Willem A. deVries (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely ...
More
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.Less
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.
James R. O'Shea
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores the difficult question of the nature of the relationship between the natural and the normative as it was conceived by Sellars. Sellars's view represented an attempt to defend ...
More
This chapter explores the difficult question of the nature of the relationship between the natural and the normative as it was conceived by Sellars. Sellars's view represented an attempt to defend both the irreducibility of the normative space of reasons and yet, simultaneously and in another sense, its comprehensive reducibility from the perspective of an ideal scientific conception of the nature of reality and of the human being. An early distinction in Sellars between ‘logical’ vs. ‘causal’ reducibility is exploited to explain the relationship between the manifest and scientific images. There is a complex norm/nature presuppositional structure that runs throughout Sellars's views on the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of meaning, intentionality, knowledge, and truth. This interpretation makes it possible to reconcile some of the differences that have divided the so-called ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ Sellarsians.Less
This chapter explores the difficult question of the nature of the relationship between the natural and the normative as it was conceived by Sellars. Sellars's view represented an attempt to defend both the irreducibility of the normative space of reasons and yet, simultaneously and in another sense, its comprehensive reducibility from the perspective of an ideal scientific conception of the nature of reality and of the human being. An early distinction in Sellars between ‘logical’ vs. ‘causal’ reducibility is exploited to explain the relationship between the manifest and scientific images. There is a complex norm/nature presuppositional structure that runs throughout Sellars's views on the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of meaning, intentionality, knowledge, and truth. This interpretation makes it possible to reconcile some of the differences that have divided the so-called ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ Sellarsians.
Willem A. deVries
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter distinguishes between epistemologically and metaphysically motivated forms of idealism. It then shows how Wilfrid Sellars systematically blocks the epistemological motivations for ...
More
This chapter distinguishes between epistemologically and metaphysically motivated forms of idealism. It then shows how Wilfrid Sellars systematically blocks the epistemological motivations for idealism popular in the empiricist tradition. It then argues that the metaphysical motivations for idealism common in the German tradition posed a more significant challenge to Sellars's realism and naturalism, and that it is in response to this challenge that he developed and defended his notion of picturing.Less
This chapter distinguishes between epistemologically and metaphysically motivated forms of idealism. It then shows how Wilfrid Sellars systematically blocks the epistemological motivations for idealism popular in the empiricist tradition. It then argues that the metaphysical motivations for idealism common in the German tradition posed a more significant challenge to Sellars's realism and naturalism, and that it is in response to this challenge that he developed and defended his notion of picturing.
Paul Snowdon
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the ...
More
This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the traditional sense datum theory are insightful but in some respects indecisive. It is further argued that Sellars's account of our thought about perception contains important insights in his treatment of looks-judgments, but that he mis-describes in a fundamental way our understanding of such talk, and that more mistakes creep into his account when he links our thought about perception to the second myth of Jones.Less
This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the traditional sense datum theory are insightful but in some respects indecisive. It is further argued that Sellars's account of our thought about perception contains important insights in his treatment of looks-judgments, but that he mis-describes in a fundamental way our understanding of such talk, and that more mistakes creep into his account when he links our thought about perception to the second myth of Jones.
Johanna Seibt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In ‘Empiricism of the Philosophical Mind’ (EPM) Sellars argues that mental contents as such cannot be caused, rejecting the empiricist notion of mental representation. In Sellars's view perceivers ...
More
In ‘Empiricism of the Philosophical Mind’ (EPM) Sellars argues that mental contents as such cannot be caused, rejecting the empiricist notion of mental representation. In Sellars's view perceivers causally ‘picture’ their environment in perception: physical processes are causally correlated with the perceiver's neurophysiological processes that exhibit certain functional relationships and thus can be attributed content. This chapter argues that ‘picturing’, the link between the ‘causal order’ and the ‘logical space of reasons’, is best understood as non-linear processing in orientation systems with emergent levels of functionality and normativity. First, it is analyzed which process configurations ‘picture’, i.e., form an orientation system for agent navigation that does not involve predication. Second, it is discussed in which sense ‘pictured’ items can be said to be real, and Sellars's transcendental argument for scientific realism is briefly reconstructed. In conclusion, ‘picturing’ is related to recent work on natural functions and anti-representational accounts of cognition.Less
In ‘Empiricism of the Philosophical Mind’ (EPM) Sellars argues that mental contents as such cannot be caused, rejecting the empiricist notion of mental representation. In Sellars's view perceivers causally ‘picture’ their environment in perception: physical processes are causally correlated with the perceiver's neurophysiological processes that exhibit certain functional relationships and thus can be attributed content. This chapter argues that ‘picturing’, the link between the ‘causal order’ and the ‘logical space of reasons’, is best understood as non-linear processing in orientation systems with emergent levels of functionality and normativity. First, it is analyzed which process configurations ‘picture’, i.e., form an orientation system for agent navigation that does not involve predication. Second, it is discussed in which sense ‘pictured’ items can be said to be real, and Sellars's transcendental argument for scientific realism is briefly reconstructed. In conclusion, ‘picturing’ is related to recent work on natural functions and anti-representational accounts of cognition.
John McDowell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (EPM) is sometimes read as attacking empiricism in general. But Sellars's announced target is traditional empiricism. In traditional empiricism, experience ...
More
‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (EPM) is sometimes read as attacking empiricism in general. But Sellars's announced target is traditional empiricism. In traditional empiricism, experience yields knowledge in a way that does not presuppose other empirical knowledge, so that the knowledge provided by experience can serve as foundations, in a straightforward sense, for other empirical knowledge. To accept this conception is to fall into a form of the Myth of the Given. In EPM Sellars works out a different conception of experience, according to which it is a kind of inner episode that, in the best kind of case, yields knowledge, but in a way that presupposes other empirical knowledge. The knowledge provided by experience can still serve as foundations for other empirical knowledge, but now only in a nuanced sense. The chapter concludes that so far from rejecting empiricism altogether, EPM rehabilitates empiricism, but in a non-traditional form.Less
‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (EPM) is sometimes read as attacking empiricism in general. But Sellars's announced target is traditional empiricism. In traditional empiricism, experience yields knowledge in a way that does not presuppose other empirical knowledge, so that the knowledge provided by experience can serve as foundations, in a straightforward sense, for other empirical knowledge. To accept this conception is to fall into a form of the Myth of the Given. In EPM Sellars works out a different conception of experience, according to which it is a kind of inner episode that, in the best kind of case, yields knowledge, but in a way that presupposes other empirical knowledge. The knowledge provided by experience can still serve as foundations for other empirical knowledge, but now only in a nuanced sense. The chapter concludes that so far from rejecting empiricism altogether, EPM rehabilitates empiricism, but in a non-traditional form.
Bruce Kuklick
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199260164
- eISBN:
- 9780191597893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260168.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Of equal importance as the development of pragmatism and instrumentalism, although more narrowly and professionally focused, was the development of realism, a view that argued for the independent ...
More
Of equal importance as the development of pragmatism and instrumentalism, although more narrowly and professionally focused, was the development of realism, a view that argued for the independent existence of the material world in space and time. This movement began in the first decade of the twentieth century led by Harvard's neo‐realist, Ralph Perry. It continued with the more significant Critical Realists of the second decade of the century—George Santayana, Arthur Lovejoy, and Roy Wood Sellars. C.I. Lewis, the most important inter‐war philosopher and another Harvard professor, known for his conceptual pragmatism, also embraced realistic ideas. In the second half of the century, Wilfrid Sellars influentially defended this point of view.Less
Of equal importance as the development of pragmatism and instrumentalism, although more narrowly and professionally focused, was the development of realism, a view that argued for the independent existence of the material world in space and time. This movement began in the first decade of the twentieth century led by Harvard's neo‐realist, Ralph Perry. It continued with the more significant Critical Realists of the second decade of the century—George Santayana, Arthur Lovejoy, and Roy Wood Sellars. C.I. Lewis, the most important inter‐war philosopher and another Harvard professor, known for his conceptual pragmatism, also embraced realistic ideas. In the second half of the century, Wilfrid Sellars influentially defended this point of view.
Willem A. deVries and Paul Coates
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In his Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert B. Brandom's discussion of Sellars's two-ply account of observation and critique of Cartesian philosophies of mind makes several crucial errors that would ...
More
In his Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert B. Brandom's discussion of Sellars's two-ply account of observation and critique of Cartesian philosophies of mind makes several crucial errors that would render Sellars's analysis of ‘looks’-sentences incoherent. Brandom does not recognize the difference in ‘level’ between observation reports concerning physical objects and ‘looks’-reports, and he denies that ‘looks’-sentences are reports or even make claims. Furthermore, he does not recognize the importance of the nonconceptual content of experiential states. This chapter argues that a careful reading of ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ does not support Brandom's interpretation, and show how to read Sellars properly on the analysis of such sentences.Less
In his Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert B. Brandom's discussion of Sellars's two-ply account of observation and critique of Cartesian philosophies of mind makes several crucial errors that would render Sellars's analysis of ‘looks’-sentences incoherent. Brandom does not recognize the difference in ‘level’ between observation reports concerning physical objects and ‘looks’-reports, and he denies that ‘looks’-sentences are reports or even make claims. Furthermore, he does not recognize the importance of the nonconceptual content of experiential states. This chapter argues that a careful reading of ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ does not support Brandom's interpretation, and show how to read Sellars properly on the analysis of such sentences.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time ...
More
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.Less
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.
Jay F. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter reviews Sellars's arguments for the ultimate ontological primacy of the ‘scientific image’ over the ‘manifest image’, despite the fact that the manifest image is essential to the ...
More
This chapter reviews Sellars's arguments for the ultimate ontological primacy of the ‘scientific image’ over the ‘manifest image’, despite the fact that the manifest image is essential to the constitution of humanity. In order better to understand the relation Sellars takes to hold between the objects of the manifest image and ‘theoretical’ postulates of the sciences, the fundamental conception of scientific explanation in Sellars's philosophy is taken into account. It is argued that ‘already within the manifest image, the epistemology of natural science is arguably best understood in Sellarsian terms as a systematic working out of an ontological dialectic of appearance vs. reality’. In Sellars's view, then, the ontological primacy of the scientific image is simply a consequence of commitments already present in the manifest image.Less
This chapter reviews Sellars's arguments for the ultimate ontological primacy of the ‘scientific image’ over the ‘manifest image’, despite the fact that the manifest image is essential to the constitution of humanity. In order better to understand the relation Sellars takes to hold between the objects of the manifest image and ‘theoretical’ postulates of the sciences, the fundamental conception of scientific explanation in Sellars's philosophy is taken into account. It is argued that ‘already within the manifest image, the epistemology of natural science is arguably best understood in Sellarsian terms as a systematic working out of an ontological dialectic of appearance vs. reality’. In Sellars's view, then, the ontological primacy of the scientific image is simply a consequence of commitments already present in the manifest image.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that ...
More
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.Less
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199217250
- eISBN:
- 9780191696053
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, ...
More
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.Less
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199217250
- eISBN:
- 9780191696053
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. At the heart of the Myth of the Given, Sellars finds this claim: that in ...
More
This chapter considers the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. At the heart of the Myth of the Given, Sellars finds this claim: that in making observation reports we are guided by prelinguistic takings of the given, whose authority our reports inherit. Finding this unacceptably obscure, Sellars prefers a kind of reliabilism. What gives epistemic authority to an observational report is said to be rather this: its manifesting the speaker's tendency to issue such reports if and only if he then observes the state of affairs described by the report (given, presumably, that the issuing of a report on that question is then called for).Less
This chapter considers the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. At the heart of the Myth of the Given, Sellars finds this claim: that in making observation reports we are guided by prelinguistic takings of the given, whose authority our reports inherit. Finding this unacceptably obscure, Sellars prefers a kind of reliabilism. What gives epistemic authority to an observational report is said to be rather this: its manifesting the speaker's tendency to issue such reports if and only if he then observes the state of affairs described by the report (given, presumably, that the issuing of a report on that question is then called for).
Ruth Garret Millikan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284764
- eISBN:
- 9780191603167
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284768.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from ...
More
The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or “attitude”.Less
The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or “attitude”.
Huw Price
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198722199
- eISBN:
- 9780191789045
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Aesthetics
This chapter explores the location of John McDowell’s recipe for philosophical tranquility with respect to certain other positions in contemporary philosophy. It is argued that McDowell’s development ...
More
This chapter explores the location of John McDowell’s recipe for philosophical tranquility with respect to certain other positions in contemporary philosophy. It is argued that McDowell’s development of his quietism faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the way he distances himself from various other philosophical positions threatens to push him toward a position even more anti-theoretical than his own, a position from which distinctions McDowell himself wants to draw can’t be seen. To avoid this, however, McDowell must recognize the philosophical value of a ‘sideways’-on view of linguistic practice—albeit not a metaphysical sideways-on view. The argument proceeds in part via a discussion of Sellars’ views.Less
This chapter explores the location of John McDowell’s recipe for philosophical tranquility with respect to certain other positions in contemporary philosophy. It is argued that McDowell’s development of his quietism faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the way he distances himself from various other philosophical positions threatens to push him toward a position even more anti-theoretical than his own, a position from which distinctions McDowell himself wants to draw can’t be seen. To avoid this, however, McDowell must recognize the philosophical value of a ‘sideways’-on view of linguistic practice—albeit not a metaphysical sideways-on view. The argument proceeds in part via a discussion of Sellars’ views.
Christoph Kletzer
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199237159
- eISBN:
- 9780191705427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Starting from the perception that jurisprudence still predominantly but mostly unconsciously operates under the paradigm of logical empiricism, this chapter presents the following arguments: (i) ...
More
Starting from the perception that jurisprudence still predominantly but mostly unconsciously operates under the paradigm of logical empiricism, this chapter presents the following arguments: (i) logical empiricism is a doctrine that stands under fundamental tensions, namely between its logicistic and its empiristic tenets; (ii) Quine tried to solve this incompatibility by redefining the ambit of logicism and by saving empiricism in its redefined form of naturalism; (iii) Wilfrid Sellars, on the other hand, resolved the incoherence of logical empiricism by attacking its core thesis of empiricism as such; (iv) insight into Quine's arguments necessitate a move from legal positivism to legal naturalism; and (v) insight into Sellars' arguments necessitate a move from legal positivism to a non-empiricist theory of law of which so far we have only two (probably flawed) examples: Hegel's theory of Objective Spirit and Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.Less
Starting from the perception that jurisprudence still predominantly but mostly unconsciously operates under the paradigm of logical empiricism, this chapter presents the following arguments: (i) logical empiricism is a doctrine that stands under fundamental tensions, namely between its logicistic and its empiristic tenets; (ii) Quine tried to solve this incompatibility by redefining the ambit of logicism and by saving empiricism in its redefined form of naturalism; (iii) Wilfrid Sellars, on the other hand, resolved the incoherence of logical empiricism by attacking its core thesis of empiricism as such; (iv) insight into Quine's arguments necessitate a move from legal positivism to legal naturalism; and (v) insight into Sellars' arguments necessitate a move from legal positivism to a non-empiricist theory of law of which so far we have only two (probably flawed) examples: Hegel's theory of Objective Spirit and Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.
Harvey Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190682675
- eISBN:
- 9780190682705
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190682675.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivating of rationality. This chapter relates this tradition in ...
More
A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivating of rationality. This chapter relates this tradition in philosophy of education to recent work, inspired by Wilfrid Sellars, on “the space of reasons.” I briefly lay out Sellars’ notion and discuss its place in the work of some of those he influenced, especially John McDowell. I next address recent work in philosophy of education that suggests that there is a tension between Sellars’ notion and the traditional educational ideal, or that the Sellarsian view as developed by McDowell resolves outstanding difficulties with my version of the traditional view. I argue that there is less tension than some of my critics suggest, and that the Sellarsian notion is compatible with the traditional view, but that it leaves out an important aspect of that view that should not be lost.Less
A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivating of rationality. This chapter relates this tradition in philosophy of education to recent work, inspired by Wilfrid Sellars, on “the space of reasons.” I briefly lay out Sellars’ notion and discuss its place in the work of some of those he influenced, especially John McDowell. I next address recent work in philosophy of education that suggests that there is a tension between Sellars’ notion and the traditional educational ideal, or that the Sellarsian view as developed by McDowell resolves outstanding difficulties with my version of the traditional view. I argue that there is less tension than some of my critics suggest, and that the Sellarsian notion is compatible with the traditional view, but that it leaves out an important aspect of that view that should not be lost.
James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett, and John Collier
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276196
- eISBN:
- 9780191706127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter defends a radically naturalistic metaphysics, which is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary science. For reasons to ...
More
This chapter defends a radically naturalistic metaphysics, which is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary science. For reasons to be explained, this chapter takes the view that no alternative kind of metaphysics can be regarded as a legitimate part of our collective attempt to model the structure of objective reality. One of the most distinguished predecessors in this attitude is Wilfrid Sellars, who expressed a naturalistic conception of soundly motivated metaphysics when he said that the philosopher's aim should be “knowing one's way around with respect to the subject matters of all the special [scientific] disciplines” and “building bridges” between them. This chapter focuses on a sense of “understanding” that is perhaps better characterized by the word “explanation”, where an explanation must be true (at least in its most general claims). It is argued that a given metaphysic's achievement of domestication furnishes no evidence at all that the metaphysic in question is true, and thus no reason for believing that it explains anything.Less
This chapter defends a radically naturalistic metaphysics, which is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary science. For reasons to be explained, this chapter takes the view that no alternative kind of metaphysics can be regarded as a legitimate part of our collective attempt to model the structure of objective reality. One of the most distinguished predecessors in this attitude is Wilfrid Sellars, who expressed a naturalistic conception of soundly motivated metaphysics when he said that the philosopher's aim should be “knowing one's way around with respect to the subject matters of all the special [scientific] disciplines” and “building bridges” between them. This chapter focuses on a sense of “understanding” that is perhaps better characterized by the word “explanation”, where an explanation must be true (at least in its most general claims). It is argued that a given metaphysic's achievement of domestication furnishes no evidence at all that the metaphysic in question is true, and thus no reason for believing that it explains anything.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Chapter 8 employs insights from the work of pragmatist philosophers Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, Jeffrey Stout, and speech-act theory to further clarify, enrich, and expand Frei's account of ...
More
Chapter 8 employs insights from the work of pragmatist philosophers Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, Jeffrey Stout, and speech-act theory to further clarify, enrich, and expand Frei's account of literal reading and the plain sense of scripture. It aims to identify and sort out the several delicately interwoven strands of normative constraint in scriptural practices which easily become tangled in Frei's latest writings. Such tangles obscure the nuances of his claims and invite charges that Frei, for instance, merely offers cultural-linguistic correction of his earlier claims about realistic narrative, and that what inevitably ensues is a textual "warranted assertability" that collapses meaning into the community of readers' uses of the text.Less
Chapter 8 employs insights from the work of pragmatist philosophers Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, Jeffrey Stout, and speech-act theory to further clarify, enrich, and expand Frei's account of literal reading and the plain sense of scripture. It aims to identify and sort out the several delicately interwoven strands of normative constraint in scriptural practices which easily become tangled in Frei's latest writings. Such tangles obscure the nuances of his claims and invite charges that Frei, for instance, merely offers cultural-linguistic correction of his earlier claims about realistic narrative, and that what inevitably ensues is a textual "warranted assertability" that collapses meaning into the community of readers' uses of the text.
Stephen P. Stich and Ian Ravenscroft
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126662
- eISBN:
- 9780199868322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126661.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A central premise in eliminativist arguments is that terms like “belief” and “desire” can be viewed as theoretical terms, in a tacit or unconscious theory of the mind, often called “folk psychology.” ...
More
A central premise in eliminativist arguments is that terms like “belief” and “desire” can be viewed as theoretical terms, in a tacit or unconscious theory of the mind, often called “folk psychology.” But the term “folk psychology” has been used as a label for a number of different sorts of things, and on some interpretations of the term, folk psychology could not turn out to be a false theory. Some philosophers, notably David Lewis, unpack the idea of folk psychology by appealing to the platitudes about the mind that everyone knows. Other philosophers unpack the idea by appeal to tacit principles that underlie the capacity to attribute mental states to other people and oneself. On this latter account, it could turn out that folk psychology consists entirely of procedural rules (as in a recipe or computer program), or that it is encoded in a connectionist network that does not map onto a set of propositions in a unique and well‐motivated way. If things do turn out this way, then eliminativist arguments will not work, because folk psychology does not make claims that can be true or false. The chapter begins with a brief history of the idea that ordinary claims about mental states – both our own and those of other people – are subserved by a tacit theory. The basic idea is traced to the work of Wilfred Sellars. Noam Chomsky's work in linguistics made it plausible that we could use a complex theory, without having any conscious access to the principles of the theory.Less
A central premise in eliminativist arguments is that terms like “belief” and “desire” can be viewed as theoretical terms, in a tacit or unconscious theory of the mind, often called “folk psychology.” But the term “folk psychology” has been used as a label for a number of different sorts of things, and on some interpretations of the term, folk psychology could not turn out to be a false theory. Some philosophers, notably David Lewis, unpack the idea of folk psychology by appealing to the platitudes about the mind that everyone knows. Other philosophers unpack the idea by appeal to tacit principles that underlie the capacity to attribute mental states to other people and oneself. On this latter account, it could turn out that folk psychology consists entirely of procedural rules (as in a recipe or computer program), or that it is encoded in a connectionist network that does not map onto a set of propositions in a unique and well‐motivated way. If things do turn out this way, then eliminativist arguments will not work, because folk psychology does not make claims that can be true or false. The chapter begins with a brief history of the idea that ordinary claims about mental states – both our own and those of other people – are subserved by a tacit theory. The basic idea is traced to the work of Wilfred Sellars. Noam Chomsky's work in linguistics made it plausible that we could use a complex theory, without having any conscious access to the principles of the theory.
