Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, ...
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This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.Less
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their ...
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This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.Less
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that ...
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This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.Less
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.
Paul F. Snowdon
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195389364
- eISBN:
- 9780199932368
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter is a critical and interpretative discussion of Ryle's views on knowing how, in particular as presented in his early paper ‘Knowing How and Knowing That.’ Some preliminary evidence is ...
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The chapter is a critical and interpretative discussion of Ryle's views on knowing how, in particular as presented in his early paper ‘Knowing How and Knowing That.’ Some preliminary evidence is presented, intended to show that it is wrong to regard, as Ryle did, knowing how and knowing that as strongly contrastable. Ryle's own primary interest seems to be to show that the view he calls ‘intellectualism’ is wrong. It is argued that Ryle's explanation of intellectualism is inadequate and, by scrutinizing some of the examples that Ryle focuses on, that he fails to justify any conclusions about knowing how on the basis of rejecting intellectualism. Finally, a recent attempt by Wiggins to defend Ryle's view and some of his arguments is criticized. The conclusion is that the Rylean paradigm about knowing how lacks a defense.Less
The chapter is a critical and interpretative discussion of Ryle's views on knowing how, in particular as presented in his early paper ‘Knowing How and Knowing That.’ Some preliminary evidence is presented, intended to show that it is wrong to regard, as Ryle did, knowing how and knowing that as strongly contrastable. Ryle's own primary interest seems to be to show that the view he calls ‘intellectualism’ is wrong. It is argued that Ryle's explanation of intellectualism is inadequate and, by scrutinizing some of the examples that Ryle focuses on, that he fails to justify any conclusions about knowing how on the basis of rejecting intellectualism. Finally, a recent attempt by Wiggins to defend Ryle's view and some of his arguments is criticized. The conclusion is that the Rylean paradigm about knowing how lacks a defense.
André Gallois
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261833
- eISBN:
- 9780191698798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261833.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the relevance of philosopher David Wiggins' only A and B rule for identity to the occasional identity thesis. This rule states that A's having a relation (R) to B must be such ...
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This chapter examines the relevance of philosopher David Wiggins' only A and B rule for identity to the occasional identity thesis. This rule states that A's having a relation (R) to B must be such that objects distinct from A or B are irrelevant to whether A has R to B. Though the only A and B rule is compelling, it violates the extrinsic view identity. This view proposes that, in the case of amoebic division, whether AMOEBA is ever identical to the POND depends on the existence of SLIDE, which does not exist in W2.Less
This chapter examines the relevance of philosopher David Wiggins' only A and B rule for identity to the occasional identity thesis. This rule states that A's having a relation (R) to B must be such that objects distinct from A or B are irrelevant to whether A has R to B. Though the only A and B rule is compelling, it violates the extrinsic view identity. This view proposes that, in the case of amoebic division, whether AMOEBA is ever identical to the POND depends on the existence of SLIDE, which does not exist in W2.
Crispin Wright
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236399
- eISBN:
- 9780191597565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236395.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory ...
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This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory solution of this paradox are imposed. Second, it discusses and rejects on the basis of these five constraints Dummett's solution to the paradox, as well as the more recently offered alternative approach of Wiggins. In the following, the source of the paradox is identified with the intuitive sounding Reference Principle, i.e. that sameness of reference should ensure sameness of semantic role, which suffices to develop the paradox on a standard Fregean semantics. Lastly, a resolution is offered by distinguishing two kinds of semantic relations, reference for singular terms and ascription for predicates, which resolves the paradox, while retaining the Reference Principle, however it seems subject to other well‐known problems such as the intensional version of Russell's Paradox.Less
This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory solution of this paradox are imposed. Second, it discusses and rejects on the basis of these five constraints Dummett's solution to the paradox, as well as the more recently offered alternative approach of Wiggins. In the following, the source of the paradox is identified with the intuitive sounding Reference Principle, i.e. that sameness of reference should ensure sameness of semantic role, which suffices to develop the paradox on a standard Fregean semantics. Lastly, a resolution is offered by distinguishing two kinds of semantic relations, reference for singular terms and ascription for predicates, which resolves the paradox, while retaining the Reference Principle, however it seems subject to other well‐known problems such as the intensional version of Russell's Paradox.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's ...
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This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's wider position, the chapter defends the legitimacy of a demand for an explanation of the reliability of human moral cognition against McDowell's quietism. It seeks to demonstrate both that an explanation is required, and that McDowell cannot provide one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of David Wiggins' weaker conception of objectivity in ethics. It argues that Wiggins' position offers further confirmation of the central thesis of the book: that the explanatory gap is only evaded by positions which fail to do justice to our pre-philosophical commitments.Less
This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's wider position, the chapter defends the legitimacy of a demand for an explanation of the reliability of human moral cognition against McDowell's quietism. It seeks to demonstrate both that an explanation is required, and that McDowell cannot provide one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of David Wiggins' weaker conception of objectivity in ethics. It argues that Wiggins' position offers further confirmation of the central thesis of the book: that the explanatory gap is only evaded by positions which fail to do justice to our pre-philosophical commitments.
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of ...
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We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of clay, undetached parts, fission, fusion and longevity, vague identity, and conventional identity. A good solution is given by the ‘worm theory’, according to which continuants are aggregates of temporal parts; a better solution is given by the ‘stage theory’, according to which continuants are instantaneous temporal parts, whose temporal properties are understood via temporal counterpart theory. There are other solutions that do not appeal to temporal parts: Wiggins's constitution theory, Burke's dominance view, Gallois's temporary identity theory, eliminativism, and mereological essentialism. But these are arguably inferior: some are insufficiently general, others are subject to powerful criticisms.Less
We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of clay, undetached parts, fission, fusion and longevity, vague identity, and conventional identity. A good solution is given by the ‘worm theory’, according to which continuants are aggregates of temporal parts; a better solution is given by the ‘stage theory’, according to which continuants are instantaneous temporal parts, whose temporal properties are understood via temporal counterpart theory. There are other solutions that do not appeal to temporal parts: Wiggins's constitution theory, Burke's dominance view, Gallois's temporary identity theory, eliminativism, and mereological essentialism. But these are arguably inferior: some are insufficiently general, others are subject to powerful criticisms.
Theresa Lloyd (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813178790
- eISBN:
- 9780813178806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813178790.003.0704
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Social Groups
Mountain society changed dramatically with rapid post-Civil War industrialization, which laid the groundwork for the region’s wide-scale poverty and dependency. The hardships of work and oppressive ...
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Mountain society changed dramatically with rapid post-Civil War industrialization, which laid the groundwork for the region’s wide-scale poverty and dependency. The hardships of work and oppressive living conditions in newly industrialized Appalachia gave birth to a rich and important body of literature, which includes fiction, poetry, drama, and songs. The development of Appalachia’s literature of protest paralleled the rise of social justice and workers’ literature internationally.Less
Mountain society changed dramatically with rapid post-Civil War industrialization, which laid the groundwork for the region’s wide-scale poverty and dependency. The hardships of work and oppressive living conditions in newly industrialized Appalachia gave birth to a rich and important body of literature, which includes fiction, poetry, drama, and songs. The development of Appalachia’s literature of protest paralleled the rise of social justice and workers’ literature internationally.
Paul F. Snowdon
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198719618
- eISBN:
- 9780191788703
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719618.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The starting point for this book is a particular answer to the fundamental question — what kind of thing are we? The particular answer is that we are animals (of a certain sort)—a view nowadays ...
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The starting point for this book is a particular answer to the fundamental question — what kind of thing are we? The particular answer is that we are animals (of a certain sort)—a view nowadays called ‘animalism’. Many philosophers reject this answer. The aim of the book is to propose, contrary to that attitude, that there are strong reasons to believe animalism, and that when properly analysed, the objections against it that philosophers have given are not convincing. The initial chapters analyse the content and general philosophical implications of animalism—these implications relate primarily to the so-called problem of personal identity, and that of the unity of consciousness—and they also provide a framework which categorizes the standard philosophical objections. It is then argued that animalism is consistent with a perfectly plausible account of the central notion of a ‘person’, and it criticizes the accounts offered by Locke and by Wiggins of that notion. The next two chapters argue that there are very strong reasons to think animalism is true, and some central claims about animal which are relevant to the argument are proposed. The rest of the book considers the lack of cogency of the standard philosophical objections. In considering many types of objections the views of various philosophers, including Nagel, Shoemaker, Johnston, Wilkes, and Olson are also considered. The book then concludes by considering other types of objections and dismissing them. The conclusion by the end is that animalism represents a highly commonsensical and defensible way of thinking about ourselves, and that its rejection by philosophers rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.Less
The starting point for this book is a particular answer to the fundamental question — what kind of thing are we? The particular answer is that we are animals (of a certain sort)—a view nowadays called ‘animalism’. Many philosophers reject this answer. The aim of the book is to propose, contrary to that attitude, that there are strong reasons to believe animalism, and that when properly analysed, the objections against it that philosophers have given are not convincing. The initial chapters analyse the content and general philosophical implications of animalism—these implications relate primarily to the so-called problem of personal identity, and that of the unity of consciousness—and they also provide a framework which categorizes the standard philosophical objections. It is then argued that animalism is consistent with a perfectly plausible account of the central notion of a ‘person’, and it criticizes the accounts offered by Locke and by Wiggins of that notion. The next two chapters argue that there are very strong reasons to think animalism is true, and some central claims about animal which are relevant to the argument are proposed. The rest of the book considers the lack of cogency of the standard philosophical objections. In considering many types of objections the views of various philosophers, including Nagel, Shoemaker, Johnston, Wilkes, and Olson are also considered. The book then concludes by considering other types of objections and dismissing them. The conclusion by the end is that animalism represents a highly commonsensical and defensible way of thinking about ourselves, and that its rejection by philosophers rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.
Elijah Millgram
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190873240
- eISBN:
- 9780190873271
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190873240.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The popular view that the meaning of a life should be a project is assessed by examining a life that did have that shape. John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian life project is described, and is argued to be ...
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The popular view that the meaning of a life should be a project is assessed by examining a life that did have that shape. John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian life project is described, and is argued to be a best representative of the class. Turning points and unusual features of Mill’s life are shown to be side effects or preconditions of having a very large project center stage in it. Life projects are motivated as satisfying a coherence requirement imposed on the valuable elements of a life. But Mill’s biography demonstrates that living out one’s life as a project undermines its coherence. The overunified life, it is concluded, is to be avoided, and the meaningfulness of a life is best reconceived so as to give it application in the lives of loosely organized agents.Less
The popular view that the meaning of a life should be a project is assessed by examining a life that did have that shape. John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian life project is described, and is argued to be a best representative of the class. Turning points and unusual features of Mill’s life are shown to be side effects or preconditions of having a very large project center stage in it. Life projects are motivated as satisfying a coherence requirement imposed on the valuable elements of a life. But Mill’s biography demonstrates that living out one’s life as a project undermines its coherence. The overunified life, it is concluded, is to be avoided, and the meaningfulness of a life is best reconceived so as to give it application in the lives of loosely organized agents.
James McDermott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719084775
- eISBN:
- 9781781702673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719084775.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Tribunalists came from widely different backgrounds and enjoyed markedly dissimilar expectations of themselves and their immediate society. In the early months of the Tribunal system, many single ...
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Tribunalists came from widely different backgrounds and enjoyed markedly dissimilar expectations of themselves and their immediate society. In the early months of the Tribunal system, many single young men claimed to be the only, or sole remaining, support of a widowed mother or of incapacitated parents. The Tribunals were not part of that inadvertent social experiment. The cases presented offer evidence of the self-serving idiosyncrasies reported of tribunalists elsewhere. If Northampton Borough's treatment of W.P. Townley and Leslie Wiggins suggests a certain direction to their partialities, their quixotic behaviour upon other occasions makes simplistic conclusions problematic. The Appeals Tribunal matched Northampton Borough's predilection for the sentimental, even quixotic gesture. Appeals Tribunal were grateful to the Mayor for giving them the opportunity to affirm so robustly their egalitarian pretensions in the glare of local publicity.Less
Tribunalists came from widely different backgrounds and enjoyed markedly dissimilar expectations of themselves and their immediate society. In the early months of the Tribunal system, many single young men claimed to be the only, or sole remaining, support of a widowed mother or of incapacitated parents. The Tribunals were not part of that inadvertent social experiment. The cases presented offer evidence of the self-serving idiosyncrasies reported of tribunalists elsewhere. If Northampton Borough's treatment of W.P. Townley and Leslie Wiggins suggests a certain direction to their partialities, their quixotic behaviour upon other occasions makes simplistic conclusions problematic. The Appeals Tribunal matched Northampton Borough's predilection for the sentimental, even quixotic gesture. Appeals Tribunal were grateful to the Mayor for giving them the opportunity to affirm so robustly their egalitarian pretensions in the glare of local publicity.
Amy Kate Bailey and Stewart E. Tolnay
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469620879
- eISBN:
- 9781469623092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469620879.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter focuses on the characteristics of atypical lynch victims—women and white men—and the circumstances surrounding their murders. Among them is Bob Sims, a white man living in Choctaw ...
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This chapter focuses on the characteristics of atypical lynch victims—women and white men—and the circumstances surrounding their murders. Among them is Bob Sims, a white man living in Choctaw County, AL. Mr. Sims was reported to be a self-proclaimed religious prophet and the leader of a notorious band of outlaws known as the Sims Gang. In December 1891, they were said to have murdered three people and burned their victims’ house to the ground. A group of local residents banded together to form a posse and bring Bob Sims and the rest of his outlaw gang to justice. Another victim was Ella Mays Wiggins, a twenty-eight-year-old white woman who lived in Gaston County, NC. Ms. Wiggins had been deserted by her husband and was working in the local textile mills when, according to newspaper reports, she joined the union and attended a public organizing meeting held in the county seat of Gastonia. A mob shot and killed her, although the details surrounding the incident are unclear.Less
This chapter focuses on the characteristics of atypical lynch victims—women and white men—and the circumstances surrounding their murders. Among them is Bob Sims, a white man living in Choctaw County, AL. Mr. Sims was reported to be a self-proclaimed religious prophet and the leader of a notorious band of outlaws known as the Sims Gang. In December 1891, they were said to have murdered three people and burned their victims’ house to the ground. A group of local residents banded together to form a posse and bring Bob Sims and the rest of his outlaw gang to justice. Another victim was Ella Mays Wiggins, a twenty-eight-year-old white woman who lived in Gaston County, NC. Ms. Wiggins had been deserted by her husband and was working in the local textile mills when, according to newspaper reports, she joined the union and attended a public organizing meeting held in the county seat of Gastonia. A mob shot and killed her, although the details surrounding the incident are unclear.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672349
- eISBN:
- 9780191751325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy
This paper builds on an earlier paper, ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’, in which it was denied that instantiations of a thick concept invoke a single attitudinal response, and always the same one. The ...
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This paper builds on an earlier paper, ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’, in which it was denied that instantiations of a thick concept invoke a single attitudinal response, and always the same one. The no-priority view is that neither property nor attitude is conceptually prior; they interpenetrate each other, because the property is that of being such as to merit the response, and the attitude is to the object as meriting that response. This present paper suggests that the no-priority view will not generalise so as to cover all cases. This present paper also express doubts about the earlier appeal to Aristotelian domains. Finally, Williams's distinction between world-guided and action-guiding in examined, and it is suggested that instances of thick concepts have an intrinsic practical relevance which needs no further explanation.Less
This paper builds on an earlier paper, ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’, in which it was denied that instantiations of a thick concept invoke a single attitudinal response, and always the same one. The no-priority view is that neither property nor attitude is conceptually prior; they interpenetrate each other, because the property is that of being such as to merit the response, and the attitude is to the object as meriting that response. This present paper suggests that the no-priority view will not generalise so as to cover all cases. This present paper also express doubts about the earlier appeal to Aristotelian domains. Finally, Williams's distinction between world-guided and action-guiding in examined, and it is suggested that instances of thick concepts have an intrinsic practical relevance which needs no further explanation.
Mark LeBar
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199931118
- eISBN:
- 9780199345717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter explains how the account of norms for success in practical reason underwrite a conception of the metaphysics of value properties as response-dependent, along the lines suggested by John ...
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This chapter explains how the account of norms for success in practical reason underwrite a conception of the metaphysics of value properties as response-dependent, along the lines suggested by John McDowell and David Wiggins. It considers the relation between reasons, ends, and values, and consider how response-dependent views of value properties have been developed by McDowell, Wiggins, and others before setting out a schema for understanding value as response-dependent given the account of practical rationality offered in this book.Less
This chapter explains how the account of norms for success in practical reason underwrite a conception of the metaphysics of value properties as response-dependent, along the lines suggested by John McDowell and David Wiggins. It considers the relation between reasons, ends, and values, and consider how response-dependent views of value properties have been developed by McDowell, Wiggins, and others before setting out a schema for understanding value as response-dependent given the account of practical rationality offered in this book.
Elizabeth Cassidy Parker
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190671358
- eISBN:
- 9780190671396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190671358.003.0009
- Subject:
- Music, Ethnomusicology, World Music
Chapter 4 focuses on adolescent feelings, including two large concepts: (1)musical perseverance and vulnerability, and (2) musical agency. Adolescents share their feelings about making music—how they ...
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Chapter 4 focuses on adolescent feelings, including two large concepts: (1)musical perseverance and vulnerability, and (2) musical agency. Adolescents share their feelings about making music—how they use music to strengthen the self, persevere through difficulty, experience joy, and connect with others. Building blocks to musical agency are identified as perseverance and vulnerability. The chapter then looks closely at musical agency, specifically self-regulation, self-transformation, and connecting to self and world. The end of the chapter introduces holistic teaching with an aim to foster balance, inclusion, and connection. Educators are encouraged to work with adolescents on growing a sense of purpose.Less
Chapter 4 focuses on adolescent feelings, including two large concepts: (1)musical perseverance and vulnerability, and (2) musical agency. Adolescents share their feelings about making music—how they use music to strengthen the self, persevere through difficulty, experience joy, and connect with others. Building blocks to musical agency are identified as perseverance and vulnerability. The chapter then looks closely at musical agency, specifically self-regulation, self-transformation, and connecting to self and world. The end of the chapter introduces holistic teaching with an aim to foster balance, inclusion, and connection. Educators are encouraged to work with adolescents on growing a sense of purpose.
Peter A. Kopp
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780520277472
- eISBN:
- 9780520965058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520277472.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Oregon became the leading hop producer in the United States, with the Willamette Valley contributing millions of pounds of hops to the world’s brewers. ...
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In the first decade of the twentieth century, Oregon became the leading hop producer in the United States, with the Willamette Valley contributing millions of pounds of hops to the world’s brewers. The region claimed to be the Hop Center of the World. This chapter explains how those in the industry sought to professionalize by connecting with local and international brewers, including Ireland’s Guinness Brewery, and international hop distribution companies. Additionally, industry leaders championed the region’s hops as the finest in the world and benefitted from the emergence of a hop research program at the Agricultural Experiment Station in Corvallis.Less
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Oregon became the leading hop producer in the United States, with the Willamette Valley contributing millions of pounds of hops to the world’s brewers. The region claimed to be the Hop Center of the World. This chapter explains how those in the industry sought to professionalize by connecting with local and international brewers, including Ireland’s Guinness Brewery, and international hop distribution companies. Additionally, industry leaders championed the region’s hops as the finest in the world and benefitted from the emergence of a hop research program at the Agricultural Experiment Station in Corvallis.
Simon Kirchin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198803430
- eISBN:
- 9780191841613
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803430.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers a second anti-separationist strategy, namely the thought that if one separates thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevaluative, descriptive content, as separationists ...
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This chapter considers a second anti-separationist strategy, namely the thought that if one separates thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevaluative, descriptive content, as separationists think, one is erroneously committed to thinking that the latter can in some way map onto the evaluative concept that one is analysing such that one can predict novel uses of that concept. This anti-separationist argument is often called the ‘disentangling argument’, something that is reliant on the ‘shapelessness hypothesis’, and is associated with John McDowell and David Wiggins, among others. This famous argument and hypothesis are laid out in great detail. The upshot is that the argument does not work as traditionally given, although a weaker version may have some attraction. Overall it is argued that nonseparationists should pursue a different anti-separationist strategy.Less
This chapter considers a second anti-separationist strategy, namely the thought that if one separates thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevaluative, descriptive content, as separationists think, one is erroneously committed to thinking that the latter can in some way map onto the evaluative concept that one is analysing such that one can predict novel uses of that concept. This anti-separationist argument is often called the ‘disentangling argument’, something that is reliant on the ‘shapelessness hypothesis’, and is associated with John McDowell and David Wiggins, among others. This famous argument and hypothesis are laid out in great detail. The upshot is that the argument does not work as traditionally given, although a weaker version may have some attraction. Overall it is argued that nonseparationists should pursue a different anti-separationist strategy.
Arna Bontemps
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252037696
- eISBN:
- 9780252094958
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252037696.003.0027
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter examines Negro music as well as musicians such as singers, instrumentalists, directors, and composers in Illinois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It begins with a ...
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This chapter examines Negro music as well as musicians such as singers, instrumentalists, directors, and composers in Illinois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It begins with a discussion of various Negro musicians in Illinois, from piano prodigy “Blind Tom” Wiggins and the Hampton Singers to the Fisk Jubilee Singers and choral groups known for singing spirituals. Among them were the Chicago Choral Study Club, one of the first to perform the works of black composer Samuel Coleridge-Taylor. The chapter also considers the emergence of organized music schools among Chicago Negroes, including the Coleridge-Taylor Music School and the National Conservatory of Music, as well as church choirs, musical clubs and associations.Less
This chapter examines Negro music as well as musicians such as singers, instrumentalists, directors, and composers in Illinois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It begins with a discussion of various Negro musicians in Illinois, from piano prodigy “Blind Tom” Wiggins and the Hampton Singers to the Fisk Jubilee Singers and choral groups known for singing spirituals. Among them were the Chicago Choral Study Club, one of the first to perform the works of black composer Samuel Coleridge-Taylor. The chapter also considers the emergence of organized music schools among Chicago Negroes, including the Coleridge-Taylor Music School and the National Conservatory of Music, as well as church choirs, musical clubs and associations.