Christopher P. Loss
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148274
- eISBN:
- 9781400840052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148274.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist ...
More
This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, presented evidence to military commanders that better-educated soldiers were more efficient, exhibited higher morale, and were less likely to desert or suffer a psychoneurotic breakdown than their educationally deprived peers. Military and educational policymakers were galvanized by this finding and joined forces to create the Army Information and Education Division—the education clearinghouse for the common soldier. With the steady support of General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the army, who believed wholeheartedly in the transformative power of education, millions of G.I.s made use of the educational services provided to them.Less
This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, presented evidence to military commanders that better-educated soldiers were more efficient, exhibited higher morale, and were less likely to desert or suffer a psychoneurotic breakdown than their educationally deprived peers. Military and educational policymakers were galvanized by this finding and joined forces to create the Army Information and Education Division—the education clearinghouse for the common soldier. With the steady support of General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the army, who believed wholeheartedly in the transformative power of education, millions of G.I.s made use of the educational services provided to them.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity ...
More
The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also eased the military's task. As the fighting bogged down in stalemate, it became less newsworthy. For the first time, the military also had enormous control over what reporters saw. And at the same time, they were now in a position to alleviate the two practical problems that had soured military‐media relations in 1950: appalling billets and antiquated communications. In Washington, meanwhile, officials undertook numerous information campaigns that helped sustain a measure of support for the war.Less
The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also eased the military's task. As the fighting bogged down in stalemate, it became less newsworthy. For the first time, the military also had enormous control over what reporters saw. And at the same time, they were now in a position to alleviate the two practical problems that had soured military‐media relations in 1950: appalling billets and antiquated communications. In Washington, meanwhile, officials undertook numerous information campaigns that helped sustain a measure of support for the war.
G. Kurt Piehler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823231201
- eISBN:
- 9780823240791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823231201.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of ...
More
This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of combat historian S. L. A. Marshall to produce richly detailed histories that contributed to the U.S. Army's unprecedented drive to document the services wartime history—a practice that the Army had not followed either during or after other major conflicts. The chapter demonstrates that in addition to its use in official histories, others put oral history to use to serve the war effort. Samuel Stouffer and the U.S. Army's Research Branch often used oral histories to improve survey questions that went out to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The Research Branch's work proved invaluable in many instances, and perhaps nowhere was it more worthwhile than in reshaping treatments for battle fatigue. The extensive use of oral histories during the war led to its widespread acceptance by the U.S. Army after 1945, and because of the active campaigning of wartime practitioners such as historian Forest Pogue, the wider community of academic historians, who often disparaged the value of oral history after the war, came increasingly to embrace the practice during the 1960s and the 1970s.Less
This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of combat historian S. L. A. Marshall to produce richly detailed histories that contributed to the U.S. Army's unprecedented drive to document the services wartime history—a practice that the Army had not followed either during or after other major conflicts. The chapter demonstrates that in addition to its use in official histories, others put oral history to use to serve the war effort. Samuel Stouffer and the U.S. Army's Research Branch often used oral histories to improve survey questions that went out to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The Research Branch's work proved invaluable in many instances, and perhaps nowhere was it more worthwhile than in reshaping treatments for battle fatigue. The extensive use of oral histories during the war led to its widespread acceptance by the U.S. Army after 1945, and because of the active campaigning of wartime practitioners such as historian Forest Pogue, the wider community of academic historians, who often disparaged the value of oral history after the war, came increasingly to embrace the practice during the 1960s and the 1970s.
Jeffrey Magee
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195398267
- eISBN:
- 9780199933358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195398267.003.0006
- Subject:
- Music, History, American, Popular
When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) ...
More
When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) and succeeded by avoiding direct expressions of patriotism and focusing instead on the ordinary complaints and wishes of the common soldier. More than that, Berlin’s songs had a way of reflecting the common preoccupations that soldiers and citizens shared, and thus it could be argued, his work helped to normalize the war experience in an unstable period of American history. This Is the Army takes center stage in Berlin’s work for several reasons: its tour of the U.S. and war zones, its performances for more than a million civilian and soldier spectators, and its status as “the best thing I’ve ever been connected with,” as Berlin called it.Less
When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) and succeeded by avoiding direct expressions of patriotism and focusing instead on the ordinary complaints and wishes of the common soldier. More than that, Berlin’s songs had a way of reflecting the common preoccupations that soldiers and citizens shared, and thus it could be argued, his work helped to normalize the war experience in an unstable period of American history. This Is the Army takes center stage in Berlin’s work for several reasons: its tour of the U.S. and war zones, its performances for more than a million civilian and soldier spectators, and its status as “the best thing I’ve ever been connected with,” as Berlin called it.
Henry G. Gole
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125008
- eISBN:
- 9780813135168
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125008.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the ...
More
Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. This book draws from sources such as transcripts and letters in DePuy's personal papers, interviews with those who knew him best, and secondary literature to trace DePuy's life—from child to decorated officer to commander of Training and Doctrine Command.Less
Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. This book draws from sources such as transcripts and letters in DePuy's personal papers, interviews with those who knew him best, and secondary literature to trace DePuy's life—from child to decorated officer to commander of Training and Doctrine Command.
General Donn A. Starry
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the ...
More
This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the merger of the cavalry and armor divisions in 1950. The chapter also explores the history of the development of mechanized forces in the whole of the U.S. Army, from the advent of tanks in battle in the 1914–1918 war to the end of Desert Storm in 1991.Less
This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the merger of the cavalry and armor divisions in 1950. The chapter also explores the history of the development of mechanized forces in the whole of the U.S. Army, from the advent of tanks in battle in the 1914–1918 war to the end of Desert Storm in 1991.
George F. Hofmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized ...
More
This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized warfare supported by tactical aviation as a solution to trench warfare during World War I. He became a visionary after witnessing the introduction of the airplane and tank in warfare. The chapter provides background on Parker's education and career.Less
This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized warfare supported by tactical aviation as a solution to trench warfare during World War I. He became a visionary after witnessing the introduction of the airplane and tank in warfare. The chapter provides background on Parker's education and career.
Henry G. Gole
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125008
- eISBN:
- 9780813135168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125008.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous ...
More
Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.Less
Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.
Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807832783
- eISBN:
- 9781469605081
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807898567_hsieh
- Subject:
- History, American History: Civil War
Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into ...
More
Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. This book demonstrates how the “old army” transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how “old army” methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War.Less
Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. This book demonstrates how the “old army” transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how “old army” methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War.
John T. Greenwood (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125251
- eISBN:
- 9780813135038
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125251.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources ...
More
During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources for World War II scholars and enthusiasts alike. Until now, one of the most historically significant of these diaries, the one kept by General Courtney H. Hodges of the First U.S. Army, has not been widely available to the public. Maintained by two of Hodges' aides, Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr., this military journal offers a firsthand account detailing the actions, decisions, and daily activities of General Hodges and the First Army throughout the war. It opens on June 2, 1944, as Hodges and the First Army prepare for the Allied invasion of France. In the weeks and months that follow, the diary highlights the crucial role that Hodges' often undervalued command—the first to cross the German border, the first to cross the Rhine, the first to close to the Elbe—played in the Allied operations in northwest Europe. It recounts the First Army's involvement in the fight for France, the Siegfried Line campaign, the Battle of the Bulge, the drive to the Roer River, and the crossing of the Rhine, following Hodges and his men through savage European combat until the German surrender in May 1945. Popularly referred to as the “Sylvan Diary” after its primary writer, the diary has previously been available only to military historians and researchers, who were permitted to use it at only the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the U.S. Army Center for Military History, or the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The text has now been edited in its entirety a biography of General Hodges, as well as extensive notes that clarify the diary's historical details, have been added.Less
During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources for World War II scholars and enthusiasts alike. Until now, one of the most historically significant of these diaries, the one kept by General Courtney H. Hodges of the First U.S. Army, has not been widely available to the public. Maintained by two of Hodges' aides, Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr., this military journal offers a firsthand account detailing the actions, decisions, and daily activities of General Hodges and the First Army throughout the war. It opens on June 2, 1944, as Hodges and the First Army prepare for the Allied invasion of France. In the weeks and months that follow, the diary highlights the crucial role that Hodges' often undervalued command—the first to cross the German border, the first to cross the Rhine, the first to close to the Elbe—played in the Allied operations in northwest Europe. It recounts the First Army's involvement in the fight for France, the Siegfried Line campaign, the Battle of the Bulge, the drive to the Roer River, and the crossing of the Rhine, following Hodges and his men through savage European combat until the German surrender in May 1945. Popularly referred to as the “Sylvan Diary” after its primary writer, the diary has previously been available only to military historians and researchers, who were permitted to use it at only the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the U.S. Army Center for Military History, or the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The text has now been edited in its entirety a biography of General Hodges, as well as extensive notes that clarify the diary's historical details, have been added.
Henry G. Gole
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125008
- eISBN:
- 9780813135168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125008.003.0014
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The period between 1969 and 1973 marked a very bad time for the U.S. Army's history as Vietnam appeared to have the upper hand in the war against the United States. While the U.S. Army was busily ...
More
The period between 1969 and 1973 marked a very bad time for the U.S. Army's history as Vietnam appeared to have the upper hand in the war against the United States. While the U.S. Army was busily engaged in Asian light infantry combat, the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army as well as the mobile fire support in Europe had already been modernized. As such, the U.S. Army had to improve training procedures, a rethought of doctrine, and modernized weapon systems so that they would properly be able to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Some of the effects of this war involve the end to conscription as well as how volunteers were needed to be recruited in the army.Less
The period between 1969 and 1973 marked a very bad time for the U.S. Army's history as Vietnam appeared to have the upper hand in the war against the United States. While the U.S. Army was busily engaged in Asian light infantry combat, the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army as well as the mobile fire support in Europe had already been modernized. As such, the U.S. Army had to improve training procedures, a rethought of doctrine, and modernized weapon systems so that they would properly be able to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Some of the effects of this war involve the end to conscription as well as how volunteers were needed to be recruited in the army.
George F. Hofmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the struggle of the U.S. Army cavalry to find new mounts and a tactical doctrine. It discusses criticisms of the mechanized cavalry, including its vulnerability to antitank ...
More
This chapter examines the struggle of the U.S. Army cavalry to find new mounts and a tactical doctrine. It discusses criticisms of the mechanized cavalry, including its vulnerability to antitank weapons and its inability to function as soon as the fuel is exhausted, unlike horses. The chapter also explains the underlying principles of the tentative Tactical Employment of the Mechanized Division and The Tactical Employment of Cavalry, which highlighted principles and methods applicable to both horse and mechanized cavalry.Less
This chapter examines the struggle of the U.S. Army cavalry to find new mounts and a tactical doctrine. It discusses criticisms of the mechanized cavalry, including its vulnerability to antitank weapons and its inability to function as soon as the fuel is exhausted, unlike horses. The chapter also explains the underlying principles of the tentative Tactical Employment of the Mechanized Division and The Tactical Employment of Cavalry, which highlighted principles and methods applicable to both horse and mechanized cavalry.
George F. Hofmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the unpreparedness of the U.S. Army for World War II because of the line branch chiefs' compartmentalized organizations and their refusal to adopt military mechanization ...
More
This chapter examines the unpreparedness of the U.S. Army for World War II because of the line branch chiefs' compartmentalized organizations and their refusal to adopt military mechanization strategies. The regular army and National Guard divisions were unable to reach full strength during the interwar period, or have the opportunity to engage in large-scale maneuvers to test cavalry doctrine, until 1940.Less
This chapter examines the unpreparedness of the U.S. Army for World War II because of the line branch chiefs' compartmentalized organizations and their refusal to adopt military mechanization strategies. The regular army and National Guard divisions were unable to reach full strength during the interwar period, or have the opportunity to engage in large-scale maneuvers to test cavalry doctrine, until 1940.
C. J. Alvarez
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226277646
- eISBN:
- 9780226277813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226277813.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter examines the establishment of the United States-Mexico border, not just as a cartographic construction, but as a joint production of cooperative policing. As U.S.-Mexico relations ...
More
This chapter examines the establishment of the United States-Mexico border, not just as a cartographic construction, but as a joint production of cooperative policing. As U.S.-Mexico relations deepened and became more complex in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the borderland transformed into a space of bilateral, if sometimes grudging, consent. By focusing on U.S.-Mexico military campaigns against Apaches and U.S. attempts to quell Mexican political dissidents on American soil, an image emerges of a fledgling bilateral policing apparatus, one in which the police power of both countries is pooled, borrowed, and amplified.Less
This chapter examines the establishment of the United States-Mexico border, not just as a cartographic construction, but as a joint production of cooperative policing. As U.S.-Mexico relations deepened and became more complex in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the borderland transformed into a space of bilateral, if sometimes grudging, consent. By focusing on U.S.-Mexico military campaigns against Apaches and U.S. attempts to quell Mexican political dissidents on American soil, an image emerges of a fledgling bilateral policing apparatus, one in which the police power of both countries is pooled, borrowed, and amplified.
Chris E. Fonvielle Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823232864
- eISBN:
- 9780823240777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823232864.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
Long before Ulysses S. Grant made his move to the James River, the North Carolina seaport of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River had become the principal port of entry for ships carrying essential ...
More
Long before Ulysses S. Grant made his move to the James River, the North Carolina seaport of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River had become the principal port of entry for ships carrying essential supplies to Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. By the summer of 1864, as Grant fought his way through the wilderness, and Butler moved up the James River to Bermuda Hundred, the survival of Lee's army depended heavily on the flow of European arms, equipment, and provisions being imported into the Confederacy by way of Wilmington. Union military authorities did not initiate a serious campaign against this key city until late 1864. By then, however, Wilmington was the most heavily defended city on the Atlantic seaboard, with the exception of Charleston. Nevertheless, with important lessons learned in previous combined operations, the U.S. Army and Navy made plans to capture Wilmington with a large-scale combined operation.Less
Long before Ulysses S. Grant made his move to the James River, the North Carolina seaport of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River had become the principal port of entry for ships carrying essential supplies to Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. By the summer of 1864, as Grant fought his way through the wilderness, and Butler moved up the James River to Bermuda Hundred, the survival of Lee's army depended heavily on the flow of European arms, equipment, and provisions being imported into the Confederacy by way of Wilmington. Union military authorities did not initiate a serious campaign against this key city until late 1864. By then, however, Wilmington was the most heavily defended city on the Atlantic seaboard, with the exception of Charleston. Nevertheless, with important lessons learned in previous combined operations, the U.S. Army and Navy made plans to capture Wilmington with a large-scale combined operation.
Cameron B. Strang
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781469640471
- eISBN:
- 9781469640495
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469640471.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter focuses on the Second Seminole War (1835–1842) and how whites and natives both developed new knowledge about the Seminoles as a unique ethnic group through violence against each other’s ...
More
This chapter focuses on the Second Seminole War (1835–1842) and how whites and natives both developed new knowledge about the Seminoles as a unique ethnic group through violence against each other’s dead. On the one hand, Euro-Americans looked to native skulls to add scientific legitimacy to assertions that the Seminoles were a clearly defined ethnicity whose supposed predisposition for violence and lack of ancestral bonds to Florida justified their removal. On the other hand, the collection and circulation of white scalps strengthened the Seminoles’ understanding of themselves as a distinct people and allowed them to rebuild complete communities—ones that integrated the living, the multiethnic dead, and Floridian land—despite the trauma of the war.Less
This chapter focuses on the Second Seminole War (1835–1842) and how whites and natives both developed new knowledge about the Seminoles as a unique ethnic group through violence against each other’s dead. On the one hand, Euro-Americans looked to native skulls to add scientific legitimacy to assertions that the Seminoles were a clearly defined ethnicity whose supposed predisposition for violence and lack of ancestral bonds to Florida justified their removal. On the other hand, the collection and circulation of white scalps strengthened the Seminoles’ understanding of themselves as a distinct people and allowed them to rebuild complete communities—ones that integrated the living, the multiethnic dead, and Floridian land—despite the trauma of the war.
George F. Hofmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of the book, which is about the history of the mechanization of the U.S. Army horse cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The book ...
More
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of the book, which is about the history of the mechanization of the U.S. Army horse cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The book examines the changes in the cavalry doctrine during this period, the untold story of the first mechanized cavalry theorist Frank Parker, and the Army Organization Act which merged the cavalry with the armor branch. It also highlights of the role of Fort Knox in Kentucky, where new ideas had germinated at times and been discussed with German staff officers who visited the base in the 1930s.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of the book, which is about the history of the mechanization of the U.S. Army horse cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The book examines the changes in the cavalry doctrine during this period, the untold story of the first mechanized cavalry theorist Frank Parker, and the Army Organization Act which merged the cavalry with the armor branch. It also highlights of the role of Fort Knox in Kentucky, where new ideas had germinated at times and been discussed with German staff officers who visited the base in the 1930s.
John Southard
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813145266
- eISBN:
- 9780813145464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813145266.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter analyzes how the overall American manpower shortage in Vietnam and the ever-present interservice rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps affected the Combined Action Program. In ...
More
This chapter analyzes how the overall American manpower shortage in Vietnam and the ever-present interservice rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps affected the Combined Action Program. In June 1965, when Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt arrived in Da Nang as the commander of U.S. Marine forces, he realized that securing and providing for the civilian population should take precedence over large-unit conventional military forays into the unpopulated jungles. However, Walt's strategic approach disagreed with the war of attrition that U.S. Army general William C. Westmoreland implemented as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander from June 1964 to June 1968. Westmoreland enjoyed operational control over all U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Many top-ranking Marine officers such as Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak and Gen. Wallace Greene accused the army of intentionally retarding the growth of the program. However, solely to blame the army and MACV for the sluggish growth of CAPs ignores the overall manpower shortage that afflicted the U.S. military in Vietnam. More than the army's war of attrition, the lack of manpower in the IIIMAF area of operations prevented the program from flourishing at the high level envisioned by the Corps.Less
This chapter analyzes how the overall American manpower shortage in Vietnam and the ever-present interservice rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps affected the Combined Action Program. In June 1965, when Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt arrived in Da Nang as the commander of U.S. Marine forces, he realized that securing and providing for the civilian population should take precedence over large-unit conventional military forays into the unpopulated jungles. However, Walt's strategic approach disagreed with the war of attrition that U.S. Army general William C. Westmoreland implemented as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander from June 1964 to June 1968. Westmoreland enjoyed operational control over all U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Many top-ranking Marine officers such as Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak and Gen. Wallace Greene accused the army of intentionally retarding the growth of the program. However, solely to blame the army and MACV for the sluggish growth of CAPs ignores the overall manpower shortage that afflicted the U.S. military in Vietnam. More than the army's war of attrition, the lack of manpower in the IIIMAF area of operations prevented the program from flourishing at the high level envisioned by the Corps.
George F. Hofmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124032
- eISBN:
- 9780813134819
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124032.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the history of mechanization of the U.S. Army cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The results reveal the ...
More
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the history of mechanization of the U.S. Army cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The results reveal the misguided mystique of the horse and its use in the cavalry. The chapter provides insights into how the mechanized cavalry men made the necessary adjustments during World War II to advance the role of their combat arm and explains the effect of post-war American attitudes and the international turmoil on the future of U.S. Cavalry and its leadership.Less
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the history of mechanization of the U.S. Army cavalry during the first half of the twentieth century. The results reveal the misguided mystique of the horse and its use in the cavalry. The chapter provides insights into how the mechanized cavalry men made the necessary adjustments during World War II to advance the role of their combat arm and explains the effect of post-war American attitudes and the international turmoil on the future of U.S. Cavalry and its leadership.
Audra Jennings
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780813042077
- eISBN:
- 9780813043456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813042077.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines how veterans pushed to expand and police the boundaries of welfare state programs that targeted veterans and specifically focuses on the battles fought over national amputation ...
More
This chapter examines how veterans pushed to expand and police the boundaries of welfare state programs that targeted veterans and specifically focuses on the battles fought over national amputation and prosthetic programs during and immediately after World War II. Veterans and their organizations worked to maintain their separate and special status as deserving welfare recipients and rejected attempts to create universal disability policies. In the realm of amputation and prosthetic policy, veterans and veterans’ organizations condemned the poor policies, planning, and prosthetics that formed the core of the U.S. amputation and prosthetic programs. They demanded specialized care and research programs administered through the Veterans Administration and the military. Because of their service and sacrifices, veterans argued, the U.S. government owed them first and free access to the best prosthetic devices science could develop.Less
This chapter examines how veterans pushed to expand and police the boundaries of welfare state programs that targeted veterans and specifically focuses on the battles fought over national amputation and prosthetic programs during and immediately after World War II. Veterans and their organizations worked to maintain their separate and special status as deserving welfare recipients and rejected attempts to create universal disability policies. In the realm of amputation and prosthetic policy, veterans and veterans’ organizations condemned the poor policies, planning, and prosthetics that formed the core of the U.S. amputation and prosthetic programs. They demanded specialized care and research programs administered through the Veterans Administration and the military. Because of their service and sacrifices, veterans argued, the U.S. government owed them first and free access to the best prosthetic devices science could develop.
