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This chapter examines how the Roman alphabet and other ASCII symbols such as numerals are used to represent colloquial Gulf Arabic dialect in instant messaging in the United Arab Emirates. This use of ASCII symbols to represent a language normally written in its own standardized alphabet illustrates how language systems and technological systems interact with social meanings and user identities. The study reported here investigated how young educated UAE females use ASCII symbols to represent Arabic sounds; how consistent these representations are; what influences shape the choice of spellings; and what purposes this kind of writing serves for those who use it. ASCII symbol use was found to be moderately consistent and influenced not only by hardware/software considerations, but also by the social connotations of English, Standard Arabic, and local dialect among the users.

This chapter traces the history of the insurance industry in the United Arab Emirates. The oil-exporting countries of the Gulf all have a very brief history of exposure to the concept of modern insurance. Among them the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides the most arresting example of a quantum leap from a poverty-stricken society to a business environment, where assets worth billions of dollars need to be insured. There are currently fifty-eight insurance companies and 170 brokers operating in the two main population centres, the capital of the UAE Abu Dhabi, the business hub Dubai and in the five smaller emirates. The acceleration over the last four decades of public and private economic activities in the UAE necessitated and facilitated the establishment of an insurance industry, in which national companies now outnumber the foreign ones. The institution by federal and regional governments of an increasing number of mandatory insurances furthered the recent growth of this market.

UAE foreign policy has been able, through constructive engagement, quiet diplomacy, the power of the purse, and commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, to achieve its national goals. The UAE has utilized all means including military, economic, diplomatic, and media to advocate its positions and commitments and achieve its objectives. It has been able to extend its relations to all UN member states and to engage itself in many international issues, including humanitarian causes. In implementing foreign policy orientations it is clear that the four circles—Gulf, Arab, Islamic, and international—are tightly connected and inseparable. However, as a microstate with limited military and human resources confronted by mounting regional threats, it has ended up depending heavily on the US for its security. In the meantime, it seems that the peaceful succession of power to Sheikh Khalifa did not affect the direction of UAE foreign policy.

This chapter looks at the expansion of women's rights in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through the lenses of a movement 'by implication.' Departing from the ideational support leant by the Emirati state to the promotion of the policies of education, professional insertion, and political participation for females, it is argued that women felt encouraged to step into new roles, thus becoming examples to others. Their actions and the multiplier effects they generated have given rise to a movement that is here described as one that is 'by implication.' It is further argued that by taking this approach, it is possible to sketch the main lines of the UAE state's gender policy since its 1971 independence, as well as understand its successes and failures.

The purpose of this chapter is to present new empirical research on the Arab Spring and, specifically, to focus on the attitudes of residents of one country in the Middle East towards the Arab Spring. This research was conducted in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been one of the main migrant destinations in the world for the last two decades. This allows for comparisons regarding attitudes towards the Arab Spring across individuals from different regions of origin such as GCC, South Asia, and Western countries. The attitudes of university students are important because the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced a substantial increase in the 17 to 23 years of age population. Existing reports suggest that, by far, those involved in Arab Spring protests were young individuals. The analysis places particular emphasis on the correlation of attitudes towards the Arab Spring with three key aspects: religiousness, attachment to the GCC countries, and attachment to country of origin.

This chapter tackles the puzzle of international fuel supply cooperation. It explains why the historical record of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) is mixed even though internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle could make markets function more efficiently and reduce the risk of proliferation by eliminating the need for indigenous enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Framing this issue as an international credible commitment problem, the analysis demonstrates that the efficacy of MNAs hinges on the degree of power asymmetry and vulnerability among the bargaining parties. These factors shape the character of risk and trust at issue with reliance on international fuel supply. The evidence from contrasting cases studies of the UAE, South Korea, South Africa, and Kazakhstan shows that countries are most likely to support MNAs when suppliers do not wield sufficient market power to blackmail other states and when customers do not expect to be overly reliant on nuclear energy.

Globally, studies on migrant teachers have tended to focus on Africa and Asia, while the topic of teacher migration in the Middle East in general, and in the Gulf in particular, has not been examined before. This study examines the status of Arab migrant teachers through both an educational and institutional lens. The research employs a mixed-methods comparative approach to investigate contractual agreements, employment experiences, and social integration of Arab teachers in Qatar and the UAE. The results of the study are consistent with literature on the economic motivation behind migration. Arab migrant teachers come to the Gulf largely in order to make money and, in turn, to be able to provide for their families. In addition to examining the motivations for migration, the study also found that the majority of Arab migrant teachers come to the Gulf with the intention of living and working for significant periods of time. Examining issues such as how the uncertain employment conditions for expatriate Arab teachers manifest in their commitment to teaching, the chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations for improving the conditions and output of Arab migrant teachers in the UAE and Qatar.

This chapter explores the fate of Arabs of Palestinian origin in the UAE, culminating in events surrounding the first Gulf War and the Arab uprisings. The specific questions this project addresses include: In the context of the UAE, which factors have historically shaped and changed the position of “other Arabs” over time? How have Palestinians, including younger generations, negotiated and addressed their sometimes tenuous relationship with the UAE? What do current dynamics portend for future relations between Emiratis and Arabs of Palestinian origin who live in the UAE? Two important observations emerged from this research which challenged existing assumptions about the status of Arabs in the UAE and the GCC more generally. First, there is an important generational divide which challenges many preconceived notions surrounding relations between locals and expatriates, sense of belonging, and issues of trust. The guardedness and caution that characterized earlier generations did not appear as salient or relevant for the younger generation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this research reaffirmed the primacy of privilege associated with class and social status as it relates to citizenship. Although Emirati citizenship itself was not necessarily sought after, the attainment of legal citizenship in a stable country remained significant for the lives of Palestinian migrants.

This chapter analyses the development strategy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The de facto development strategy of the UAE has been at the political level, with economic power concentrated in the hands of the rulers of the seven emirates that constitute the UAE, as well as the rules and policies designed to ensure cooperation from the local or native UAE citizens. Large portions of oil revenue were invested in sovereign wealth funds which now generate significant profits, while the balance of the funds was used to spur domestic investments in tourism and industry. The UAE has been liberal in its use of foreign expertise and skills in domestic industry and has shown tolerance towards the importation of unskilled workers to fuel the growth of the domestic economy.

This chapter discusses the South Asian experience within the Gulf, as well as the politics of inclusion and exclusion that deny the expatriates within the scope of a modern Emirati identity. The South Asian diaspora had arrived in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the country’s oil boom, as their labor had made up for the lack of manpower in the state. However, in more recent times there came a desire for the elite class to establish themselves as the legitimate ruling class, and their efforts in doing so have alienated the South Asian identity from a chance at citizenship within a neoliberal regime. There is, however, a deeper undercurrent of fear that causes the divide and the complacency thereof between Emiratis and immigrants alike—that the promises of capitalism may fail them one day.

This chapter examines multiple discourses surrounding the acquisition of nuclear energy technology to illuminate the motivations and intentions of actors who will shape the future of the nuclear renaissance. The analysis demonstrates that suppliers and buyers often tout the ambiguities of nuclear power in their rhetoric. In particular, discourses tend to emphasize the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The study does not suggest that countries pursue nuclear technologies because they have an interest in developing the bomb. Rather, buyer countries can enhance their power and prestige by maintaining ambiguity about their intentions. At the same time, suppliers have incentives to emphasize the ambiguity of nuclear technology because it helps them sell their product.

Early efforts to raise money for T&E falter. An international donor conference in Ankara, sponsored by the US and Turkey, also fails to secure funding. President Clinton dispatches Presidential Advisor Mack McLarty to the Middle East in a successful effort to raise funds in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. Pardew raises additional money from the Sultan of Brunei. The State Department sets up an elaborate financial structure to account for donor money and to reduce the potential for corruption.

This chapter explores the ties Israel has established with the monarchies of the lower Gulf: Oman, Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar. It highlights the shared concern over Iran, but equally, how Israel has used its ‘soft power’ to help leverage influence.

This work analyses change in prehistoric funerary structures and related material culture of Early Bronze Age eastern Arabia (Northern Oman and UAE, 3100-2000 BC) from the perspective of cultural evolutionary theory. By observing decorative and structural elements in monumental tombs and pottery, new hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms of cultural transmission can be explored. The main objective is to transcend the traditional dichotomy between early and late tomb types by creating an explanatory framework that looks at diachronic variation for inferring cultural processes. The research develops a new systematic description of burials and ceramics. Diversity measures are used to investigate the role played by human interaction/isolation and demography in determining adoption, replication, and systematic preference and persistence of the examined cultural variants. Results confirm that, for both tombs and ceramics, specific mechanisms are at work in different moments of time. Starting to research the processes underlying structural change allows for a reassessment of the current interpretation of prehistoric funerary practices and generates new hypotheses on the movement of people and ideas in a still largely unexplored context.

The tomb at Tell Abraq (c. 2200–2000 BC) was the repository for over 400 individuals of all ages and sexes. Situated on the Arabian Gulf near Sharjah and Um al-Quwain in the United Arab Emirates, the tomb contained the commingled remains of at least 276 adults and 127 subadults. Of the subadults, there was a relatively high frequency of premature (28%) and newborn (9%) infants in the tomb. This overview provides the demographic structure of the tomb population based on a detailed MNI study and the complex nature of the mortuary program. Based on the overall MNI determined by the talus bone, observed versus expected ratios show that many long bones and hands and feet bones are underrepresented. We propose that these can be accounted for by other excavation and retrieval strategies. The mortuary program appears to be what Boz and Hager have described as being “primary disturbed.” Grossly underrepresented elements, such as the cranium, could have been removed and used in other contexts. This late Bronze Age tomb is unusual in many ways and does not fit any Umm an Nar patterns.

This chapter provides historical context to the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi from the mid-nineteenth century up until 2011. The chapter covers the emergence of Qatar and the disruptive impact on all the smaller Gulf States, including the UAE, of Saudi expansionary designs on the Arabian Peninsula. Beginning in the 1990s, a new generation of Qatari leaders began to develop political and economic policies that carved a more autonomous role for Qatar in regional affairs. In February 1996, the same four states that would blockade Qatar in 2017 were linked to an abortive coup attempt against the Emir of Qatar, and the chapter ends by examining the aftermath of the coup attempt and the trajectory of Saudi pressure on Qatar in the 2000s.

This chapter examines in detail the events surrounding the blockade of Qatar from the Riyadh Summit in May 2017 to the visit by Kuwait’s Emir to the White House in September. It begins with the hacking of the Qatar News Agency that formed the trigger for the events that followed, and reviews the campaign of outreach and influence-building in Washington, D.C. that led Saudi and Emirati officials to believe that their move against Qatar, an integral U.S. partner, would receive White House support. This, notably, did not happen, and the chapter focuses on how the blockade unfolded to the surprise and consternation of (most) observers in the United States and other world capitals. The remainder of the chapter explores how and why the blockading states’ ‘gamble’ on the Trump White House backfired over the course of the summer of 2017, as by September, the Trump administration had committed itself to a diplomatic resolution of the blockade.

Libya introduced four laws between 1972 and 1974 that regulated ḥudūd crimes and other related offences. In 1994 another statute was introduced, which ordered the courts to follow the classical rules of retaliation and blood money in homicide cases. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Constitution 1971 states that “Islam is the official religion of the Union, and that Islamic shariah is the main source of its legislation.” This last phrase is understood to mean that, in addition to shariah, other sources may also be utilised for purposes of legislation. The formula thus provides for a mixed legal system. Qatar Penal Code 2004 incorporates the shariah ḥudūd punishments for various offenses. Article 1 of this law states that the provisions of Islamic law concerning qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr offences also apply if the defendant or victim is a Muslim.