Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter analyzes the Preface of the Groundwork. Its main focus is on Kant’s argument for the necessity of a metaphysics of morals, that is, an a priori moral philosophy. Kant claims that such a ...
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This chapter analyzes the Preface of the Groundwork. Its main focus is on Kant’s argument for the necessity of a metaphysics of morals, that is, an a priori moral philosophy. Kant claims that such a metaphysics is necessary for both moral theory and practice. The former stems from the assumption that moral principles have an absolute necessity and universal scope, which precludes deriving them from experience. The latter stems from the fact that, without firm principles, which can only be established by such a metaphysics, morals are open to corruption by alien considerations, e.g., a concern for happiness. It is claimed that absolute necessity must be understood in a modal sense, as applicability to every conceivable rational agent. This means that the supreme principle of morality must be derived from a concept that applies to every conceivable rational agent, which is just that of being a rational agent.Less
This chapter analyzes the Preface of the Groundwork. Its main focus is on Kant’s argument for the necessity of a metaphysics of morals, that is, an a priori moral philosophy. Kant claims that such a metaphysics is necessary for both moral theory and practice. The former stems from the assumption that moral principles have an absolute necessity and universal scope, which precludes deriving them from experience. The latter stems from the fact that, without firm principles, which can only be established by such a metaphysics, morals are open to corruption by alien considerations, e.g., a concern for happiness. It is claimed that absolute necessity must be understood in a modal sense, as applicability to every conceivable rational agent. This means that the supreme principle of morality must be derived from a concept that applies to every conceivable rational agent, which is just that of being a rational agent.
Benson Mates
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195059465
- eISBN:
- 9780199833429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195059468.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
To reconcile his account of truth with his acceptance of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz introduces a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. It ...
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To reconcile his account of truth with his acceptance of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz introduces a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. It turns out that for him a proposition P is hypothetically necessary if the proposition ‘If the actual world exists, then P’ is absolutely necessary; or, what comes to the same thing, the conjunction ‘The actual world exists and not P’ is absolutely impossible.Less
To reconcile his account of truth with his acceptance of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz introduces a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. It turns out that for him a proposition P is hypothetically necessary if the proposition ‘If the actual world exists, then P’ is absolutely necessary; or, what comes to the same thing, the conjunction ‘The actual world exists and not P’ is absolutely impossible.
Hale Bob
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199669578
- eISBN:
- 9780191765186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
After explaining how McFetridge’s proposed account of logically necessary inference may be extended to a general characterization of absolutely necessity in terms of generalized counterfactuals which ...
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After explaining how McFetridge’s proposed account of logically necessary inference may be extended to a general characterization of absolutely necessity in terms of generalized counterfactuals which potentially encompasses not only logically necessary propositions but absolute necessities of other kinds, two further ways of characterizing absolute necessity are described—as the limiting case of relative necessity, and in terms of the absence of any kind of competing possibility. The relations between these three conceptions of absoluteness are discussed, and it is argued that, under plausible assumptions, they coincide in extension. Finally, a familiar view of the relation between logical and metaphysical modalities, according to which non-logical metaphysical necessities cannot be absolute, because their opposites are logically possible, is contrasted with an alternative, and preferable, picture on which both logical and metaphysical necessities are absolute, and logical necessity can be seen to be a restricted kind of metaphysical necessity.Less
After explaining how McFetridge’s proposed account of logically necessary inference may be extended to a general characterization of absolutely necessity in terms of generalized counterfactuals which potentially encompasses not only logically necessary propositions but absolute necessities of other kinds, two further ways of characterizing absolute necessity are described—as the limiting case of relative necessity, and in terms of the absence of any kind of competing possibility. The relations between these three conceptions of absoluteness are discussed, and it is argued that, under plausible assumptions, they coincide in extension. Finally, a familiar view of the relation between logical and metaphysical modalities, according to which non-logical metaphysical necessities cannot be absolute, because their opposites are logically possible, is contrasted with an alternative, and preferable, picture on which both logical and metaphysical necessities are absolute, and logical necessity can be seen to be a restricted kind of metaphysical necessity.
Nils Melzer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199533169
- eISBN:
- 9780191714511
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533169.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
This chapter examines the extent to which the method of targeted killing can be regarded as permissible under each of the conditions and modalities of the international normative paradigm of law ...
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This chapter examines the extent to which the method of targeted killing can be regarded as permissible under each of the conditions and modalities of the international normative paradigm of law enforcement. It shows that any State-sponsored targeted killing not directed against a legitimate military target in an armed conflict must be governed by the normative paradigm of law enforcement. Therefore, in order to be lawful a particular targeted killing must, cumulatively: (i) have a sufficient legal basis in domestic law; (ii) not be of punitive but of exclusively preventive nature; (iii) aim exclusively at protecting human life from unlawful attack; (iv) be absolutely necessary in qualitative, quantitative and temporal terms for the achievement of this purpose; and (v) be the undesired ultima ratio, and not the actual aim, of an operation which is planned, prepared and conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to lethal force.Less
This chapter examines the extent to which the method of targeted killing can be regarded as permissible under each of the conditions and modalities of the international normative paradigm of law enforcement. It shows that any State-sponsored targeted killing not directed against a legitimate military target in an armed conflict must be governed by the normative paradigm of law enforcement. Therefore, in order to be lawful a particular targeted killing must, cumulatively: (i) have a sufficient legal basis in domestic law; (ii) not be of punitive but of exclusively preventive nature; (iii) aim exclusively at protecting human life from unlawful attack; (iv) be absolutely necessary in qualitative, quantitative and temporal terms for the achievement of this purpose; and (v) be the undesired ultima ratio, and not the actual aim, of an operation which is planned, prepared and conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to lethal force.
Stephan Leuenberger
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198786436
- eISBN:
- 9780191828751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786436.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles ...
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Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.Less
Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238195
- eISBN:
- 9780191597824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238193.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and ...
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It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.Less
It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.
