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Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of humanitarian intervention also poses a challenge to the UN and its member states, and could even undermine the organization. At the heart of the UN’s difficulty is a delicate balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. For its first 45 years, the body was associated with the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force, yet, since 1990, it has endorsed a series of interventions for humanitarian purposes. After considering the history and causes of this shift, the author discusses nine cases of intervention between 1990 and 2001. These cases reveal a number of issues and controversies, including reliance on the UN Security Council for authorization, the stance of the UN Secretary General, and the impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.

This chapter reintroduces international institutional law to the reader. It also discusses a survey of charter provisions in relation to the influence of international organization to law-making proceedings. This survey includes charters or constitutions that aspire to global membership and draws certain general conclusions from this textual review. The ‘external’ ripples of ‘internal’ law are explained, including the following: the Assembly's purse-string power, legal personality and its consequences, the alleged treaty basis for charter powers, the limits of enumerated powers, and the distinction between external and internal rule-making. The chapter also revisits the development of international law through the political organs of the United Nations by discussing statehood and participation, participation by non-state actors, and human rights and the shrinking concept of domestic jurisdiction.

Examines the justifications, motives, and outcomes surrounding India's use of force against Pakistan in December 1971. It shows how international society as reflected in the positions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly interpreted India's action as a breach of the legal rules prohibiting the use of force rather than as a rescue of the Bengali people.

This chapter discusses the role of the United Nations political bodies in creating, facilitating, maintaining, and enforcing international law on the subject of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the cornerstone international organization in the area of international peace and security, the United Nations has had a long history of engagement with the issue of WMD proliferation, beginning with the very first General Assembly Resolution on January 24, 1946. The UN Charter itself gives to the political bodies of the organization specific powers to participate in the creation of new international law on issues of WMD proliferation, as well as special powers of enforcement of non-proliferation law to the UN Security Council.

This chapter discusses the varied forms of international institutional law. It looks into the role of the Security Council as law-maker and its position between power and law. A selective survey on the standard-setting in other international organizations is also presented. The survey mentions the Codex Alimentarius, ICAO's standards and recommended practices, international organizations ‘advisory’ material, ILO recommendations, and IAEA standards. Also mentioned are the FAO's and UNEP's prior informed consent regime, WTO Soft Law, the WHO's Code on marketing of breast-milk substitutes, the World Bank guidelines, IMF conditionality, and emerging global administrative law. The chapter ends with interim conclusions that are at odds with the standard accounts of the limited role of international organizations in law-making and that describe the emerging global administrative law that these organizations produce.

This chapter critically examines the process of reform of three principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat. It discusses the shortcomings and obstacles of the process and recommends how to move forward. The purpose of reform is to enhance both justice and security by forging more equal representation and allowing more efficient responses to threats to the peace. The chapter offers innovative ideas for revitalizing the General Assembly, improving the selection of UN Secretaries-General, and altering the Security Council’s composition according to a model of “8 + 8 + 8”—a mix of permanent, renewable, and non-renewable seats.

This chapter investigates the mechanisms that have been or are being established with a view to securing international action to protect people from being tortured or ill-treated. It deals briefly with reviewing a number of developments of the mechanisms in the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. It then describes the later developments that have involved major advances in the field: the provision for a Committee against Torture to be created under the Convention against Torture, and the establishment of a United Nations Voluntary Fund. In addition, it describes the context of ‘preventive’ mechanisms such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture.

This chapter focuses on the UN Security Council’s authority to convene meetings as embodied in its Provisional Rules of Procedures. It first considers the instances when the Council President shall call a meeting and cases where an agenda item may be rejected, along with the meaning of the term ‘agenda’ in the context of the Council. It then turns to a discussion of the Summary Statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized, which is issued each week by the Secretary-General pursuant to Rule 11 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. It also looks at Article 12(2) of the UN Charter requiring the Secretary-General to notify the UN General Assembly each year of any matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Finally, the chapter cites the Provisional Rules of Procedure requiring no rule in establishing a quorum, along with the notice and timing of Council meetings.

In line with the European Union’s (EU’s or Union’s) dual commitment to human rights and effective multilateralism, cooperation with the United Nations (UN) is an important element of the Union’s external human rights policy. Owing to a strong internal coordination mechanism, the EU acts as one of the most cohesive regional blocs at the UN. It successfully promotes a range of resolutions and ranks among the principal donors of UN human rights institutions. Nevertheless, the EU’s engagement with the UN is not without challenges, both external and internal in nature. Limited participation rights and time-consuming internal coordination processes, but also the increasing tendency among EU Member States to act outside of the Union, limit the EU’s potential for assuming its intended leadership role. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the UN human rights system and explores the Union’s political commitment to engaging with the UN, as well as the legal framework for doing so. After a brief overview of the Union’s internal coordination and external representation mechanisms, the chapter analyses the different tools that the EU has at its disposal in the UN. Finally, the chapter explores the opportunities and the challenges of EU-UN cooperation and concludes with a set of recommendations.

This chapter focuses on the legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention: the right to immediate and continuing assistance; the right to communicate with family members; restriction of the length of interrogation sessions and provision of adequate periods for rest and refreshment; medical examination before and after interrogation; detailed recording of all relevant facts concerning interrogation; a requirement that arrested persons be brought before a judge within 24 hours and thereafter kept in custody only under order and supervision of the court; and adequate remedies for bringing complaints of illegal detention or ill-treatment before the court without any delay. It also discusses the development of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment adopted by the UN General Assembly.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly and entered into force on 23 March 1976. The Covenant has been ratified by 148 States, including many with significant indigenous populations. The Covenant is a complex statement of rights incorporating several domains of discourse: those of collective rights (self-determination), undifferentiated individual rights (most of the text), and minority rights (Article 27); it does not include a specific article on indigenous rights. The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which allows for communications from individuals who claim to be victims of violations of Covenant rights, has 98 States' parties. In the main text of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, procedures for implementation centre on the eighteen-member Human Rights Committee (HRC), elected as independent experts by secret ballot of the States' parties. The Committee formally takes decisions by simple majority, but working methods allow for attempts to reach a consensus—an approach ‘which has been the rule ever since the Committee' inception’.

The major instrument of the UN devoted to the issue of race discrimination is the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965 and entered into force on 4 January 1969. By December 2001, the Convention had 161 States' parties. The text incorporates a preamble of twelve paragraphs, seven substantive articles (Part I of the Convention), a further nine articles addressing implementation (Part II) and nine articles on entry into force, denunciation, revision, reservations, etc. (Part III).

This chapter briefly assesses the geographical scope of the practice of corporal punishment and investigates reports of the rare occasions upon which it has been considered by the General Assembly and other UN bodies. It compares the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions' prohibition of corporal punishment and takes on the question whether the infliction of corporal punishment would entail a grave breach of the Conventions within their respective meaning. In the environment of international human rights law, the chapter studies the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners definition of corporate punishment. Furthermore, it analyses the Tyrer v. United Kingdom case brought before the European Commission of Human Rights to test the compatibility of jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The problem of coordination between international courts and tribunals arises as a result of the existence of numerous tribunals interpreting and applying international law. This problem is due to the horizontal, autonomous, and non-hierarchical relationships between these courts. The need for coordination arises in two respects: the jurisdiction of certain courts may overlap; and the substantive law that each court ‘produces’ can cause disparities in the interpretation and application of international law. For the purposes of coordination, one should consider the creation by the UN General Assembly of a new expert body, modelled on the International Law Commission, which would ensure ‘the progressive development of international law and its codification’. The task of this expert body would be to identify and analyse the potential divergences in the interpretation and application of general international law, as well as the consequences thereof.

In the months prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Serbian Government began devising a range of political, economic and legal responses to that territory’s decision to secede. At the core of the legal approach was a decision to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. However, this raised a number of important questions. Should it try to challenge the declaration or the decision of countries to recognize an independent Kosovo? Serbia decided to seek an advisory opinion from the Court. This required support from the UN General Assembly. Despite opposition from key international supporters of Kosovo’s independence, Serbia engaged in an intense period of diplomacy to persuade countries to support its request. This chapter examines how Serbia brought the question of Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the Court, the political problems it encountered, and why it was ultimately successful in placing its cause before the Court.