Search Results

Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

After considering the development and nature of UN peacekeeping, this chapter focuses on the decision to deploy British troops to Bosnia in 1994–5. The government's decisions to contribute to the UN peacekeeping force (the ineptly named UN Protection Force: UNPROFOR) and to the enforcement of the no-fly zone in a NATO operation are analyzed in political and legal terms. The fact of there being UN authority and its effect on the decision to deploy British troops has to be considered alongside that of the absence of the legal and military conditions for peacekeeping. Was Parliament more willing to accept the decision to deploy British troops to Bosnia because UNPROFOR was seen as a UN-mandated consensual peacekeeping force? Was there any attempt made in Parliament to address the issue of ‘mission creep’ as UNPROFOR's mandate was changed by the Security Council in an attempt to address the deteriorating situation?

UNPROFOR fails to prevent genocide. The slaughter of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 forces US action. The United States is going to Bosnia one way or the other as the Europeans prepare to withdraw. The Clinton Administration appoints Holbrooke to launch a major diplomatic effort to find a peaceful solution in Bosnia. Holbrooke grabs the opportunity to lead US negotiations to find peace in Bosnia.

The year 1993 never got close to a peaceful settlement of the Balkans conflict despite the United Nations, European, and American attempts to achieve one. The siege of Sarajevo had begun in 1992 immediately after the declaration of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1993, a military stalemate persisted in Bosnia as the diplomatic challenge limped along. President Bill Clinton’s cabinet of national security leaders—the Principals Committee—gathered in the Situation Room for the first time on January 28, 1993, and dealt exclusively with the situation in Bosnia. In April 1993, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, delivered a memorandum to the national security adviser recommending use of American air power. The recommendation failed to attract sufficient support, and further diplomatic efforts to end the war also failed. “Assertive multilateralism” took a beating in Situation Room discussions as 1993 wore on.

During 1994, tactics in the Situation Room over America’s role in the Balkans were plagued by procrastination, fear of the unknown, and a futile search for alternatives to bold action. A 1994 journey by the author and Madeleine Albright to the region demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating U.S. policy with the United Nations and U.S. allies. The February 5, 1994, mortar attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo ignited a long process of efforts to bring the war to an end. The Federation of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats united against the Bosnian Serbs. Goražde became the next battleground of Bosnian Serb pressure to capitulate, but NATO support for its security held firm. Debates in the Situation Room ended with endorsements of the status quo. Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace effort, and all slid back into war. The fate of UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping force, also dominated discussions in the Situation Room.

The four-month cessation of hostilities agreement took effect in January 1995. There was tension between expanding UNPROFOR and the UNPROFOR withdrawal option known as OPLAN 40104. The Deputies and Principals spent early 1995 focused on Croatia and the intentions of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The costs of UNPROFOR and OPLAN 40104 seized some Situation Room discussions. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević finally refused to mutually recognize Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as steps toward a peace deal. The Principals decided in March 1995 to maintain diplomatic engagement and provision of humanitarian relief, keep UNPROFOR deployed in Bosnia and Croatia, and take measures to contain the conflict. Washington continued to support the Bosnian government’s goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal but seek to lower public expectations of immediate success and avoid any illusion that the United States or NATO would intervene militarily on behalf of the Bosniaks.

In July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica led to efforts to forge a new peace plan. The Principals received a “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” paper, which proposed shoring up UNPROFOR, pushing for a political settlement with Slobodan Milošević, supporting Bosnia’s survival if UNPROFOR withdrew, providing additional support to the Bosniaks, and offering sanctions relief to induce Milošević to stay out of Bosnia. Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger initiated strategizing that Madeleine Albright used to “examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.” Albright proposed using air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement and training Federation forces. Bill Clinton endorsed this. The Croatian Army successfully regained their lands in Croatia. Discussions in the Situation Room focused on creation of a post-settlement Peace Implementation Force. Another bombing of the Markale market in Sarajevo unleashed NATO air power, and Milošević began to negotiate seriously.