images. Human knowledge is primarily the knowledge of a story. The best contemporary Catholic theology agrees that of the three transcendentals inherent in being—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—the Beautiful is primary in that it is the one we encounter first. In contemporary American Catholicism however, Beauty is cast away as an expensive option and Truth, usually the prepositional variant, is squeezed into the public psyche so they be as good as the accepted definition of Good. If accepted that spiritual depth can be gauged on the basis of the art it produces, American Catholic spirituality does not hold much water.

Every successful music educator has a curriculum that contains a scope (overarching goals) and sequence (how we will achieve our goals and in what order) that are critical to reaching meaningful educational goals within the music classroom. Walker and Soltis (2004) state: “Working with the curriculum is an integral part of all teachers’ daily lives”. When specific curricula are not mandated (by the state, or federal government), most music educators use a set of standards or guidelines to devise a scope and sequence for classroom teaching (i.e., the National Standards). It is important as music educators to consider their curriculum when preparing to teach all students, not just students with learning challenges. This is what separates an educator from a therapist or a service provider. The questions that we will address in this chapter include: How do music educators maintain a focus on their own curricular goals while adapting that same curriculum to the individual needs of students? And how do we assess and reflect on these goals to make adjustments in our curriculum? These are difficult questions to answer. In fact, this has been a challenge for teachers since the inclusion of students with special needs began following the passage of P.L. 94–142 more than 35 years ago. Walker and Soltis explain, “While many teachers supported the goal, many were offended that rigid regulations were imposed on them without their consent”. All these issues require a thoughtful and sequential approach when preparing, presenting, and assessing instruction in the music classroom. However, the stronger the underlying curricular focus is, the easier it will be to adapt and modify your existing curriculum to individualize instruction for students who have learning differences. Your specific curriculum, if not mandated by your state or school system, will be a result of your philosophy of music education. Even when utilizing prescribed curricula, your choices in scope and sequence will reflect your values in the classroom. These same values will be reflected in the choices you make in modifying your curricula for students with special needs.

The present chapter discusses another important abstract concept, viz. dike. This time we are not confronted with an abstraction that can have both a positive and a negative aspect, expressed through adjectival attributes. In the case of dike, there is no ontological split as in Eris, either. Instead, in presenting dike Hesiod uses the same means of expression as earlier (adjectival attribution) in order to portray the opposition between genuine and false justice. But Hesiod goes further and illustrates the variety of (sometimes contradictory) meanings which dike can have. It turns out to be so multivalent and (sometimes) deceitfully used that it requires a special kind of definition. Coming to grips with the confusion that the (mis-)application of dike can cause is essential for Hesiod’s project since this concept is of paramount importance for the world of mortals as established by Zeus.

This chapter explores two further ‘split’ abstract concepts presented in the Works and Days, Aidos (‘Shame/Awe’) and Nemesis (‘Righteous Indignation’). It is shown that not only are there contradictory meanings inherent in these terms, but these contradictions become apparent only once we consider the context. For Hesiod, the good and the bad Aidos are not clearly opposed and distinct from one another, but can have positive or negative effects depending on the existing conditions. Reality and its linguistic expression are not static, but fluid and dynamic, and must be subjected to interpretation.

This chapter examines Eris (‘Strife’) and Zelos (‘emulation/jealousy’), two ‘split’ abstract concepts presented programmatically at the opening of the Works and Days. It argues that what appears in the beginning as a clear-cut opposition between a good and a bad Ἔρις‎ turns out to be not so well-defined after all. The two members of the antithesis begin to resemble each other, and indeed form a unity, just like Heraclitus’ bow in fr. 48, when allowance is made for differing perspectives. What is more, the name Ἔρις‎ does not suffice in order for the audience to grasp the nature of this goddess, but its further qualification is necessary, in this case through the adjectives ἀγαθή‎ (‘good’) and σχετλίη‎ (‘evil’). This point, the idea that names (and words in general) are not fully capable of conveying the nature of the entity or thing they designate, brings Hesiod’s Erga closer to Heraclitus.