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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the music and ritual songs of the Sibe people of Xinjiang, China. This book aims to counter the monolithic view of Chinese culture by demonstrating a more complex picture of layers of syncretism and multi-directional cultural flow between discrete sub-cultures, within and without the larger Chinese cultural domain. It traces the musical processes of the absorption and gradual remoulding of the music of other peoples of Xinjiang and examines the recent creation of a Sibe ethnic identity as a minority nationality.

This chapter examines the styles of song, instrumental music, and opera of the Sibe people in demonstrate aspects of change and continuity in Sibe music during their 240-year residence in Xinjiang, China. It aims to show that contrary to the conclusions of Chinese and Sibe musicologists, Sibe music in Xinjiang has undergone a great degree of change and innovation, and has been substantially influenced by other musical styles in the region. The chapter discusses existing accounts of Sibe music and comments on the approaches and agendas that underlie them.

This chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the musical history of the Sibe people in Xinjiang, China. It provides evidence to show that in spite of their reputation as a people who have kept themselves aloof and kept their ancient traditions alive, Sibe culture in general and music culture in particular is distinguished by a high degree of syncretism and rapid change. The chapter also argues that though the contexts of music and the media through which it is disseminated are changing rapidly and radically, certain underlying themes in the discussion of music remain constant as modernity takes root in the region.

Chapter One introduces the major institutional hallmarks of the Xinjiang Class. It carefully interrogates the CCP’s current objectives for maintaining boarding schools for Uyghur students. It draws on documents drafted by China’s Ministry of Education, Xinjiang’s Education Department, and individual schools hosting a Xinjiang Class as well as individual testimony to paint a vivid picture of the daily life of Xinjiang Class students. The chapter contends that the primary objective of the Xinjiang Class is to create, from scratch, a cohort of Uyghurs who are loyal to the CCP

Chapter Three reveals the tendency for Xinjiang Class graduates to seek opportunities abroad or in inner China instead of returning to Xinjiang. Considering the pressures China’s Ministry of Education and Xinjiang’s provincial-level government place on these Uyghurs to return to Xinjiang after their formal education, this chapter interprets these students’ decisions to not return as a tacit expression of ethno-national identity, which takes the form of resistance to political culture.

Chapter Four follows Xinjiang Class graduates’ return to Xinjiang. Contrary to the political goals of the program, few of its graduates return to the region with the intention of serving the Party. More often, institutional restraints that cripple mobility in China, unrelenting pressure from family members, and inconveniences adhering to Islamic practices in inner China compel these individuals to return. The return, however, only marks the beginning of a sometimes frustrating process of reintegration. The second part of this chapter describes how these young adults reacclimate to daily life in Xinjiang. Uyghurs Xinjiang Class graduates often feel marginalized upon returning, but re-establish a genuine sense of belonging after a period of readjustment. However, my female informants, who are often expected to conform to rigidly defined gender roles, tend to find this readjustment process more discouraging than men.

The research for this chapter began with the question of how U.S. policies implemented in the wake of September 11, 2001, were affecting the policy of other states, for example China. It shows how 9/11 has both altered conditions for international migration and also served as a pretext for governments to pursue preexisting agendas toward its immigrant and minority populations with increased force. It discusses the situation of Uighurs in Xinjiang and how Chinese state policies are affecting Uighur migration from Xinjiang. Subsequently, it shows how state policies, increased migration, and the development of a transnationally linked activist community of Uighurs may foment Uighur nationalist ambitions. It also refers to Tibetan cases for comparison throughout. The burgeoning transnational campaign highlights the situation of Uighurs in China and its relationship with the now decades-old struggle for international attention for the Tibetan cause.

Violence was a widespread and fundamental part of the reconstitution of the state and attempts to build national unification in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).Emerging from a prolonged period of state disintegration, the Party-state of the Maoist period deployed and incited violence not only against perceived political enemies, but also against ‘minority nationalities’ (shaoshu minzu) that resisted unification of the Chinese nation.The resistance of ‘minority’ peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang in particular is a stark reminder that national unification remains an unfinished project and a profound challenge to the state.Despite the greatly enhanced state capacity of the post-Mao period, in recent years the most intensive campaigns of national unification in these regions have increased state-minority and inter-communal violence, with the Party-state prepared to deploy violence against minority resistance in the cause of the greater ‘Chinese people’ (Zhonghua minzu).

This chapter delineates some of the main forces influencing ethnic definition in Xinjiang. In particular, it focuses on two liminal groups: the Turkic Muslim officials, or begs, who served in the Qing government, and the Tungans (Hanhui), or Sino-Muslims, who migrated to Xinjiang from the northwestern provinces of the Chinese heartland. The chapter aims demonstrate the tensions between Islam and the Qing imperial system. At the same time, it argues that from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, although concerned with questions of identity and loyalty, the Qing imperial state did not promote Chinese cultural or political forms for their own sake, or attempt to assimilate Xinjiang inhabitants to the ways of China.

Belt and Road is fostering infrastructure investments, transboundary development corridors, trade deals, as well as the conservation of World Heritage Sites, museums, and historical cities. The chapter discusses various projects and multibillion-dollar deals trumpeted as Belt and Road initiatives, and explores the template of cultural sector cooperation and regional integration that has been put in place, critically interrogating the complex cultural politics Belt and Road has set in train.

In his chapter, Chen Yangbin suggests that given their different responses to the growing complexity of the “Xinjiang problem,” Uyghur graduates from specialized dislocated schools are likely to form a new educational elite group. These Uyghur youth, who attend boarding schools in inland cities (Xinjiangban) and undertook the university entrance exam in Putonghua, have gained access to universities across inland China, including some of China’s most prestigious. Based on an initial survey of these graduates, Chen delineates the uniqueness of their experiences both at university and in their daily lives in eastern China. He demonstrates their feeling of superiority in terms of educational achievement, which they attempt to balance with an equally strong sense of representing Uyghur culture. The chapter also analyzes the implications of this new group of elites when viewed against the background of identity, multiculturalism and ethnic integration in China

In his chapter, Timothy Grose critically interrogates the relationship between social background and religiosity among his Uyghur informants. He explores the complex attitudes Uyghur students in Beijing have towards Ramadan, the obligatory month-long fast observed by Muslims worldwide. He reminds us how fluid and situational ethnic identity is outside official state discourse, and warns against the dangers of reifying educational categories like minkaomin (minority students taking exams in minority languages) and minkaohan (Han students taking exams in Chinese) or projecting cultural stereotypes onto them. He demonstrates how the decision to fast during Ramadan is closely correlated with family background and personal choice rather than educational background. It is an important reminder that while state categories might be rigid, quotidian identity (both group and individual) is anything but.

In her Chapter, Zuliyati Simayi provides a comprehensive and sophisticated survey of bilingualism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). She highlights some of the important accomplishments over the last couple of decades, and some of the systemic limitations inherent in the current system. In particular, she emphasizes the way in which a minzu-based education, rather than one that takes the individual as its starting point, can undermine learning and social outcomes, echoing the debate in Western liberalism over the relationship between group and individual rights. She concludes: “…one of the essential objectives of school education should be not only the cultivation of respect for different ethnic group’s history, culture and guaranteed development, but also the cultivation of ethnic minorities into equal citizens of the state. The best way to realize this objective is to promote multicultural education that targets justice and equality at the individual level rather than a group basis.”