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This chapter explains how Reid arrives at his appeal to suggestion by an argument from elimination. It then discusses his application of his theory of suggestion to tactile perception. Reid claims that the Way of Ideas operates upon the assumption that the immediate intentional objects of our thoughts are ideas or other representational intermediaries. The Way of Ideas attempts to reduce contentful mental states to non-contentful features of those states, whereas Reid takes intentional content as irreducible and basic. Special attention is given to Reid's experimentum crucis, or ‘crucial test’, a thought experiment involving a subject's systematic sensory deprivation. Reid seeks to show that the uses of sensation, custom, and reasoning are singly and jointly insufficient for the formation of our perceptual contents. He takes this as a fine objection to the Way of Ideas, on which sensations and reflection upon sensations are sufficient for providing us with our perceptual contents.

This chapter brings together some remarks upon Reid's methodological empiricism and attempts to set him apart from these predecessors. By placing thorough limitations upon natural philosophy, he precludes us from understanding or knowing that substance dualism or materialism is true. This feature of his philosophy of mind resembles the views now associated with certain contemporary philosophers of mind who hold that the true nature of consciousness is beyond human comprehension due to the constitutional limitations of our minds. By employing epistemic principles to adjudicate metaphysical disputes, his empiricism resembles the philosophical perspective we have come to associate with some contemporary philosophers of science, who eschew metaphysical posturing in just the way Reid shuns the Way of Ideas' hypotheses.

This chapter analyzes Reid's theory of visual perception. Specifically, it determines the nature of Reid's theory of visual perception and its implications on a theory of perceptual knowledge. Vision had seemed to Reid's predecessors obviously to be indirect. While he disagrees with this sentiment, his concession to the Way of Ideas is his recognition of a type of visual intermediary, which he calls ‘visible figure’. He argues that the presence of visible figure does not thwart his attempt to show that even visual perception can provide us direct access to features of the world. Analysis of Reid's underdeveloped notion of visible figure yields a theory of perception that implies touch and vision afford us differently structured relations to the mind-independent world.

This chapter analyzes Reid's treatment of the Molyneux question. Molyneux's question can be presented in general form as this: ‘Were a blind person to be given sight, and were a cube and a sphere set in her field of vision, would she be capable of identifying which object is which?’ In the Inquiry, Reid gives both a ‘no’ and a ‘yes’ to Molyneux's question. The thrust of Reid's response to Molyneux's issues emphasizes the limitations Reid places upon sensation in the perceptual process. This chapter exhibits the key differences between Reid and the Way of Ideas, and confirms several other attributions made to Reid in the material preceding this chapter.

A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.