Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390964
- eISBN:
- 9780199776788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390964.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those ...
More
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those like Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, have borne a disproportionate share of America's wartime sacrifice. The size of the differences in casualty rates between rich and poor communities may not be as great as some of the rhetoric from the Left suggests. While socioeconomically disadvantaged communities do bear disproportionately large shares of the casualty burden, some wealthy and highly educated communities have also suffered significant numbers of casualties. However, contra the protestations of some on the Right, the casualty gap is real, and, perhaps equally significantly, the data suggest that this gap may have widened over time.Less
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those like Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, have borne a disproportionate share of America's wartime sacrifice. The size of the differences in casualty rates between rich and poor communities may not be as great as some of the rhetoric from the Left suggests. While socioeconomically disadvantaged communities do bear disproportionately large shares of the casualty burden, some wealthy and highly educated communities have also suffered significant numbers of casualties. However, contra the protestations of some on the Right, the casualty gap is real, and, perhaps equally significantly, the data suggest that this gap may have widened over time.
Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390964
- eISBN:
- 9780199776788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390964.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Combining individual-level survey data with state and county electoral returns, this chapter empirically investigates whether the relationships between local casualties, public opinion, and voting ...
More
Combining individual-level survey data with state and county electoral returns, this chapter empirically investigates whether the relationships between local casualties, public opinion, and voting behavior in Iraq parallel those observed during the Vietnam era. The data reveal that some of these relationships in the contemporary conflict are dramatically different from those observed in Vietnam, while others remain eerily similar. Americans' differential exposure to casualties continues to play a significant role in influencing support for the war and for the political leaders charged with directing it. At their core, the results of the analysis of Iraq strongly reaffirm that the casualty gap has critically important political ramifications for American governance. Public opinion turns increasingly against the war when citizens experience the costs of war first-hand through casualties from their local community. Because high casualty-rate communities historically tend to have lower levels of income and education, and their residents are less engaged with politics than their peers from low casualty-rate communities, the dampening effect of casualties on hawkish military policies is weaker in practice than conventional wisdom suggests.Less
Combining individual-level survey data with state and county electoral returns, this chapter empirically investigates whether the relationships between local casualties, public opinion, and voting behavior in Iraq parallel those observed during the Vietnam era. The data reveal that some of these relationships in the contemporary conflict are dramatically different from those observed in Vietnam, while others remain eerily similar. Americans' differential exposure to casualties continues to play a significant role in influencing support for the war and for the political leaders charged with directing it. At their core, the results of the analysis of Iraq strongly reaffirm that the casualty gap has critically important political ramifications for American governance. Public opinion turns increasingly against the war when citizens experience the costs of war first-hand through casualties from their local community. Because high casualty-rate communities historically tend to have lower levels of income and education, and their residents are less engaged with politics than their peers from low casualty-rate communities, the dampening effect of casualties on hawkish military policies is weaker in practice than conventional wisdom suggests.
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226763880
- eISBN:
- 9780226763910
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226763910.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Two dimensions of the War in Iraq deserve analytical attention. First, there is the question of how the conflict could have domestic legitimacy when it did not have a UN mandate and was intended to ...
More
Two dimensions of the War in Iraq deserve analytical attention. First, there is the question of how the conflict could have domestic legitimacy when it did not have a UN mandate and was intended to be preemptive. In contrast to Suez (where a canal was nationalized) or the Gulf War (where a sovereign country was invaded) there had been no obviously threatening triggering act or violation of international law by Iraq. If President Bush had “ignored Iraq … the price would have been a few disappointed Administration hawks and one or two grumpy Op-Eds.” Yet millions of Americans agreed with the president when he put Iraq on the agenda and sent troops to die there. How could this have happened? If support for the war raises one set of questions, then the widespread opposition to the War in Iraq raises another. What was it about this war, in contrast to the Gulf War, that led to France removing its assistance and to growing opposition and legitimation crisis in the United Kingdom and eventually the United States? Both conflicts had involved the “evil” Saddam Hussein and both were dealing with a possible threat to world security. Something happened to make the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in 2003 qualitatively different for many people than that of 1990. The chapter asks: What was this?Less
Two dimensions of the War in Iraq deserve analytical attention. First, there is the question of how the conflict could have domestic legitimacy when it did not have a UN mandate and was intended to be preemptive. In contrast to Suez (where a canal was nationalized) or the Gulf War (where a sovereign country was invaded) there had been no obviously threatening triggering act or violation of international law by Iraq. If President Bush had “ignored Iraq … the price would have been a few disappointed Administration hawks and one or two grumpy Op-Eds.” Yet millions of Americans agreed with the president when he put Iraq on the agenda and sent troops to die there. How could this have happened? If support for the war raises one set of questions, then the widespread opposition to the War in Iraq raises another. What was it about this war, in contrast to the Gulf War, that led to France removing its assistance and to growing opposition and legitimation crisis in the United Kingdom and eventually the United States? Both conflicts had involved the “evil” Saddam Hussein and both were dealing with a possible threat to world security. Something happened to make the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in 2003 qualitatively different for many people than that of 1990. The chapter asks: What was this?