Jonathan Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent ...
More
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.Less
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.
Matthew S. Seligmann
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199574032
- eISBN:
- 9780191741432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574032.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It ...
More
This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It argues that, owing to the Admiralty’s consistently expressed fears that, in the event of an Anglo-German conflict, German commerce-raiders could interdict vital supplies, the British government began to consider German maritime power as a serious danger to British national security at the very outset of the twentieth century and that this sense of anxiety continued, even sharpened, as the years unfolded. It further argues that as a result of this perception of a growing menace, the Royal Navy devoted considerable time and energy to devising ever more elaborate countermeasures. These included developing new types of auxiliary and then regular warships, attempting to change international maritime law, creating a new global intelligence network, seeking to involve the government in the maritime insurance system and, finally, arming British merchant vessels and taking steps to place trained gun crews on these vessels in peacetime. While some of these developments have been subject to alternative explanations, some have never been explained at all. Yet, as this book shows, all had their origins, substantially or even entirely, in the Admiralty’s fears of a German threat to British maritime commerce. As a result, it concludes that the prospect of a German assault on British trade played a major part in shaping Admiralty policy in the twelve years before 1914.Less
This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It argues that, owing to the Admiralty’s consistently expressed fears that, in the event of an Anglo-German conflict, German commerce-raiders could interdict vital supplies, the British government began to consider German maritime power as a serious danger to British national security at the very outset of the twentieth century and that this sense of anxiety continued, even sharpened, as the years unfolded. It further argues that as a result of this perception of a growing menace, the Royal Navy devoted considerable time and energy to devising ever more elaborate countermeasures. These included developing new types of auxiliary and then regular warships, attempting to change international maritime law, creating a new global intelligence network, seeking to involve the government in the maritime insurance system and, finally, arming British merchant vessels and taking steps to place trained gun crews on these vessels in peacetime. While some of these developments have been subject to alternative explanations, some have never been explained at all. Yet, as this book shows, all had their origins, substantially or even entirely, in the Admiralty’s fears of a German threat to British maritime commerce. As a result, it concludes that the prospect of a German assault on British trade played a major part in shaping Admiralty policy in the twelve years before 1914.
Paul Addison
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0014
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill's acquaintance with radio began before 1914. After his unhappy experiences with Guglielmo Marconi and David Lloyd George, he learnt as First Lord of the Admiralty the value of radio ...
More
Winston Churchill's acquaintance with radio began before 1914. After his unhappy experiences with Guglielmo Marconi and David Lloyd George, he learnt as First Lord of the Admiralty the value of radio for naval communications. Regular public programmes from the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) started in 1922. Churchill's first broadcast was of a speech delivered at the London School of Economics on June 27, 1924. He established a popular reputation to challenge Adolf Hitler largely by appearances on radio and in the cinema where he had been virtually unheard and unseen for a decade. During the Second World War, Churchill gave fifty-six broadcasts, forty-nine of them as Prime Minister, to British audiences. Recordings of many Churchill speeches are held in the BBC Sound Archive and can be heard most readily in the National Sound Archive of the British Library in Kensington.Less
Winston Churchill's acquaintance with radio began before 1914. After his unhappy experiences with Guglielmo Marconi and David Lloyd George, he learnt as First Lord of the Admiralty the value of radio for naval communications. Regular public programmes from the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) started in 1922. Churchill's first broadcast was of a speech delivered at the London School of Economics on June 27, 1924. He established a popular reputation to challenge Adolf Hitler largely by appearances on radio and in the cinema where he had been virtually unheard and unseen for a decade. During the Second World War, Churchill gave fifty-six broadcasts, forty-nine of them as Prime Minister, to British audiences. Recordings of many Churchill speeches are held in the BBC Sound Archive and can be heard most readily in the National Sound Archive of the British Library in Kensington.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
More
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This introductory chapter discusses Winston Churchill's earlier career, his view of world politics, and the way he conducted alliance politics during the Second World War. These topics are examined ...
More
This introductory chapter discusses Winston Churchill's earlier career, his view of world politics, and the way he conducted alliance politics during the Second World War. These topics are examined in an attempt to determine why the career of one of the greatest statesmen of the century ended in the pursuit of measures against an authoritarian menace.Less
This introductory chapter discusses Winston Churchill's earlier career, his view of world politics, and the way he conducted alliance politics during the Second World War. These topics are examined in an attempt to determine why the career of one of the greatest statesmen of the century ended in the pursuit of measures against an authoritarian menace.
Warren F. Kimball
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0018
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
According to Winston Churchill, the Second World War breathed new life into the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Britain. Over forty-five years after the end of the war, American ...
More
According to Winston Churchill, the Second World War breathed new life into the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Britain. Over forty-five years after the end of the war, American images of its closest wartime ally remain dominated by the Battle of Britain, the desert war, and Winston Churchill — all of which bombard American television audiences almost weekly in one documentary or another. Added to that is a constant stream of motion pictures and television docu-dramas set in wartime Britain. But even the Second World War pales next to what one observer called ‘the Churchill Cult’, perpetuated by an informal public relations machine that should be the envy of most governments. Part and parcel of the heroic depiction of Churchill is his link with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The strong Anglo-American relations and the personal relationship between the two men made victory possible against Germany, Italy, and Japan.Less
According to Winston Churchill, the Second World War breathed new life into the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Britain. Over forty-five years after the end of the war, American images of its closest wartime ally remain dominated by the Battle of Britain, the desert war, and Winston Churchill — all of which bombard American television audiences almost weekly in one documentary or another. Added to that is a constant stream of motion pictures and television docu-dramas set in wartime Britain. But even the Second World War pales next to what one observer called ‘the Churchill Cult’, perpetuated by an informal public relations machine that should be the envy of most governments. Part and parcel of the heroic depiction of Churchill is his link with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The strong Anglo-American relations and the personal relationship between the two men made victory possible against Germany, Italy, and Japan.
G. C. Peden
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198207078
- eISBN:
- 9780191677472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207078.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Economic History
Treasury officials successfully guided ministers to complete the post-war return to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy by restoring the gold standard. On the other hand, questions must be asked about the ...
More
Treasury officials successfully guided ministers to complete the post-war return to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy by restoring the gold standard. On the other hand, questions must be asked about the utility of attempts to impose rigid doctrines on public finance. Both Winston Churchill and Philip Snowden resorted to fiscal window dressing in order to achieve the appearance of a balanced budget, although the budget constraint on spending departments was real enough. The confidence of international money markets in British public finance was shaken in 1931 when it became apparent that the cost of unemployment relief was unbalancing the budget to an unknown extent. The very rigidity of the doctrines that the Treasury had imposed on monetary policy and public finance made it difficult in 1931 to absorb shocks from the international economy. The period 1924–1931 further broadened the experience of those Treasury officials who had to deal with economic theory in relation to unemployment or international finance, as the world moved into a depression.Less
Treasury officials successfully guided ministers to complete the post-war return to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy by restoring the gold standard. On the other hand, questions must be asked about the utility of attempts to impose rigid doctrines on public finance. Both Winston Churchill and Philip Snowden resorted to fiscal window dressing in order to achieve the appearance of a balanced budget, although the budget constraint on spending departments was real enough. The confidence of international money markets in British public finance was shaken in 1931 when it became apparent that the cost of unemployment relief was unbalancing the budget to an unknown extent. The very rigidity of the doctrines that the Treasury had imposed on monetary policy and public finance made it difficult in 1931 to absorb shocks from the international economy. The period 1924–1931 further broadened the experience of those Treasury officials who had to deal with economic theory in relation to unemployment or international finance, as the world moved into a depression.
Martin Ceadel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199571161
- eISBN:
- 9780191721762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571161.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into ...
More
This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into self-restraint, whereas he now understood that at least in the short term they had either to be appeased or to be deterred. Rejecting the former option, he opted decisively for the latter, campaigning vigorously for collective security and becoming both a leader alongside Viscount Cecil and Gilbert Murray of the League of Nations Union and a member of Winston Churchill's private support group. Admittedly, during 1932–5 Angell somewhat pulled his punches, implying that economic sanctions alone could prevent or punish aggression. After 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, Mussolini conquered Abyssinia, and Franco rebelled in Spain, he accepted that collective security required rearmament and military alliances, though idiosyncratically he claimed to support such measures only because the public would not accept his first-choice policy of pacifism. The strain caused by this unresolved contradiction in his thinking caused his health, never good, to deteriorate as war approached.Less
This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into self-restraint, whereas he now understood that at least in the short term they had either to be appeased or to be deterred. Rejecting the former option, he opted decisively for the latter, campaigning vigorously for collective security and becoming both a leader alongside Viscount Cecil and Gilbert Murray of the League of Nations Union and a member of Winston Churchill's private support group. Admittedly, during 1932–5 Angell somewhat pulled his punches, implying that economic sanctions alone could prevent or punish aggression. After 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, Mussolini conquered Abyssinia, and Franco rebelled in Spain, he accepted that collective security required rearmament and military alliances, though idiosyncratically he claimed to support such measures only because the public would not accept his first-choice policy of pacifism. The strain caused by this unresolved contradiction in his thinking caused his health, never good, to deteriorate as war approached.
Arthur J. Marder
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Military History
It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The ...
More
It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The first section of this chapter examines the confusing division of naval responsibilities and the friction between Mountbatten and Somerville. The second section discusses Operation ‘Culverin’. The third section describes the reinforcements for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese battle fleet at Singapore, Japanese shortage of fuel oil, convoying, and Somerville's preference for hunting groups. The last section describes the search for strategies in the spring of 1944.Less
It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The first section of this chapter examines the confusing division of naval responsibilities and the friction between Mountbatten and Somerville. The second section discusses Operation ‘Culverin’. The third section describes the reinforcements for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese battle fleet at Singapore, Japanese shortage of fuel oil, convoying, and Somerville's preference for hunting groups. The last section describes the search for strategies in the spring of 1944.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses the Fulton Speech, which established Winston Churchill's reputation as the original Cold Warrior. Churchill prepared this speech during a holiday in Miami, amidst rumours that ...
More
This chapter discusses the Fulton Speech, which established Winston Churchill's reputation as the original Cold Warrior. Churchill prepared this speech during a holiday in Miami, amidst rumours that he was about to resign. During his absence, Churchill appointed Anthony Eden as the acting leader of the Conservative Party. This chapter also looks at some of the events that occurred during his holiday, as well as his last friendly exchange with Stalin.Less
This chapter discusses the Fulton Speech, which established Winston Churchill's reputation as the original Cold Warrior. Churchill prepared this speech during a holiday in Miami, amidst rumours that he was about to resign. During his absence, Churchill appointed Anthony Eden as the acting leader of the Conservative Party. This chapter also looks at some of the events that occurred during his holiday, as well as his last friendly exchange with Stalin.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses the steps Winston Churchill took to propose a summit. It was part of Churchill's plan to achieve détente, despite the reservations of other world leaders. It looks at the ...
More
This chapter discusses the steps Winston Churchill took to propose a summit. It was part of Churchill's plan to achieve détente, despite the reservations of other world leaders. It looks at the Foreign Affairs debate from May 11 to May 12, the Berlin Uprising, and the moment when Churchill presented his Cabinet, the FO, Britain's European allies, and the Americans with a fait accompli. It is noted that Churchill also suffered a stroke, but that this never dampened his hope of ending the Cold War once and for all.Less
This chapter discusses the steps Winston Churchill took to propose a summit. It was part of Churchill's plan to achieve détente, despite the reservations of other world leaders. It looks at the Foreign Affairs debate from May 11 to May 12, the Berlin Uprising, and the moment when Churchill presented his Cabinet, the FO, Britain's European allies, and the Americans with a fait accompli. It is noted that Churchill also suffered a stroke, but that this never dampened his hope of ending the Cold War once and for all.
Norman Rose
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill never spoke of the Jews in the same disrespectful terms that he sometimes applied to Negroes, to whom he would refer scornfully as ‘blackamoors’ or ‘niggers’, or to Arabs and ...
More
Winston Churchill never spoke of the Jews in the same disrespectful terms that he sometimes applied to Negroes, to whom he would refer scornfully as ‘blackamoors’ or ‘niggers’, or to Arabs and Indians and others whom he would just as scornfully call ‘baboos’ or ‘Hottentots’. Not too much should be read into these terms: they indicate merely that he was an all too typical son of his class, generation, and background. Although naturally subject to the anti-Jewish strains that permeated western Christian civilization, there is no evidence that Churchill related to Jews on terms other than of tolerance and equality. The Balfour Declaration, and the British mandate for Palestine that sprang from it, were among the most extraordinary acts in the history of Britain's foreign policy. They raised problems that proved beyond the wit of any British statesman to solve satisfactorily, Churchill included. Yet few Englishmen have a better record on behalf of Zionism, and few can equal Churchill's high reputation among Zionists.Less
Winston Churchill never spoke of the Jews in the same disrespectful terms that he sometimes applied to Negroes, to whom he would refer scornfully as ‘blackamoors’ or ‘niggers’, or to Arabs and Indians and others whom he would just as scornfully call ‘baboos’ or ‘Hottentots’. Not too much should be read into these terms: they indicate merely that he was an all too typical son of his class, generation, and background. Although naturally subject to the anti-Jewish strains that permeated western Christian civilization, there is no evidence that Churchill related to Jews on terms other than of tolerance and equality. The Balfour Declaration, and the British mandate for Palestine that sprang from it, were among the most extraordinary acts in the history of Britain's foreign policy. They raised problems that proved beyond the wit of any British statesman to solve satisfactorily, Churchill included. Yet few Englishmen have a better record on behalf of Zionism, and few can equal Churchill's high reputation among Zionists.
Paul Addison
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill ranks as one of the founders of the welfare state. With Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George, he was the principal driving force behind the Liberal Party's welfare reforms of ...
More
Winston Churchill ranks as one of the founders of the welfare state. With Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George, he was the principal driving force behind the Liberal Party's welfare reforms of 1908–1911. At the Board of Trade, he pioneered measures to reduce poverty and unemployment through state intervention in the labour market. In 1909, he toured Britain campaigning for the ‘People's Budget’ and its radical proposals for the taxation of wealth. At the Home Office, his penal reforms as well as his measures to improve working conditions in shops and coal-mines were reflections of a continuing drive for social reform that was cut short by his transfer, in 1911, to the Admiralty. In the course of a lifetime in party politics, Churchill often touched on social questions, and there were other phases of his career in which he bore some responsibility for the development of social policy.Less
Winston Churchill ranks as one of the founders of the welfare state. With Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George, he was the principal driving force behind the Liberal Party's welfare reforms of 1908–1911. At the Board of Trade, he pioneered measures to reduce poverty and unemployment through state intervention in the labour market. In 1909, he toured Britain campaigning for the ‘People's Budget’ and its radical proposals for the taxation of wealth. At the Home Office, his penal reforms as well as his measures to improve working conditions in shops and coal-mines were reflections of a continuing drive for social reform that was cut short by his transfer, in 1911, to the Admiralty. In the course of a lifetime in party politics, Churchill often touched on social questions, and there were other phases of his career in which he bore some responsibility for the development of social policy.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses the Berlin conference, the East-West Trade, and the debate about the H-bomb. It looks at the Berlin conference, which managed to come to its predicted conclusion without ...
More
This chapter discusses the Berlin conference, the East-West Trade, and the debate about the H-bomb. It looks at the Berlin conference, which managed to come to its predicted conclusion without upsetting the Germans or the French. The chapter then shows that the East-West trade was initially refused by the Americans, but the Europeans pointed out that it would be able to provide important commodities such as timber and grain, while allowing them to minimize the need for dollars. The chapter also highlights Winston Churchill's concerns over the dangers of a nuclear conflagration, which was caused by the debate on the hydrogen bomb or H-bomb.Less
This chapter discusses the Berlin conference, the East-West Trade, and the debate about the H-bomb. It looks at the Berlin conference, which managed to come to its predicted conclusion without upsetting the Germans or the French. The chapter then shows that the East-West trade was initially refused by the Americans, but the Europeans pointed out that it would be able to provide important commodities such as timber and grain, while allowing them to minimize the need for dollars. The chapter also highlights Winston Churchill's concerns over the dangers of a nuclear conflagration, which was caused by the debate on the hydrogen bomb or H-bomb.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0013
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses Churchill's decision to preside over a ‘fag-end administration’, after Eden's refusal to bequeath it. It discusses the fall of Malenkov, the second debate about the hydrogen ...
More
This chapter discusses Churchill's decision to preside over a ‘fag-end administration’, after Eden's refusal to bequeath it. It discusses the fall of Malenkov, the second debate about the hydrogen bomb (H-Bomb), and the last few bids for détente. It also highlights the irony that shortly after Winston Churchill retired, the idea of a summit, which he had long hoped for, finally drew close to realization.Less
This chapter discusses Churchill's decision to preside over a ‘fag-end administration’, after Eden's refusal to bequeath it. It discusses the fall of Malenkov, the second debate about the hydrogen bomb (H-Bomb), and the last few bids for détente. It also highlights the irony that shortly after Winston Churchill retired, the idea of a summit, which he had long hoped for, finally drew close to realization.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses Winston Churchill's return to power on October 26, 1951. It describes his slowly deteriorating health and fluctuating mental state, and how these affected his different ...
More
This chapter discusses Winston Churchill's return to power on October 26, 1951. It describes his slowly deteriorating health and fluctuating mental state, and how these affected his different political activities. The chapter also looks at the Paris General Assembly and Churchill's attempts to re-establish the special relationship he shared with Stalin.Less
This chapter discusses Winston Churchill's return to power on October 26, 1951. It describes his slowly deteriorating health and fluctuating mental state, and how these affected his different political activities. The chapter also looks at the Paris General Assembly and Churchill's attempts to re-establish the special relationship he shared with Stalin.
Robert Blake
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0016
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill was 54 when the Conservative Party narrowly lost the general election of June 1929 to a combination of Labour and Liberals. He had held all the principal offices of state except ...
More
Winston Churchill was 54 when the Conservative Party narrowly lost the general election of June 1929 to a combination of Labour and Liberals. He had held all the principal offices of state except those of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. No man had more experience in public life, and he had every reason to expect high office when Stanley Baldwin returned to power — an event expected soon in light of the fragile position of the second Labour Cabinet under Ramsay MacDonald, 1929–1931. Churchill resigned on January 27, 1931 from the Conservative ‘Business Committee’, the equivalent of the modern Shadow Cabinet, because Baldwin supported the tentative moves by Lord Irwin (later Viscount Halifax) towards Indian self-government. Churchill believed that the Irwin-MacDonald-Baldwin policy would be a disaster for Britain, India, and the Empire. Churchill's outlook on foreign policy and defence has been given a retrospective consistency that the facts hardly warrant. Churchill became Prime Minister by default against the wishes of his own party and with only tepid acquiescence by the others.Less
Winston Churchill was 54 when the Conservative Party narrowly lost the general election of June 1929 to a combination of Labour and Liberals. He had held all the principal offices of state except those of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. No man had more experience in public life, and he had every reason to expect high office when Stanley Baldwin returned to power — an event expected soon in light of the fragile position of the second Labour Cabinet under Ramsay MacDonald, 1929–1931. Churchill resigned on January 27, 1931 from the Conservative ‘Business Committee’, the equivalent of the modern Shadow Cabinet, because Baldwin supported the tentative moves by Lord Irwin (later Viscount Halifax) towards Indian self-government. Churchill believed that the Irwin-MacDonald-Baldwin policy would be a disaster for Britain, India, and the Empire. Churchill's outlook on foreign policy and defence has been given a retrospective consistency that the facts hardly warrant. Churchill became Prime Minister by default against the wishes of his own party and with only tepid acquiescence by the others.
David Cannadine
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill was in many ways a quintessential patrician. Throughout his life, he regarded the Duke of Marlborough as the head of his family, and as the bearer of the greatest name in the land. ...
More
Winston Churchill was in many ways a quintessential patrician. Throughout his life, he regarded the Duke of Marlborough as the head of his family, and as the bearer of the greatest name in the land. And it was in Bladon churchyard, within sight of his ancestral palace, that he was buried, beside his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, and Jennie, his mother. At the outset of his career, Churchill certainly benefited from the patronage and support of his ducal relatives and noble connections. But in the much longer perspective of his ninety-year lifetime, the balance tilted markedly the other way. Despite his own reverential feelings towards them, too many of Churchill's ancestors and relatives were tainted by unstable temperament, unsound judgement, financial profligacy, and rhetorical (and also alcoholic) excess. And these were also the very defects of character that censorious contemporaries detected in Churchill himself. In explaining his ‘failure’ in the years before 1940, the political consequences of this genealogically precarious reputation should not be ignored.Less
Winston Churchill was in many ways a quintessential patrician. Throughout his life, he regarded the Duke of Marlborough as the head of his family, and as the bearer of the greatest name in the land. And it was in Bladon churchyard, within sight of his ancestral palace, that he was buried, beside his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, and Jennie, his mother. At the outset of his career, Churchill certainly benefited from the patronage and support of his ducal relatives and noble connections. But in the much longer perspective of his ninety-year lifetime, the balance tilted markedly the other way. Despite his own reverential feelings towards them, too many of Churchill's ancestors and relatives were tainted by unstable temperament, unsound judgement, financial profligacy, and rhetorical (and also alcoholic) excess. And these were also the very defects of character that censorious contemporaries detected in Churchill himself. In explaining his ‘failure’ in the years before 1940, the political consequences of this genealogically precarious reputation should not be ignored.
Matthew S. Seligmann
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199574032
- eISBN:
- 9780191741432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574032.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. One of the first problems he sought to tackle was how to protect British trade from the threat posed by Germany's armed liners. ...
More
Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. One of the first problems he sought to tackle was how to protect British trade from the threat posed by Germany's armed liners. His solution was to arm selected cargo ships. There were many obstacles. Defensively armed merchant ships (DAMS) represented a major reversal of British policy, which for the previous half century had encouraged the disarmament of merchantmen. There was also some anxiety that in wartime the Germans would hang the crews of such vessels as pirates if they were captured. Finally, it required a major revision of the system of naval training to ensure that the crews of all DAMS contained naval reservists capable of using the installed weaponry. Yet, despite requiring considerable time and energy to implement, numerous DAMS were available when war broke out.Less
Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. One of the first problems he sought to tackle was how to protect British trade from the threat posed by Germany's armed liners. His solution was to arm selected cargo ships. There were many obstacles. Defensively armed merchant ships (DAMS) represented a major reversal of British policy, which for the previous half century had encouraged the disarmament of merchantmen. There was also some anxiety that in wartime the Germans would hang the crews of such vessels as pirates if they were captured. Finally, it required a major revision of the system of naval training to ensure that the crews of all DAMS contained naval reservists capable of using the installed weaponry. Yet, despite requiring considerable time and energy to implement, numerous DAMS were available when war broke out.
David Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
In 1940, Britain faced the greatest crisis in its history since Napoleon's armies massed on the French coast in 1804–1805. Yet at the same moment Churchill at last attained his cherished ambition, ...
More
In 1940, Britain faced the greatest crisis in its history since Napoleon's armies massed on the French coast in 1804–1805. Yet at the same moment Churchill at last attained his cherished ambition, becoming Prime Minister and leading his country at a time when his peculiar talents could be given full rein and just appreciation. Britain's worst hour was also Churchill's finest. This chapter argues that a sober examination of Churchill's performance as war leader in 1940 does not belittle his greatness. On the contrary, it makes him a more human and thereby a more impressive figure than the two-dimensional bulldog of national mythology. This chapter explores Churchill's role as war leader in three main areas: first, naval strategy during the Phoney War while he was at the Admiralty; the realignment of British foreign policy following the collapse of France; and defence policy and domestic leadership during the Battle of Britain.Less
In 1940, Britain faced the greatest crisis in its history since Napoleon's armies massed on the French coast in 1804–1805. Yet at the same moment Churchill at last attained his cherished ambition, becoming Prime Minister and leading his country at a time when his peculiar talents could be given full rein and just appreciation. Britain's worst hour was also Churchill's finest. This chapter argues that a sober examination of Churchill's performance as war leader in 1940 does not belittle his greatness. On the contrary, it makes him a more human and thereby a more impressive figure than the two-dimensional bulldog of national mythology. This chapter explores Churchill's role as war leader in three main areas: first, naval strategy during the Phoney War while he was at the Admiralty; the realignment of British foreign policy following the collapse of France; and defence policy and domestic leadership during the Battle of Britain.
