Emanuel Sakal
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813150802
- eISBN:
- 9780813153315
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813150802.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Military History
While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion ...
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While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion reigned between Elazar and Gonen over the crucial issue of Dovecote deployment for the 252nd Armored Division's regulars. Did it mean two brigades on the canal or one? This chapter details the disastrous results of Gonen's refusal to deploy the division according to Dovecote; the shoddy staff work in GHQ and Southern Command; the failure to evacuate the strongholds and the losses incurred trying to extricate the men there; the use of tanks according to the War of Attrition model; failure of the October 8 counterattack because of Gonen's obsession with crossing the canal; and the chief of staff's misunderstanding of ground events, irresponsible approval of requests, and errors in the conduct of operations.Less
While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion reigned between Elazar and Gonen over the crucial issue of Dovecote deployment for the 252nd Armored Division's regulars. Did it mean two brigades on the canal or one? This chapter details the disastrous results of Gonen's refusal to deploy the division according to Dovecote; the shoddy staff work in GHQ and Southern Command; the failure to evacuate the strongholds and the losses incurred trying to extricate the men there; the use of tanks according to the War of Attrition model; failure of the October 8 counterattack because of Gonen's obsession with crossing the canal; and the chief of staff's misunderstanding of ground events, irresponsible approval of requests, and errors in the conduct of operations.
Avi Shilon
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300162356
- eISBN:
- 9780300189032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300162356.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without ...
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The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without surrendering its political positions. Israel also disregarded Egypt's military capabilities after President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and his deputy, Anwar Sadat, took over. Despite being in the opposition, Menachem Begin showed remarkable knowledge about the war and the various tactics employed, and it eventually became clear that his source was Major General (Reserve) Ariel Sharon, the commander of Division 143 in Sinai. Begin would lead a new political party, the Likud, established by Sharon and Chaim Weizmann. In June 1974, Golda Meir resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Hamaarach candidate Yitzhak Rabin, who served as Israel Defense Forces chief of staff during the Six-Day War and former Israeli ambassador to the United States.Less
The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without surrendering its political positions. Israel also disregarded Egypt's military capabilities after President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and his deputy, Anwar Sadat, took over. Despite being in the opposition, Menachem Begin showed remarkable knowledge about the war and the various tactics employed, and it eventually became clear that his source was Major General (Reserve) Ariel Sharon, the commander of Division 143 in Sinai. Begin would lead a new political party, the Likud, established by Sharon and Chaim Weizmann. In June 1974, Golda Meir resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Hamaarach candidate Yitzhak Rabin, who served as Israel Defense Forces chief of staff during the Six-Day War and former Israeli ambassador to the United States.
Reuven Firestone
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199860302
- eISBN:
- 9780199950621
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860302.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success ...
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It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success was often articulated in religious Zionist publications through such imagery as the “hand of God.” If it was God’s design, then was it not a holy war? The miraculous victory of the war was a clear sign to many that God intends for Jews to conquer and settle all of the Biblical Land of Israel, including those lands extending beyond the borders established by the United Nations Partition Plan and armistice agreements of 1947-48. The failure of the 1973 War actually caused an increase in rationalization and a resurgence of messianic, militant activism. Fear that the war would result in concessions of territories energized many to hold onto them. Revitalization efforts emerged among a generation of Orthodox youth disaffected with the ways in which their parents’ generation expressed its religiosity and Zionism, and the Settler Movement appropriated many of the classical symbols of classical secular Zionism that had since declined.Less
It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success was often articulated in religious Zionist publications through such imagery as the “hand of God.” If it was God’s design, then was it not a holy war? The miraculous victory of the war was a clear sign to many that God intends for Jews to conquer and settle all of the Biblical Land of Israel, including those lands extending beyond the borders established by the United Nations Partition Plan and armistice agreements of 1947-48. The failure of the 1973 War actually caused an increase in rationalization and a resurgence of messianic, militant activism. Fear that the war would result in concessions of territories energized many to hold onto them. Revitalization efforts emerged among a generation of Orthodox youth disaffected with the ways in which their parents’ generation expressed its religiosity and Zionism, and the Settler Movement appropriated many of the classical symbols of classical secular Zionism that had since declined.
Henry G. Gole
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125008
- eISBN:
- 9780813135168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125008.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous ...
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Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.Less
Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.
Emanuel Sakal
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813150802
- eISBN:
- 9780813153315
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813150802.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the ...
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The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the strategic level: the concepts for decision and warning were not updated, the reservists were not mobilized on time, war aims were unclear or unachievable, the defensive and offensive plans were not integrated, and assessment of the enemy was faulty. On the operational level: there were insufficient forces for a simultaneous two-front decision, the Israelis were ignorant of the Egyptians’ offensive plan, the chief of staff was unfamiliar with Sinai, the Israelis were certain that this was a war of attrition, there was limited transportation for tanks, mistakes were made in the buildup of ground forces, and there was no corps headquarters. On the tactical level: tanks were unable to counter infantry antitank weapons, there was a shortage of infantry equipment, the purpose of the Egyptian ramps was misperceived, the rear defensive line was unprepared, the IDF was indifferent toward the enemy's massive buildup of antitank weapons, and there was a gap between strongholds in the central sector.Less
The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the strategic level: the concepts for decision and warning were not updated, the reservists were not mobilized on time, war aims were unclear or unachievable, the defensive and offensive plans were not integrated, and assessment of the enemy was faulty. On the operational level: there were insufficient forces for a simultaneous two-front decision, the Israelis were ignorant of the Egyptians’ offensive plan, the chief of staff was unfamiliar with Sinai, the Israelis were certain that this was a war of attrition, there was limited transportation for tanks, mistakes were made in the buildup of ground forces, and there was no corps headquarters. On the tactical level: tanks were unable to counter infantry antitank weapons, there was a shortage of infantry equipment, the purpose of the Egyptian ramps was misperceived, the rear defensive line was unprepared, the IDF was indifferent toward the enemy's massive buildup of antitank weapons, and there was a gap between strongholds in the central sector.
Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813169552
- eISBN:
- 9780813174242
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169552.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal ...
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The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal moment being Major General Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal, which is known as the crossing battle In this narrative Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz consider the war and Sharon’s leadership as a case study of generalship for the benefit of new generations of senior field commanders. By focusing on the divisional command, Even and Maoz balance the macro view of the war (in the context of the political atmosphere of the time) with the micro view (as a cascade of individual decisions made by each commanding officer).Less
The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal moment being Major General Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal, which is known as the crossing battle In this narrative Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz consider the war and Sharon’s leadership as a case study of generalship for the benefit of new generations of senior field commanders. By focusing on the divisional command, Even and Maoz balance the macro view of the war (in the context of the political atmosphere of the time) with the micro view (as a cascade of individual decisions made by each commanding officer).
General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Maoz
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813169552
- eISBN:
- 9780813174242
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169552.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had ...
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Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had when entering the Yom Kippur War, from their goals prior to the 1973 war, to their practical goals for the Yom Kippur War, as well as Egypt’s objectives. At the war’s end in 1973, both Egypt and Israel believed, justifiably, that they had won a great victory because they fought for two separate but related goals. Israel sought to remove Egypt from the circle of war, and Egypt hoped to regain territory it had lost in 1967. Even and Maoz conclude that, ultimately, everyone won the war.Less
Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had when entering the Yom Kippur War, from their goals prior to the 1973 war, to their practical goals for the Yom Kippur War, as well as Egypt’s objectives. At the war’s end in 1973, both Egypt and Israel believed, justifiably, that they had won a great victory because they fought for two separate but related goals. Israel sought to remove Egypt from the circle of war, and Egypt hoped to regain territory it had lost in 1967. Even and Maoz conclude that, ultimately, everyone won the war.
Assaf Shelleg
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199354948
- eISBN:
- 9780199354962
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199354948.003.0004
- Subject:
- Music, Ethnomusicology, World Music, History, Western
After the linear properties of non-Western Jewish musical traditions had destabilized Zionist Eurocentric formulations, the theological undercurrents nationalized by the Hebrewist discourse grew more ...
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After the linear properties of non-Western Jewish musical traditions had destabilized Zionist Eurocentric formulations, the theological undercurrents nationalized by the Hebrewist discourse grew more visible. Art music of the 1960s and ’70s saw a dialectical return to the Jewish worlds from which Hebrew culture sought to be “healed.” Hasidic stories enacted in modernist musical syntaxes now avoided both the otherness embedded in post-romantic and auto-exoticist constructions in the spirit of the Yishuv while the properties of both the Eastern European soundscape and non-Western Jewish oral musical traditions gave birth to new modes of cultural memory. Paradoxically, the aftermath of the 1967 War accelerated the dialectical return to Jewish culture outside of the land, underscoring the subterranean presence of linguistic and theological strata that manifested themselves both culturally and politically. The collapse of national rhetoric that formerly distinguished between diasporic and Hebrewist cultures now enabled the reemergence of repressed exilic pasts that defined Jewishness through its symbiotic qualities, rather than the translation of theology into politics that gave rise to territorial maximalism in the 1970s.Less
After the linear properties of non-Western Jewish musical traditions had destabilized Zionist Eurocentric formulations, the theological undercurrents nationalized by the Hebrewist discourse grew more visible. Art music of the 1960s and ’70s saw a dialectical return to the Jewish worlds from which Hebrew culture sought to be “healed.” Hasidic stories enacted in modernist musical syntaxes now avoided both the otherness embedded in post-romantic and auto-exoticist constructions in the spirit of the Yishuv while the properties of both the Eastern European soundscape and non-Western Jewish oral musical traditions gave birth to new modes of cultural memory. Paradoxically, the aftermath of the 1967 War accelerated the dialectical return to Jewish culture outside of the land, underscoring the subterranean presence of linguistic and theological strata that manifested themselves both culturally and politically. The collapse of national rhetoric that formerly distinguished between diasporic and Hebrewist cultures now enabled the reemergence of repressed exilic pasts that defined Jewishness through its symbiotic qualities, rather than the translation of theology into politics that gave rise to territorial maximalism in the 1970s.
Ami Pedahzur
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199744701
- eISBN:
- 9780199979394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744701.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; ...
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This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; the Jerusalem predicament; the return to Gush Etzion; Levinger’s success; the bureaucratic benefits of territorial expansions; the Yom Kippur War and the rise of Ariel Sharon; the emergence of a new faction within the National Religious Party called Gush Emunim; the legalization of the settlements; Sharon’s first betrayal; and the success of the settlers’ network.Less
This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; the Jerusalem predicament; the return to Gush Etzion; Levinger’s success; the bureaucratic benefits of territorial expansions; the Yom Kippur War and the rise of Ariel Sharon; the emergence of a new faction within the National Religious Party called Gush Emunim; the legalization of the settlements; Sharon’s first betrayal; and the success of the settlers’ network.
Reuven Pedatzur
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199862184
- eISBN:
- 9780199979950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862184.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The chapter focuses on the effects that the occupation has had on the Israeli army. It argues that the army has naturally played a major role in the management of the occupied territories. In ...
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The chapter focuses on the effects that the occupation has had on the Israeli army. It argues that the army has naturally played a major role in the management of the occupied territories. In fulfilling this role the army has been responsible for encouraging, initiating, realizing and supporting the Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This role has led to illegal acts, to the legitimization of illegal acts, to political involvement of the army and to the disregard of violations of the Palestinians’ human rights. It has also led to neglect in preparing the military to fight a conventional war as it was preoccupied with containing the resistance of the Palestinians to occupation and fighting the emerging terror.Less
The chapter focuses on the effects that the occupation has had on the Israeli army. It argues that the army has naturally played a major role in the management of the occupied territories. In fulfilling this role the army has been responsible for encouraging, initiating, realizing and supporting the Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This role has led to illegal acts, to the legitimization of illegal acts, to political involvement of the army and to the disregard of violations of the Palestinians’ human rights. It has also led to neglect in preparing the military to fight a conventional war as it was preoccupied with containing the resistance of the Palestinians to occupation and fighting the emerging terror.
Emanuel Sakal
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813150802
- eISBN:
- 9780813153315
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813150802.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on ...
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Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on the proper way to defend the borders according to an unwritten directive: “not one step.” The operational concept stated that in the event of war, even in the case of a surprise attack on two fronts, “the regulars would hold” because of Israel's deterrence, early warning, and overwhelming airpower. The following chapters describe Israel's national security doctrine regarding such issues as defense versus offense, the preemptive strike, and strategic depth. The main focus, however, is the tactical and operational analysis of the defensive battle in Sinai between October 6 and 15, 1973, and the missed opportunity to prevail in the defensive campaign on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.Less
Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on the proper way to defend the borders according to an unwritten directive: “not one step.” The operational concept stated that in the event of war, even in the case of a surprise attack on two fronts, “the regulars would hold” because of Israel's deterrence, early warning, and overwhelming airpower. The following chapters describe Israel's national security doctrine regarding such issues as defense versus offense, the preemptive strike, and strategic depth. The main focus, however, is the tactical and operational analysis of the defensive battle in Sinai between October 6 and 15, 1973, and the missed opportunity to prevail in the defensive campaign on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.
Thomas Robb
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780719091759
- eISBN:
- 9781781706985
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719091759.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 3 shows how the Nixon–Heath relationship deteriorated to such an extent that both Nixon and Kissinger would declare that the special relationship was over. Indeed, both intelligence and ...
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Chapter 3 shows how the Nixon–Heath relationship deteriorated to such an extent that both Nixon and Kissinger would declare that the special relationship was over. Indeed, both intelligence and nuclear collaboration between the two sides were suspended on a number of occasions at Washington's behest. This chapter highlights that US–UK relations had assumed a virtually antagonistic agenda because of differences surrounding what Henry Kissinger termed the ‘Year of Europe’. It is also in this chapter that the Nixon-Kissinger notion of coercive diplomacy, as usually associated with their diplomacy towards the USSR, Red China and North Vietnam, was also applied to their handling of the US-UK relationship. Therefore, in order to encourage Edward Heath to take a more positive attitude towards the ‘Year of Europe’; to persuade him to support the US's Middle East diplomacy, and to convince the prime minister to side with the United States at the Washington Energy Conference, the United States, largely under the direction of Henry Kissinger, suspended nuclear and intelligence cooperation with their British ally and made a number of threats regarding future security commitments to Europe and to the world economic system. As shown, this had the desired effect upon London and resulted in Heath changing policy course.Less
Chapter 3 shows how the Nixon–Heath relationship deteriorated to such an extent that both Nixon and Kissinger would declare that the special relationship was over. Indeed, both intelligence and nuclear collaboration between the two sides were suspended on a number of occasions at Washington's behest. This chapter highlights that US–UK relations had assumed a virtually antagonistic agenda because of differences surrounding what Henry Kissinger termed the ‘Year of Europe’. It is also in this chapter that the Nixon-Kissinger notion of coercive diplomacy, as usually associated with their diplomacy towards the USSR, Red China and North Vietnam, was also applied to their handling of the US-UK relationship. Therefore, in order to encourage Edward Heath to take a more positive attitude towards the ‘Year of Europe’; to persuade him to support the US's Middle East diplomacy, and to convince the prime minister to side with the United States at the Washington Energy Conference, the United States, largely under the direction of Henry Kissinger, suspended nuclear and intelligence cooperation with their British ally and made a number of threats regarding future security commitments to Europe and to the world economic system. As shown, this had the desired effect upon London and resulted in Heath changing policy course.
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190693480
- eISBN:
- 9780190943240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0030
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
Recent testimony from a Soviet general and others showed that the transport aircraft which evacuated the dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt on the eve of the Yom Kippur War also flew in more ...
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Recent testimony from a Soviet general and others showed that the transport aircraft which evacuated the dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt on the eve of the Yom Kippur War also flew in more advisers to assist in the crossing of the Suez Canal. Another indication of Soviet collusion is the immediate start of a Soviet resupply effort as soon as the offensive was launched on 6 October, which proves earlier prepositioning. Both advisers and Soviet special forces were involved in operations across the canal. Soviet SAM batteries were also redeployed in Egypt and Syria, especially after the tide turned against the Arab onslaught after the first days of fighting. .Less
Recent testimony from a Soviet general and others showed that the transport aircraft which evacuated the dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt on the eve of the Yom Kippur War also flew in more advisers to assist in the crossing of the Suez Canal. Another indication of Soviet collusion is the immediate start of a Soviet resupply effort as soon as the offensive was launched on 6 October, which proves earlier prepositioning. Both advisers and Soviet special forces were involved in operations across the canal. Soviet SAM batteries were also redeployed in Egypt and Syria, especially after the tide turned against the Arab onslaught after the first days of fighting. .
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190693480
- eISBN:
- 9780190943240
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, ...
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Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen (at a time) with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture the land it lost to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources--memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.Less
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen (at a time) with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture the land it lost to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources--memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.
Rose McDermott and Uri Bar-Joseph
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199341733
- eISBN:
- 9780190677008
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199341733.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that ...
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This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that surprise attacks that started wars have almost always succeeded, we analyze the psychological mechanisms by which leaders learn from their mistakes, especially in the way available intelligence is used. In order to undertake this analysis in a systematic way, it investigates three pairs of major military attacks: “Barbarossa,” the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure), and the battle for Moscow between October 1941 and January 1942 (success); the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea (failure), and the Chinese intervention in the war five months later (failure); and the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure), and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). It challenges the central thesis in the field, which asserts that the fiascos are the product of structural obstacles to proper information processing. Instead, it delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies, particularly narcissism, paranoia, and lack of openness to new information, in precipitating failure in order to show that the key explanation for some of the most significant cases of warning failure is not unintentional action but motivated biases in key intelligence and military officers or policymakers that null the more alarmistic views of others around them. In addition, it identifies the learning process that central decision-makers engage as key to subsequent success.Less
This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that surprise attacks that started wars have almost always succeeded, we analyze the psychological mechanisms by which leaders learn from their mistakes, especially in the way available intelligence is used. In order to undertake this analysis in a systematic way, it investigates three pairs of major military attacks: “Barbarossa,” the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure), and the battle for Moscow between October 1941 and January 1942 (success); the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea (failure), and the Chinese intervention in the war five months later (failure); and the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure), and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). It challenges the central thesis in the field, which asserts that the fiascos are the product of structural obstacles to proper information processing. Instead, it delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies, particularly narcissism, paranoia, and lack of openness to new information, in precipitating failure in order to show that the key explanation for some of the most significant cases of warning failure is not unintentional action but motivated biases in key intelligence and military officers or policymakers that null the more alarmistic views of others around them. In addition, it identifies the learning process that central decision-makers engage as key to subsequent success.
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190693480
- eISBN:
- 9780190943240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0029
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
Israeli and US intelligence had ample field reports of Soviet as well as Egyptian and Syrian war preparations well before Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, but these were disregarded in favor of an ...
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Israeli and US intelligence had ample field reports of Soviet as well as Egyptian and Syrian war preparations well before Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, but these were disregarded in favor of an unchanged assessment that an Arab offensive was unlikely – among other reasons, for assumed lack of Soviet support. One cause was the priority assigned to the input of “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan, who did not relay a warning until after the mass evacuation of Soviet advisers’ dependents from Egypt and Syria on 4 October provided an unmistakable indication. It was, however, misinterpreted as signaling Soviet dissociation from the impending offensive. Marwan’s warning came too late for effective mobilization of Israeli reserves, and also included a spurious assurance that the USSR was not involved. In a continuing internecine Israeli controversy about Marwan’s role, this supports the claim that he acted as an efficient Egyptian double agent.Less
Israeli and US intelligence had ample field reports of Soviet as well as Egyptian and Syrian war preparations well before Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, but these were disregarded in favor of an unchanged assessment that an Arab offensive was unlikely – among other reasons, for assumed lack of Soviet support. One cause was the priority assigned to the input of “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan, who did not relay a warning until after the mass evacuation of Soviet advisers’ dependents from Egypt and Syria on 4 October provided an unmistakable indication. It was, however, misinterpreted as signaling Soviet dissociation from the impending offensive. Marwan’s warning came too late for effective mobilization of Israeli reserves, and also included a spurious assurance that the USSR was not involved. In a continuing internecine Israeli controversy about Marwan’s role, this supports the claim that he acted as an efficient Egyptian double agent.
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190693480
- eISBN:
- 9780190943240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0032
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely ...
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This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely believed, in the summer of 1972 did develop gradually after the Yom Kippur War, with Egypt moving into the US camp in the Cold War. Unlike the present book’s challenge to many conventional assumptions about the 1967-1973 period, here the widespread concept appears to be borne out that once Egyptian President Anwar Sadat opted for peace, he needed US influence with Israel as much as he needed Soviet military support for the military achievement which he required as a precondition. Moscow was involved in the first stages of postwar settlement, such as the reopening of the Suez Canal and the Geneva peace conference. But it was edged out of the subsequent process and did its best to back its remaining allies, mainly Syria and Palestinian groups, in opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace as far as backing attempts on Sadat’s life.Less
This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely believed, in the summer of 1972 did develop gradually after the Yom Kippur War, with Egypt moving into the US camp in the Cold War. Unlike the present book’s challenge to many conventional assumptions about the 1967-1973 period, here the widespread concept appears to be borne out that once Egyptian President Anwar Sadat opted for peace, he needed US influence with Israel as much as he needed Soviet military support for the military achievement which he required as a precondition. Moscow was involved in the first stages of postwar settlement, such as the reopening of the Suez Canal and the Geneva peace conference. But it was edged out of the subsequent process and did its best to back its remaining allies, mainly Syria and Palestinian groups, in opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace as far as backing attempts on Sadat’s life.
Stig Tenold
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780973893427
- eISBN:
- 9781786944627
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9780973893427.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Maritime History
This chapter provides a history of the shipping market between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the shipping crisis of 1973. It documents the major changes to shipping and ...
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This chapter provides a history of the shipping market between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the shipping crisis of 1973. It documents the major changes to shipping and shipbuilding practices that occurred during this period, including the increase in technological advancement, a steady growth of the oil trade, and the rise of container shipping. It concludes in 1973 after a misleadingly strong growth in shipping demand, and cites the short but consequential Yom Kippur War as a crucial shift in international power structure and the world economy, deeming it the beginning of the shipping crisis.Less
This chapter provides a history of the shipping market between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the shipping crisis of 1973. It documents the major changes to shipping and shipbuilding practices that occurred during this period, including the increase in technological advancement, a steady growth of the oil trade, and the rise of container shipping. It concludes in 1973 after a misleadingly strong growth in shipping demand, and cites the short but consequential Yom Kippur War as a crucial shift in international power structure and the world economy, deeming it the beginning of the shipping crisis.
Daniel Friedmann
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190278502
- eISBN:
- 9780190278533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190278502.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Comparative Law, Legal History
The Purse and the Sword presents a critical analysis of the Israeli legal system in the context of Israeli politics, history, and the forces that shape Israeli society. The book examines the ...
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The Purse and the Sword presents a critical analysis of the Israeli legal system in the context of Israeli politics, history, and the forces that shape Israeli society. The book examines the extensive powers that Israel’s Supreme Court has arrogated to itself since the 1980s and traces the history of the transformation of the Israeli legal system and the shifts in the balance of power between the branches of government. Centrally, this shift has put unprecedented power in the hands of both the Court and Israel’s attorney general and state prosecution at the expense of Israel’s cabinet, constituting its executive branch and the Knesset, its parliament. The expansion of judicial power followed the weakening of the political leadership in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the election results in the following years. These developments are detailed in the context of major issues faced by the modern-day Israel, including the war against terror, the conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab minority, settlements in the West Bank, state and religion, immigration, military service, censorship and freedom of expression, appointments to the government and to public office, and government policies. The aggrandizement of power by the legal system led to a backlash against the Supreme Court in the early part of the current century and to the partial rebalancing of power toward the political branches.Less
The Purse and the Sword presents a critical analysis of the Israeli legal system in the context of Israeli politics, history, and the forces that shape Israeli society. The book examines the extensive powers that Israel’s Supreme Court has arrogated to itself since the 1980s and traces the history of the transformation of the Israeli legal system and the shifts in the balance of power between the branches of government. Centrally, this shift has put unprecedented power in the hands of both the Court and Israel’s attorney general and state prosecution at the expense of Israel’s cabinet, constituting its executive branch and the Knesset, its parliament. The expansion of judicial power followed the weakening of the political leadership in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the election results in the following years. These developments are detailed in the context of major issues faced by the modern-day Israel, including the war against terror, the conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab minority, settlements in the West Bank, state and religion, immigration, military service, censorship and freedom of expression, appointments to the government and to public office, and government policies. The aggrandizement of power by the legal system led to a backlash against the Supreme Court in the early part of the current century and to the partial rebalancing of power toward the political branches.
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190693480
- eISBN:
- 9780190943240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0031
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
If Soviet and Egyptian planning for the offensive of October 1973, assumed that its limited objective of recapturing Sinai would not trigger an Israeli nuclear response, in the event this proved ...
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If Soviet and Egyptian planning for the offensive of October 1973, assumed that its limited objective of recapturing Sinai would not trigger an Israeli nuclear response, in the event this proved dangerously flawed. The initial Israeli defeat on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts caused such concern for a threat to the Israeli heartland that the doomsday option was reportedly considered and signaled. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were ordered to ready a response, and nuclear-capable MiG-25s were redeployed in Egypt. Their use for a nuclear strike at Israel’s nuclear complex was considered seriously enough for a Jewish weapons developer to threaten suicide. When Israeli forces reversed the course of the war with a counter-crossing of the Suez Canal, Soviet Scud missiles with conventional warheads were launched at them. Nuclear warheads, supposedly detected on a Soviet ship headed for Egypt, were cited (but as this chapter argues, erroneously) as the cause for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had been blindsided by the Arab offensive, to declare a DefCon-3 alert that brought the superpowers close to a nuclear confrontation.Less
If Soviet and Egyptian planning for the offensive of October 1973, assumed that its limited objective of recapturing Sinai would not trigger an Israeli nuclear response, in the event this proved dangerously flawed. The initial Israeli defeat on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts caused such concern for a threat to the Israeli heartland that the doomsday option was reportedly considered and signaled. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were ordered to ready a response, and nuclear-capable MiG-25s were redeployed in Egypt. Their use for a nuclear strike at Israel’s nuclear complex was considered seriously enough for a Jewish weapons developer to threaten suicide. When Israeli forces reversed the course of the war with a counter-crossing of the Suez Canal, Soviet Scud missiles with conventional warheads were launched at them. Nuclear warheads, supposedly detected on a Soviet ship headed for Egypt, were cited (but as this chapter argues, erroneously) as the cause for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had been blindsided by the Arab offensive, to declare a DefCon-3 alert that brought the superpowers close to a nuclear confrontation.
