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Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

The primary international organization involved with refugees is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1950 to protect and assist refugees and supervise the implementation of the UN refugee treaty regime. In terms of the broader international system, without significant institutional change, increased financial support and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the UN will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace‐building tasks assigned to it in the coming years.

To promote greater coherence in the making and implementing of forced migration policy, a new intellectual capacity is needed. The proposal made by the author is for the establishment of Strategic Humanitarian Action and Research (SHARE), a humanitarian action think tank. SHARE would be both a planning resource and an archive of lessons learned, which ultimately could become an intergovernmental mechanism. It would craft responses to fill the gaps that regularly emerge in post‐crisis situations, particularly in post‐crisis situations when emergency relief is ending, but before the development of a fully functioning state.

A key focus is the organizational culture and effectiveness of UNHCR as the principal protection agency for refugees. UNHCR functions with an imperfect mandate, under circumstances necessitating competition with other agencies for limited resources, and in political environments that are inhospitable to crisis management and refugee protection. Because of its financial vulnerability and dependence on donor governments and host states, the agency's actions are clearly shaped by the interests of governments. The UNHCR finds it difficult to learn from past mistakes and it lacks strong policy research and strategic thinking capacities. The author offers policy recommendations aimed at making UNHCR more effective and accountable in its central function of protecting refugees.

For the past half century the UNHCR has been central to the international debates about human rights, conflict resolution, sovereignty, intervention and preventative action, and the role of international organizations in world politics. A central theme is change and continuity in the international political and security systems, in the refugee regime, and in the UNHCR. Contemporary refugee crises are placing the UNHCR under growing pressure regarding both its functions and identity. From focusing almost exclusively on protection and humanitarian relief for refugees in host countries, the UNHCR has progressively taken on additional responsibilities that involve it in a myriad of activities for refugees and non‐refugees alike.

Beginning with the establishment by the League of Nations of the first High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921, the scope and functions of assistance programmes for refugees gradually expanded, as efforts were made to regularize the status and control of stateless and denationalized people. During and after World War II, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO) further expanded the international organizational framework for refugees. Since 1951, an international refugee regime—composed of UNHCR and a network of other international agencies, national governments, and voluntary or non‐governmental organizations—has developed a response strategy that permits some refugees to remain in their countries of first asylum, enables some to resettle in third countries and arranges for still others to be repatriated to their countries of origin.

UNHCR was created with a mandate for refugee protection and to provide solutions to refugee problems, but with practically no funds with which to carry out these functions. Despite the inauspicious beginnings of the UNHCR and the opposition of the US and the Soviet Union in the early Cold War period, the first High Commissioner, Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart, convinced the major powers that their interests in political stability in Europe converged with those of the UNHCR. By gradually enlarging the scope of his office, by obtaining the capacity for independent fund raising through the UN Refugee Emergency Fund and by assuming material assistance responsibilities, the High Commissioner paved the way for the UNHCR to become the centrepiece of the emerging international refugee regime.

Two political events at the centre of world politics in the mid‐ to late‐1950s—the Hungarian Revolution and the subsequent intervention by the USSR and the Algerian War of National Independence against France—transformed the UNHCR. The roles played by the second UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Auguste Lindt, in both refugee crises resulted in fundamental changes in UNHCR's orientation and its international reputation. The crises in Hungary and Algeria constituted a bridgehead leading to future institutional growth and autonomy for the UNHCR. The UNHCR also expanded into the developing world through programmes assisting refugees from The Peoples Republic of China in Hong Kong and Tibetan refugees.

Part 1 argues that when there are large numbers of internally displaced people, humanitarian groups should anticipate and prepare for the risks of a large outflow of refugees. The chapter argues that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was unprepared to deal with the refugee crisis in Kosovo, and that its ability to coordinate the humanitarian response was hampered by lack of funding and coordination, proliferation of NGOs in the field funded directly by their governments and complex relations with the military. Part 2 of the chapter analyses the relationship between the media on one side and NATO, Yugoslav government, and NGOs on the other side. The second part of the chapter concludes by encouraging development of free press and mass media in post‐war Kosovo.

This chapter focuses on the so called ‘protracted’ refugee situations which have proved the most problematic in terms of human security in Africa and the way in which recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-led initiatives may address these concerns. The chapter first outlines the legal and political environment in which refugee movements occur, the nature of refugee flows in Africa, and the security concerns which have arisen from these. It then discusses the meaning of ‘human security’ as it applies to refugee situations. It considers the implications that recent UNHCR initiatives and the restrictive refugee policies of many asylum host states may have for the human security of refugees within Africa. Finally, the chapter questions whether the concept of ‘human security’ is one that should be utilized in the refugee context at all.

Among the various categories of international migration, asylum and refugee protection is unique in its degree of formal institutionalization. It has its own international convention and a specialized UN agency, UNHCR. This structure is complemented by regional agreements and human rights norms. However, although the refugee regime guarantees the protection of refugees who reach the territory of a state, it offers little normative guidance on states' obligations to support other states in hosting refugees. Given that most refugees are in the developing world, this creates a fundamental imbalance, which defines the politics of refugee protection. This chapter explains the politics and the limitations of the existing regime. It offers politically feasible suggestions for ways in which the regime and the work of UNHCR might be adapted to meet the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century.

The African refugee regime protects and provides for the nearly 3 million refugees on the African continent. Grounded in regional and international treaties, the protection of refugees in Africa is the most problematic among the world's regions because borders among African states are so porous, resource constraints are so severe, and conflict and natural disasters are so destructive. The foundational sources of this refugee protection are the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Optional Protocol, and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, nongovernmental organizations, government agencies, and other state and nonstate actors coexist and collaborate in a complex web of refugee protection. Despite the improvements occasioned by the progressive human rights treaties and the protections provided by states and organizations, many refugees still face tremendous deprivation and discrimination in their countries of asylum.

This chapter generally introduces international bureaucracies as autonomous actors in the practice of interpretation and then illustrates in greater detail how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has contributed to developing the meaning of its Statute and of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. While at the outset of its life UNHCR offered quasi-consular protection to a rather narrow group of refugees, it is now the world’s chief international agency providing humanitarian assistance. When new challenges of refugee protection arose to which the Convention seemed to offer no answers and prospects of any treaty amendment were dim, UNHCR vested its efforts into shifting interpretations instead. It has crafted documents of interpretative guidance and intervened in seminal court cases, thereby directing semantic developments and the making of refugee law.

This chapter recalls the historical background to the development of responsibility allocation and safe third country practices. It begins with an overview of the fundamental concepts and instruments of international refugee law, and proceeds with a description of the changes that affected refugee flows at the end of the 1970s and led to the progressive decline of protection standards and the development of restrictive refugee policies, including an analysis of the failed UN Conference on territorial asylum and of the discussions that took place within the Executive Committee of UNHCR. Developments at the regional level are also covered, namely, the negotiations of the two draft agreements on responsibility for examining an asylum request prepared by the ‘Ad Hoc Committee on the Legal Aspects of Asylum and Refugees’ of the Council of Europe (CAHAR), and the gradual rise to prominence of the European Community in the asylum and migration fields.

This chapter is concerned with the human rights situation in Kosovo during the period immediately preceding NATO intervention in 1999, when Serbian/FRY policy shifted from a programme of legislative discrimination to one of military assault. Although purportedly directed against an increasingly militant KLA, FRY/Serbian ‘counter-insurgency’ operations had devastating consequences for the civilian population and led to massive displacements. The chapter assesses the response of international agencies to the humanitarian crisis and suggests that, unlike previous large-scale humanitarian operations, the lead role assumed by the UNHCR meant that coordination and planning was well effected, at least in the early phases. The important role of the ICRC is also noted. The chapter then examines the role played by sanctions in the Kosovo crisis, tracing their recent usage, their impact on the Yugoslav conflict more generally and, finally, the reasons behind the relative ineffectiveness of Resolution 1160 (1998).

This chapter explores how, through various steps and missteps, international norms governing refugees and asylum-seekers have evolved in response to events and crises of the 20th century. The two great wars of the 20th century triggered crucial rounds of normative development. The debates over what to do with refugees created by World War I and the Russian Revolution led to ad hoc measures and an emerging norm of care for refugees. The Holocaust triggered a new cycle of norm change, out of which emerged international organizations (UNHCR) and treaties (the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol) designed to ensure basic rights for refugees and asylum-seekers. In subsequent refugee crises, states have sought to limit their international responsibilities toward refugees.

This chapter outlines humanitarian and human rights consequences of the United States's (U.S.) invasion and occupation of Iraq. It contextualizes the displacement crisis by tracing how U.S. foreign policy contributed to the humanitarian disaster. It examines the topic of advocacy for Iraqi refugees and highlights the efforts of international NGOs to compel the United States and the international community to comprehensively address the displacement crisis. This analysis is based on documentary evidence from nongovernmental and official sources and approximately thirty interviews with staff and officials from NGOs, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Congressional staff members working on immigrant and refugee policy. Research shows that while NGOs have been the most important actors calling for accountability for displaced Iraqis, they are constrained by the politics of humanitarian assistance in the United States and Middle East. It concludes by highlighting the Bush administration's failure to take responsibility for the human costs of the U.S. invasion and considers the effects of public apathy in the United States about the impact of the war on Iraqis.

Chapter two further examines the biblical tradition of radical hospitality that has been inspiring religious activists at the U.S.–Mexico border. It looks at the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s and at how clergy in the Tucson Sector challenged federal immigration laws by providing safe haven for Central American refugees fleeing from civil war. The chapter highlights key biblical passages and interpretations that have motivated religious activists in their quest to provide aid and hospitality to migrants and refugees, and at how the language and vision of the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s has been adopted by current New Sanctuary Movement leaders and other immigrant rights groups across the country.

This chapter presents insights into global migration governance and maps the management of environmentally induced migration. Focusing on the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Program (UNDP) and UN Environmental Program (UNEP) the author discusses the migration policies of these organizations and their involvement in the negotiation of Global Compacts on migration and refugees. It highlights that migration governance takes place in different international organizations with overlapping mandates and memberships. Also, that their efforts are limited due to sovereignty claims of member states. The chapter concludes by mentioning the achievements and difficulties of environmental migration governance on the international level and how the UN Global Compacts can serve as potential problem solvers.