James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325195
- eISBN:
- 9780199776412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter attempts to clarify the claim that there should be an absolute prohibition against torture. To clarify the claim, it is important to have a clear understanding of what we mean by ...
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This chapter attempts to clarify the claim that there should be an absolute prohibition against torture. To clarify the claim, it is important to have a clear understanding of what we mean by torture. Treatment that destroys rational agency, and thereby undermines human dignity, defines the heart of human torture. George W. Bush's administration, in defining torture as prolonged physical or mental damage, offered a misleading and dangerous definition of torture. Given our acceptance of killing in self‐defense and of so‐called ticking‐bomb scenarios, we cannot in theory accept an absolute prohibition of torture. However, we still might believe it right to ban torture in practice. The limits of our motivation and of our understanding — our near‐invincible ignorance — might lead us to think it best to block, if we could, any policy that would allow torture. In this regard, it is important to see the weaknesses of Alan Dershowitz's and of Richard Posner's proposals for allowing a limited use of torture. Still, we cannot rule out that there could be exceptions that would allow for torture. But to act on these exceptions, we would need to know how to weigh the considerations for and against torture in particular exceptional situations. It is far from clear, however, that we know how to weigh the relevant considerations or even how to identify the exceptional situations. Given these limitations, it is perhaps best to enforce an absolute prohibition against torture, while hoping that anyone who, contrary to the ban, resorts to torture has correctly identified an exception. Much of moral importance is at stake; but we find ourselves in murky waters.Less
This chapter attempts to clarify the claim that there should be an absolute prohibition against torture. To clarify the claim, it is important to have a clear understanding of what we mean by torture. Treatment that destroys rational agency, and thereby undermines human dignity, defines the heart of human torture. George W. Bush's administration, in defining torture as prolonged physical or mental damage, offered a misleading and dangerous definition of torture. Given our acceptance of killing in self‐defense and of so‐called ticking‐bomb scenarios, we cannot in theory accept an absolute prohibition of torture. However, we still might believe it right to ban torture in practice. The limits of our motivation and of our understanding — our near‐invincible ignorance — might lead us to think it best to block, if we could, any policy that would allow torture. In this regard, it is important to see the weaknesses of Alan Dershowitz's and of Richard Posner's proposals for allowing a limited use of torture. Still, we cannot rule out that there could be exceptions that would allow for torture. But to act on these exceptions, we would need to know how to weigh the considerations for and against torture in particular exceptional situations. It is far from clear, however, that we know how to weigh the relevant considerations or even how to identify the exceptional situations. Given these limitations, it is perhaps best to enforce an absolute prohibition against torture, while hoping that anyone who, contrary to the ban, resorts to torture has correctly identified an exception. Much of moral importance is at stake; but we find ourselves in murky waters.
Brad Hooker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256570
- eISBN:
- 9780191597701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256578.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to ...
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We typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to underwrite these prohibitions, and, in particular, to underwrite our views about when such prohibitions should be amended or overridden. Argues against absolute prohibitions and explores the role of judgement in rule‐consequentialism. The final section explains how rule‐consequentialism can endorse rules giving agents special obligations towards family and friends.Less
We typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to underwrite these prohibitions, and, in particular, to underwrite our views about when such prohibitions should be amended or overridden. Argues against absolute prohibitions and explores the role of judgement in rule‐consequentialism. The final section explains how rule‐consequentialism can endorse rules giving agents special obligations towards family and friends.
Scott A. Anderson and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226529387
- eISBN:
- 9780226529554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226529554.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This book gathers fourteen essays on torture, addressing its complexities from the perspectives of psychology, history, philosophy, law, and cultural commentary. It appears in the wake of the ...
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This book gathers fourteen essays on torture, addressing its complexities from the perspectives of psychology, history, philosophy, law, and cultural commentary. It appears in the wake of the American “War on Terror,” and the apparent evaporation of a broad consensus in international law, the U.S. legal community, and public thinking that torture is never an acceptable act, even in war. The chapters of the book seek to understand the historical and cultural roots of torture; to assess its impacts on survivors, their societies, and those who engage in it or with its victims; to consider philosophical arguments about its justification; and to consider how law and lawyers should confront the problem of torture. While there is no single message or thesis running throughout the book, all of the chapters seek to bring out the complexity of torture as a social, psychological, legal and ethical problem. The introductory chapter, by torture survivor Albie Sachs, who went on to become a justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, demonstrates many of the challenges that torture creates for a society, and for conceiving justice in the wake of torture. Many of the subsequent chapters address the possibilities and difficulties for law and social institutions to respond effectively to torture by creating legal frameworks and structural barriers to guard against the temptations that torture offers. While none of the chapters defend using torture, many grapple with the difficulties of explaining convincingly why ethics absolutely prohibits torture.Less
This book gathers fourteen essays on torture, addressing its complexities from the perspectives of psychology, history, philosophy, law, and cultural commentary. It appears in the wake of the American “War on Terror,” and the apparent evaporation of a broad consensus in international law, the U.S. legal community, and public thinking that torture is never an acceptable act, even in war. The chapters of the book seek to understand the historical and cultural roots of torture; to assess its impacts on survivors, their societies, and those who engage in it or with its victims; to consider philosophical arguments about its justification; and to consider how law and lawyers should confront the problem of torture. While there is no single message or thesis running throughout the book, all of the chapters seek to bring out the complexity of torture as a social, psychological, legal and ethical problem. The introductory chapter, by torture survivor Albie Sachs, who went on to become a justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, demonstrates many of the challenges that torture creates for a society, and for conceiving justice in the wake of torture. Many of the subsequent chapters address the possibilities and difficulties for law and social institutions to respond effectively to torture by creating legal frameworks and structural barriers to guard against the temptations that torture offers. While none of the chapters defend using torture, many grapple with the difficulties of explaining convincingly why ethics absolutely prohibits torture.
