Sarah Coakley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199203567
- eISBN:
- 9780191708190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203567.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the mystical writings of St Teresa of Ávila with an eye to providing certain correctives to analytic appropriations of St Teresa's work. It begins with a playful feminist ...
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This chapter explores the mystical writings of St Teresa of Ávila with an eye to providing certain correctives to analytic appropriations of St Teresa's work. It begins with a playful feminist analysis of some of the most important turns to religious experience in analytic philosophy of religion in recent decades, which lead on, in the light of a feminist critique, to an analysis of how Teresa's project might suggest how contemplative practice (as opposed to passing religious experiences) could help provide justification for certain sorts of theistic claim, and what role an apophatic sensibility would play in such a move. This final chapter not only attempts to extend some of the main moves made by William Alston in his Perceiving God in such a new way, but also responds to Alston's own recent attempt to press his epistemological project in this apophatic direction. It is argued that Alston's new ‘turn’ has considerable potential, but one still in need of further development and critique.Less
This chapter explores the mystical writings of St Teresa of Ávila with an eye to providing certain correctives to analytic appropriations of St Teresa's work. It begins with a playful feminist analysis of some of the most important turns to religious experience in analytic philosophy of religion in recent decades, which lead on, in the light of a feminist critique, to an analysis of how Teresa's project might suggest how contemplative practice (as opposed to passing religious experiences) could help provide justification for certain sorts of theistic claim, and what role an apophatic sensibility would play in such a move. This final chapter not only attempts to extend some of the main moves made by William Alston in his Perceiving God in such a new way, but also responds to Alston's own recent attempt to press his epistemological project in this apophatic direction. It is argued that Alston's new ‘turn’ has considerable potential, but one still in need of further development and critique.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195129656
- eISBN:
- 9780199849130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195129656.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter takes up another aspect relevant to God's relation to time — God's relation to the world, specifically, his relation to human beings. The Scriptures affirm that God is in relationship ...
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This chapter takes up another aspect relevant to God's relation to time — God's relation to the world, specifically, his relation to human beings. The Scriptures affirm that God is in relationship with human beings. Being in relationship seems to imply the possibility of real give-and-take. Several attributes of God seem to make real give-and-take impossible. Can a timeless God enter into dialogue? Furthermore, can a God who knows what you are going to do and say ahead of time engage you in a genuine dialogue? The chapter examines two proposed solutions to the problem of divine-human dialogue. It ultimately rejects the solution proposed by William Alston and argues that Richard Swinburne's solution is sufficient to preserve genuine dialogue but comes at too high a cost. A solution is proposed that can preserve genuine divine-human dialogue even if it turns out that God determines every event.Less
This chapter takes up another aspect relevant to God's relation to time — God's relation to the world, specifically, his relation to human beings. The Scriptures affirm that God is in relationship with human beings. Being in relationship seems to imply the possibility of real give-and-take. Several attributes of God seem to make real give-and-take impossible. Can a timeless God enter into dialogue? Furthermore, can a God who knows what you are going to do and say ahead of time engage you in a genuine dialogue? The chapter examines two proposed solutions to the problem of divine-human dialogue. It ultimately rejects the solution proposed by William Alston and argues that Richard Swinburne's solution is sufficient to preserve genuine dialogue but comes at too high a cost. A solution is proposed that can preserve genuine divine-human dialogue even if it turns out that God determines every event.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804776646
- eISBN:
- 9780804781008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804776646.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter examines two related problems: what can replace the systematic and dogmatic approach to theology within Judaism, and what account of Jewish theology can embrace the resources of ...
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This chapter examines two related problems: what can replace the systematic and dogmatic approach to theology within Judaism, and what account of Jewish theology can embrace the resources of hermeneutic theory while maintaining the possibility of theological truth claims. It addresses these issues by offering a critical analysis of Pierre Hadot's work on the role of spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy and William Alston's contribution to analytic religious epistemology. Hadot's complex account of the functions of ancient philosophical discourse implies that the systematic and dogmatic conception of theology can be replaced with an account of theology in which theory and practice are inextricable. In his Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Alston proposes a religious epistemology that is primarily concerned with the contribution of religious experience to religious belief. Alston's externalist epistemology claims that we have no alternative but to rely upon socially established belief-forming practices, which he calls doxastic practices.Less
This chapter examines two related problems: what can replace the systematic and dogmatic approach to theology within Judaism, and what account of Jewish theology can embrace the resources of hermeneutic theory while maintaining the possibility of theological truth claims. It addresses these issues by offering a critical analysis of Pierre Hadot's work on the role of spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy and William Alston's contribution to analytic religious epistemology. Hadot's complex account of the functions of ancient philosophical discourse implies that the systematic and dogmatic conception of theology can be replaced with an account of theology in which theory and practice are inextricable. In his Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Alston proposes a religious epistemology that is primarily concerned with the contribution of religious experience to religious belief. Alston's externalist epistemology claims that we have no alternative but to rely upon socially established belief-forming practices, which he calls doxastic practices.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers whether fideism might be avoided through alternative approaches to the (assumed) evidential ambiguity of theism. Isolationist (Wittgensteinian) epistemology (often linked to ...
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This chapter considers whether fideism might be avoided through alternative approaches to the (assumed) evidential ambiguity of theism. Isolationist (Wittgensteinian) epistemology (often linked to theological non-realism) takes theistic doxastic frameworks to be epistemically isolated in the sense that their framework principles are necessarily not assessable in the light of external evidence. Reformed epistemology maintains that holding certain theistic beliefs may be evidentially justified because their truth is basically, non-inferentially, evident in the believer's experience. It is argued that both these epistemologies must ultimately be regarded as fideist, and a critique is provided, in particular, of William Alston's appeal to an alleged parity with perceptual beliefs and Alvin Plantinga's appeal to his epistemological externalist theory of warrant. It is argued that reflective believers must recognize that their commitment to basic theistic beliefs involves a faith-venture.Less
This chapter considers whether fideism might be avoided through alternative approaches to the (assumed) evidential ambiguity of theism. Isolationist (Wittgensteinian) epistemology (often linked to theological non-realism) takes theistic doxastic frameworks to be epistemically isolated in the sense that their framework principles are necessarily not assessable in the light of external evidence. Reformed epistemology maintains that holding certain theistic beliefs may be evidentially justified because their truth is basically, non-inferentially, evident in the believer's experience. It is argued that both these epistemologies must ultimately be regarded as fideist, and a critique is provided, in particular, of William Alston's appeal to an alleged parity with perceptual beliefs and Alvin Plantinga's appeal to his epistemological externalist theory of warrant. It is argued that reflective believers must recognize that their commitment to basic theistic beliefs involves a faith-venture.
Richard Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199253722
- eISBN:
- 9780191601361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253722.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of ...
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Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.Less
Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.
Gregory E. Ganssle
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195129656
- eISBN:
- 9780199849130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195129656.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the implications of William Alston's claim that God knows what he knows without having any beliefs. Most discussions of God's knowledge assume that we ought to understand God's ...
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This chapter explores the implications of William Alston's claim that God knows what he knows without having any beliefs. Most discussions of God's knowledge assume that we ought to understand God's knowledge as being something like a propositional attitude, just as we understand human knowledge. Alston has challenged this construal of divine knowledge. God knows what he knows, Alston claims, in virtue of his direct awareness of facts. He does not have propositional attitudes at all. It is argued that if God knows what he knows by direct awareness, then God must be atemporal. If God is temporal, he cannot have absolute immediate awareness of past or future facts. Absolute immediate awareness cannot span time. A knowing subject who is temporal can have direct intuitive awareness only of those facts that are temporally present.Less
This chapter explores the implications of William Alston's claim that God knows what he knows without having any beliefs. Most discussions of God's knowledge assume that we ought to understand God's knowledge as being something like a propositional attitude, just as we understand human knowledge. Alston has challenged this construal of divine knowledge. God knows what he knows, Alston claims, in virtue of his direct awareness of facts. He does not have propositional attitudes at all. It is argued that if God knows what he knows by direct awareness, then God must be atemporal. If God is temporal, he cannot have absolute immediate awareness of past or future facts. Absolute immediate awareness cannot span time. A knowing subject who is temporal can have direct intuitive awareness only of those facts that are temporally present.
John Allan Knight
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199969388
- eISBN:
- 9780199301546
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969388.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
The concluding chapter connects the concerns of liberals and postliberals with their respective positions on religious and theological language. Liberal theology is driven to a descriptivist or ...
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The concluding chapter connects the concerns of liberals and postliberals with their respective positions on religious and theological language. Liberal theology is driven to a descriptivist or truth-conditional understanding of meaning by its concern to defend the truth of religious or theological assertions via criteria that are truly public. Conversely, postliberal embrace of the later Wittgenstein is driven by the concern to vindicate the particularity of God’s self-revelation in Jesus, thus avoiding vulnerability to Feuerbach’s critique. Such concerns are frustrated by the Hobson’s choice between descriptivism and Wittgenstein. The chapter thus points to developments in philosophy of language that can move theology past the liberal/postliberal impasse. These include the development of theories of meaning-as-use, by philosophers like William Alston that incorporate a Kripkean view of direct or causal reference. The chapter describes how such developments could be put to use in correcting liberal and postliberal shortcomings in theological method. The chapter closes by suggesting areas in which further work could be done on meaning, reference, interpretation and truth—the four elements of theological method mentioned in the introduction. In all these areas, recent analytic philosophy could prove to be a fruitful conversation partner.Less
The concluding chapter connects the concerns of liberals and postliberals with their respective positions on religious and theological language. Liberal theology is driven to a descriptivist or truth-conditional understanding of meaning by its concern to defend the truth of religious or theological assertions via criteria that are truly public. Conversely, postliberal embrace of the later Wittgenstein is driven by the concern to vindicate the particularity of God’s self-revelation in Jesus, thus avoiding vulnerability to Feuerbach’s critique. Such concerns are frustrated by the Hobson’s choice between descriptivism and Wittgenstein. The chapter thus points to developments in philosophy of language that can move theology past the liberal/postliberal impasse. These include the development of theories of meaning-as-use, by philosophers like William Alston that incorporate a Kripkean view of direct or causal reference. The chapter describes how such developments could be put to use in correcting liberal and postliberal shortcomings in theological method. The chapter closes by suggesting areas in which further work could be done on meaning, reference, interpretation and truth—the four elements of theological method mentioned in the introduction. In all these areas, recent analytic philosophy could prove to be a fruitful conversation partner.
William J. Abraham
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198786504
- eISBN:
- 9780191828706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786504.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
One of the most important philosophers who applied a concept of intentional action to God was William P. Alston. In this chapter, the author engages Alston’s proposals, and argues that even a robust ...
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One of the most important philosophers who applied a concept of intentional action to God was William P. Alston. In this chapter, the author engages Alston’s proposals, and argues that even a robust notion of intentional action predicated of God yields very little when it comes to understanding claims about divine action that are of prime importance to the Christian tradition. The author also begins to query the concept of God as an acting agent. The author also indicates again how most philosophers commit themselves to a thin version of a doctrinal tradition even without explicitly stating it, and that the debate about divine action is better served by thick engagement with the Christian doctrinal tradition.Less
One of the most important philosophers who applied a concept of intentional action to God was William P. Alston. In this chapter, the author engages Alston’s proposals, and argues that even a robust notion of intentional action predicated of God yields very little when it comes to understanding claims about divine action that are of prime importance to the Christian tradition. The author also begins to query the concept of God as an acting agent. The author also indicates again how most philosophers commit themselves to a thin version of a doctrinal tradition even without explicitly stating it, and that the debate about divine action is better served by thick engagement with the Christian doctrinal tradition.
Ayon Maharaj
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190868239
- eISBN:
- 9780190868260
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190868239.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical ...
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This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical resonances between Sri Ramakrishna’s skeptical theism and William Alston’s skeptical theist refutation of William Rowe’s argument from evil. On the one hand, Maharaj draws on Alston’s skeptical theist response to Rowe as a means of developing and defending Sri Ramakrishna’s own skeptical theist position. On the other, Maharaj argues that Alston’s failure to consider Indian karma-based theodicies significantly weakens his argument. Maharaj then brings Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy into dialogue with Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. Hick’s convincing arguments for the necessity of evil in a soul-making environment lend support to Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy. However, Maharaj also identifies major weaknesses in Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which stem from Hick’s assumption of a one-life-only paradigm and his neglect of mystical experience. On this basis, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystically grounded saint-making theodicy, which presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth, has significant advantages over Hick’s theodicy.Less
This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical resonances between Sri Ramakrishna’s skeptical theism and William Alston’s skeptical theist refutation of William Rowe’s argument from evil. On the one hand, Maharaj draws on Alston’s skeptical theist response to Rowe as a means of developing and defending Sri Ramakrishna’s own skeptical theist position. On the other, Maharaj argues that Alston’s failure to consider Indian karma-based theodicies significantly weakens his argument. Maharaj then brings Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy into dialogue with Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. Hick’s convincing arguments for the necessity of evil in a soul-making environment lend support to Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy. However, Maharaj also identifies major weaknesses in Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which stem from Hick’s assumption of a one-life-only paradigm and his neglect of mystical experience. On this basis, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystically grounded saint-making theodicy, which presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth, has significant advantages over Hick’s theodicy.
Jordan Wessling
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198852483
- eISBN:
- 9780191886935
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198852483.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Chapter 7 proposes a manner of conceiving of God’s deifying love, whereby God shares His intra-trinitarian life of love with men and women through the life and death of Christ. The proposal, which ...
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Chapter 7 proposes a manner of conceiving of God’s deifying love, whereby God shares His intra-trinitarian life of love with men and women through the life and death of Christ. The proposal, which builds upon the Eastern Orthodox distinction between God’s essence and energies, includes partial accounts of both the Atonement and deification, along with an explanation of how these two doctrines fit together. The offered account of God’s deifying love is also shown to fit nicely with the understanding of love’s union exposited and defended in Chapter 2, thereby highlighting a connection between the defended model of God’s love and a classical way of thinking about Christian salvation.Less
Chapter 7 proposes a manner of conceiving of God’s deifying love, whereby God shares His intra-trinitarian life of love with men and women through the life and death of Christ. The proposal, which builds upon the Eastern Orthodox distinction between God’s essence and energies, includes partial accounts of both the Atonement and deification, along with an explanation of how these two doctrines fit together. The offered account of God’s deifying love is also shown to fit nicely with the understanding of love’s union exposited and defended in Chapter 2, thereby highlighting a connection between the defended model of God’s love and a classical way of thinking about Christian salvation.
James W. Jones
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190927387
- eISBN:
- 9780190927417
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190927387.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Taking embodiment seriously impacts the way religion is theorized in the discipline of cognitive psychology and in other religious studies disciplines, including theology. This chapter describes new ...
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Taking embodiment seriously impacts the way religion is theorized in the discipline of cognitive psychology and in other religious studies disciplines, including theology. This chapter describes new avenues of research that follow from adopting an embodied perspective. An embodied perspective also transforms the way we think about traditional topics concerning religious knowledge. The often argued parallel between ordinary perceptual experience and certain religious experiences commonly described as religious perceptions is analyzed and an appreciative critique of William Alston’s 1991 book Perceiving God is offered. Arguments for conceiving of religious experience as a form of perception are strong but the argument as currently framed is seriously flawed psychologically. Reframing the argument in terms of an embodied-relational model strengthens it and supports the argument in this book that reason is on the side of those who choose a religiously lived life.Less
Taking embodiment seriously impacts the way religion is theorized in the discipline of cognitive psychology and in other religious studies disciplines, including theology. This chapter describes new avenues of research that follow from adopting an embodied perspective. An embodied perspective also transforms the way we think about traditional topics concerning religious knowledge. The often argued parallel between ordinary perceptual experience and certain religious experiences commonly described as religious perceptions is analyzed and an appreciative critique of William Alston’s 1991 book Perceiving God is offered. Arguments for conceiving of religious experience as a form of perception are strong but the argument as currently framed is seriously flawed psychologically. Reframing the argument in terms of an embodied-relational model strengthens it and supports the argument in this book that reason is on the side of those who choose a religiously lived life.
Krista Lawlor
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199657896
- eISBN:
- 9780191748127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
We start with Austin’s suggestion that we should compare ‘I know’ with ‘I promise.’ Assurances, routinely expressed with an explicit ‘I know’, offer an unlimited guarantee to one’s addressee. This ...
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We start with Austin’s suggestion that we should compare ‘I know’ with ‘I promise.’ Assurances, routinely expressed with an explicit ‘I know’, offer an unlimited guarantee to one’s addressee. This guarantee can be understood in terms of the assurance giver offering exclusionary reasons to the hearer. This distinguishes the speech act of assurance from that of assertion. Alston’s theory of speech acts provides a framework for articulating the distinctive features of assurance. We find that assurance givers and receivers have commitments that they can shoulder only by appeal to a standard of reasonableness. As in the law, a reasonable person standard allows for coordination of judgments about the relevant normative commitments. Further, we find that a link between assurance-giving and knowledge is forged by the notion of reasonableness; the result is a reasonable alternatives theory of knowledge.Less
We start with Austin’s suggestion that we should compare ‘I know’ with ‘I promise.’ Assurances, routinely expressed with an explicit ‘I know’, offer an unlimited guarantee to one’s addressee. This guarantee can be understood in terms of the assurance giver offering exclusionary reasons to the hearer. This distinguishes the speech act of assurance from that of assertion. Alston’s theory of speech acts provides a framework for articulating the distinctive features of assurance. We find that assurance givers and receivers have commitments that they can shoulder only by appeal to a standard of reasonableness. As in the law, a reasonable person standard allows for coordination of judgments about the relevant normative commitments. Further, we find that a link between assurance-giving and knowledge is forged by the notion of reasonableness; the result is a reasonable alternatives theory of knowledge.
Steven L. Porter and Brandon Rickabaugh
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- July 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780192895349
- eISBN:
- 9780191916168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192895349.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The Christian tradition envisions the third member of the Triune Godhead—the Holy Spirit—as central to a life of virtue. But just how does the Holy Spirit figure into virtue formation? William Alston ...
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The Christian tradition envisions the third member of the Triune Godhead—the Holy Spirit—as central to a life of virtue. But just how does the Holy Spirit figure into virtue formation? William Alston developed three models of the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit: the fiat model, the interpersonal model, and the sharing model. In response to Alston’s argument for the sharing model, this chapter offers grounds for a reconsideration of the interpersonal model. It closes with a discussion of some of the implications of one’s understanding of the transforming work of the Holy Spirit for practical Christian spirituality.Less
The Christian tradition envisions the third member of the Triune Godhead—the Holy Spirit—as central to a life of virtue. But just how does the Holy Spirit figure into virtue formation? William Alston developed three models of the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit: the fiat model, the interpersonal model, and the sharing model. In response to Alston’s argument for the sharing model, this chapter offers grounds for a reconsideration of the interpersonal model. It closes with a discussion of some of the implications of one’s understanding of the transforming work of the Holy Spirit for practical Christian spirituality.
Charles Taliaferro
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199646821
- eISBN:
- 9780191744853
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646821.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Religion and Society
After an overview of some of the main themes of God and Enchantment of Place, this chapter defends the continuing importance of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Brown criticizes the ...
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After an overview of some of the main themes of God and Enchantment of Place, this chapter defends the continuing importance of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Brown criticizes the formal character of the various appeals to religious experience made by William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne. The chapter argues in reply that although Brown demonstrates the enchanting allure and compelling interest of Christian faith, particularly for an aesthetically-oriented audience, we still need the work of Alston, Plantinga, Swinburne and others to secure a stable epistemology. The chapter concludes with friendly observations and suggestions to strengthen Brown's project: notably how Brown's work offers an interesting reply to the ‘hiddenness of God’ objection, Brown's affinity to Cambridge Platonism, and how his focus on the enchantment of space may usefully incorporate more reflection on the enchantment of time and of our encounter, in time, of the eternal God.Less
After an overview of some of the main themes of God and Enchantment of Place, this chapter defends the continuing importance of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Brown criticizes the formal character of the various appeals to religious experience made by William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne. The chapter argues in reply that although Brown demonstrates the enchanting allure and compelling interest of Christian faith, particularly for an aesthetically-oriented audience, we still need the work of Alston, Plantinga, Swinburne and others to secure a stable epistemology. The chapter concludes with friendly observations and suggestions to strengthen Brown's project: notably how Brown's work offers an interesting reply to the ‘hiddenness of God’ objection, Brown's affinity to Cambridge Platonism, and how his focus on the enchantment of space may usefully incorporate more reflection on the enchantment of time and of our encounter, in time, of the eternal God.
Ayon Maharaj
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190868239
- eISBN:
- 9780190868260
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190868239.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores how Sri Ramakrishna’s mystical testimony and teachings enrich contemporary analytic debates about the epistemic value of mystical experience. These debates center on a key ...
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This chapter explores how Sri Ramakrishna’s mystical testimony and teachings enrich contemporary analytic debates about the epistemic value of mystical experience. These debates center on a key question: are we warranted in taking mystical experiences—either our own or those of others—to be veridical? After briefly delineating Sri Ramakrishna’s views on the scope of theological reason, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystical testimony lends strong support to the philosopher Robert Oakes’s position that self-authenticating experiences of God are possible. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the argument from experience, the argument that it is reasonable to infer God’s existence from the testimony of people claiming to have experienced Him. Maharaj draws on Sri Ramakrishna’s teachings and mystical testimony in order to bolster contemporary philosophical defenses of the argument from experience. He contends, moreover, that Sri Ramakrishna’s distinctive approach helps defuse two serious objections to the argument from experience: namely, lack of adequate cross-checkability and the conflicting claims objection.Less
This chapter explores how Sri Ramakrishna’s mystical testimony and teachings enrich contemporary analytic debates about the epistemic value of mystical experience. These debates center on a key question: are we warranted in taking mystical experiences—either our own or those of others—to be veridical? After briefly delineating Sri Ramakrishna’s views on the scope of theological reason, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystical testimony lends strong support to the philosopher Robert Oakes’s position that self-authenticating experiences of God are possible. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the argument from experience, the argument that it is reasonable to infer God’s existence from the testimony of people claiming to have experienced Him. Maharaj draws on Sri Ramakrishna’s teachings and mystical testimony in order to bolster contemporary philosophical defenses of the argument from experience. He contends, moreover, that Sri Ramakrishna’s distinctive approach helps defuse two serious objections to the argument from experience: namely, lack of adequate cross-checkability and the conflicting claims objection.
Ray S. Yeo
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190204600
- eISBN:
- 9780190204624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190204600.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter makes the claim that character and virtue formation in the Christian tradition is distinct from its non-religious counterparts in its foundational insistence that genuine Christian ...
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This chapter makes the claim that character and virtue formation in the Christian tradition is distinct from its non-religious counterparts in its foundational insistence that genuine Christian character formation can only be achieved through the gracious gift of God, and cannot be had simply through human endeavors. However, the precise relationship between the transforming grace of God and the character transformation of the believer has not always been well understood. In light of this obscurity, the chapter attempts to provide a theoretical model for understanding the nature of the Spirit’s indwelling in transforming grace by synthesizing Jonathan Edwards’s theological psychology with William Alston’s model of indwelling. The significance of the proposed model for Christian character formation is then explored.Less
This chapter makes the claim that character and virtue formation in the Christian tradition is distinct from its non-religious counterparts in its foundational insistence that genuine Christian character formation can only be achieved through the gracious gift of God, and cannot be had simply through human endeavors. However, the precise relationship between the transforming grace of God and the character transformation of the believer has not always been well understood. In light of this obscurity, the chapter attempts to provide a theoretical model for understanding the nature of the Spirit’s indwelling in transforming grace by synthesizing Jonathan Edwards’s theological psychology with William Alston’s model of indwelling. The significance of the proposed model for Christian character formation is then explored.
Michael C. Rea
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198826019
- eISBN:
- 9780191865015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198826019.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter, together with Chapter 6, presents a theory about encounters with God according to which experience of God’s presence is much more widely available than is typically credited in the ...
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This chapter, together with Chapter 6, presents a theory about encounters with God according to which experience of God’s presence is much more widely available than is typically credited in the literature on divine hiddenness. The present chapter further develops the account sketched in Chapter 6 and, in so doing, locates the account in relation to a few important decision points in the literature on religious experience. The chapter concludes with some reasons for thinking that the view of divine encounters sketched here is the most plausible account of how creatures like us might experience divine presence in a material world.Less
This chapter, together with Chapter 6, presents a theory about encounters with God according to which experience of God’s presence is much more widely available than is typically credited in the literature on divine hiddenness. The present chapter further develops the account sketched in Chapter 6 and, in so doing, locates the account in relation to a few important decision points in the literature on religious experience. The chapter concludes with some reasons for thinking that the view of divine encounters sketched here is the most plausible account of how creatures like us might experience divine presence in a material world.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 2 offers a structured synopsis of the history of natural theology from Xenophanes to Richard Swinburne. It is argued, for example, that the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are outdated, and that ...
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Chapter 2 offers a structured synopsis of the history of natural theology from Xenophanes to Richard Swinburne. It is argued, for example, that the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are outdated, and that the decline of natural theology in the nineteenth century was due largely to Kant’s and Hume’s philosophies of science. However, since these philosophies of science have turned out to be problematic, there is no reason for religious believers to stick to some blend of religious irrationalism à la Kierkegaard or William James, or to hold that natural theology must be meaningless. In principle, natural theology can be a perfectly decent intellectual enterprise.Less
Chapter 2 offers a structured synopsis of the history of natural theology from Xenophanes to Richard Swinburne. It is argued, for example, that the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are outdated, and that the decline of natural theology in the nineteenth century was due largely to Kant’s and Hume’s philosophies of science. However, since these philosophies of science have turned out to be problematic, there is no reason for religious believers to stick to some blend of religious irrationalism à la Kierkegaard or William James, or to hold that natural theology must be meaningless. In principle, natural theology can be a perfectly decent intellectual enterprise.
Declan Smithies
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199642632
- eISBN:
- 9780191807145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. Section ...
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This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. Section one proposes an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. Section two uses this analysis to argue for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe a proposition iff one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. Section three distinguishes between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argues that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. Section four argues that the propositional version of access internalism explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. Section five concludes with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility, and personhood.Less
This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. Section one proposes an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. Section two uses this analysis to argue for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe a proposition iff one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. Section three distinguishes between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argues that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. Section four argues that the propositional version of access internalism explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. Section five concludes with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility, and personhood.
John Pittard
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190051815
- eISBN:
- 9780190051846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190051815.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Weak conciliationism affirms that many of one’s epistemic starting points enjoy “partisan justification,” justified confidence that exceeds the degree of confidence that is supportable on impartial ...
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Weak conciliationism affirms that many of one’s epistemic starting points enjoy “partisan justification,” justified confidence that exceeds the degree of confidence that is supportable on impartial grounds. But weak conciliationism does not itself supply an account that says when such partisan justification is and is not available. This chapter begins by identifying the options for an account of partisan justification. It then argues for an exclusively rationalist account according to which partisan justification is grounded in rational insight and is not available in disagreements with acknowledged internal rational parity. This argument presents a challenge for “reformed epistemologists,” like Alston and Plantinga, who deemphasize the role of rational insight in religious belief and who defend religious belief by emphasizing similarities between religious belief formation and the formation of perceptual beliefs. It is argued that the religious epistemologies of Alston and Plantinga cannot successfully meet the higher-order challenge posed by religious disagreement.Less
Weak conciliationism affirms that many of one’s epistemic starting points enjoy “partisan justification,” justified confidence that exceeds the degree of confidence that is supportable on impartial grounds. But weak conciliationism does not itself supply an account that says when such partisan justification is and is not available. This chapter begins by identifying the options for an account of partisan justification. It then argues for an exclusively rationalist account according to which partisan justification is grounded in rational insight and is not available in disagreements with acknowledged internal rational parity. This argument presents a challenge for “reformed epistemologists,” like Alston and Plantinga, who deemphasize the role of rational insight in religious belief and who defend religious belief by emphasizing similarities between religious belief formation and the formation of perceptual beliefs. It is argued that the religious epistemologies of Alston and Plantinga cannot successfully meet the higher-order challenge posed by religious disagreement.