Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's intentions and capabilities prior to the attacks. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of al-Qa'ida during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to 9/11, and contrasts these mainstream Agency views with those of a Cassandra, Michael Scheuer. It describes how Scheuer, as head of the CIA's bin Ladin Unit, Alec Station, tried to provide strategic warning within the Agency, but was discounted and then demoted for his efforts. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, preference for secrets and drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure to occur.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's intentions and capabilities prior to the attacks. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of al-Qa'ida during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to 9/11, and contrasts these mainstream Agency views with those of a Cassandra, Michael Scheuer. It describes how Scheuer, as head of the CIA's bin Ladin Unit, Alec Station, tried to provide strategic warning within the Agency, but was discounted and then demoted for his efforts. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, preference for secrets and drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure to occur.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the ...
More
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.Less
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.
