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The Nature of and Need for a Metaphysic of Morals: An Analysis of the Preface of GMS

Henry E. Allison

in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary

This chapter analyzes the Preface of the Groundwork. Its main focus is on Kant’s argument for the necessity of a metaphysics of morals, that is, an a priori moral philosophy. Kant claims that such a ... More

This chapter analyzes the Preface of the Groundwork. Its main focus is on Kant’s argument for the necessity of a metaphysics of morals, that is, an a priori moral philosophy. Kant claims that such a metaphysics is necessary for both moral theory and practice. The former stems from the assumption that moral principles have an absolute necessity and universal scope, which precludes deriving them from experience. The latter stems from the fact that, without firm principles, which can only be established by such a metaphysics, morals are open to corruption by alien considerations, e.g., a concern for happiness. It is claimed that absolute necessity must be understood in a modal sense, as applicability to every conceivable rational agent. This means that the supreme principle of morality must be derived from a concept that applies to every conceivable rational agent, which is just that of being a rational agent.Less

Absolute Modality

Hale Bob

in Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them

After explaining how McFetridge’s proposed account of logically necessary inference may be extended to a general characterization of absolutely necessity in terms of generalized counterfactuals which ... More

After explaining how McFetridge’s proposed account of logically necessary inference may be extended to a general characterization of absolutely necessity in terms of generalized counterfactuals which potentially encompasses not only logically necessary propositions but absolute necessities of other kinds, two further ways of characterizing absolute necessity are described—as the limiting case of relative necessity, and in terms of the absence of any kind of competing possibility. The relations between these three conceptions of absoluteness are discussed, and it is argued that, under plausible assumptions, they coincide in extension. Finally, a familiar view of the relation between logical and metaphysical modalities, according to which non-logical metaphysical necessities cannot be absolute, because their opposites are logically possible, is contrasted with an alternative, and preferable, picture on which both logical and metaphysical necessities are absolute, and logical necessity can be seen to be a restricted kind of metaphysical necessity.Less

Permissibility of Targeted Killing as a Method of Law Enforcement

Nils Melzer

in Targeted Killing in International Law

This chapter examines the extent to which the method of targeted killing can be regarded as permissible under each of the conditions and modalities of the international normative paradigm of law ... More

This chapter examines the extent to which the method of targeted killing can be regarded as permissible under each of the conditions and modalities of the international normative paradigm of law enforcement. It shows that any State-sponsored targeted killing not directed against a legitimate military target in an armed conflict must be governed by the normative paradigm of law enforcement. Therefore, in order to be lawful a particular targeted killing must, cumulatively: (i) have a sufficient legal basis in domestic law; (ii) not be of punitive but of exclusively preventive nature; (iii) aim exclusively at protecting human life from unlawful attack; (iv) be absolutely necessary in qualitative, quantitative and temporal terms for the achievement of this purpose; and (v) be the undesired ultima ratio, and not the actual aim, of an operation which is planned, prepared and conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to lethal force.Less

S5 as the Logic of Metaphysical Modality: Two Arguments for and Two Arguments against

Bob Hale

Jessica Leech and Kit Fine (eds)

in Essence and Existence

Two arguments for S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are favourably discussed: one from the logic of absolute necessity, one from Timothy Williamson. Two arguments against S5 being the logic ... More

Two arguments for S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are favourably discussed: one from the logic of absolute necessity, one from Timothy Williamson. Two arguments against S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are discussed and rebuffed: one from Nathan Salmon against S4, and thereby S5, being the logical of metaphysical modality; and one from Michael Dummett against the B principle for metaphysical modality. In the Appendix, some comments are offered on the logics of ‘true in virtue of the nature of’, and its relation to logical necessity. It is argued that the logic both of ‘true in virtue of the nature of x’ and of essentialist logical necessity is S5.Less

Wolff’s Close Shave with Fatalism

Stephan Leuenberger

in The Actual and the Possible: Modality and Metaphysics in Modern Philosophy

Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles ... More

Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.Less

On the Many Senses of “Self-Determination”

Karl Ameriks

in Kantian Subjects: Critical Philosophy and Late Modernity

This chapter begins by noting a number of basic meanings that “determination” has for Kant: causal, epistemic, formal, and normative, in the sense of defining a “vocation” for the individual and ... More

This chapter begins by noting a number of basic meanings that “determination” has for Kant: causal, epistemic, formal, and normative, in the sense of defining a “vocation” for the individual and humanity as a whole. These distinctions are employed in a reinterpretation of the difficult transition in Kant’s argument connecting Sections II and III of the Groundwork. In this context, a new reading is given of Kant’s “Formula of Autonomy,” one of the basic meanings of his categorical imperative. It is argued that it is primarily the autonomy of the faculty of reason and its appreciation of an absolutely necessary norm that is Kant’s main concern. It is also argued that Kant’s notion of autonomy should not be understood in a loose, anarchic way, nor in such a way that free action against morality, that is, evil, is not clearly possible.Less

The Enslavement of the Human Being

Miikka Ruokanen

in Trinitarian Grace in Martin Luther's The Bondage of the Will

Luther underscores sin as unbelief which cuts off the relationship between the human being and his/her Creator resulting in the imprisonment of the human by sin, death, and transcendental evil. ... More

Luther underscores sin as unbelief which cuts off the relationship between the human being and his/her Creator resulting in the imprisonment of the human by sin, death, and transcendental evil. He/she exists in the state of infirmity, incapable of changing his/her basic orientation of life. Sin is weakness, inability to be free. Paradoxically, the enslavement of sin entered humanity when the human being was deceived by an illusion of absolute freedom, independence from the Creator: “man himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God.” Erasmus criticized Luther for using the deterministic concept of “absolute necessity.” In fact, Luther is not a determinist, but he uses a hamartiological idea of “the necessity of immutability”: the sinner necessarily must continue to be a captive of unfaith until efficient Pneumatological grace liberates him/her. Luther’s thought does not include any notion of “the necessity of coaction.” The sinner freely enjoys sinning unless changed by God. The necessity of immutability concerns the human being’s relation to the “things above oneself,” not to those “below oneself” where natural freedom of will prevails. Luther represents no theodicy, he leaves open the question about where the ultimate origin of evil will lies. God is not the cause of evil will, but he may sometimes use it as an “instrumental cause” for his good purposes. In Luther’s treatise there is no trace of a doctrine of predestination applied to individual human beings. Any notion of double predestination is impossible in Luther’s doctrine of grace.Less