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This chapter sets the scene for the Christmas truce by examining the letters British soldiers wrote home during the first winter of the war, which included forthright descriptions of the horrors of the trenches, the respect they had for the German soldiers, and occasional friendly relations with their enemies. Letters that were printed in the British newspapers containing this information conditioned the public to accept a reality about the front lines that deviated from the official reports. The frankness with which the British soldiers wrote home during this time anticipates how they would report the truce, and the way it would be received by the home front.

The subject of this chapter is the Oscar-winning film All Quiet on the Western Front. After discussion of why the Laemmle family’s Universal Studios wanted to make film of Erich Maria Remarque’s celebrated novel, the chapter considers the screenplay adaptation, casting of Lew Ayres in leading role, the revolutionary sound design, influence of Sergei Eisenstein’s montage technique, reception and political reaction to the film in the United States, and changing attitudes towards World War I. The final section focuses on the hostile reception of the film in Germany, where it was used by the Nazi leaders, especially Joseph Goebbels, for propaganda purposes, and how the film’s global renown changed Milestone’s life.

Between the year 1941 and 1942, the Wehrmacht's combat units underwent a radical process of demodernization, just as the Third Reich's economy was being mobilized for a total industrial war. This chapter examines the contradiction between the Wehrmacht's image as the most modern army of its time, and the profound process of demodernization it underwent particularly on the Eastern Front. Through a detailed reconstruction of life at the front, the chapter demonstrates the effects of the immense material attrition on the troops' physical condition and state of mind. Strong emphasis is given on the winter of 1941–2, when the majority of Germany's soldiers were forced into trench warfare highly reminiscent of the Western Front of 1914–18, while facing, however, an increasingly modernized enemy. Several consequences of the demodernization of the front are also presented in this chapter.

This chapter outlines the Western Front’s environmental history to show how the First World War was fought in, through, and against nature. If sterility implies the absence of life and infertility, it seemed that the war had sterilized vast swathes of northern and eastern France. The mobilization of terrain and topography had begun before the establishment of trench warfare during the initial war of movement. The military mobilization of animals during the war was, at times, symbolic. As well as featuring on propaganda posters, animal imagery appeared on actual war machines. Bases and training grounds served a variety of purposes during the war. Among them were training troops in trench warfare, testing weapons, and providing places of repose for soldiers recovering from life in the trenches. The mobilization of nature for military training and weapons testing militarized sites beyond northern and eastern France.

This chapter discusses the conventional narrative of the Christmas truce and then introduces the popular narrative of the First World War, demonstrates how the standard view of the Christmas truce supports that narrative, and reviews recent historiography that challenges the conventional war narrative. The truce is then reexamined to illustrate how it can contribute to a more complete understanding of the First World War.

Works from the interwar and immediate post–World War II period, when everyone in Britain was supposed to be thoroughly disillusioned with the conflict, demonstrate that in fact the narrative of the war was still at this point hotly disputed, and remained so through the late 1950s. Memoirs, treatises, novels, general histories, and polemics all took different attitudes toward the war, and the truce was an important part of this contested narrative: some dismissed it as a mere curiosity, while others contended that the cease-fire signified an important moral about the conflict.

This chapter highlights the German Army's experience on the Western Front. It shows that the German Army learned more effectively as it shifted toward moderately decentralized command practices, developed coherent and independent assessment mechanisms, and exerted centralized control over training. The Germans were the first to reach this ideal setup and were also the first to adopt (most of) the elements of a superior combined-arms doctrine. The chapter also illustrates the way organizational structure influences learning. It argues that the German Army was structured to learn. Its often-cited command practices were part of the story, but its assessment mechanisms and highly centralized training systems were also important. The chapter reveals that the German Army was not more creative or original than its competitors. It was, however, better at turning good concepts into practical doctrine. Ultimately, the chapter examines the importance of tactical performance in the military effectiveness equation, and how the German Army learned faster than its adversaries.

This chapter investigates the case of the French Army on the Western Front. It argues that the French Army was arguably the most decentralized and adaptive army on the Western Front. French infantry units experimented sooner and more aggressively than their British and German counterparts. The chapter then analyses the army's assault tactics and elastic defenses, as well as the army's moderately decentralized command and control for most of the war. The chapter also discusses French Army's high command — the Grand Quartier Général (GQG). It recounts how the GQG struggled to isolate, identify, and promote the sort of assault, combined-arms, and defensive tactics needed. The chapter highlights two factors to take into account when testing assessment, command, and training (ACT) theory against the French Army. First, political and strategic imperatives limited the army's doctrinal options. Second, is that the French Army occupies a blind spot in the English-language military historiography on tactical change during the First World War.

This chapter provides a basic overview of the tactical dilemma facing the British, French, and German armies on the Western Front. It investigates how the troop-to-space ratio and the imbalance between strategic and tactical mobility — combined with firepower contributed to the stalemate on the Western Front. Beyond these daunting firepower and organizational challenges, the chapter also looks at a number of coordination problems being faced by the commanders during the war: infantry–artillery coordination, the challenge around achieving surprise, and logistics. It also examines the two unenviable trade-offs encountered by the commanders which revolved around depth and breadth. The chapter then shifts to discuss the challenges of the defenders and how they had to constantly adapt during the war. It identifies the optimal doctrine for ending the stalemate. Finally, the chapter analyzes the British, French, and German armies' set of solutions to these problems and challenges: assault tactics, combined-arms, and elastic defense in depth.

This chapter details the story of the IEFA (Indian Corps), which fought in France. We tackle the question whether the IEFA faced a breakdown of morale; if not, how was it able to cope with the challenges of mass industrial trench warfare in the cold damp region of north France and the Low Countries? How the sepoys and sowars were able to make a transition from waging small wars to conducting mass industrial warfare centring round mud-filled trenches and mass infantry attacks supported by voluminous heavy gunfire is an issue discussed here. The first section deals with tactics and techniques of warfare for which the sepoys and sowars were prepared before the onset of the Great War, and the second section discusses the adaptation and adoption on part of the Indian troops in face of combat along the Western Front. The third section relates the soldiers’ experiences with issues of morale and discipline.

In this chapter, the popular narrative of the truce is challenged by the letters and diaries of the soldiers involved. Although there were soldiers who joined in truces that mirror the conventional view of the cease-fire—including fraternization and even the occasional football match—an examination of the contemporary documents demonstrates that there were many types of truces. Some were held only to bury the dead, whereas others were cease-fires with no fraternization. There were soldiers who refused to participate out of mistrust of the Germans, and others who resented the enemy more after meeting with them. This chapter demonstrates that the truce was a much more nuanced and complex event than the current narrative allows.

The popular narrative of the truce further maintains that the event was “hushed up” by the military leadership and the government, and that the British public would have been horrified to learn that their soldiers had fraternized with the enemy. An examination of six nationally available newspapers from the end of 1914 through the beginning of 1915, however, shows that many letters from soldiers freely discussing the truce were published during that time. As a result, the British public was fully aware of the event; additionally, no letters or editorials critical of the soldiers who participated or of the truce itself appeared in those papers.

The introduction explores reasons for the relative scholarly neglect of Lewis Milestone and his films: his diverse body of work, his troubles during the Blacklist period, the serious nature of most of his films, his difficulty getting along with studio bosses, his distaste for the “star system,” changing Hollywood tastes. It provides an overview of his career, from the silent to the sound era, and his huge early success with All Quiet on the Western Front, which came to haunt him in later years. Milestone was drawn repeatedly to the theme of war, especially its impact on ordinary soldiers. Also discussed is how Milestone’s life embodies the “rag-to-riches” American dream of millions of immigrants.

This chapter reviews three confounding factors and alternative ways to explain events. It begins with analyzing Germany's experience during the First World War and their inept political and strategic decisions. The chapter also explores the author's assumption that the British, French, and German armies should have converged on a superior war-fighting doctrine that combined flexible assault tactics, integrated artillery–infantry operations, and elastic defenses in depth. Genius and individual leadership offer yet another tempting way to account for change. The chapter unfolds the story of wartime learning during the First World War. It introduces two shadow cases — the US Army in Vietnam (1965–1973) and Iraq (2003–2010) — so as to suggest that assessment, command, and training (ACT) theory can explain more than just learning on the Western Front. The chapter concludes by identifying important policy implications for contemporary defense strategists.