Wayne Wei‐siang Hsieh
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195342536
- eISBN:
- 9780199867042
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342536.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter discusses the relationship between evangelical Protestantism and the American Civil War through the lives of Abraham Lincoln and William T. Sherman. The jeremiad script of evangelical ...
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This chapter discusses the relationship between evangelical Protestantism and the American Civil War through the lives of Abraham Lincoln and William T. Sherman. The jeremiad script of evangelical Protestantism played a major role in sustaining both the Union's and the Confederacy's war efforts, even while Abraham Lincoln's own views on Providence evolved in a manner both similar to and distinctive from that of his contemporaries. Sherman, in contrast, represented the war's potential for fomenting godlessness, with the challenge his Deification of the State represented to conventional nineteenth‐century Christianity. While evangelicals proved equal to the task of fending off this heterodoxy in the short term, the military and political forces Sherman represented had lasting effects on some postwar figures like Oliver Wendell Holmes, and in historical terms, they cannot be ignored.Less
This chapter discusses the relationship between evangelical Protestantism and the American Civil War through the lives of Abraham Lincoln and William T. Sherman. The jeremiad script of evangelical Protestantism played a major role in sustaining both the Union's and the Confederacy's war efforts, even while Abraham Lincoln's own views on Providence evolved in a manner both similar to and distinctive from that of his contemporaries. Sherman, in contrast, represented the war's potential for fomenting godlessness, with the challenge his Deification of the State represented to conventional nineteenth‐century Christianity. While evangelicals proved equal to the task of fending off this heterodoxy in the short term, the military and political forces Sherman represented had lasting effects on some postwar figures like Oliver Wendell Holmes, and in historical terms, they cannot be ignored.
Kristopher A. Teters
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781469638867
- eISBN:
- 9781469638881
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469638867.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Military History
From beginning to end, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman remained a reluctant liberator who never saw emancipation as a moral imperative. He had opposed the Emancipation Proclamation at the time it was ...
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From beginning to end, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman remained a reluctant liberator who never saw emancipation as a moral imperative. He had opposed the Emancipation Proclamation at the time it was issued, but by late 1863, Sherman had come to accept the end of slavery as a necessary and inevitable consequence of the war. But even if emancipation made some pragmatic sense, Sherman harbored deep racial prejudices, despised abolitionists, and worried that emancipation issues were looming too large in the Union war effort. During his famed marches in Georgia and the Carolinas, Sherman tried to carry out emancipation on a strictly military basis to benefit the army. He and his officers willingly took in slaves that they could use and discouraged all others. Yet thousands of black refugees had still joined Sherman’s columns. Regardless of what army officers thought, many slaves viewed them as liberators and would not pass up an opportunity to gain freedom. So ironically, the general who was probably least interested in assuming the mantle of a liberator led an army that freed thousands. For many, Sherman’s results mattered more than intentions.Less
From beginning to end, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman remained a reluctant liberator who never saw emancipation as a moral imperative. He had opposed the Emancipation Proclamation at the time it was issued, but by late 1863, Sherman had come to accept the end of slavery as a necessary and inevitable consequence of the war. But even if emancipation made some pragmatic sense, Sherman harbored deep racial prejudices, despised abolitionists, and worried that emancipation issues were looming too large in the Union war effort. During his famed marches in Georgia and the Carolinas, Sherman tried to carry out emancipation on a strictly military basis to benefit the army. He and his officers willingly took in slaves that they could use and discouraged all others. Yet thousands of black refugees had still joined Sherman’s columns. Regardless of what army officers thought, many slaves viewed them as liberators and would not pass up an opportunity to gain freedom. So ironically, the general who was probably least interested in assuming the mantle of a liberator led an army that freed thousands. For many, Sherman’s results mattered more than intentions.
John F. Marszalek
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195330854
- eISBN:
- 9780199851393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195330854.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
William T. “Cump” Sherman and Ellen Ewing had grown up as foster siblings before they married in 1850. Their sixty-year relationship, first as brother and sister, then as husband and wife, was ...
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William T. “Cump” Sherman and Ellen Ewing had grown up as foster siblings before they married in 1850. Their sixty-year relationship, first as brother and sister, then as husband and wife, was complex and turbulent. Ellen's father and Cump's foster father and father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, played an influential role in their lives. Ellen adored her father and was immensely loyal to him and his desires. Cump, the adopted son, and frustrated son-in-law, desperately sought both approval and autonomy from Thomas. Ellen and Cump's disagreements over religion undermined their marriage and affected their relationship, particularly when their son Tom became a Jesuit priest. Although the Sherman marriage remained contentious to the end, the general's success in the war affected his wife's stubborn devotion to his father. The Civil War appeared to break the hold of Thomas Ewing on both Shermans.Less
William T. “Cump” Sherman and Ellen Ewing had grown up as foster siblings before they married in 1850. Their sixty-year relationship, first as brother and sister, then as husband and wife, was complex and turbulent. Ellen's father and Cump's foster father and father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, played an influential role in their lives. Ellen adored her father and was immensely loyal to him and his desires. Cump, the adopted son, and frustrated son-in-law, desperately sought both approval and autonomy from Thomas. Ellen and Cump's disagreements over religion undermined their marriage and affected their relationship, particularly when their son Tom became a Jesuit priest. Although the Sherman marriage remained contentious to the end, the general's success in the war affected his wife's stubborn devotion to his father. The Civil War appeared to break the hold of Thomas Ewing on both Shermans.
Mark L. Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125077
- eISBN:
- 9780813135120
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125077.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
North Carolina was the last state among the eleven states that made up the Confederacy to break away from the Union as it succumbed only after Fort Sumter fell and President Abraham Lincoln directed ...
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North Carolina was the last state among the eleven states that made up the Confederacy to break away from the Union as it succumbed only after Fort Sumter fell and President Abraham Lincoln directed a seventy-five thousand troops attempt to suppress the rebellion. However, various forms of anti-Confederate opposition which included Unionism persisted in North Carolina. While the Confederate army was able to gather more than 120,000 men, Unionists continued to hide out in swamps and mountains that bordered Tennessee. “Buffaloes” and “tories” that resided in the east and in the west respectively, either resisted as guerillas or joined the various federal regiments. This chapter illustrates the contributions of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman as well as how the negotiations at the Bennett farm were facilitated.Less
North Carolina was the last state among the eleven states that made up the Confederacy to break away from the Union as it succumbed only after Fort Sumter fell and President Abraham Lincoln directed a seventy-five thousand troops attempt to suppress the rebellion. However, various forms of anti-Confederate opposition which included Unionism persisted in North Carolina. While the Confederate army was able to gather more than 120,000 men, Unionists continued to hide out in swamps and mountains that bordered Tennessee. “Buffaloes” and “tories” that resided in the east and in the west respectively, either resisted as guerillas or joined the various federal regiments. This chapter illustrates the contributions of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman as well as how the negotiations at the Bennett farm were facilitated.
Andrew Billingsley
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195161793
- eISBN:
- 9780199849512
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161793.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter discusses the contribution of General William T. Sherman to the black church. Gen. Sherman's brilliant and bloody march through Georgia and the Carolinas during the fall and winter of ...
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This chapter discusses the contribution of General William T. Sherman to the black church. Gen. Sherman's brilliant and bloody march through Georgia and the Carolinas during the fall and winter of 1864–65 profoundly affected the black community and the black church. Just as profoundly did the black people and their church affect the success of Sherman's mission. After Sherman's conquest, the Zion Baptist Church would become separate and free, and Brother Ephraim would lead this independent church into the early years of freedom. The quest of Gen. Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah is described. Twenty black religious leaders were the special guests of the general. They were summoned to help the general and President Lincoln on how to implement the Emancipation Proclamation. After six weeks in Savannah, Sherman left the city for his campaign through the Carolinas.Less
This chapter discusses the contribution of General William T. Sherman to the black church. Gen. Sherman's brilliant and bloody march through Georgia and the Carolinas during the fall and winter of 1864–65 profoundly affected the black community and the black church. Just as profoundly did the black people and their church affect the success of Sherman's mission. After Sherman's conquest, the Zion Baptist Church would become separate and free, and Brother Ephraim would lead this independent church into the early years of freedom. The quest of Gen. Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah is described. Twenty black religious leaders were the special guests of the general. They were summoned to help the general and President Lincoln on how to implement the Emancipation Proclamation. After six weeks in Savannah, Sherman left the city for his campaign through the Carolinas.
Barbara Brooks Tomblin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125541
- eISBN:
- 9780813135311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125541.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
As December 1864 came to a close, General William T. Sherman's army approached its objective: Savannah, Georgia. Sherman's march across Georgia afforded many Union soldiers the opportunity to become ...
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As December 1864 came to a close, General William T. Sherman's army approached its objective: Savannah, Georgia. Sherman's march across Georgia afforded many Union soldiers the opportunity to become acquainted with and befriend black civilians. Young northern soldiers hired black men as servants, teaching them to read and offering them tips on how to survive in their new world of freedom. In letters home, soldiers wrote of their admiration for blacks who assisted escaping Union prisoners and guided Union soldiers on foraging parties in search of food. The advance of Sherman's army across Georgia to Savannah and then northward encouraged thousands of slaves to seek freedom and start new lives. For many more African Americans along the southern coast or in Union-occupied areas inland, the final months of the Civil War brought a measure of peace and stability. For other African Americans, especially those in the path of Sherman's advance, 1865 brought turmoil.Less
As December 1864 came to a close, General William T. Sherman's army approached its objective: Savannah, Georgia. Sherman's march across Georgia afforded many Union soldiers the opportunity to become acquainted with and befriend black civilians. Young northern soldiers hired black men as servants, teaching them to read and offering them tips on how to survive in their new world of freedom. In letters home, soldiers wrote of their admiration for blacks who assisted escaping Union prisoners and guided Union soldiers on foraging parties in search of food. The advance of Sherman's army across Georgia to Savannah and then northward encouraged thousands of slaves to seek freedom and start new lives. For many more African Americans along the southern coast or in Union-occupied areas inland, the final months of the Civil War brought a measure of peace and stability. For other African Americans, especially those in the path of Sherman's advance, 1865 brought turmoil.
Kristopher A. Teters
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781469638867
- eISBN:
- 9781469638881
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469638867.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
From the beginning of the war to the summer of 1862, officers in the West adopted policies toward fugitive slaves that ranged from barring them altogether from their lines to aggressively liberating ...
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From the beginning of the war to the summer of 1862, officers in the West adopted policies toward fugitive slaves that ranged from barring them altogether from their lines to aggressively liberating them. In August 1861, Congress offered some guidance on the issue with the First Confiscation Act, but the act’s limited scope led to minimal confiscation or none at all by top officers. Sensitive to the sentiments of border states like Missouri, who supported the Union but wanted slavery preserved, Lincoln was not yet ready to push for emancipation. At times, however, officers in the Border South still carried out the First Confiscation Act, but much depended on the dispositions and political views of the officers. Some Union officers, like William T. Sherman, Henry Halleck, and Ulysses S. Grant, held conservative views and pushed back against letting fugitive slaves enter Union lines and confiscating slaves belonging to Unionists. Officers, particularly in states like Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana, had very different ideas about how to handle fugitive slaves, and they were willing to pursue them even if it meant conflict with each other, their superiors or subordinates, or Washington.Less
From the beginning of the war to the summer of 1862, officers in the West adopted policies toward fugitive slaves that ranged from barring them altogether from their lines to aggressively liberating them. In August 1861, Congress offered some guidance on the issue with the First Confiscation Act, but the act’s limited scope led to minimal confiscation or none at all by top officers. Sensitive to the sentiments of border states like Missouri, who supported the Union but wanted slavery preserved, Lincoln was not yet ready to push for emancipation. At times, however, officers in the Border South still carried out the First Confiscation Act, but much depended on the dispositions and political views of the officers. Some Union officers, like William T. Sherman, Henry Halleck, and Ulysses S. Grant, held conservative views and pushed back against letting fugitive slaves enter Union lines and confiscating slaves belonging to Unionists. Officers, particularly in states like Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana, had very different ideas about how to handle fugitive slaves, and they were willing to pursue them even if it meant conflict with each other, their superiors or subordinates, or Washington.
James A. Ramage and Andrea S. Watkins
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813134406
- eISBN:
- 9780813135977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813134406.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
When Kentucky neutrality ended, Lincoln's military commanders struggled to keep the people loyal to the Union. Commanders were chosen carefully as the number one criteria was that the man be from ...
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When Kentucky neutrality ended, Lincoln's military commanders struggled to keep the people loyal to the Union. Commanders were chosen carefully as the number one criteria was that the man be from Kentucky. When talk began of a Confederate Army advancing quickly toward Louisville, many Kentuckians believed it was time to take action. The state was so divided, however, that it was difficult to mobilize any residents. Lincoln continued assigning pro-Union commanders to the state in hopes of eventually winning over the entire citizenry.Less
When Kentucky neutrality ended, Lincoln's military commanders struggled to keep the people loyal to the Union. Commanders were chosen carefully as the number one criteria was that the man be from Kentucky. When talk began of a Confederate Army advancing quickly toward Louisville, many Kentuckians believed it was time to take action. The state was so divided, however, that it was difficult to mobilize any residents. Lincoln continued assigning pro-Union commanders to the state in hopes of eventually winning over the entire citizenry.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781469602110
- eISBN:
- 9781469608372
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9781469602127_Hess
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
While fighting his way toward Atlanta, William T. Sherman encountered his biggest roadblock at Kennesaw Mountain, where Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee held a heavily fortified position. The ...
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While fighting his way toward Atlanta, William T. Sherman encountered his biggest roadblock at Kennesaw Mountain, where Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee held a heavily fortified position. The opposing armies confronted each other from June 19 to July 3, 1864, and Sherman initially tried to outflank the Confederates. His men endured heavy rains, artillery duels, sniping, and a fierce battle at Kolb's Farm before Sherman decided to directly attack Johnston's position on June 27. This book tells the story of an important phase of the Atlanta campaign. It explains how this battle, with its combination of maneuver and combat, severely tried the patience and endurance of the common soldier and why Johnston's strategy might have been the Confederates' best chance to halt the Federal drive toward Atlanta. The author gives special attention to the engagement at Kolb's Farm on June 22 and Sherman's assault on June 27. A final section explores the Confederate earthworks preserved within the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park.Less
While fighting his way toward Atlanta, William T. Sherman encountered his biggest roadblock at Kennesaw Mountain, where Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee held a heavily fortified position. The opposing armies confronted each other from June 19 to July 3, 1864, and Sherman initially tried to outflank the Confederates. His men endured heavy rains, artillery duels, sniping, and a fierce battle at Kolb's Farm before Sherman decided to directly attack Johnston's position on June 27. This book tells the story of an important phase of the Atlanta campaign. It explains how this battle, with its combination of maneuver and combat, severely tried the patience and endurance of the common soldier and why Johnston's strategy might have been the Confederates' best chance to halt the Federal drive toward Atlanta. The author gives special attention to the engagement at Kolb's Farm on June 22 and Sherman's assault on June 27. A final section explores the Confederate earthworks preserved within the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park.
Michael B. Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781604738421
- eISBN:
- 9781604738438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781604738421.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter describes Sherman’s Meridian campaign. Sherman is credited for raising the level of hard war, beginning with the Meridian campaign. He chose to bring the war home to noncombatants, ...
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This chapter describes Sherman’s Meridian campaign. Sherman is credited for raising the level of hard war, beginning with the Meridian campaign. He chose to bring the war home to noncombatants, making them feel the pain and price of war, not by personal attacks but by destruction of food, railroads, and anything else that might provide support to Confederates. He believed that thought such destruction would break the will of Southerners and Confederate soldiers to carry on the war. He wanted to terrorize Southern whites to the point of making them want the war to end. However, the indiscriminate burning and wrecking of homes by Union troops was often unjustified, and in such cases went beyond his stated position.Less
This chapter describes Sherman’s Meridian campaign. Sherman is credited for raising the level of hard war, beginning with the Meridian campaign. He chose to bring the war home to noncombatants, making them feel the pain and price of war, not by personal attacks but by destruction of food, railroads, and anything else that might provide support to Confederates. He believed that thought such destruction would break the will of Southerners and Confederate soldiers to carry on the war. He wanted to terrorize Southern whites to the point of making them want the war to end. However, the indiscriminate burning and wrecking of homes by Union troops was often unjustified, and in such cases went beyond his stated position.
Michael B. Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781604738421
- eISBN:
- 9781604738438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781604738421.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter focuses on the Union campaign to capture Vicksburg. It details Grant’s strategy; the Holly Springs debacle that forced Grant to retreat north toward Tennessee; and the battle of Chicksaw ...
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This chapter focuses on the Union campaign to capture Vicksburg. It details Grant’s strategy; the Holly Springs debacle that forced Grant to retreat north toward Tennessee; and the battle of Chicksaw Bayou. The grand scheme concocted by Grant and Sherman had failed miserably. In their attempt to hurry up the campaign in order to have Vicksburg, they ignored the risks that lengthy supply lines, geography, and weather conditions could impose on an army.Less
This chapter focuses on the Union campaign to capture Vicksburg. It details Grant’s strategy; the Holly Springs debacle that forced Grant to retreat north toward Tennessee; and the battle of Chicksaw Bayou. The grand scheme concocted by Grant and Sherman had failed miserably. In their attempt to hurry up the campaign in order to have Vicksburg, they ignored the risks that lengthy supply lines, geography, and weather conditions could impose on an army.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469622415
- eISBN:
- 9781469623221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469622415.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter describes the first phase of Major General William T. Sherman's Atlanta campaign in 1864. Sherman relied on a combination of maneuver and fighting to deal with each fortified Confederate ...
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This chapter describes the first phase of Major General William T. Sherman's Atlanta campaign in 1864. Sherman relied on a combination of maneuver and fighting to deal with each fortified Confederate position from Dalton down to the Chattahoochee River. There was hard fighting at Resaca, New Hope Church, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain, but the key to Union progress had always been Sherman's ability to pin the Confederates in their works and move part of his army group to flank each position. He thereby compelled enemy forces to retreat or risk losing their line of communications. To Henry W. Halleck, the chief of staff in Washington, D.C., Sherman explained that, rather than “attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads. This is a delicate movement and must be done with caution.”Less
This chapter describes the first phase of Major General William T. Sherman's Atlanta campaign in 1864. Sherman relied on a combination of maneuver and fighting to deal with each fortified Confederate position from Dalton down to the Chattahoochee River. There was hard fighting at Resaca, New Hope Church, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain, but the key to Union progress had always been Sherman's ability to pin the Confederates in their works and move part of his army group to flank each position. He thereby compelled enemy forces to retreat or risk losing their line of communications. To Henry W. Halleck, the chief of staff in Washington, D.C., Sherman explained that, rather than “attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads. This is a delicate movement and must be done with caution.”
Stephen Cushman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781469640761
- eISBN:
- 9781469640785
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469640761.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, Military History
While Sheridan’s memoirs have not enjoyed the popularity of those written by Grant and William T. Sherman, Cushman argues that they revealed considerable literary merit offering readers “richly ...
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While Sheridan’s memoirs have not enjoyed the popularity of those written by Grant and William T. Sherman, Cushman argues that they revealed considerable literary merit offering readers “richly textured glimpses of moments and subjects that have no counterparts in Grant’s and Sherman’s accounts.” Equally important, Cushman considers Sheridan’s stylistic choices and highlights the striking ways the general’s leadership style shone through his prose. A close examination of the memoirs exposes Sheridan’s frank self-justification, critiques of his fellow officers, self-censorship, and firm but constant vigilance for the welfare of his men. Indeed, this window into Sheridan’s personality helps explain his choices during the Appomattox Campaign.Less
While Sheridan’s memoirs have not enjoyed the popularity of those written by Grant and William T. Sherman, Cushman argues that they revealed considerable literary merit offering readers “richly textured glimpses of moments and subjects that have no counterparts in Grant’s and Sherman’s accounts.” Equally important, Cushman considers Sheridan’s stylistic choices and highlights the striking ways the general’s leadership style shone through his prose. A close examination of the memoirs exposes Sheridan’s frank self-justification, critiques of his fellow officers, self-censorship, and firm but constant vigilance for the welfare of his men. Indeed, this window into Sheridan’s personality helps explain his choices during the Appomattox Campaign.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781469634197
- eISBN:
- 9781469634210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469634197.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
On July 17, Sherman moved all of his troops to the south side of the Chattahoochee River and marched on Atlanta, with James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee moving the longest distance to reach ...
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On July 17, Sherman moved all of his troops to the south side of the Chattahoochee River and marched on Atlanta, with James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee moving the longest distance to reach Decatur east of Atlanta and tear up the Georgia Railroad as it advanced toward the city. This cut one of the three railroads Johnston relied on to feed his army in Atlanta. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland had the shortest route to march, crossing the Chattahoochee near its junction with Peach Tree Creek, moving to Buck Head, and then marching south toward Atlanta. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio tried to fill in the distance between those two forces. As the Federals advanced with minor skirmishing against a screen of Confederate cavalry, Davis decided to relieve Johnston of command and elevate John Bell Hood to replace him. Hood, taken by surprise, tried to convince Davis to change his mind or at least postpone the change in commanders but the Confederate president refused to do so. Hood finally assumed his new command on July 18 and tried to prepare the Army of Tennessee to meet Sherman's advance.Less
On July 17, Sherman moved all of his troops to the south side of the Chattahoochee River and marched on Atlanta, with James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee moving the longest distance to reach Decatur east of Atlanta and tear up the Georgia Railroad as it advanced toward the city. This cut one of the three railroads Johnston relied on to feed his army in Atlanta. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland had the shortest route to march, crossing the Chattahoochee near its junction with Peach Tree Creek, moving to Buck Head, and then marching south toward Atlanta. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio tried to fill in the distance between those two forces. As the Federals advanced with minor skirmishing against a screen of Confederate cavalry, Davis decided to relieve Johnston of command and elevate John Bell Hood to replace him. Hood, taken by surprise, tried to convince Davis to change his mind or at least postpone the change in commanders but the Confederate president refused to do so. Hood finally assumed his new command on July 18 and tried to prepare the Army of Tennessee to meet Sherman's advance.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781469634197
- eISBN:
- 9781469634210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469634197.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
Union and Confederate survivors evaluated the battle of Peach Tree Creek, commented on the performance of their enemy, and judged the conduct of their own officers. The Federals were jubilant over ...
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Union and Confederate survivors evaluated the battle of Peach Tree Creek, commented on the performance of their enemy, and judged the conduct of their own officers. The Federals were jubilant over their victory and the Confederates admitted defeat. The battle increased the already high state of morale among Union soldiers and dimmed Confederate hopes. Hood also was frustrated by the failure of his first battle as army leader, believing a report that Hardee had warned his men before the battle to be wary of Union earthworks. There is no proof of this but Hood blamed Hardee for the defeat in his official report and his post-war memoirs. Hood also blamed Joseph E. Johnston for instilling a timid mood among the men through his constant retreats and refusal to take the offensive. Sherman continued to close up on Atlanta during July 21-22, advancing his men to follow up Hood's evacuation of the Peach Tree Creek Line and the Outer Line. Hood prepared to strike at Sherman's left flank, which resulted in the Battle of Atlanta on the afternoon of July 22. His men came much closer to tactical victory than they had two days before at Peach Tree Creek.Less
Union and Confederate survivors evaluated the battle of Peach Tree Creek, commented on the performance of their enemy, and judged the conduct of their own officers. The Federals were jubilant over their victory and the Confederates admitted defeat. The battle increased the already high state of morale among Union soldiers and dimmed Confederate hopes. Hood also was frustrated by the failure of his first battle as army leader, believing a report that Hardee had warned his men before the battle to be wary of Union earthworks. There is no proof of this but Hood blamed Hardee for the defeat in his official report and his post-war memoirs. Hood also blamed Joseph E. Johnston for instilling a timid mood among the men through his constant retreats and refusal to take the offensive. Sherman continued to close up on Atlanta during July 21-22, advancing his men to follow up Hood's evacuation of the Peach Tree Creek Line and the Outer Line. Hood prepared to strike at Sherman's left flank, which resulted in the Battle of Atlanta on the afternoon of July 22. His men came much closer to tactical victory than they had two days before at Peach Tree Creek.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781469634197
- eISBN:
- 9781469634210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469634197.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with ...
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William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with Louisville, Kentucky, Sherman refused to risk his men in repeated or heavy frontal attacks against the well-fortified positions Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston established at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain. Although Sherman experimented with a few attacks along the way, most notably at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain, his failure did not result in crippling losses like those suffered by Ulysses S. Grant at the same time in Virginia. Johnston's tendency to evacuate his strong positions at the slightest sign of Union flanking moves, or because his corps leaders thought those positions untenable, not only contributed to Sherman's success but tremendously increased the morale of Union soldiers to the point where they were supremely confidence in their leader and in the eventual success of the campaign. In contrast, when Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, Confederate President Jefferson Davis lost all patience with his Fabian strategy in Georgia and came to the conclusion that he had to be replaced. Johnston failed to protect all the possible crossings of the Chattahoochee that could be used by the Federals. As a result, Sherman was able to secure two bridgeheads on the south side of the river, well north of its junction with Peach Tree Creek, in the days following Johnston's fall back.Less
William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with Louisville, Kentucky, Sherman refused to risk his men in repeated or heavy frontal attacks against the well-fortified positions Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston established at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain. Although Sherman experimented with a few attacks along the way, most notably at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain, his failure did not result in crippling losses like those suffered by Ulysses S. Grant at the same time in Virginia. Johnston's tendency to evacuate his strong positions at the slightest sign of Union flanking moves, or because his corps leaders thought those positions untenable, not only contributed to Sherman's success but tremendously increased the morale of Union soldiers to the point where they were supremely confidence in their leader and in the eventual success of the campaign. In contrast, when Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, Confederate President Jefferson Davis lost all patience with his Fabian strategy in Georgia and came to the conclusion that he had to be replaced. Johnston failed to protect all the possible crossings of the Chattahoochee that could be used by the Federals. As a result, Sherman was able to secure two bridgeheads on the south side of the river, well north of its junction with Peach Tree Creek, in the days following Johnston's fall back.
William Marvel
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469622491
- eISBN:
- 9781469623313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469622491.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter examines Edwin M. Stanton's role in the investigation of those responsible for the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln in 1865 as the Civil War continued to rage. As Lincoln's ...
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This chapter examines Edwin M. Stanton's role in the investigation of those responsible for the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln in 1865 as the Civil War continued to rage. As Lincoln's second term was approaching, there was intense speculation over which cabinet officers he would retain. Meanwhile, Stanton met with a gathering of black religious leaders in Savannah, Georgia. In accordance with the majority wish of the gathered ministers, William T. Sherman arranged for at least the temporary settlement of Savannah's freedmen on separate parcels of confiscated land. The rest of this chapter discusses Lincoln's travel to Virginia and Stanton's proposal for restoring both Virginia and North Carolina to the Union. It also considers Stanton's reaction to Lincoln's death at the hands of John Wilkes Booth, along with his activities after the assassination and the military trial of the accused.Less
This chapter examines Edwin M. Stanton's role in the investigation of those responsible for the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln in 1865 as the Civil War continued to rage. As Lincoln's second term was approaching, there was intense speculation over which cabinet officers he would retain. Meanwhile, Stanton met with a gathering of black religious leaders in Savannah, Georgia. In accordance with the majority wish of the gathered ministers, William T. Sherman arranged for at least the temporary settlement of Savannah's freedmen on separate parcels of confiscated land. The rest of this chapter discusses Lincoln's travel to Virginia and Stanton's proposal for restoring both Virginia and North Carolina to the Union. It also considers Stanton's reaction to Lincoln's death at the hands of John Wilkes Booth, along with his activities after the assassination and the military trial of the accused.
Michael B. Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781604738421
- eISBN:
- 9781604738438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781604738421.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter describes General William T. Sherman’s determination to get Nathan Bedford Forrest. While all of Sherman’s efforts to “get” Forrest failed, they had kept him busy enough to stay away ...
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This chapter describes General William T. Sherman’s determination to get Nathan Bedford Forrest. While all of Sherman’s efforts to “get” Forrest failed, they had kept him busy enough to stay away from Sherman’s supply line. By September 1864 Confederates gave up Atlanta, and Sherman no longer worried about Forrest. There would be one more major raid in Mississippi—a winter raid led by cavalry chief Benjamin Grierson aimed at decimating the Mobile & Ohio.Less
This chapter describes General William T. Sherman’s determination to get Nathan Bedford Forrest. While all of Sherman’s efforts to “get” Forrest failed, they had kept him busy enough to stay away from Sherman’s supply line. By September 1864 Confederates gave up Atlanta, and Sherman no longer worried about Forrest. There would be one more major raid in Mississippi—a winter raid led by cavalry chief Benjamin Grierson aimed at decimating the Mobile & Ohio.
Barbara Brooks Tomblin
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780813167039
- eISBN:
- 9780813167817
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813167039.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
The Mississippi Squadron’s gunboats and tinclads moved up the Yazoo to prepare for an operation by Sherman’s troops against Chickasaw Bluffs, intended to draw rebel troops away from Vicksburg. The ...
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The Mississippi Squadron’s gunboats and tinclads moved up the Yazoo to prepare for an operation by Sherman’s troops against Chickasaw Bluffs, intended to draw rebel troops away from Vicksburg. The USS Cairo was sunk by “torpedoes,” or mines, in the river. Porter’s gunboats lent support to Sherman’s attack, but he failed to seize the bluffs. Grant’s communications to Columbus were severed by Bedford Forest’s men, and General Banks did not advance on Port Hudson. The combined plan of Sherman, Grant, and Porter to capture the “Gibraltar of the West” failed.Less
The Mississippi Squadron’s gunboats and tinclads moved up the Yazoo to prepare for an operation by Sherman’s troops against Chickasaw Bluffs, intended to draw rebel troops away from Vicksburg. The USS Cairo was sunk by “torpedoes,” or mines, in the river. Porter’s gunboats lent support to Sherman’s attack, but he failed to seize the bluffs. Grant’s communications to Columbus were severed by Bedford Forest’s men, and General Banks did not advance on Port Hudson. The combined plan of Sherman, Grant, and Porter to capture the “Gibraltar of the West” failed.
Earl J. Hess
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469622415
- eISBN:
- 9781469623221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469622415.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
This chapter describes the state of both Union and Confederate armies in the few hours before Ezra Church was to become a battleground, as well as the ensuing skirmish. The battle itself tested the ...
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This chapter describes the state of both Union and Confederate armies in the few hours before Ezra Church was to become a battleground, as well as the ensuing skirmish. The battle itself tested the leadership skills of both armies, with Sherman's close supervision of his army, and the conflict of battle plans between Lee and Hood. The outcome of the skirmishing along Lick Skillet Road would end in favor of the Federals, but soon the tide seemed to turn. The course of the skirmishing near Ezra Church demonstrated once again that the Federals were willing to commit substantial manpower to the mini-battles that developed between the lines. Due to a tragic miscalculation on Lee's part, the Confederate army would lose thousands of its men on a dubious battlefield endeavor.Less
This chapter describes the state of both Union and Confederate armies in the few hours before Ezra Church was to become a battleground, as well as the ensuing skirmish. The battle itself tested the leadership skills of both armies, with Sherman's close supervision of his army, and the conflict of battle plans between Lee and Hood. The outcome of the skirmishing along Lick Skillet Road would end in favor of the Federals, but soon the tide seemed to turn. The course of the skirmishing near Ezra Church demonstrated once again that the Federals were willing to commit substantial manpower to the mini-battles that developed between the lines. Due to a tragic miscalculation on Lee's part, the Confederate army would lose thousands of its men on a dubious battlefield endeavor.
