Search Results

The chapter introduces the core arguments of part one. It outlines how the argument for creative action and recomposition in the postwar history of the steel industry in the US, Germany and Japan undermines the view, developed by the Varieties of Capitalism school of institutionalism, that countries have comparative institutional advantages in international industrial competition

This chapter examines the role and performance of the Group of Three and the Western Contact Group in the process leading to the independence of Namibia in 1990. At the United Nations level, decolonization resulted in a significant increase in membership that shifted governance in the General Assembly and the Security Council. The admission of post-colonial states turned decolonization into an ideological issue that contributed to a situation where direct UN involvement became ineffective. It complicated the process towards the further dismantling of the colonial system, and generated a push towards exit as epitomized in the formation of informal groups. The case of Namibia illustrates the potential and limits of engaging the United States in a cooperative framework.

This chapter summarizes the causes of informal groups of states and their effects on Security Council governance. It argues that those informal settings are changing the role of the UN Security Council in the international system. The functions of diplomatic problem-solving and its collective legitimization have become separate from one another. This has implications for the understanding of power, legitimacy, and change in the theory of international relations.

The draft proposals for the United Nations Charter that emerged from Dumbarton Oaks allowed only for one brief mention of human rights. The final version agreed at San Francisco gave human rights a much higher profile. Why did this change take place? There is a substantial body of literature that accounts for it exclusively in terms of the activities of the US Consultants (representatives of NGOs), attached to the US Delegation. However, the role of Latin American states, as well as of the Soviet Union, needs to be remembered. The chapter draws attention to the problems surrounding the heroic role of the US consultants. It traces the evolution of thinking about human rights during the war years, culminating in the attendance of some 1,200 representatives of NGOs at the San Francisco conference. There is no doubt, therefore, that state officials were conscious of wide public expectations on the human rights front. Since popular support for the UN would be vital to its future effectiveness, respect for human rights can be seen as a kind of ‘social wage’ in return. This gave the individual a new standing in international society and international law.

Anecdotal evidence states that German dividend policy is much more flexible than the UK or US dividend policy. Given the different corporate governance environment, dividends may play less of a signalling and monitoring role in Germany than in the US or UK.

Presents the author's strong opinions on the ending of the 2000 US presidential election. Starts by pointing out that the five justices who ended the 2000 election by stopping the Florida hand recount have damaged the credibility of the US Supreme Court, and that their lawless decision in Bush vs Gore promises to have a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome of the election itself. The USA accepted the election of George W. Bush, as it must under the rule of law, but the unprecedented decision of the five justices to substitute their political judgement for that of the people threatens to undermine the moral authority of the high court for generations to come — for the Supreme Court consists of only nine relatively unknown justices with small staffs, and it has wielded an enormous influence on US history. The majority ruling in Bush vs Gore has marked a number of significant firsts in American history; these are outlined and it is noted that there is now a widespread loss of confidence that reaches to the highest part of the judiciary, that the Supreme Court decision may well have violated Article II of the Constitution, and, furthermore, determined a presidential election on doubtful equal protection grounds. Attempts to explain the Court's decision and the justices concerned, and establish how the USA has reached the point where five unelected judges could have had so much influence on the political destiny of a nation.

Gives an account of the final decision of the US Supreme Court on the Florida vote in the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000. Includes discussion of the deliberations and decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in the case of the recount in that state. The main sections of the chapter are: Imperfect Ballots and the Misuse of the Equal‐Protection Clause; Discerning Intent; The Majority's Curious Use of Precedent to Reach Its Result — the inability of the majority of the Supreme Court to point to any case that supported its questionable interpretation of the equal‐protection clause; Of Fundamental Rights, Equal Protection, and Victims; Limited Circumstances — the statement by the Supreme Court that their consideration was limited to the 2000 US presidential election; The Article II Argument — by the US Supreme Court that the Florida Supreme Court had usurped the constitutional authority of the legislature; and Justification by National Crisis.

Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. The author states that he is convinced that if it had been Bush rather than Gore who needed the Florida recount in order to have any chance of winning the election, that at least some of the five justices who voted to stop the recount would instead have voted to allow it to proceed. The main sections of the chapter are: Judicial Impropriety; Hypothetical Cases Involving a Supreme Court Decision Regarding a Presidential Election; The Difficulty of Proving an Improper Motive; Academic Defenders of the Majority Justices; Ad Hominem Arguments and Analysis of Motive; and Analysing the Justices’ Motives in Bush vs Gore: A Prelude.

Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. Contrasts the prior decisions and writings of the particular majority justices with the opinions that they joined in this case; the dramatic discrepancies found raise troubling questions. Moves from this concrete evidence to a more speculative consideration of what may have motivated these inconsistencies. The different sections of the chapter look first at the decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Clarence Thomas. The following speculative sections first ask generally why each justice behaved as they did, and then go on to devote separate sections on the motives of each of the five justices.

Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. Discusses the importance of Bush vs Gore to all Americans, and starts by noting that Bush vs Gore is certainly not the first bad Supreme Court ruling. It looks at some of the other evil, immoral, and even dangerous, decisions made, most of which have been overturned by later courts and condemned by the verdict of history. However, for the most part, the justices who wrote or joined the majority opinions for these terrible decisions were acting consistently with their own judicial philosophies; Bush vs Gore was different because the majority justices violated their own previously declared judicial principles, and in this respect, the decision in the Florida election (recount) case may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history. The different sections of the chapter discuss why criticism and accountability are important, some lessons to be learned from Bush vs Gore, the wages of Roe vs Wade (a controversial abortion case that helped to secure the presidency for Ronald Reagan), and changing how justices are selected.

An examination is made of the relationship between the US and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade Organization, addressing the crucial question of the likelihood that the US will exit, or through its behaviour undermine, the multilateral trade organization in favour of regional or bilateral alternatives. It is concluded that the probability of a US‐inspired weakening of the WTO is low, although the incentives for protectionism in the US are strong and growing as a result of globalization and the changing international division of labour. The US domestic political system gives voice to such protectionist interests in international trade policy through a set of administrative and legal remedies that are reinforced by principles such as reciprocity and ‘fair trade’. Countervailing factors to this situation include the growing power of US export interests, the effectiveness of the Executive in deflecting the protectionist tendencies in the US Congress, and the exceptional power and influence of the US over the multilateral regime, in which it is a rule maker rather than a rule taker, enjoying the power to bend the rules selectively to serve its interests. As such, the WTO tends to reflect and reinforce US economic interests, and the US is, therefore, likely to continue in overall terms its efforts to comply with and generally strengthen the multilateral organization, rather than to break away from it.

This chapter is concerned with costs and fees in derivative actions in the context of incentives for such litigation. It explores the critical role of costs and fees in initiating and maintaining derivative actions. Section 6.2 briefly explicates the economics of derivative action litigation. As part of this, the US rules on derivative action fees are examined. After rehearsing the common law recognition of the problems of the impecunious shareholder in the form of indemnity costs orders, Section 6.3 exposes major flaws in the operation of these orders. In response, possible solutions to rectify the funding problem are examined and assessed in the next chapter. Section 6.4 concludes.

This chapter examines four possible avenues to rectify the economic impediments to derivative actions. The first two focus on short-term solutions and involve the company and the claimant shareholder. Section 7.2.1 considers making a mandatory requirement for the company to pay the costs of the action. Section 7.2.2 then looks at the merits and demerits of rewarding the shareholder with part of the proceeds of a successful action. The last two sections concentrate on solutions in which the risk of loss is shifted on to the claimant's attorney. Section 7.3 explores new possibilities in the guise of conditional fee agreements; Section 7.4 assesses the possibility of adopting a US-style contingency fees in the limited context of derivative actions. Section 7.5 concludes.

Outlines the constitutional and statutory framework within which presidential elections are conducted in the USA. Provides a brief chronology and an account of the US (Bush vs Gore) presidential election of 2000. The different sections of the chapter are: How We Elect Our President (the constitutional and statutory framework); The 2000 Election and Its Aftermath; The Ground War in Florida; The Butterfly Ballot; ‘Count All the Votes’ — or at Least the Ones That Favour Gore; Bush Goes to Court; The Overseas Absentee Ballots; The Supreme Court's Initial — Unanimous — Decision; and The Supreme Court's Stay (the decision to stop recounting in Florida before even hearing an argument) — looks at other cases in which equal protection has or has not been applied by the US Supreme Court.

An examination is made of the evolution of US behaviour in the United Nations Security Council since the 1990s; this behaviour shows an inconsistency born out of a general suspicion of the organization, particularly of its General Assembly, and the author demonstrates that US historical experience of the UN largely explains that suspicion. First provides some evidence of this US inconsistency of behaviour, with reference both to conflict resolution and humanitarian issues. Then goes on to explain the primary influences on this behaviour, arguing that US ambivalence towards the UN has been more affected by struggles over a New International Economic Order in the 1970s and US perceptions of unbalanced UN approaches to the Arab–Israeli dispute than by the end of the cold war. Having made special reference to America's chequered historical experience of the UN, the chapter examines the ways in which negative perceptions of the UN have played out in US domestic politics, particularly since the late 1990s. Finally, America's experience of the UN's expanded post‐cold‐war security agenda is reviewed, noting that the inherent tensions between the promotion of values and the promotion of interests, and the difficulties of relating means to ends, have come sharply to the fore during this period.

The purpose is to trace and assess the ways in which the US has used multilateral institutions/organizations (both those international institutions/organizations of which it is a member and those regional institutions/organizations of which it is not) and multilateralism itself to pursue its interests on the African continent. The emergence of a noticeable multilateral dimension to American policy towards Africa is situated against two backgrounds: the first (Sect. 1 of the chapter) deals with the general features of American policy towards Africa since the Second World War and the role that multilateralism in general has played in that; the second (Sect. 2) deals with the rise of multilateralism (and multilateral regional institutions/organizations) on the African continent as a process that has a dynamic of its own. This perspective on Africa as an agent, and not simply as an object, of US policy is important for maintaining a critical perspective on the successes but also the contradictions and failures of US policy towards Africa. The final two sections offer a detailed description and evaluation of the dimensions of multilateralism in post‐cold‐war US policy, and, in particular, the Clinton era, which, in many respects, encapsulates much of what is right and wrong with US policy towards the continent. The evaluation made and the general assumptions used to approach the theme of US policy towards Africa are informed by a broadly neo‐Gramscian appraisal of the hegemonic function of the US in the current global political and economic order, and of the place of multilateralism within that hegemonic function.

Takes up the relationship between the US and regional multilateral organizations in Europe, in particular, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and the European Union (specifically the common European security and defence policy, or ESDP). It is suggested that US relations with Europe are an indicator of the US commitment to multilateralism more generally, and argued that the US approach to NATO has been driven by a combination of international structural factors (the distribution of capabilities) and the key domestic factor of national character (the liberal identity of the US). These very same factors hold important consequences for NATO because the US is the decisive actor in NATO, which, as a political entity, reflects the multilateralism that has its foundations in US national character, but as a military instrument, reflects the dominant power of the US. The resulting tensions in NATO were finessed more easily during the cold war, in the face of a common enemy, but are more significant in the current unipolar system, which exaggerates both the incentives for the US to act unilaterally and the frustration of European states who are less able to constrain the US yet unwilling to act independently. The author expects NATO to become less rather than more important to the US in the years ahead, and thus to matter less as a multilateral organization. The different sections of the chapter are: Isolationism as Multilateralism's ‘Other’?; Sources of America's Eurocentric Multilateralism; Systemic Change and American Behaviour: The Case of NATO; Consequences for Multilateral Organizations: The EU and the ESDP; and The Bush Administration and the European Allies.