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This chapter analyzes international harmonization of rules on trade remedies, comprising anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguards. Originating in domestic law in the US in the late 19th and early 20th century, these rules were subsequently established as international trade rules under the GATT and further elaborated under the WTO. Persistent conflicts between harmonized rules and the domestic laws of some states, notably the US and the so-called “new users”, are analyzed in conjunction with mechanisms for monitoring domestic implementation under the GATT/WTO (dispute settlement mechanisms and committee review).

The chapter outlines the enormous importance of Word Trade Organization (WTO) law to China’s state control and its implications for China’s state-permeated economy and welfare system. The chapter demonstrates the PRC’s contradictory policies, not least by highlighting China’s good compliance record with adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Body rulings and contrasting this with China’s creativity in circumventing implementation of WTO law in the banking sector. In line with the core argument of the book, China’s contradictory policy is traced to trade-offs between different economic and nationalist legitimization needs and the varying degrees of influence of different actors within the party-state. The chapter ends by discussing the implications for the future international order, referencing two modes of action that provide China’s contradictory WTO policy with systemic relevance: China’s instrumental approach to law and its undermining of the key definitions that underpin the core vocabulary of international trade policy.

This chapter sheds light on the relationship between the composition of the bench and the sociological legitimacy of the judicial branch of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Two identity characteristics are consistently part of the criticism of the WTO’s bench: the lack of female adjudicators as well as individuals with academic experience. Overall, however, the identity of the bench does not appear to matter greatly for how WTO Members evaluate its exercise of authority. We suggest that the role of the WTO’s Legal Affairs Division and the Appellate Body Secretariat in streamlining outcomes and procedures may best explain this, as it helps prevent such diversity from manifesting in dispute rulings. Alternatively, it tells us that judicial diversity matters more for the bench’s normative legitimacy—and for scholars—than it does for governments.