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This chapter recounts the Buddhist revival in the late Ming. It first describes the institutional reorganization of Buddhism in the early Ming. Then the revival of Tiantai, Huayan, Yogacara, and ordination ceremonies in the late Ming was introduced. However, Chan Buddhism was not fully recovered because of the confusion of dharma transmission and divergence of Chan understandings.

This chapter argues that there is indeed an important sense in which the Buddha never utters a word, that is, in which he never uses language in the way that language is ordinarily used. Drawing from the Yogācāra account of the awareness of a buddha, the chapter argues that the way to understand this apparently paradoxical statement is through drawing the distinction between a referential and a use semantics for natural language. If one takes it that to “utter a word”—to use language—just is to refer and to characterize, the Buddha fails to do that. But that is not the semiotic theory preferred by Buddhist philosophers of language. Instead, enlightened language use is precisely use, not reference. And the Buddha can use words to undermine a natural semantics.

Buddhist thinkers after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti will form the argument that reflexivism cannot solve the conceptual problem of other minds, the problem of explaining how it is possible to form a conception of a mental life distinct from one's own or conceive that there can be a plurality of minds. Reflexivism, argues Ratnakīrti out of a suggestion made earlier by Jñānaśrīmitra, entails that there are no phenomenal or intentional boundaries between oneself and others within a stream of experience. The idea that reflexivism entails conceptual solipsism is confirmed by Kashmiri Śaiva philosophers, who appropriate Buddhist Yogācāra reflexivism but transform it into a constitutive theory of self: the self just is that which consists of reflexive self‐representation. Abhinavagupta shows clearly that this view leads to solipsism, an implication he actually seems to welcome. This chapter includes a full translation of Ratnakīrti's closely argued text. These difficulties with reflexivist analyses of subjectivity constitute a partial vindication of the earlier mental files theory.

Explores Buddhists’ use of Consciousness-Only thought to critique and supplement modern psychology. This argument was primarily produced by members of the “Wuchang School,” which the book argues is a useful category for discussing the shared agenda of the teachers and students of China’s first modern Buddhist seminary. This concept allows scholars to de-center the Taixu from the narrative of reformist Chinese Buddhism during this period. Members of the Wuchang School argued against the materialist Behaviorist psychology coming into vogue in China in the 1920s, and stated that Consciousness-Only thought could help explain certain phenomena that were problematic for modern psychology, specifically memory and instinct. The chapter tells the story of the Buddhist community’s rejection of the materialist interpretation of Consciousness-Only offered by Jin Han, which shows the limits of the community’s reinterpretation of Consciousness-Only thought in light of modern science of the mind.

The relationship between Madhyamaka and Mind-Only is configured in different ways among Tibetan traditions, and how their relationship is configured informs the shape of the distinct contemplative practices there. The conclusion here reiterates how understanding the interplay of these two traditions, in conversation with the discourses of ontology and phenomenology, can illuminate some of the issues at stake in Tibetan thought and connect them to contemporary issues. Like Mind-Only and Madhyamaka, ontology and phenomenology represent divergent modes of thought and practice that can be seen to offer unique lenses on the world, yet they can also be seen to overlap, or even mutually entail each other.

Vasubandhu is famous for converting from Śrāvakayāna to Mahāyāna between writing his Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma (Abhidharmakośabhāsya, AKBh) and his Yogācāra works. This chapter considers the doctrinal shift that comes with the adoption of the interpretive perspective of the Scripture on the Clarification of the [Buddha's] Intent (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, SNS)—a shift that accounts for not just the validity of Mahāyāna scriptures and treatises, but for the adoption of many specific doctrines within those scriptures. It shows just what this transition would have entailed by illuminating in detail Vasubandhu's distinctive Yogācāra philosophy. Vasubandhu's transition to Yogācāra and his transformative contribution to it were prefigured, if not yet fully enacted, in the AKBh passages already discussed.

This introductory chapter discusses the Buddhist philosophy of mind in East Asia. Modern scholars have distinguished two major streams of early East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. These are the doctrinal streams of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha. These were the two most significant philosophies of mind to be received, studied, and interpreted by Wŏnhyo (617–686), and they provided the basic framework for his own philosophical perspectives. The chapter pays special attention to Wŏnhyo's treatment of these two doctrinal streams. It begins with a brief review of their general course of development, paying special attention to their symbiotic relationship.

This chapter examines the development of the “Maitreya School” from the eve of its founding to its peak of activity in 1937. This occurred in two phases. In the first, the school was closely associated with Yogācāra and served as the “house cult” of Taixu’s seminaries, forming an important part of the educational and ritual lives of these institutions. In the second phase, the school came to be seen in more expansive terms as an all-inclusive teaching and pure land elements overshadow Yogācāra. In this phase, active propagation grew and Taixu’s students and associates began to assume a more prominent role. Liturgies were composed, lay associations were organized, and the landscape was inscribed with the cult.

This chapter offers an analysis of Taixu’s Maitreyan theology through a close reading of his commentaries on the Three Essentials—the texts he identified as the cult’s foundation. These were the “Chapter on Knowing Reality,” the Yoga Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa, and the Sutra of Maitreya’s Ascent. It argues that Taixu found in these texts, and in his interpretations augmented, indigenous analogues to the key values that inspired him as a young anarchist: science, a revolutionary ethic, and utopia. These texts further allowed him to bring these values into meaningful relationship with the core Buddhist good of Buddhahood.

This book explores Arthur Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought, with particular emphasis on his doctrine of representation and his account of the genesis of the will. It considers the extent and nature of the affinities between Schopenhauer’s thought and the philosophical and religious ideas of India by concentrating on the schools associated with Hinduism and Buddhism: the Advaita Vedānta and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. The book is divided into four sections. The first section provides the background to Schopenhauer’s interest in Indian thought and the growth and extent of his knowledge of Hindu and Buddhist ideas. The second section deals with the doctrine of representation and related views found in India, while the third section discusses the doctrine of the will and its relation to Indian thought. The fourth and lasr section focuses on the ontological status of the will and the nature of final reality.

This chapter examines how the arising of the empirical world is understood in Buddhism by focusing on the Yogācāra teaching. The Buddhist tradition shares with Hinduism essentially the same understanding of karmic impressions, formative forces, and “seeds.” The formative forces arise out of ignorance and lead to cognition as a subject aware of objects. This chapter first provides a background on the Yogācāra school before explaining what brings the formative forces into being from a Buddhist perspective. It then considers the Yogācāra doctrine of “mind only” (cittamātra), along with the concept of the store-consciousness or ālaya-vijñāna as the source of suffering. It also discusses the two aspects of karman, dubbed paripūraka and āksepa-karman.

The Madhayamaka or Middle Way School is the subject of chapter 12. As in the other chapters of Part II, Rogben is concerned with the views of the Madhyamaka school in general, as well as with the views of the particular subschools, but he begins by discussing the major works of Madhyamaka thought. After outlining the basic tenets of Madhayamaka—including a long discussion on the different types of Madhyamaka syllogisms—he refutes the school, chiefly from the viewpoint of tantra.

This chapter addresses the category of ineffability—the critical point of convergence of studies of mystical experience and Tibetan approaches to realization of reality. It also explores the relationship between mystical experiences and polemics, showing the critical role the latter play in the former. In particular, it focuses on “internalized polemics”: a deconstructive process of contemplation of ultimate reality which consists of using specific types of Madhyamaka reasoning that are “internalized” through analytical meditation. It also demonstrates certain areas where Tibetan thinkers argue for compatibility of realizations and experiences across different traditions while acknowledging their overall diversity. In this context, it outlines the position of Shakya Chokden, who argues that despite contradictory worldviews, different types of contemplative conditioning leading to realization of reality, and conflicting descriptions of that realization, followers of the two major systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism―Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Yogācāra—can access the same direct meditative experience of ultimate reality.

In this chapter I explore the relationship between Fernando Pessoa and Buddhism. I first introduce the brilliant French philosopher Simone Weil (1909–43), a contemporary of Pessoa but someone of whom he certainly had never heard. One way to read her remarks is as directed against the positional use of ‘I’, against the deployment in thought and speech of a positional conception of self. One should abandon forms of self-consciousness that are grounded in one’s thinking of oneself as the one at the centre of a landscape of sensation. For Weil, it is precisely such contact with reality as attention makes possible which holds the uncentred mind together, preventing its content being ‘a phantasmagoric fluttering with no centre or sense’. The uncentred mind would thus be a sort of conformal and aperspectival map of reality, standing in correspondence with the world without any privileged perspectival point. With these distinctions in mind, we say more of the mind of Alberto Caeiro, and address the question whether he is a Buddhist heteronym.