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May the Lord Make You My Atonement: Yom Kippur in the Ethnographic Accounts on the Jews

Yaacov Deutsch

in Judaism in Christian Eyes: Ethnographic Descriptions of Jews and Judaism in Early Modern Europe

This chapter focuses on the descriptions of a single festival—Yom Kippur. Out of all the possible holidays, Yom Kippur has been chosen for several reasons. To begin with, it comes up more often than ... More

This chapter focuses on the descriptions of a single festival—Yom Kippur. Out of all the possible holidays, Yom Kippur has been chosen for several reasons. To begin with, it comes up more often than any other festival in the ethnographic accounts, so that there is more material on the Day of Atonement than any other topic. Moreover, Yom Kippur constitutes one of the most important festivals on the Jewish calendar, which helps explain why it attracted so much attention from Christian authors. As a result, it also stands to reason that writing about Yom Kippur is more comprehensive than any of the other holidays.Less

Mysterium Tremendum The Varieties of Religious Experience in Hebrew Modernism

in Literary Passports: The Making of Modernist Hebrew Fiction in Europe

This chapter focuses on the modernist articulations of religiosity and a quest for religious experience in modernist Hebrew writings, examinesing the religious theme of Yom Kippur (the Day of ... More

This chapter focuses on the modernist articulations of religiosity and a quest for religious experience in modernist Hebrew writings, examinesing the religious theme of Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) in the novels and stories of Yosef Chaim Brenner, Gershon Shofman, and Uri Nissan Gnessin.Less

Ground Forces in the Defensive Battle

Emanuel Sakal

in Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War

While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion ... More

While in London, the head of Mossad was told on the evening of October 5 that war would erupt the next day at 18:00, but the field units in Sinai and the Golan Heights were not informed. Confusion reigned between Elazar and Gonen over the crucial issue of Dovecote deployment for the 252nd Armored Division's regulars. Did it mean two brigades on the canal or one? This chapter details the disastrous results of Gonen's refusal to deploy the division according to Dovecote; the shoddy staff work in GHQ and Southern Command; the failure to evacuate the strongholds and the losses incurred trying to extricate the men there; the use of tanks according to the War of Attrition model; failure of the October 8 counterattack because of Gonen's obsession with crossing the canal; and the chief of staff's misunderstanding of ground events, irresponsible approval of requests, and errors in the conduct of operations.Less

Against Expectations

Avi Shilon

in Menachem Begin

The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without ... More

The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise attack on Israel by Egyptian and Syrian military forces. The Israeli government was caught off-guard, since it imposed a ceasefire in the Suez Canal without surrendering its political positions. Israel also disregarded Egypt's military capabilities after President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and his deputy, Anwar Sadat, took over. Despite being in the opposition, Menachem Begin showed remarkable knowledge about the war and the various tactics employed, and it eventually became clear that his source was Major General (Reserve) Ariel Sharon, the commander of Division 143 in Sinai. Begin would lead a new political party, the Likud, established by Sharon and Chaim Weizmann. In June 1974, Golda Meir resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Hamaarach candidate Yitzhak Rabin, who served as Israel Defense Forces chief of staff during the Six-Day War and former Israeli ambassador to the United States.Less

Initial Blunders

Emanuel Sakal

in Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War

The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the ... More

The units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that were hurled into the fighting bore the brunt of the initial blunders that affected the entire campaign. Errors were made at all levels. On the strategic level: the concepts for decision and warning were not updated, the reservists were not mobilized on time, war aims were unclear or unachievable, the defensive and offensive plans were not integrated, and assessment of the enemy was faulty. On the operational level: there were insufficient forces for a simultaneous two-front decision, the Israelis were ignorant of the Egyptians’ offensive plan, the chief of staff was unfamiliar with Sinai, the Israelis were certain that this was a war of attrition, there was limited transportation for tanks, mistakes were made in the buildup of ground forces, and there was no corps headquarters. On the tactical level: tanks were unable to counter infantry antitank weapons, there was a shortage of infantry equipment, the purpose of the Egyptian ramps was misperceived, the rear defensive line was unprepared, the IDF was indifferent toward the enemy's massive buildup of antitank weapons, and there was a gap between strongholds in the central sector.Less

Passover and the Holiday Cycle

Lee Shai Weissbach

in A Jewish Life on Three Continents: The Memoir of Menachem Mendel Frieden

Because Frieden was concerned with recording for future generations as much as possible about his early life, in this chapter he recalls the holiday celebrations of his youth. In doing so, he ... More

Because Frieden was concerned with recording for future generations as much as possible about his early life, in this chapter he recalls the holiday celebrations of his youth. In doing so, he interweaves a general description of the way various holidays were observed with recol- lections about his own family’s customs, thus reminding us that although many of the beliefs and practices associated with the Jewish holidays are common to Jews all over the world, some were peculiar to individual Jew- ish communities, such as Frieden’s own now-vanished Lithuanian milieu. Frieden adopts a traditionalist approach in discussing the Jewish holidays, taking many of the beliefs he recounts on faith. He writes with conviction about the way individuals are judged before a heavenly court during the Ten Days of Repentance, for example, and about the way their fate for the coming year is determined during that period.Less

TRADOC Commander: The Army’s Road Back

Henry G. Gole

in General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War

Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous ... More

Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.Less

What Is Atonement?: Yom Kippur

David Greenstein

in Torah Queeries: Weekly Commentaries on the Hebrew Bible

This chapter critiques the traditional reading of Yom Kippur during the annual Day of Atonement—a time of Divine forgiveness, purification, and reconciliation. This way of reading does not include ... More

This chapter critiques the traditional reading of Yom Kippur during the annual Day of Atonement—a time of Divine forgiveness, purification, and reconciliation. This way of reading does not include passages in Torah that might have been deemed relevant to the themes of Yom Kippur such as the Ten Commandments, or the declaration of God's mercy and forgiveness that the rabbinic tradition teaches. Instead, the traditional reading focuses on texts that describe the High Priest's temple ritual for Yom Kippur, and on texts that forbids sexual relations, which was used by Christians and Jews as a scriptural warrant to condemn homosexuality. Hence, a new way of reading must be establishing to celebrate forgiveness, reconciliation and purification—all of which are the aim of the Day of Atonement.Less

1967 to 1973: The Miracle of Conquest and the Test of Yom Kippur

Reuven Firestone

in Holy War in Judaism: The Fall and Rise of a Controversial Idea

It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success ... More

It was only after the extraordinary victory of the 1967 War that most religious Zionists acknowledged what they considered to be the truly messianic, redemptive nature of Zionism. Military success was often articulated in religious Zionist publications through such imagery as the “hand of God.” If it was God’s design, then was it not a holy war? The miraculous victory of the war was a clear sign to many that God intends for Jews to conquer and settle all of the Biblical Land of Israel, including those lands extending beyond the borders established by the United Nations Partition Plan and armistice agreements of 1947-48. The failure of the 1973 War actually caused an increase in rationalization and a resurgence of messianic, militant activism. Fear that the war would result in concessions of territories energized many to hold onto them. Revitalization efforts emerged among a generation of Orthodox youth disaffected with the ways in which their parents’ generation expressed its religiosity and Zionism, and the Settler Movement appropriated many of the classical symbols of classical secular Zionism that had since declined.Less

Yom Kippur War

Dina Rezk

in The Arab World and Western Intelligence: Analysing the Middle East, 1956-1981

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our ... More

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ The most recently released material suggests that Kissinger’s explanation requires some revising. This chapter demonstrates that British and American analysts understood perfectly well Sadat’s intentions, specifically his desire for a limited military victory to gain ‘face’ at home and leverage abroad. Instead analytical weakness lay in assessments of Egypt’s military capability where there was a unanimous consensus of Egypt’s impotency. Ideas about Arab ‘culture’ seem to have played a key role in this underestimation: the notion of a fatalistic Islam for example, prevailed in numerous analyses. In a radical revision of the conventional wisdom about the strengths and weaknesses of Western intelligence agencies, the Yom Kippur war provides a revealing case study whereby the West excelled in understanding the ‘mystery’ or intentions leading to war, but simply did not believe that Egypt possessed the capability to act effectively, and so perilously dismissed the prospect of an Egyptian attack.Less

The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur

Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott

in Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor

The War of Yom Kippur (October 6–24, 1973) between Israel, Egypt, and Syria was the most intensive and complicated short war in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It started with a sudden ... More

The War of Yom Kippur (October 6–24, 1973) between Israel, Egypt, and Syria was the most intensive and complicated short war in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It started with a sudden attack that surprised Israel despite numerous warnings about the looming threat. The official investigation of this failure concluded that at its root was the persistent adherence to the belief that Egypt would not launch war before acquiring the aircraft and the missiles that would neutralize Israel’s air superiority. Although this belief was shared by some intelligence officers, the authoritarian style and high need for closure of the strong man of the community, Eli Zeira, singled him out as the key person responsible for the fiasco. A fast learning process improved the policy-makers’ ability to integrate critical intelligence into their decision-making process and facilitated the decision that turned the tide of the war in favor of Israel.Less

Jonah, Nineveh, the Great Fish, and God: Jews Ponder the Story

Robert C. Gregg

in Shared Stories, Rival Tellings: Early Encounters of Jews, Christians, and Muslims

From first to last verse of Jonah, the prophet is resentful of the mission that God has commanded for him, and especially angry when the Ninevites, whose destruction he had proclaimed, repented and ... More

From first to last verse of Jonah, the prophet is resentful of the mission that God has commanded for him, and especially angry when the Ninevites, whose destruction he had proclaimed, repented and were saved. Rabbis respected Jonah’s status as a prophet but also leveled recriminations against him—for his flight from God, and for believing he could go to a place beyond God’s power to call him to account for his disobedience. Topics opened for the interpreters: What transpired while Jonah was in the whale? Did Jonah confess his sin, thereby gaining release? Another narrative of Jonah in the whale portrayed him as a hero—the one to slay the dangerous Leviathan on the day of judgment. Writings featured are Josephus’s Antiquities, Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer, Talmud Tractate Yoma, and Pseudo-Philo, On Jonah. A final question arises: where is Jonah in Jewish art?Less

Israel

Or Rabinowitz

in Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals

The chapter is dedicated to Israel and its political thinking about nuclear tests and their utility. Primary sources are used to explore how intelligence agencies and governments viewed and assessed ... More

The chapter is dedicated to Israel and its political thinking about nuclear tests and their utility. Primary sources are used to explore how intelligence agencies and governments viewed and assessed the likelihood of an Israeli nuclear test, and new information about Israeli plans to detonate a nuclear device in the first hours of the Six Day War is discussed. The evolution of Israel’s non-testing obligation is charted, starting with the Nixon-Meir deal in 1969, following though the myth surrounding Israel’s assumed alleged nuclear signalling in the Yom Kippur War, the Vela incident of September 1979, and Israel’s signing of the CTBT.Less

The Order and the Division: From Call-Up to Assembly

General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Maoz

in At the Decisive Point in the Sinai: Generalship in the Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War began on Yom Kippur, the highest holy day in Judaism, in 1973. Since the Israeli army was made up of reserve units, the Egyptian army attacked on the holiday, believing the timing ... More

The Yom Kippur War began on Yom Kippur, the highest holy day in Judaism, in 1973. Since the Israeli army was made up of reserve units, the Egyptian army attacked on the holiday, believing the timing would impede the army’s call-up process. In reality, this strategy made it possible for the reservists to arrive at their designated locations sooner than usual because the roads were clear; most people were either at home or their local synagogue. The Egyptian attack came as a surprise to the Israeli reservists because Israel had definitively won the Six-Day War against Egypt and its allies in 1967. However, the Egyptian army had significantly increased its antitank resources in the interim, and both sides were startled to discover that neither had the advantage they thought they did.Less

“Better Is the End of a Thing Than the Beginning Thereof” (Eccles. 7:8)

General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Maoz

in At the Decisive Point in the Sinai: Generalship in the Yom Kippur War

Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had ... More

Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had when entering the Yom Kippur War, from their goals prior to the 1973 war, to their practical goals for the Yom Kippur War, as well as Egypt’s objectives. At the war’s end in 1973, both Egypt and Israel believed, justifiably, that they had won a great victory because they fought for two separate but related goals. Israel sought to remove Egypt from the circle of war, and Egypt hoped to regain territory it had lost in 1967. Even and Maoz conclude that, ultimately, everyone won the war.Less

 Beit El Practice

Pinchas Giller

in Shalom Shar'abi and the Kabbalists of Beit El

Beit El thought and practice eschews “classical” Jewish mysticism in favor of a worldview entirely based on Lurianic Kabbalah. In some cases, Beit El kabbalists are at a loss when non‐Lurianic ... More

Beit El thought and practice eschews “classical” Jewish mysticism in favor of a worldview entirely based on Lurianic Kabbalah. In some cases, Beit El kabbalists are at a loss when non‐Lurianic practices do enter their culture. One exception to this rule is the ongoing reference to the vicissitudes of the Shekhinah. Otherwise, Beit El is distinguished by their specific doctrines attached cycles of time, such as the atonement cycle. The Beit El kabbalists practiced flagellation and other mortifications, assuming a special responsibility for the fate of the people Israel. These rites of self‐mortification reflect an ancient pietistic suspicion of the efficacy of Halakhah. Another time‐based practice was the observance of the Sabbatical year, which was the object of much controversy in Beit El, and the counting of the Omer. The Beit El kabbalist are notable for their practice wearing double sets of phylacteries as an act of piety, and practice the rite of ascent through the four worlds of existence during their morning prayers.Less

The Old Radical Right

Ami Pedahzur

in The Triumph of Israel’s Radical Right

This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; ... More

This chapter analyzes the ideology, trajectory, predicaments, and eventual decline of the old radical Right. It discusses the rebirth of territorial nativism; Rabbi Kook’s followers, the Allon Plan; the Jerusalem predicament; the return to Gush Etzion; Levinger’s success; the bureaucratic benefits of territorial expansions; the Yom Kippur War and the rise of Ariel Sharon; the emergence of a new faction within the National Religious Party called Gush Emunim; the legalization of the settlements; Sharon’s first betrayal; and the success of the settlers’ network.Less

Introduction

Emanuel Sakal

in Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War

Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on ... More

Between 1967 and 1973 Israel's leadership believed that its military strength would deter the Arabs from launching a war to recapture the Golan Heights and Sinai. High-level discussions were held on the proper way to defend the borders according to an unwritten directive: “not one step.” The operational concept stated that in the event of war, even in the case of a surprise attack on two fronts, “the regulars would hold” because of Israel's deterrence, early warning, and overwhelming airpower. The following chapters describe Israel's national security doctrine regarding such issues as defense versus offense, the preemptive strike, and strategic depth. The main focus, however, is the tactical and operational analysis of the defensive battle in Sinai between October 6 and 15, 1973, and the missed opportunity to prevail in the defensive campaign on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.Less