Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
More
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
Matias Møl Dalsgaard
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780748694433
- eISBN:
- 9781474412452
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748694433.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood has been interpreted as an essentially narrativist one. But have such readings taken sufficient account of Kierkegaard’s Protestant heritage? Drawing on Luther to ...
More
Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood has been interpreted as an essentially narrativist one. But have such readings taken sufficient account of Kierkegaard’s Protestant heritage? Drawing on Luther to discuss the problem of the will in Christian thought, this chapter argues that this heritage pulls against key elements of the narrativist reading. In the joy in Christian living that is central to Kierkegaard’s discourse on the lily and the bird, one forgets one’s self-narratives, concerned as they are with one’s past and future. The lily and the bird do not plan – there is no ‘self-shaping’ – but rather live God’s plan. They are narrated by God. This presents a serious complication for narrativist interpretations.Less
Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood has been interpreted as an essentially narrativist one. But have such readings taken sufficient account of Kierkegaard’s Protestant heritage? Drawing on Luther to discuss the problem of the will in Christian thought, this chapter argues that this heritage pulls against key elements of the narrativist reading. In the joy in Christian living that is central to Kierkegaard’s discourse on the lily and the bird, one forgets one’s self-narratives, concerned as they are with one’s past and future. The lily and the bird do not plan – there is no ‘self-shaping’ – but rather live God’s plan. They are narrated by God. This presents a serious complication for narrativist interpretations.
Lenn E. Goodman and D. Gregory Caramenico
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226061061
- eISBN:
- 9780226061238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226061238.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Our case for the soul stands or falls with human agency: Do we act, or are we only acted upon? William James, deeply troubled by epiphenomenalism, which made thought no more consequential to action ...
More
Our case for the soul stands or falls with human agency: Do we act, or are we only acted upon? William James, deeply troubled by epiphenomenalism, which made thought no more consequential to action than the whistle on a steam engine, responded (after working things out) that unless thought made some practical difference there’d be no more selective advantage in awareness than evolution imparts to the reflexes of an oyster. Jaegwon Kim has revived the epiphenomenalist claim, arguing that free will violates “causal closure,” by introducing energies into the world unregulated by natural law. But we argue that living beings have ample energies to pursue their interests. The familiar conflict of causal determinism with voluntarism is bogus, since the free will worth having is not indeterminist. It involves self-determination. The readiness potential that Benjamin Libet recorded, we suspect, marks not a pre-choice determination but, as its name implies, a preparedness to act. Much that we do is a matter of habit or routine. But these are often consciously, freely, painstakingly acquired. We may, at times, assign choices to random outcomes. But we remain free agents. We use our brains and are not well described as merely being used by them.Less
Our case for the soul stands or falls with human agency: Do we act, or are we only acted upon? William James, deeply troubled by epiphenomenalism, which made thought no more consequential to action than the whistle on a steam engine, responded (after working things out) that unless thought made some practical difference there’d be no more selective advantage in awareness than evolution imparts to the reflexes of an oyster. Jaegwon Kim has revived the epiphenomenalist claim, arguing that free will violates “causal closure,” by introducing energies into the world unregulated by natural law. But we argue that living beings have ample energies to pursue their interests. The familiar conflict of causal determinism with voluntarism is bogus, since the free will worth having is not indeterminist. It involves self-determination. The readiness potential that Benjamin Libet recorded, we suspect, marks not a pre-choice determination but, as its name implies, a preparedness to act. Much that we do is a matter of habit or routine. But these are often consciously, freely, painstakingly acquired. We may, at times, assign choices to random outcomes. But we remain free agents. We use our brains and are not well described as merely being used by them.
