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This chapter examines how the Roman alphabet and other ASCII symbols such as numerals are used to represent colloquial Gulf Arabic dialect in instant messaging in the United Arab Emirates. This use of ASCII symbols to represent a language normally written in its own standardized alphabet illustrates how language systems and technological systems interact with social meanings and user identities. The study reported here investigated how young educated UAE females use ASCII symbols to represent Arabic sounds; how consistent these representations are; what influences shape the choice of spellings; and what purposes this kind of writing serves for those who use it. ASCII symbol use was found to be moderately consistent and influenced not only by hardware/software considerations, but also by the social connotations of English, Standard Arabic, and local dialect among the users.

This is a brief interstitial introduction by art historian Kim A. Munson explaining how the period of rediscovery and large survey shows of comic art were followed by specialized shows exploring comics by a multitude of topics that were previously ignored or taboo, including shows of work by feminist comic artists, by alternative comic artists, by African American comic artists, erotic comics, and experimental shows of ‘gallery comics.’  The Western style of exhibiting comic art replicated internationally to Manga Museums in Japan and to the Cartoon Museum in the United Arab Emirates.

This chapter traces the history of the insurance industry in the United Arab Emirates. The oil-exporting countries of the Gulf all have a very brief history of exposure to the concept of modern insurance. Among them the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides the most arresting example of a quantum leap from a poverty-stricken society to a business environment, where assets worth billions of dollars need to be insured. There are currently fifty-eight insurance companies and 170 brokers operating in the two main population centres, the capital of the UAE Abu Dhabi, the business hub Dubai and in the five smaller emirates. The acceleration over the last four decades of public and private economic activities in the UAE necessitated and facilitated the establishment of an insurance industry, in which national companies now outnumber the foreign ones. The institution by federal and regional governments of an increasing number of mandatory insurances furthered the recent growth of this market.

This chapter outlines a sociolinguistic history of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and considers the complexity that this history poses to the postcolonial and non-postcolonial Englishes categorisation. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the status and functions of English in the UAE, and it studies the roles of the English language in the country. Considering these elements, the text applies the EIF Model to the variety and hypothesizes the direction in which the variety is likely to develop. This application suggests that the variety is entering phase 3, and that any further development to the variety is strongly tied to future social and economic developments in the country.

This chapter includes a 2016 essay by comics studies pioneer John A. Lent about the Cartoon Art Gallery in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Dubai is home to the Middle East Film and Comic Con (the largest regional convention), Comicave (the largest comics related store in the region), and Majid, the most popular comics character (published since 1979). A group of dedicated young people with faith in comics as an essential form of art and communication have nurtured a small cartoon art museum and an active comics community amongst the glittering skyscrapers. Lent visited the museum, talking with the founder, Melvin Matthew, about their exhibition style and sense of community. This chapter discusses popular comics titles and cartoonists in the UAE. Images: 3 gallery photos.

This chapter looks at the expansion of women's rights in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through the lenses of a movement 'by implication.' Departing from the ideational support leant by the Emirati state to the promotion of the policies of education, professional insertion, and political participation for females, it is argued that women felt encouraged to step into new roles, thus becoming examples to others. Their actions and the multiplier effects they generated have given rise to a movement that is here described as one that is 'by implication.' It is further argued that by taking this approach, it is possible to sketch the main lines of the UAE state's gender policy since its 1971 independence, as well as understand its successes and failures.

UAE foreign policy has been able, through constructive engagement, quiet diplomacy, the power of the purse, and commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, to achieve its national goals. The UAE has utilized all means including military, economic, diplomatic, and media to advocate its positions and commitments and achieve its objectives. It has been able to extend its relations to all UN member states and to engage itself in many international issues, including humanitarian causes. In implementing foreign policy orientations it is clear that the four circles—Gulf, Arab, Islamic, and international—are tightly connected and inseparable. However, as a microstate with limited military and human resources confronted by mounting regional threats, it has ended up depending heavily on the US for its security. In the meantime, it seems that the peaceful succession of power to Sheikh Khalifa did not affect the direction of UAE foreign policy.

This chapter explores the relationship between museum spatiality and migrant status in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Despite accounting for more than 80% of the resident population and having a long and visible presence in society, migrant labourers continue to remain mostly excluded from official museum narratives and they rarely visit collections. Rather, they prefer to gather outside museums, where they meet to socialise and take pictures. This chapter draws attention to the importance of the outside space for museum research. It also highlights the formidable exhibitionary power of museums, showing how they can be used as stages of alternative heritage practices and discourses for a population that remains marginalised, all the while showcasing its social stigma. As they socialise outside museums, migrant labourers become exhibits for incoming and outgoing visitors; the uneasy reminders of the social and economic discrepancies existing in the UAE.

The purpose of this chapter is to present new empirical research on the Arab Spring and, specifically, to focus on the attitudes of residents of one country in the Middle East towards the Arab Spring. This research was conducted in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been one of the main migrant destinations in the world for the last two decades. This allows for comparisons regarding attitudes towards the Arab Spring across individuals from different regions of origin such as GCC, South Asia, and Western countries. The attitudes of university students are important because the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced a substantial increase in the 17 to 23 years of age population. Existing reports suggest that, by far, those involved in Arab Spring protests were young individuals. The analysis places particular emphasis on the correlation of attitudes towards the Arab Spring with three key aspects: religiousness, attachment to the GCC countries, and attachment to country of origin.

This chapter tackles the puzzle of international fuel supply cooperation. It explains why the historical record of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) is mixed even though internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle could make markets function more efficiently and reduce the risk of proliferation by eliminating the need for indigenous enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Framing this issue as an international credible commitment problem, the analysis demonstrates that the efficacy of MNAs hinges on the degree of power asymmetry and vulnerability among the bargaining parties. These factors shape the character of risk and trust at issue with reliance on international fuel supply. The evidence from contrasting cases studies of the UAE, South Korea, South Africa, and Kazakhstan shows that countries are most likely to support MNAs when suppliers do not wield sufficient market power to blackmail other states and when customers do not expect to be overly reliant on nuclear energy.

Globally, studies on migrant teachers have tended to focus on Africa and Asia, while the topic of teacher migration in the Middle East in general, and in the Gulf in particular, has not been examined before. This study examines the status of Arab migrant teachers through both an educational and institutional lens. The research employs a mixed-methods comparative approach to investigate contractual agreements, employment experiences, and social integration of Arab teachers in Qatar and the UAE. The results of the study are consistent with literature on the economic motivation behind migration. Arab migrant teachers come to the Gulf largely in order to make money and, in turn, to be able to provide for their families. In addition to examining the motivations for migration, the study also found that the majority of Arab migrant teachers come to the Gulf with the intention of living and working for significant periods of time. Examining issues such as how the uncertain employment conditions for expatriate Arab teachers manifest in their commitment to teaching, the chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations for improving the conditions and output of Arab migrant teachers in the UAE and Qatar.

This chapter explores the fate of Arabs of Palestinian origin in the UAE, culminating in events surrounding the first Gulf War and the Arab uprisings. The specific questions this project addresses include: In the context of the UAE, which factors have historically shaped and changed the position of “other Arabs” over time? How have Palestinians, including younger generations, negotiated and addressed their sometimes tenuous relationship with the UAE? What do current dynamics portend for future relations between Emiratis and Arabs of Palestinian origin who live in the UAE? Two important observations emerged from this research which challenged existing assumptions about the status of Arabs in the UAE and the GCC more generally. First, there is an important generational divide which challenges many preconceived notions surrounding relations between locals and expatriates, sense of belonging, and issues of trust. The guardedness and caution that characterized earlier generations did not appear as salient or relevant for the younger generation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this research reaffirmed the primacy of privilege associated with class and social status as it relates to citizenship. Although Emirati citizenship itself was not necessarily sought after, the attainment of legal citizenship in a stable country remained significant for the lives of Palestinian migrants.

This chapter analyses the development strategy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The de facto development strategy of the UAE has been at the political level, with economic power concentrated in the hands of the rulers of the seven emirates that constitute the UAE, as well as the rules and policies designed to ensure cooperation from the local or native UAE citizens. Large portions of oil revenue were invested in sovereign wealth funds which now generate significant profits, while the balance of the funds was used to spur domestic investments in tourism and industry. The UAE has been liberal in its use of foreign expertise and skills in domestic industry and has shown tolerance towards the importation of unskilled workers to fuel the growth of the domestic economy.

This chapter discusses the South Asian experience within the Gulf, as well as the politics of inclusion and exclusion that deny the expatriates within the scope of a modern Emirati identity. The South Asian diaspora had arrived in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the country’s oil boom, as their labor had made up for the lack of manpower in the state. However, in more recent times there came a desire for the elite class to establish themselves as the legitimate ruling class, and their efforts in doing so have alienated the South Asian identity from a chance at citizenship within a neoliberal regime. There is, however, a deeper undercurrent of fear that causes the divide and the complacency thereof between Emiratis and immigrants alike—that the promises of capitalism may fail them one day.

This chapter examines multiple discourses surrounding the acquisition of nuclear energy technology to illuminate the motivations and intentions of actors who will shape the future of the nuclear renaissance. The analysis demonstrates that suppliers and buyers often tout the ambiguities of nuclear power in their rhetoric. In particular, discourses tend to emphasize the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The study does not suggest that countries pursue nuclear technologies because they have an interest in developing the bomb. Rather, buyer countries can enhance their power and prestige by maintaining ambiguity about their intentions. At the same time, suppliers have incentives to emphasize the ambiguity of nuclear technology because it helps them sell their product.

This chapter explores the ties Israel has established with the monarchies of the lower Gulf: Oman, Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar. It highlights the shared concern over Iran, but equally, how Israel has used its ‘soft power’ to help leverage influence.

This chapter provides historical context to the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi from the mid-nineteenth century up until 2011. The chapter covers the emergence of Qatar and the disruptive impact on all the smaller Gulf States, including the UAE, of Saudi expansionary designs on the Arabian Peninsula. Beginning in the 1990s, a new generation of Qatari leaders began to develop political and economic policies that carved a more autonomous role for Qatar in regional affairs. In February 1996, the same four states that would blockade Qatar in 2017 were linked to an abortive coup attempt against the Emir of Qatar, and the chapter ends by examining the aftermath of the coup attempt and the trajectory of Saudi pressure on Qatar in the 2000s.

This chapter examines in detail the events surrounding the blockade of Qatar from the Riyadh Summit in May 2017 to the visit by Kuwait’s Emir to the White House in September. It begins with the hacking of the Qatar News Agency that formed the trigger for the events that followed, and reviews the campaign of outreach and influence-building in Washington, D.C. that led Saudi and Emirati officials to believe that their move against Qatar, an integral U.S. partner, would receive White House support. This, notably, did not happen, and the chapter focuses on how the blockade unfolded to the surprise and consternation of (most) observers in the United States and other world capitals. The remainder of the chapter explores how and why the blockading states’ ‘gamble’ on the Trump White House backfired over the course of the summer of 2017, as by September, the Trump administration had committed itself to a diplomatic resolution of the blockade.