Search Results

Veto players and win sets in a pluralitarian democracy, compared to those in a proportional regime; and in a unitary compared to a federal regime. Duverger's Law. Constitutional moments in the United States. The unconstitutionality of the great constitutional changes there.

Argues that the role of debate in the struggle over ratification was significant to the adoption of the US Constitution because public debate was a necessary step in the decision‐making process leading to its ratification. It was a necessary step because adoption would not have been legitimate without the possibility of public debate, but the debate was also significant in another way: it provided the first widely shared and detailed interpretation of important clauses of the Constitution. This original elucidation of the meaning of the Constitution later served as the point of origin for constitutional interpretation in the political life of the early republic – an authoritative source for establishing the meaning of the Constitution.

The first two sections of this chapter discuss the two main approaches to the analysis of the ratification debate over the US Constitution. Until the late 1960s, the predominant interpretation described the debate over ratification as a conflict between “aristocratic” and “democratic” ideals and interests, but at about that time, scholars began to shift to a second approach that used the terms “liberalism” and “classical republicanism” to account for ideological differences during the revolutionary era; this shift was also accompanied by a change in the interpreters’ concerns away from social struggle toward the study of the development of political ideas. The argument presented here is that the terminology so far favored by historians and political scientists has obscured important aspects of the ideological differences between the Federalists and their opponents because it has drawn attention away from the actual issues debated during the ratification struggle. This claim can be supported in different ways, but the approach used here is to look closely at what prominent interpreters say about the limits of their own interpretation, even though this it risks being unfair to the perspectives reviewed. The last two sections of the chapter present an approach that promises better to capture the essence of the ideological disagreement between the Federalists and the Antifederalists as presented in the debate over ratification, and suggest that the debate is best seen as neither about democracy nor about liberalism, but about state formation.

Gives an account of the final decision of the US Supreme Court on the Florida vote in the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000. Includes discussion of the deliberations and decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in the case of the recount in that state. The main sections of the chapter are: Imperfect Ballots and the Misuse of the Equal‐Protection Clause; Discerning Intent; The Majority's Curious Use of Precedent to Reach Its Result — the inability of the majority of the Supreme Court to point to any case that supported its questionable interpretation of the equal‐protection clause; Of Fundamental Rights, Equal Protection, and Victims; Limited Circumstances — the statement by the Supreme Court that their consideration was limited to the 2000 US presidential election; The Article II Argument — by the US Supreme Court that the Florida Supreme Court had usurped the constitutional authority of the legislature; and Justification by National Crisis.

No group of America's leaders has ever been more mindful of the law of nations than were the Founding Fathers. This chapter tells a little of that story. It begins with American perceptions of the law of nations during the Revolution and Confederation (1776-1789), focusing on Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. Second, it turns to the importance of the law of nations in the framing of the US Constitution (1787-1789), focusing on James Madison. Third, the chapter explores how the founders relied on international law in early American diplomacy. Finally, it looks to the incorporation of the law of nations in early American judicial practice, particularly the contribution made by John Marshall.

The aim of this book is described as to search for answers as to why the US Constitution was adopted. Like most other studies of this topic, it focusses on the Federalist argument, although it also takes the Antifederalist opposition into account. However, the conclusions reached deviate sharply from the mainstream interpretation of the Federalist persuasion in that the study aims to challenge the Madisonian interpretation of Federalism in two ways: it goes beyond the interpretation of The Federalist Papers of 1787–88 and James Madison's pre‐Convention writings to analyze a much broader sample of Federalist and Antifederalist writings; and based on this broader reading, it provides a new interpretation of what the Constitution and the Federalist argument were about. The major finding presented is that the Federalist argument was not a protoliberal call for minority rights and limited government but an argument about state formation or state building. The first two sections of the introduction discuss Madison's thoughts and writings on the Federalist dilemma, and the problems of the traditionalist interpretation of the Federalist position; the last two sections give an outline of the structure of the book and describe its intended audience.

Chapter 7 and the corresponding Ch. 12 in Part Three of the book present the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the US Constitution. The opponents of the Constitution never accepted the Federalist claim that the independence, liberty, and prosperity of the American republic depended on the creation and maintenance of a peace establishment consisting of regular troops, and did not believe that the union faced as serious threats as the Federalists claimed, keeping to the view that standing armies in time of peace were a threat to liberty. Both ancient and modern history had taught that “almost all” nations in Europe and Asia had lost their liberty because of the establishment of a standing army, so it hardly made sense for Americans to imitate them. To Antifederalists, it seemed that if the military clauses of the Constitution were adopted and the Federalists realized their plan to raise a standing army, the people of America would soon find that the Constitution's supporters would make use of it on the domestic rather than the international scene. The Antifederalist criticism of the army clauses therefore said little about commercial treaties and the importance of military strength in international relations; instead, they approached the issue from the traditional British Country perspective, claiming that standing armies in time of peace posed a threat to liberty, that transfer of military power from the states to Congress threatened both the state militia and the state assemblies, and that a standing army would make it possible for the national government to deprive people of their property without their consent by levying and collecting arbitrary taxes – in other words, a standing army in a time of peace was to the Antifederalists an objection to the centralization of power at the expense of the people's ability to withhold consent through their control of strong local institutions.

Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.

Outlines the constitutional and statutory framework within which presidential elections are conducted in the USA. Provides a brief chronology and an account of the US (Bush vs Gore) presidential election of 2000. The different sections of the chapter are: How We Elect Our President (the constitutional and statutory framework); The 2000 Election and Its Aftermath; The Ground War in Florida; The Butterfly Ballot; ‘Count All the Votes’ — or at Least the Ones That Favour Gore; Bush Goes to Court; The Overseas Absentee Ballots; The Supreme Court's Initial — Unanimous — Decision; and The Supreme Court's Stay (the decision to stop recounting in Florida before even hearing an argument) — looks at other cases in which equal protection has or has not been applied by the US Supreme Court.

Chapter 5 and the corresponding Ch. 10 in Part Three of the book provide background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, the background is given to the conflict between the Federalists and the Antifederalists over the military clauses of the US Constitution, a conflict that is analyzed in Chs 6–8 (the debate over the fiscal clauses is analyzed in Part Three of the book). It is argued that two principles frustrated the ability of the Confederation Congress to provide the union with the military capacity it needed to function: first, the sovereignty of the states; and, second, the strong aversion in the American political tradition to a peacetime standing army. In the end, these principles led Congress to become passive in foreign affairs. Ends with an attempt to locate the Federalist demand for an improved military capacity of the national state not in the context of militarism, but in the context of the promotion of commerce.

Chapter 6 and the corresponding Ch. 11 in Part Three of the book provide the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks more closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the U S Constitution, here the concern is only with the proposals for amendments to the Constitution that Antifederalists suggested, or that Federalists suggested as concessions to Antifederalist objections; the purpose of the chapter is to address the question of why the Federalists refused to accept limits to the army clauses of the Constitution. When the first Congress presented the states with the proposal for what would become the Bill of Rights, this contained a guarantee against the disarmament of the people, as well as a specification of what was involved in Congress's power to govern state militias; it also contained a restriction on the right of the national government to quarter troops in private houses. The first ten amendments, however, made no attempt to restrict the right of the national government to raise an army, and not because of oversight, since neither James Madison, nor anyone else present at the first Congress, could have been unaware of the strong reservations that Antifederalists had expressed against the unlimited power to raise and maintain armies that the Constitution vested in Congress. This power was central to the national state that the Federalists attempted to form, and in the debate over ratification they made clear why no limits could be placed on Congress's power of military mobilization.

Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.

The conclusion ends the book with an explication of the Federalists’ idea of an American national state.

It starts by pointing out that the ratification of the US Constitution did not mean the end of politics, nor the end of the debate about the future course of the American republic, for now the Federalists faced the next step of state building: creating the institutions of government that would realize their ideas about a national state in America. The mainstream interpretation of the Federalist argument presents it as a call for limited government and protection of minority rights, but this study has offered a different interpretation. It sees the Federalist argument as an attempt to convince the American public about the need to build a powerful state and to explain how this state would work – the idea of an American national state that the Federalists developed during the ratification debate was the result of creative thinking in the face of serious challenges. This conclusion is devoted to an explication of both the challenge that the Federalists faced and the concept of the state they developed, but the basic issue may be summed up as follows: what the Federalists had to do, and what they did, in the debate over ratification, was to develop a conceptual framework that made it possible to accommodate the creation of a powerful national government to the strong anti‐statist current in the American political tradition.

Presents the author's strong opinions on the ending of the 2000 US presidential election. Starts by pointing out that the five justices who ended the 2000 election by stopping the Florida hand recount have damaged the credibility of the US Supreme Court, and that their lawless decision in Bush vs Gore promises to have a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome of the election itself. The USA accepted the election of George W. Bush, as it must under the rule of law, but the unprecedented decision of the five justices to substitute their political judgement for that of the people threatens to undermine the moral authority of the high court for generations to come — for the Supreme Court consists of only nine relatively unknown justices with small staffs, and it has wielded an enormous influence on US history. The majority ruling in Bush vs Gore has marked a number of significant firsts in American history; these are outlined and it is noted that there is now a widespread loss of confidence that reaches to the highest part of the judiciary, that the Supreme Court decision may well have violated Article II of the Constitution, and, furthermore, determined a presidential election on doubtful equal protection grounds. Attempts to explain the Court's decision and the justices concerned, and establish how the USA has reached the point where five unelected judges could have had so much influence on the political destiny of a nation.

Chapter 9 and the corresponding Ch. 14 in Part Three of the book offer brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives a historical account of the uses made by the national government during that period of the military powers that it was granted by the Constitution. Aims to make a judgment on the political achievement of the Federalists that hinges on the extent to which they managed to translate their principles into action when they transformed the articles of the Constitution into the policies and institutions of the new national government. Part of the discussion also addresses the fact that during the quarter century following the First US Congress, the USA had to respond repeatedly to events originating in Europe far beyond the federal government's control, and overall, drew advantage from the warfare that engulfed Britain, France, and Spain. It is noted that is not easy to answer the question of whether the federal government had any part in making this possible, but a cautious answer based on works of diplomatic history is that the reform of the federal government did make a difference to the actions of European governments.

Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.

Walter Bagehot, editor of the Economist and author of The English Constitution, wrote nearly forty articles on the United States in the 1860s, in which he touched on a variety of themes, including the Constitution, the Civil War, slavery, comparative government, the Presidency, elective monarchy, Abraham Lincoln, and reconstruction. Although a Liberal in British politics, he had misgivings about American democracy, which he thought vulgar, and criticized the US Constitution as dated and inflexible.

The Conclusion pulls together the themes that run through the earlier chapters and suggests that for all the variations in thinking about American government by the Victorians, a common strand in their opinion was a belief in Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism, that is, that the United States drew heavily on British constitutional traditions and that both countries had a gift for self-government.