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This chapter discusses the relationship between evangelical Protestantism and the American Civil War through the lives of Abraham Lincoln and William T. Sherman. The jeremiad script of evangelical Protestantism played a major role in sustaining both the Union's and the Confederacy's war efforts, even while Abraham Lincoln's own views on Providence evolved in a manner both similar to and distinctive from that of his contemporaries. Sherman, in contrast, represented the war's potential for fomenting godlessness, with the challenge his Deification of the State represented to conventional nineteenth‐century Christianity. While evangelicals proved equal to the task of fending off this heterodoxy in the short term, the military and political forces Sherman represented had lasting effects on some postwar figures like Oliver Wendell Holmes, and in historical terms, they cannot be ignored.

William T. “Cump” Sherman and Ellen Ewing had grown up as foster siblings before they married in 1850. Their sixty-year relationship, first as brother and sister, then as husband and wife, was complex and turbulent. Ellen's father and Cump's foster father and father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, played an influential role in their lives. Ellen adored her father and was immensely loyal to him and his desires. Cump, the adopted son, and frustrated son-in-law, desperately sought both approval and autonomy from Thomas. Ellen and Cump's disagreements over religion undermined their marriage and affected their relationship, particularly when their son Tom became a Jesuit priest. Although the Sherman marriage remained contentious to the end, the general's success in the war affected his wife's stubborn devotion to his father. The Civil War appeared to break the hold of Thomas Ewing on both Shermans.

From beginning to end, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman remained a reluctant liberator who never saw emancipation as a moral imperative. He had opposed the Emancipation Proclamation at the time it was issued, but by late 1863, Sherman had come to accept the end of slavery as a necessary and inevitable consequence of the war. But even if emancipation made some pragmatic sense, Sherman harbored deep racial prejudices, despised abolitionists, and worried that emancipation issues were looming too large in the Union war effort. During his famed marches in Georgia and the Carolinas, Sherman tried to carry out emancipation on a strictly military basis to benefit the army. He and his officers willingly took in slaves that they could use and discouraged all others. Yet thousands of black refugees had still joined Sherman’s columns. Regardless of what army officers thought, many slaves viewed them as liberators and would not pass up an opportunity to gain freedom. So ironically, the general who was probably least interested in assuming the mantle of a liberator led an army that freed thousands. For many, Sherman’s results mattered more than intentions.

North Carolina was the last state among the eleven states that made up the Confederacy to break away from the Union as it succumbed only after Fort Sumter fell and President Abraham Lincoln directed a seventy-five thousand troops attempt to suppress the rebellion. However, various forms of anti-Confederate opposition which included Unionism persisted in North Carolina. While the Confederate army was able to gather more than 120,000 men, Unionists continued to hide out in swamps and mountains that bordered Tennessee. “Buffaloes” and “tories” that resided in the east and in the west respectively, either resisted as guerillas or joined the various federal regiments. This chapter illustrates the contributions of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman as well as how the negotiations at the Bennett farm were facilitated.

This chapter describes William T. Sherman’s approach march to Fort McAllister. The March to the Sea might be over, but Sherman had not yet reached the sea. He had managed to cross the Ogeechee River thanks to the reconstruction of King’s Bridge, but he still faced two problems. First, he needed to make contact with the Union fleet. Second, he still needed to seize Savannah, a risky operation that needed to be completed swiftly. It is true that Sherman encountered weak opposition and that the March had not pulled significant Confederate reinforcements to Savannah. Nonetheless, Sherman lacked the equipment for a prolonged siege and might yet be seriously embarrassed. The fall of Fort McAllister permitted Sherman to concentrate his energies on establishing contact with the US Navy. Once contact with the US Navy had been firmly established, it brought some unexpected pleasures. The chapter then looks at the interactions between Sherman and the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton.

This chapter discusses the contribution of General William T. Sherman to the black church. Gen. Sherman's brilliant and bloody march through Georgia and the Carolinas during the fall and winter of 1864–65 profoundly affected the black community and the black church. Just as profoundly did the black people and their church affect the success of Sherman's mission. After Sherman's conquest, the Zion Baptist Church would become separate and free, and Brother Ephraim would lead this independent church into the early years of freedom. The quest of Gen. Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah is described. Twenty black religious leaders were the special guests of the general. They were summoned to help the general and President Lincoln on how to implement the Emancipation Proclamation. After six weeks in Savannah, Sherman left the city for his campaign through the Carolinas.

This chapter examines William T. Sherman’s experience of being an army commander in 1863. Sherman had never formally been anything other than a corps commander, though a “wing” of the Army of the Tennessee had been temporarily entrusted to his care. He had gained experience at high command and he put this to good use. To Sherman, the triumph of Vicksburg, including all the successes notched up since Arkansas Post, represented “the first gleam of daylight in this war.” All of his biographers agree that it represents an important learning experience for this commander. But this experience must be set within the context of the disappointments of the First Vicksburg Campaign. They distorted Sherman’s judgment and account for the development of Sherman’s essentially cautious outlook, mainly a product of the great distances that need to be traversed in this theater.

This chapter studies the taking of Savannah in 1864. William T. Sherman, the author of the most famous and reviled of American campaigns, here relied entirely on himself. The scheme had been his, he had persuaded his skeptical chiefs to allow him to carry it out, and in doing so, he had taken a strategic gamble in Tennessee. Yet he had brought it off with aplomb. Moral opprobrium was often lavished, especially on the March to the Sea. Much of it is rooted in “the lies” of Confederate propagandists in the very final struggle for the moral high ground in waging this war. Many southern voices can be found in the sources expressing surprise at how well they were treated. However, Sherman’s style of war was far from novel. If we accept the centrality of plunder as a motive for taking part in war, then it follows that the southern pleading concerning the unique horrors to which they were subjected should be rejected. The criticism directed at Sherman is too personalized, as if he bears personal responsibility for every burning and act of vandalism. He has assumed a wholly false diabolic presence in this self-indulgent and self-serving folklore of victimhood. Indeed, the behavior of Sherman’s soldiers differs little from that of Union and Confederate troops on other fronts.

This chapter looks at the efforts of the Republican Party to nominate William T. Sherman as its candidate for presidency in 1884. Sherman found many of these requests for him to run, especially from his old soldiers, tantamount to moral blackmail. They exploited ties of affection forged during the Civil War. Sherman rejected these efforts on two grounds. First, “that it would be the height of folly to allow any false ambition to allow the use of my name for any political office.” Second, that it was not for others to take a decision for him that would so disrupt his private life. Even before retiring, he realized that the years of achievement had passed. Sherman’s life had often been led amid controversy and tumult, and this did not ebb as death approached. Contrary to his wishes, his body lay in state at his home and received two grand funerals.

This chapter examines William T. Sherman’s experience as a banker in San Francisco, California. With his customary thoroughness, Sherman studied business practices carefully. He viewed the trust placed in him with an elevated sense of moral responsibility not widely shared by other San Francisco bankers. The system knew no regulation; laissez faire in its most extreme form prevailed. So, in the best military fashion, Sherman laid down a series of principles to determine his conduct. These reveal the workings of his mind and broader mental affinities. Sherman had really re-dedicated himself to the military code he had imbibed at West Point; rather than rejected it by entering the business world. However, a financial crisis put him off banking. Sherman entered into a law partnership with Tom Ewing Jr., and they opened an office in Leavenworth. He also ran a farm for Thomas Ewing Sr. that, he recalled, “passed the time but afforded little profit.” This phase of his career ended without success when he returned to Lancaster in July of 1859, oppressed by his inability to earn a living for his family. The chapter then looks at Sherman’s appointment as the superintendent and chair of engineering at the Louisiana State Seminary (later Louisiana State University). In Louisiana, he failed in his efforts to recreate a military life in an academic context.

This chapter recounts that on November 7, 1868, Ulysses S. Grant gained election to the presidency, leading to William T. Sherman succeeding him as general-in-chief. Throughout, Sherman had abstained from political activities, but he did express enthusiasm for Grant’s win. He also made early preparations for the move to Washington. Before Grant and Sherman’s ascents to greater responsibility, they were able to enjoy one last wartime swansong with 2000 former comrades at a joint reunion of the societies of the Armies of the Cumberland, Georgia, the Ohio, and the Tennessee in Chicago on December 15–16, 1868. At the meeting, Grant and Sherman discussed the future structure of the army. Grant assured Sherman that he intended to make the arrangements that he had introduced as general-in-chief permanent. The long duel between the commanding general and secretary of war waged since 1836 over who should direct the army would be finally decided in favor of the general-in-chief. On the same day of Grant’s inauguration, he sent to the Senate his nomination of Sherman in the rank of General of the Army of the United States. The following day, John M. Schofield issued the executive order stipulating that Sherman would succeed as commanding general.

As December 1864 came to a close, General William T. Sherman's army approached its objective: Savannah, Georgia. Sherman's march across Georgia afforded many Union soldiers the opportunity to become acquainted with and befriend black civilians. Young northern soldiers hired black men as servants, teaching them to read and offering them tips on how to survive in their new world of freedom. In letters home, soldiers wrote of their admiration for blacks who assisted escaping Union prisoners and guided Union soldiers on foraging parties in search of food. The advance of Sherman's army across Georgia to Savannah and then northward encouraged thousands of slaves to seek freedom and start new lives. For many more African Americans along the southern coast or in Union-occupied areas inland, the final months of the Civil War brought a measure of peace and stability. For other African Americans, especially those in the path of Sherman's advance, 1865 brought turmoil.

This chapter recounts how, in February of 1862, after a surfeit of disappointment and humiliation, William T. Sherman received the revivifying news that he would command a division. He threw himself into the task of bringing order, cohesion, and discipline to his division. His staff played an important role in his success, as it oversaw the commander’s orders, although some time would elapse before a cohesive team emerged. The chapter then describes the great Battle of Shiloh, which erupted on April 6. Sherman’s conduct at Shiloh earned much praise. He might appear quirky, even eccentric, nervous, and highly-strung in daily affairs, but under fire he became cool, calculating, forthright, and decisive. Indeed, Sherman’s determination to hold back the tide of the Confederate onslaught, tactical insight, overall appreciation of the battle, willingness to assume responsibility, and empathy with the problems of other divisional commanders made an enormous contribution to the Union success at Shiloh.

This chapter highlights William T. Sherman’s return to Washington. The arrival of “the Vandal Sherman,” as he described himself, plus his troops loud in threats that his Washington critics would have them “to reckon with,” had led to significant developments even before his return. There had also been some wild talk, probably exaggerated in the re-telling, of overthrowing the government. Edwin M. Stanton, perhaps sensing a matter he could exploit to his disadvantage, ordered both Ulysses S. Grant and Sherman to testify before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War on the issues surrounding the ill-fated Memorandum of Understanding reached between Sherman and Joseph E. Johnston. In retrospect, the Committee’s failure to embarrass Sherman serves to underline the complete failure of Congress at this date to make any mark on Reconstruction policy. The ensuing great battle over this issue in 1866–67 would emerge as the defining, momentous political contest of these years, and Sherman would be dragged unwittingly into its margins.

This chapter traces the origin and evolution of the Sherman family. Unlike many of his fellow countrymen, William T. Sherman did not display an enduring fascination with his family tree. He never bothered to inspect his ancestral home, even during his European tour of 1872. Consequently, his biographers have been perplexed by his ancestry or thought better of treating it in detail. The Sherman family hailed from south-eastern England, and they played a minor part in the upheavals that culminated in a great civil war that engulfed the British Isles from 1642 to 1651. The full context of Sherman’s life is not complete without some consideration of this background and legacy bequeathed to him by his forebears. The chapter also details Sherman’s experience at West Point. During his time at the military academy, Sherman’s rebelliousness became obvious—and he paid the price. It is a curious feature of his life that he spent so many of his later years proclaiming West Point’s virtues, the very standards that he had ignored in his youth. But by graduating, Sherman entered a self-conscious elite, and its values had a powerful influence on his opinions and military attitudes.

This chapter addresses the impact of the First Battle of Bull Run on William T. Sherman. On July 21, 1861, Sherman’s brigade had endured the hardest fighting. His superior officers believed that he had done well; on August 3, he received notification that he would be promoted to brigadier general of volunteers. This state of affairs would shortly change. Sherman might have witnessed his men’s foolhardy courage, but he found little else to praise in their conduct. The root of the problem lay in chronic indiscipline. Of greater interest is Sherman’s opinion of the Confederacy, as this would shape his analysis of the war’s conduct for the next six months. The experience of the First Battle of Bull Run, in his opinion, had revealed that the Confederates enjoyed significant tactical virtues. The chapter then details how Sherman suffered from adjustment disorder due to the Bull Run. On December 23, Major General Henry W. Halleck appointed Sherman to Benton Barracks, where he could train recruits and begin the resuscitation of his military career.

This chapter discusses the arrival on July 5, 1862, of orders for William T. Sherman to assume command of the Military District of Memphis, Tennessee—a job he preferred to any other. When Sherman took up the appointment, he embraced the conservative view of the war that upheld the importance of conciliating southerners. Unfortunately, the realities of fighting a great war kept breaking in and disturbing his repose. After four or five months, Sherman came to realize that the irreconcilable could not be reconciled. These months proved significant in laying the foundations for Sherman’s much harsher, increasingly punitive ideas about the conduct of the war. His sense of duty presented him with a personal dilemma. As he struggled to reconcile what he would have preferred to do with the way that the realities of the war were forcing him to act, three issues moved to the front of his mind: the conundrum posed by slavery, illicit trade with the rebels, and the increasingly audacious activities of guerrilla bands. The chapter then details the Battle of Chickasaw Bluffs.

This chapter recounts that by the autumn of 1863, William T. Sherman had arrived at the summit of military activity, according to his contemporaries. Sherman would go higher in rank, but to the Civil War generation, army command would count for more than anything else. The kind of man he became would determine Sherman’s style as a commander, so it is important to review the evolution of Sherman’s personality, and the sum of his mental and moral qualities that mark out his individuality. Also relevant is the impact of his character on others, that combination of psychological traits and moral, intellectual, and social qualities, which can be acquired as well as inherited. In his classic works on the Civil War, General J.F.C. Fuller argued that the constituent parts of generalship embraced strategy, tactics, and logistics but the manner in which these elements combine to create military success vary due to circumstances often beyond the general’s control. Sherman’s personality remained nothing less than very strong, vibrant, quirky, strikingly individualistic, and sometimes defiant of authority or prevalent opinion. These attributes aided his leadership abilities. Those who follow tend to respect commanders of a sharp, distinct profile, who spoke to them, as Sherman did, bluntly with eloquence and wit.

This chapter focuses on the Battle of Atlanta in 1864. Far from halting William T. Sherman’s progress, the Battle of Atlanta was in reality a series of tactical successes and in total an operational triumph. Sherman’s campaign demonstrated the value of an offensive strategy and operational plan combined with defensive tactics—notably in trench warfare. He had not set out to mount operations of this kind, but he had quickly grasped how such a combination aided his purpose. He exploited the tactical defensive so that he might take greater operational risks. What Sherman wanted to avoid were fruitless attacks on Atlanta’s defenses or being repulsed in the field; by this date, a setback of any order might not only endanger the integrity of his armies but would certainly seal the doom of the Lincoln administration. Ultimately, Sherman’s capture of the city was his single biggest success and illustrates the intersection of military and political events at this stage of the Civil War.