Search Results

While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion reigned between Elazar and Gonen over the crucial issue of Dovecote deployment for the 252nd Armored Division's regulars. Did it mean two brigades on the canal or one? This chapter details the disastrous results of Gonen's refusal to deploy the division according to Dovecote; the shoddy staff work in GHQ and Southern Command; the failure to evacuate the strongholds and the losses incurred trying to extricate the men there; the use of tanks according to the War of Attrition model; failure of the October 8 counterattack because of Gonen's obsession with crossing the canal; and the chief of staff's misunderstanding of ground events, irresponsible approval of requests, and errors in the conduct of operations.

The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without surrendering its political positions. Israel also disregarded Egypt's military capabilities after President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and his deputy, Anwar Sadat, took over. Despite being in the opposition, Menachem Begin showed remarkable knowledge about the war and the various tactics employed, and it eventually became clear that his source was Major General (Reserve) Ariel Sharon, the commander of Division 143 in Sinai. Begin would lead a new political party, the Likud, established by Sharon and Chaim Weizmann. In June 1974, Golda Meir resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Hamaarach candidate Yitzhak Rabin, who served as Israel Defense Forces chief of staff during the Six-Day War and former Israeli ambassador to the United States.

Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.

The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the strategic level: the concepts for decision and warning were not updated, the reservists were not mobilized on time, war aims were unclear or unachievable, the defensive and offensive plans were not integrated, and assessment of the enemy was faulty. On the operational level: there were insufficient forces for a simultaneous two-front decision, the Israelis were ignorant of the Egyptians’ offensive plan, the chief of staff was unfamiliar with Sinai, the Israelis were certain that this was a war of attrition, there was limited transportation for tanks, mistakes were made in the buildup of ground forces, and there was no corps headquarters. On the tactical level: tanks were unable to counter infantry antitank weapons, there was a shortage of infantry equipment, the purpose of the Egyptian ramps was misperceived, the rear defensive line was unprepared, the IDF was indifferent toward the enemy's massive buildup of antitank weapons, and there was a gap between strongholds in the central sector.

It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success was often articulated in religious Zionist publications through such imagery as the “hand of God.” If it was God’s design, then was it not a holy war? The miraculous victory of the war was a clear sign to many that God intends for Jews to conquer and settle all of the Biblical Land of Israel, including those lands extending beyond the borders established by the United Nations Partition Plan and armistice agreements of 1947-48. The failure of the 1973 War actually caused an increase in rationalization and a resurgence of messianic, militant activism. Fear that the war would result in concessions of territories energized many to hold onto them. Revitalization efforts emerged among a generation of Orthodox youth disaffected with the ways in which their parents’ generation expressed its religiosity and Zionism, and the Settler Movement appropriated many of the classical symbols of classical secular Zionism that had since declined.

Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had when entering the Yom Kippur War, from their goals prior to the 1973 war, to their practical goals for the Yom Kippur War, as well as Egypt’s objectives. At the war’s end in 1973, both Egypt and Israel believed, justifiably, that they had won a great victory because they fought for two separate but related goals. Israel sought to remove Egypt from the circle of war, and Egypt hoped to regain territory it had lost in 1967. Even and Maoz conclude that, ultimately, everyone won the war.

This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; the Jerusalem predicament; the return to Gush Etzion; Levinger’s success; the bureaucratic benefits of territorial expansions; the Yom Kippur War and the rise of Ariel Sharon; the emergence of a new faction within the National Religious Party called Gush Emunim; the legalization of the settlements; Sharon’s first betrayal; and the success of the settlers’ network.

After the linear properties of non-Western Jewish musical traditions had destabilized Zionist Eurocentric formulations, the theological undercurrents nationalized by the Hebrewist discourse grew more visible. Art music of the 1960s and ’70s saw a dialectical return to the Jewish worlds from which Hebrew culture sought to be “healed.” Hasidic stories enacted in modernist musical syntaxes now avoided both the otherness embedded in post-romantic and auto-exoticist constructions in the spirit of the Yishuv while the properties of both the Eastern European soundscape and non-Western Jewish oral musical traditions gave birth to new modes of cultural memory. Paradoxically, the aftermath of the 1967 War accelerated the dialectical return to Jewish culture outside of the land, underscoring the subterranean presence of linguistic and theological strata that manifested themselves both culturally and politically. The collapse of national rhetoric that formerly distinguished between diasporic and Hebrewist cultures now enabled the reemergence of repressed exilic pasts that defined Jewishness through its symbiotic qualities, rather than the translation of theology into politics that gave rise to territorial maximalism in the 1970s.

The chapter focuses on the effects that the occupation has had on the Israeli army. It argues that the army has naturally played a major role in the management of the occupied territories. In fulfilling this role the army has been responsible for encouraging, initiating, realizing and supporting the Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This role has led to illegal acts, to the legitimization of illegal acts, to political involvement of the army and to the disregard of violations of the Palestinians’ human rights. It has also led to neglect in preparing the military to fight a conventional war as it was preoccupied with containing the resistance of the Palestinians to occupation and fighting the emerging terror.

This chapter explores the role of doctrine in military adaptation and how it prepares commanders and soldiers for the fog and friction of the battlefield. It argues that doctrine must remain flexible and open to change through a constant iterative process of improvement. Effective adaptation of doctrine also requires input from all levels of the chain of command and the ability to rapidly disseminate changes throughout the force. The chapter illustrates successful and failed adaptability of military doctrine using case studies of the French and German armies in World War II and the Egyptian and Israeli armies during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on the proper way to defend the borders according to an unwritten directive: “not one step.” The operational concept stated that in the event of war, even in the case of a surprise attack on two fronts, “the regulars would hold” because of Israel's deterrence, early warning, and overwhelming airpower. The following chapters describe Israel's national security doctrine regarding such issues as defense versus offense, the preemptive strike, and strategic depth. The main focus, however, is the tactical and operational analysis of the defensive battle in Sinai between October 6 and 15, 1973, and the missed opportunity to prevail in the defensive campaign on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

Chapter 3 shows how the Nixon–Heath relationship deteriorated to such an extent that both Nixon and Kissinger would declare that the special relationship was over. Indeed, both intelligence and nuclear collaboration between the two sides were suspended on a number of occasions at Washington's behest. This chapter highlights that US–UK relations had assumed a virtually antagonistic agenda because of differences surrounding what Henry Kissinger termed the ‘Year of Europe’. It is also in this chapter that the Nixon-Kissinger notion of coercive diplomacy, as usually associated with their diplomacy towards the USSR, Red China and North Vietnam, was also applied to their handling of the US-UK relationship. Therefore, in order to encourage Edward Heath to take a more positive attitude towards the ‘Year of Europe’; to persuade him to support the US's Middle East diplomacy, and to convince the prime minister to side with the United States at the Washington Energy Conference, the United States, largely under the direction of Henry Kissinger, suspended nuclear and intelligence cooperation with their British ally and made a number of threats regarding future security commitments to Europe and to the world economic system. As shown, this had the desired effect upon London and resulted in Heath changing policy course.

This chapter describes the rise of the Israeli Peace Camp. It took place over a long period of time, and though the various organizations composing this peace camp were rooted in a left-wing ideology, their engagement did not come about as a result of a preconceived strategy but rather as a reaction to often unforeseeable events or psychological shocks, such as the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Likud victory of 1977, the visit of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1979, and the Lebanon War of 1982. In order to date the birth of the dovish left, we must go all the way back to the Six-Day War.

Recent testimony from a Soviet general and others showed that the transport aircraft which evacuated the dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt on the eve of the Yom Kippur War also flew in more advisers to assist in the crossing of the Suez Canal. Another indication of Soviet collusion is the immediate start of a Soviet resupply effort as soon as the offensive was launched on 6 October, which proves earlier prepositioning. Both advisers and Soviet special forces were involved in operations across the canal. Soviet SAM batteries were also redeployed in Egypt and Syria, especially after the tide turned against the Arab onslaught after the first days of fighting. .

This chapter shows how collective memory channels a country’s international behaviour. To that end, it first lays out the nexus between memory and state behaviour put forward by the temporal security concept. It then goes on to distinguish it from international relations’ classical realist and ontological security approaches and their predictions on state behaviour. To keep their temporal security intact, countries are assumed to enter into an ‘in-between-time’ conversation with their ‘significant historical others’. Through the emotional trigger of shame, policymakers avoid potential disconnects with their country’s ‘narrated self in the past’, thus bringing their courses of action in line with collective memory. To illustrate this process, the empirical case study looks at the reaction of West Germany and Austria to two wars in the Middle East. It contrasts their support for either of the warring parties during the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War and international oil crisis of 1973. The qualitative analysis demonstrates that West Germany and Austria’s different collective memories of the Nazi legacy channelled their behaviour along diverse reasonings to support either the Israeli or the Arab side.

This chapter examines the bond between American poet W.H. Auden and Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai. It also tells of the author’s own experiences as an American student on kibbutz followed by his unplanned joining of the Israeli military as a combat medic who patrolled Israel’s tense borders. The Yom Kippur War between Israel and allies Syria and Egypt, which reified American Jewish commitment to Israel, are detailed. Additional accounts include that of Father Daniel Berrigan, one of the first concerted American critics of Israeli “imperialism.” The varied experiences of Johnny and June Carter Cash, Bishop Pike, and Meyer Lansky with respect to Israel are also rendered.

Israeli and US intelligence had ample field reports of Soviet as well as Egyptian and Syrian war preparations well before Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, but these were disregarded in favor of an unchanged assessment that an Arab offensive was unlikely – among other reasons, for assumed lack of Soviet support. One cause was the priority assigned to the input of “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan, who did not relay a warning until after the mass evacuation of Soviet advisers’ dependents from Egypt and Syria on 4 October provided an unmistakable indication. It was, however, misinterpreted as signaling Soviet dissociation from the impending offensive. Marwan’s warning came too late for effective mobilization of Israeli reserves, and also included a spurious assurance that the USSR was not involved. In a continuing internecine Israeli controversy about Marwan’s role, this supports the claim that he acted as an efficient Egyptian double agent.