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Fleet Mobility Tactical Development, 1945–1953

Peter V. Nash

in The Development of Mobile Logistic Support in Anglo-American Naval Policy, 1900–1953

This chapter focuses on the tactical aspects of logistic support as both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy realigned their command structures and operating fleets to meet existing obligations and ... More

This chapter focuses on the tactical aspects of logistic support as both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy realigned their command structures and operating fleets to meet existing obligations and anticipated worldwide threats. It explores why and how tactical doctrine for logistic support was refined to cope with the increasingly complex challenges caused by technological advances in carrier development, jet aircraft, and weaponry, all against the constant backdrop of heightened risk from potential enemy fast submarine or air attack. This line of inquiry includes postwar fleet exercises, war-gaming, and trials programs, which provided peaceful means to improve skills, understanding, and the actual equipment associated with replenishment at sea. It concludes by examining how the Korean War logistic experience affected doctrine and why it acted as a catalyst for introducing new technology and ships that would improve both navies' future capability in the art and science of replenishing ships at sea.Less

Naval Gunfire Support In Operation Neptune: A Reexamination

Barbara Brooks Tomblin

in The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front

This chapter delivers a captivating narrative that takes readers from the choppy and cold waters of the French coast to the shores of North Africa, to Sicily, and to the ... More

This chapter delivers a captivating narrative that takes readers from the choppy and cold waters of the French coast to the shores of North Africa, to Sicily, and to the deadly beaches of Salerno, and then back again to Normandy on June 6, 1944. It demonstrates that the U.S. Navy's successes on June 6 were largely the result of putting into practice the lessons learned from previous amphibious assaults launched in the Mediterranean during 1942 and 1943. In part, because none of the major Mediterranean landings included pre-invasion bombardments of the landing zones, Allied planners recognized the need to wear down German defenses at Normandy with a pre-landing shelling, even at the sacrifice of surprise. The landings in North Africa and Italy not only highlighted the need for close-in fire support for the troops assaulting the beaches, but also revealed the effectiveness of air spot gunfire support and the need for more effective minesweeping operations. Amphibious operations prior to June 6, 1944, also uncovered the need for better defenses against German U-boat, E-boat, and air attacks. Even by the time of the Normandy landings, war planners failed to recognize, despite a wealth of information, the inherent limitations that Allied warships and landing craft would have in silencing enemy shore batteries. This oversight contributed much to the bloodshed on June 6.Less

A “Ticklish” Position: Revolution, Loyalty, and Crisis, 1959–1964

Jana K. Lipman

in Guantanamo: A Working-Class History between Empire and Revolution

Victor Davis' GTMO profession began just after World War II, survived the Cuban revolution, and continued until his retirement in 2005. Victor was born in Banes, where his Jamaican parents worked in ... More

Victor Davis' GTMO profession began just after World War II, survived the Cuban revolution, and continued until his retirement in 2005. Victor was born in Banes, where his Jamaican parents worked in the environs of the United Fruit Company. Victor Davis spoke only implicitly about the Cuban revolution and the subsequent “ticklish” problems confronting base workers. He saw GTMO's transformation from a base defined by debauchery to a military outpost defined by Cold War hostilities. He tried to find a balance between these two poles, and he was more successful than most. Victor remained in his job, but now he had to satisfy the U.S. Navy and revolutionary officials. The U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay remained a potent icon and physical reminder of U.S. imperialism. Victor insistently did not include a U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Bay when President Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961 as one of his last acts of state.Less

The Army-Navy Contest for Control of Land-Based Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate, 1942–1948

George H. Monahan

in The Sea and the Second World War: Maritime Aspects of a Global Conflict

In this chapter, George H. Monahan discusses the success of the German U-boat offensive in the Western Atlantic after the U.S. entry into World War II, which led the War Department leadership to ... More

In this chapter, George H. Monahan discusses the success of the German U-boat offensive in the Western Atlantic after the U.S. entry into World War II, which led the War Department leadership to believe that the U.S. Navy was not employing adequate antisubmarine tactics. In the application of airpower to combat the submarine threat, the War Department and Army leadership believed that aggressive "hunter-killer" tactics would prove more effective than the Navy's preferred defensive tactic of conducting aerial patrols in the vicinity of convoys. Navy leaders, meanwhile, contended that its defensive tactics were the best method of protecting shipping. A bitter interservice conflict ensued as the War Department sought to initiate an Army Air Forces antisubmarine offensive over the Bay of Biscay. Claiming jurisdiction over all air operations at sea, the Navy leadership firmly opposed the War Department's initiative and insisted that Army Air Forces antisubmarine units operate according to the Navy's defensive doctrine. Secretary of War Henry Stimson's frustration over Admiral Ernest King's refusal to accede to the War Department antisubmarine initiative led the former to support a post-war reorganization of the military command apparatus, thereby ensuring Navy subordination to civilian leadership under an overarching Secretary of Defense.Less

A Light Footprint in Bahrain

Geoffrey F. Gresh

in Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing

After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But ... More

After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But when the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 with the U.S. supporting Israel in the war, Bahrainis violently voiced their outrage over the U.S. naval presence. In late 1973, the Bahraini government announced that the U.S. naval basing agreement would be terminated. The U.S. lost its homeport at Jufair, but it was able to negotiate the maintenance of a light footprint including the presence of an administrative support unit for U.S. naval regional logistics. This chapter examines both the domestic security challenges faced by the Khalifas during this period and the politics involved in the homeport expulsion.Less

Initial Challenges: Postwar and Demobilization Planning

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's postwar and demobilization planning process, which began with the creation of Harry Yarnell's Special Planning Section under Vice Chief of Naval Operations ... More

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's postwar and demobilization planning process, which began with the creation of Harry Yarnell's Special Planning Section under Vice Chief of Naval Operations Frederic Horne. As the Navy coped with an ever-increasing number of internal and external factors, it gradually acquired greater sophistication in its analysis of the issues impinging on the service's future. The creation of a second postwar planning office—this time within the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet—brought an increased sophistication to the handling of such planning.Less

Roosevelt at the Rubicon: The Great Convoy Debate of 1941

J. Garry Clifford and Robert H. Ferrell

in The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front

This chapter goes back to the dark days of 1941 when the fates of England—and, by extension, of the United States—hung in the balance. Combining the personal insights on ... More

This chapter goes back to the dark days of 1941 when the fates of England—and, by extension, of the United States—hung in the balance. Combining the personal insights on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's diplomacy, found in works such as Warren Kimball's The Juggler and in the compelling narrative on the approach of war best seen in Waldo Heinrichs' Threshold of War, the chapter focuses on the critical issue of the U.S. Navy's convoying of merchant ships across the Atlantic during 1941. It examines how lukewarm public opinion, Congressional opposition, incomplete rearmament, and the pressing needs of other theaters, led Roosevelt to dissemble and delay rather than address the convoy question. This study offers a particularly penetrating re-examination of Roosevelt's legacy of bipartisanship, his mishandling of isolationists in 1941, and his lack of candor toward Congress and the public.Less

Adjusting to the National Military Establishment

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for ... More

This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.Less

The National Security act Achieved

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the events leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee's report favoring defense unification spurred the Navy ... More

This chapter discusses the events leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee's report favoring defense unification spurred the Navy Department's efforts to maintain its independence. James Forrestal's subsequent fight to maintain the Navy's freedom of movement on the unification question during 1945 and early 1946, and his search for allies, both within the department and outside on Capitol Hill and in the larger public community, culminated in the passage of unification legislation that reflected many of the Navy's concerns about high-level organization for defense. Regarding matters of military defense, the National Security Act of 1947 was expected to remain a mere artifact without the active support of the service components that made up the new National Military Establishment.Less

Assessing and Responding to the Soviet Naval Threat

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter considers the U.S. Navy's response to the threat posed by Soviet naval capabilities. Increasing concern about the ability of the Russians to deploy a force of highly effective new ... More

This chapter considers the U.S. Navy's response to the threat posed by Soviet naval capabilities. Increasing concern about the ability of the Russians to deploy a force of highly effective new submarines based on the German-designed Type XXI U-boat led to a massive Navy effort to increase the effectiveness of U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets. Although the Soviet high-speed submarine threat did not materialize in the 1940s, the U.S. Navy's late-decade push on improving its ASW capabilities across the board held it in good stead when new increased-capability submarines began entering the Soviet fleet in the early and mid-1950s.Less

The Sword and the Pen

William P. Leeman

in The Long Road to Annapolis: The Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic

This chapter discusses the significant decline in popularity experienced by the U.S. Navy after basking in the glory of its outstanding performance in the War of 1812. It also suffered from neglect ... More

This chapter discusses the significant decline in popularity experienced by the U.S. Navy after basking in the glory of its outstanding performance in the War of 1812. It also suffered from neglect by the federal government despite performing a wide range of important missions in service to the nation. Public indifference led to a loss of morale within the naval officer corps similar to that experienced by army officers. In the midst of this largely negative atmosphere, however, the navy was able to make strides toward greater professionalism in the 1830s and 1840s. No longer receiving the acclaim they had enjoyed after the War of 1812, naval officers increasingly closed ranks and looked within their own community for professional fulfillment. Led by a group of progressive reformers within the officer corps, more and more naval officers made it their goal to transform the naval service into a true profession through intellectual and moral improvement.Less

Closing Down the Kingdom: Union Combined Operations Against Wilmington

Chris E. Fonvielle Jr.

in Union Combined Operations in the Civil War

Long before Ulysses S. Grant made his move to the James River, the North Carolina seaport of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River had become the principal port of entry for ships carrying essential ... More

Long before Ulysses S. Grant made his move to the James River, the North Carolina seaport of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River had become the principal port of entry for ships carrying essential supplies to Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. By the summer of 1864, as Grant fought his way through the wilderness, and Butler moved up the James River to Bermuda Hundred, the survival of Lee's army depended heavily on the flow of European arms, equipment, and provisions being imported into the Confederacy by way of Wilmington. Union military authorities did not initiate a serious campaign against this key city until late 1864. By then, however, Wilmington was the most heavily defended city on the Atlantic seaboard, with the exception of Charleston. Nevertheless, with important lessons learned in previous combined operations, the U.S. Army and Navy made plans to capture Wilmington with a large-scale combined operation.Less

The Navy and Unification

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter focuses on the issue of military unification. By 1944, the Army and the Army Air Forces strongly supported the unification of the services, while the Navy and Marine Corps firmly opposed ... More

This chapter focuses on the issue of military unification. By 1944, the Army and the Army Air Forces strongly supported the unification of the services, while the Navy and Marine Corps firmly opposed it. Although the heat generated by this interservice dispute might lead one to believe that this had been a longstanding disagreement, such was not the case. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the Army and Navy had been united in their opposition to military unification. The Navy's concern that if it were forced into a unified department with the Army, its air arm at best would be subsumed by the Army Air Forces as a minor aviation element, and at worst would be eliminated entirely, appeared a highly realistic one. Other Navy concerns, such as those relating to how national defense policy and military strategy would be effectively created and managed under a system guided by a single Chief of Staff and a Joint General Staff, were forming but were still largely inchoate at this time. They would become fully formed and much more prominent during 1945.Less

Living in “Interesting Times”1

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the events following the resignation of James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense in March 1949. Forrestal's replacement, Louis Johnson, cancelled the Navy's plans to build the ... More

This chapter discusses the events following the resignation of James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense in March 1949. Forrestal's replacement, Louis Johnson, cancelled the Navy's plans to build the flush-deck aircraft carrier United States, which eventually led to the resignation of Navy Secretary John Sullivan. The appointment of Francis Matthews as Sullivan's replacement, and senior naval officers' lack of confidence in his abilities, spurred the secretive distribution of the Anonymous Document to selected members of Congress. The document castigated the Air Force's procurement of the B-36 bomber. While this action was the work of two individuals in the Navy Department, people on the outside, including the senior leaders of the Army and Air Force, were convinced that the entire Navy Department had been behind the scheme. This set the stage for renewed interservice fighting over issues of military strategy and the place of the Navy in national defense.Less

Conclusion

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter considers the U.S. Navy's activities in the early years of the Cold War. From 1945 through 1955, the Navy successfully adapted to the changed circumstances of the U.S.–USSR relationship, ... More

This chapter considers the U.S. Navy's activities in the early years of the Cold War. From 1945 through 1955, the Navy successfully adapted to the changed circumstances of the U.S.–USSR relationship, which is, in large part, a testament to the professional competence of the vast majority of senior officers and civilian leaders who served the Navy during these difficult years. The Navy's fight to retain its independence during the Truman administration's push for service unification, and the international crises that arose during this ten-year period, are also discussed.Less

The Upper Yangtze

William Reynolds Braisted

in Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922-1933

This chapter examines the challenges posed by the upper Yangtze River for the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet deployed to China for diplomatic purposes. In explains that aside from its numerous ... More

This chapter examines the challenges posed by the upper Yangtze River for the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet deployed to China for diplomatic purposes. In explains that aside from its numerous tributaries, the Yangtze River was the most troubled stretch within the Yangtze River Patrol Force's sphere of operations. It was suspected that in this area warlords and robbers agreed to share protection money, and the robber bandits thus became de facto units of the warlord's army.Less

Naval Gunfire Support at Iwo Jima: The Perils of Doctrinal Myopia

Donald K. Mitchener

in The Sea and the Second World War: Maritime Aspects of a Global Conflict

One component of the American amphibious warfare doctrine developed by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period concerned the use of naval gunfire in the softening up of enemy ... More

One component of the American amphibious warfare doctrine developed by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period concerned the use of naval gunfire in the softening up of enemy defenses prior to the landing of troops ashore. Historians of the war in the Pacific have traditionally argued that the Americans made mistakes, but that they learned valuable lessons along the way and applied those lessons fairly consistently. This chapter by Donald K. Mitchener asserts that this argument needs modification in the case of pre-assault naval gunfire support at Iwo Jima. It describes how the need to maintain strategic momentum against Japan resulted in a gunfire plan that was not adequate to the task. The chapter also shows how General Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander at Iwo, inadvertently created a defensive scheme that caused the Americans to waste much of the ammunition they expended on their last day of naval gunfire preparation.Less

The Navy in the Far East

William Reynolds Braisted

in Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922-1933

This chapter examines the deployment of the U.S. Navy Asiatic Fleet in the Far East during the years between the world wars. It was deployed not as an instrument of war but for diplomatic purposes. ... More

This chapter examines the deployment of the U.S. Navy Asiatic Fleet in the Far East during the years between the world wars. It was deployed not as an instrument of war but for diplomatic purposes. Its missions were to cooperate with the Army in defense of the Philippines against a Japanese attack and to protect American persons, property, and other interests in China.Less