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This chapter focuses on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, which outlines the Canadian and U.S. approaches to the key issues under discussion and the subsequent relationship of the two States regarding the LOS Convention.

Part 2 provides a brief history of the evolution of legal rules pertaining to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Piracy ranks among one of the old subject matters of public international law and contemporary rules on piracy laid out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have thus a long history. UNCLOS is traditionally perceived to reflect a subtle balance of extensively negotiated compromises that is only acceptable to States parties as a package deal. Thus, a widely held perception is that a modification of singular elements or even entire sections would off-set the negotiated compromise and would necessitate modifications of UNCLOS in its entirety. For the time being, States appear to be strongly committed to uphold this package-deal.

This chapter ties together the loose threads of the discussions and presents some concluding thoughts. It considers the efforts of the Security Council to remedy some of the well-known deficiencies inherent in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rules. It describes the establishment of a threefold legal enforcement regime that depends on whether pirates are pursued on the high seas, within Somalia's territorial waters, or on its mainland. It argues that while the Security Council has considerably expanded the range of enforcement powers, as far as the level of adjudicative jurisdiction is concerned the counter-piracy Security Council Resolutions do not go beyond calling for enhanced cooperation in criminal matters and a solemn invocation of a meshwork of international treaties pertaining to crimes committed at sea. The lesson learned in the fight against international terrorism, should be heeded also when aiming to sustainably repress piracy in the Gulf of Aden, namely that unambiguous rule-of-law adherence is, in the long run, the best way to success in the repression of a criminal phenomenon.

This chapter analyzes each ASEAN member state’s territorial claims and disputes both in and outside of the South China Sea as well as its current position regarding ASEAN efforts to negotiate multilaterally with China over rival South China Sea claims. It highlights the broad support for freedom of navigation within ASEAN as well as the stated desire of each government to pursue a peaceful resolution based on the Code of Conduct with China that the ASEAN members agreed to develop in Phnom Penh in 2002. The chapter makes clear that, despite the many overlapping and competing maritime territorial claims among ASEAN member states, these states have managed to cooperate to resolve disputes outside of the South China Sea and, unlike China, since the signing of the DOC have largely refrained from taking provocative actions related to contested claims within the region. The chapter further notes the important differences in the dynamics between, and preferences of, China and the rival ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea when compared to the cases of successful dispute resolution discussed in the chapter; the most obvious difference is the asymmetry in the balance of power between China and the other claimants.

The chapter summarizes the book’s findings on China’s efforts to divide ASEAN and conquer the South China Sea, using variation in member state’s reactions to the decision in favor of the Philippines by the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration to illustrate the impact of China’s influence. The book concludes that because of the inherent differences within ASEAN, especially in political institutions, as well as the intrinsic difficulties of effective multilateralism and collective action, ASEAN will be unlikely to come together to force China to the negotiating table, as long as China wishes to resist taking a seat. The chapter notes that China’s efforts to influence states in the region have not always been successful, as the case studies illustrate; China has advantages in influencing developing state, authoritarian governments but faces more and higher hurdles in its efforts to influence developing state governments operating within relatively democratic institutions. A brief comparative analysis of China’s bilateral relations in Latin America suggests that the book’s findings are generalizable to China’s relations with developing states globally. The book concludes that the potential evolution of political institutions toward democracy is a form of long-term political risk facing Chinese efforts to influence developing state governments.

The framework for an international law of the sea should have the authority or force of law and promote collective interest that drives state compliance. The process of authoritative decision flows from three distinct elements—interaction among the maritime states and oceans users; the rights of access, including the rights of access for the international community to oceans space and the rights of coastal states to claim jurisdiction over ocean space; and finally, determinations of decision-makers responding to these competing claims. The unfolding process of authoritative decision for a public order of the oceans is evident in maritime operational and diplomatic theater. In the contemporary era, this drama unfolds within the regimes reflected in the 1982 Convention. The point of departure for the regimes, and corresponding rights and duties in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), is the baseline of the coastal state. This chapter discusses baselines, internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, international straits, archipelagic waters, the exclusive economic zone, and the regimes and national security.

This chapter discusses naval forces in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There are no corresponding limitations on military activities in the EEZ or high seas. Consequently, coastal states that seek to limit military activities beyond the territorial sea have resorted to a host of legal arguments and interpretations that promote their goal, generally by trying to squeeze military activities into the definition of activities over which the coastal state has some legitimate competence.

This chapter introduces David Caron’s influential argument that Articles 7(2) and 76(9) of UNCLOS ‘negatively imply’ that baselines and the zonal limits measured from them are, as a general rule, ambulatory. It points to two important differences between these provisions neglected by Caron’s analysis. It explains why it is necessary to revisit Articles 7(2) and 76(9) with a view to determining the ordinary meaning of their terms in context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose—the project of the following two chapters. Caron’s argument is premised on a problematic interpretation of the relevant provisions and UNCLOS more broadly.

In many parts of the world, there continues to be various serious international disputes that are not amenable to negotiated solutions. Besides the improvements in the policing of fishing vessels and the need to ensure long-term sustainability of stocks, the availability of adequate compulsory procedures for resolving intractable disputes remains one of the main challenges of contemporary fishing law. This chapter aims to examine how far the international community has met this challenge. It begins by presenting the evolution of compulsory jurisdiction over fisheries disputes. The UNCLOS dispute settlement scheme and the settlement of disputes under the Fish Stocks Agreement are among the policies that are demonstrated in this chapter. Also, it cites several immense problems in using existing law to ensure that disputes relating to straddling fish stocks will if necessary be resolved by an independent third party.

This chapter examines some areas of continuity and change with respect to resource entitlement in the law of the sea. It suggests that one of the main factors which prompted the deliberations at the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was the broad perception that the Law of the Sea which had emerged from the Geneva Conferences of 1958 did not adequately reflect the views of the countries which had gained independence as part of the process of decolonization. The perception of bias in favour of developed countries applied with even greater force to rules on resource entitlement.

This chapter proposes additional policy options that the United States might pursue in the South China Sea. It recounts existing U.S. policy toward the South China Sea and finds that it is comprehensive, sensible, and well balanced. It focuses on creating stability by exhorting all parties to follow international law; it explicitly defines conflict solving; and it includes U.S. hard-power demonstrations as well as initiatives aimed at redressing some of the power imbalance between the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. It also incorporates deterrence by not ignoring America’s security alliance with the Philippines as well as providing for U.S. naval and air access. The chapter concludes by recommending several additional policy approaches while acknowledging the difficulty of getting Beijing to pay serious attention to U.S. objections to what Washington has called its “bullying” approach. Along the way it addresses what U.S. interests are involved in the South China Sea and makes the point that U.S. policy toward the South China Sea and China must be kept in perspective. The overall Sino-U.S. relationship is global in nature and involves many U.S. interests in which Beijing’s cooperation is necessary.

During the twenty-first century, relatively higher warming is projected to occur in the Arctic as compared with average global projections. This might, as hyped by the media, spur a race among the surrounding Arctic States (Russia, the US, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Greenland) to maximize their property rights for mining oil and natural gas reserves. Under international law, Arctic states are limited to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles adjacent to their coasts. Upon ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a country has a ten-year period to make claims to an extended continental shelf which, if validated, gives it exclusive rights to resources on or below the seabed of that extended shelf area. This chapter provides an overview of sampled boundary demarcation disputes in the Arctic that demonstrate the prospects and limits of UNCLOS in resolving territorial sovereignty conflicts. Two alternate policy regime options are also discussed: (i) modifications in UNCLOS to incorporate environmental security and indigenous rights concerns; and (ii) establishment of a transnational Arctic protected area or biosphere reserve. One key for any approach is to ensure that Arctic indigenous peoples fully and fairly contribute to any decisions.

US grand energy strategy has used regional allies to foster regional political climates favorable to the oil companies and to the US, often resulting in US support for despotic and illiberal regimes. Thus the desire for power and profit has often triumphed over principle in US foreign energy policy. Price-Smith also argues that Russian incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea, are driven by Putin’s desire to seize energy resources. Similarly, he argues that China’s continuing expansion throughout the South China Sea is driven by a similar calculus, and that both Russia and China’s bellicose actions are fostered in part by the language of the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS). Because of its overwhelming direct dependence on oil from the Americas, and its diminishing reliance on Persian Gulf oil, Price-Smith argues that the US should reconsider its tradition of massive military deployments to the Persian Gulf region. The US should develop an energy grand strategy that would focus on the stabilization of oil supplies from the zone of direct dependence, the Americas. The US would do well to reallocate funds and forces to create a regional energy structure in the Americas. This would entail the diversion of funds away from the projection of military power and toward initiatives (economic and diplomatic) that foster the stabilization of democracy in the Americas.

ASEAN has long promoted its key interests in a stable and autonomous Southeast by binding outside powers to ASEAN’s norms and institutions. Today, domestic political change, divergent interests among ASEAN countries, and the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific are eroding the ASEAN cohesion necessary for a collective ASEAN external policy. ASEAN policy is based on soft power and therefore is dependent on a stable balance of power. China’s rise has upset that balance, triggering Sino-American tensions and conflicts with some Southeast Asian states. ASEAN’s goals of regional stability and autonomy from great power hegemony are increasingly coming into conflict, which may force ASEAN members to choose between them.

This chapter presents issues relating to naval missions and ocean governance and their implications for the future of sea power. The chapter first discusses US naval missions and their goals (strategic deterrence; sea control; projection of power; naval presence as well as surveillance and intelligence gathering) followed by Soviet Naval missions and their goals (defense against US power; second nuclear deterrence, and economic interests), leading to a brief discussion of naval diplomacy between the two major powers. The author then explores ocean governance in India, including its concerns regarding the security of EEZs; protection of sea trade; the prevention of smuggling, insurgency, terrorism etc.; and the prevention of the degradation of the marine environment. The author describes how the institutional framework suggested by the UNCLOS envisages the creation of an integrated ocean management at the national, regional, and global levels. The laws governing merchant shipping are then discussed. The seizing of the SS Achille Lauro (1985) by four Palestinians led to the Rome Convention/SUA Convention (1988) which enacted laws to take action against those who commit unlawful acts against ships. The events of September 11, 2001 led to the creation of the International and Port Security Code, the Container Security Initiative, and the Proliferation Security initiative. The author concludes by suggesting that multilateral cooperation will be needed to deal with increasing threats of terrorism globally. A good example is the co-ordinated patrol named MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia Patrol) initiated in 2004 to counter maritime crime in the Malacca Straits for securing the waterway.

This chapter considers the licensing regime that exists for permitting the exploration for and development of oil and gas within Great Britain and on the UKCS. It discusses the evolution of the licensing regime as well as the nature of the state’s claim to hydrocarbon resources in situ. The legal nature of the UK licence – a hybrid device, with contractual as well as regulatory features – is noted, as is the use of Model Clauses. The essential features of the system of licence allocation is discussed – the use of a grid system, licencing rounds, and discretionary allocation within the framework of published guidance and the limitations imposed by EU Law (principally the Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive and environmental protection legislation). The chapter comments on the current forms of UK oil and gas licences and discusses the introduction of the Frontier and Promote licences (both of which are manifestations of the government’s desire to maximise interest in the mature province) to complement the standard production licence.

This chapter traces the evolution of both international and UK law in relation to decommissioning from the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf through to the present day, noting in the process the impact of the Brent Spar case in the mid-1990s. There is coverage of the terms both of the Petroleum Act 1998 (as amended) and of the Guidance Notes produced by the responsible government department in an effort to elucidate the UK’s likely approach to future decommissioning decisions – not least in cases where an operator seeks to derogate from the general obligations set out under international law. The chapter also considers some of the areas of uncertainty that have caused concern for the industry, notably residual liability and taxation, as well as discussing the issue of financial security.

This chapter examines the shift from a traditional strategy of isolationism to an embryonic variant of a strategy of retrenchment (called “restraint”) in the Arctic region. The Arctic is an area where environmental and economic (natural resources) concerns dominate the US agenda. Security considerations such as contested sovereignty – and the question of what proponents of a strategy of restraint call “chokepoints” – are generally neglected. The chapter therefore begins with a vignette about the Russians planting a titanium flag on the bed of the Arctic Ocean as the segue to a broader discussion of the strategic implications of the ice melt. We focus on the emergence of a new “commons;’” the development of new chokepoints that American strategists currently debate; and the lack of desire (and capacity) of the US Navy to take on this new role.