Amanda Kay McVety
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796915
- eISBN:
- 9780199933266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796915.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century, World Modern History
In 1949, the U.S. House of Representatives opened hearings H.R. 5615, the “International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949.” While discussing the specific act, which had grown out of Truman’s ...
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In 1949, the U.S. House of Representatives opened hearings H.R. 5615, the “International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949.” While discussing the specific act, which had grown out of Truman’s inaugural address earlier that year, the Congressmen discussed the much larger question of the value of using economic and technical assistance as foreign policy tools. In the end, they voted for foreign aid and established the Point Four Program. Using Ethiopia as a test case, this book explores the consequences of that decision.Less
In 1949, the U.S. House of Representatives opened hearings H.R. 5615, the “International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949.” While discussing the specific act, which had grown out of Truman’s inaugural address earlier that year, the Congressmen discussed the much larger question of the value of using economic and technical assistance as foreign policy tools. In the end, they voted for foreign aid and established the Point Four Program. Using Ethiopia as a test case, this book explores the consequences of that decision.
Louis Fisher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter explores the constitutional source of ‘inherent powers’. Firstly it analyzes what is meant by express, implied, and emergency powers. Then it examines closely the 1936 Supreme Court ...
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This chapter explores the constitutional source of ‘inherent powers’. Firstly it analyzes what is meant by express, implied, and emergency powers. Then it examines closely the 1936 Supreme Court case, Curtiss-Wright, that is most often cited for supporting inherent and extra-constitutional powers for the president. The chapter then moves to discussing the use of inherent powers by President Harry Truman in 1952 to seize steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, and the reliance on inherent powers by President George W. Bush to accomplish a range of war-related actions. Truman's initiative was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Youngstown case, but the legal and political limits of Bush's actions are still being played out.Less
This chapter explores the constitutional source of ‘inherent powers’. Firstly it analyzes what is meant by express, implied, and emergency powers. Then it examines closely the 1936 Supreme Court case, Curtiss-Wright, that is most often cited for supporting inherent and extra-constitutional powers for the president. The chapter then moves to discussing the use of inherent powers by President Harry Truman in 1952 to seize steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, and the reliance on inherent powers by President George W. Bush to accomplish a range of war-related actions. Truman's initiative was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Youngstown case, but the legal and political limits of Bush's actions are still being played out.
Estelle James, Truman Packard, and Robert Holzmann
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226801
- eISBN:
- 9780191710285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226801.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Pensions and Pension Management
This chapter begins by presenting Estelle James' points of discussion if she were to cowrite a sequel to Averting the Old Age Crisis. Truman Packard then summarizes some of the issues raised in ...
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This chapter begins by presenting Estelle James' points of discussion if she were to cowrite a sequel to Averting the Old Age Crisis. Truman Packard then summarizes some of the issues raised in Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America and highlights the most important points for pension policymakers. In particular, this chapter addresses the issues of low coverage and the expected outcome of pension reforms. The World Bank's framework for pension systems and reform is discussed.Less
This chapter begins by presenting Estelle James' points of discussion if she were to cowrite a sequel to Averting the Old Age Crisis. Truman Packard then summarizes some of the issues raised in Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America and highlights the most important points for pension policymakers. In particular, this chapter addresses the issues of low coverage and the expected outcome of pension reforms. The World Bank's framework for pension systems and reform is discussed.
Linda L. Fowler
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151618
- eISBN:
- 9781400866465
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151618.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs ...
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An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The book finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that U.S. foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the book notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. It attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. The book's detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. It argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. It investigates America's oversight of national security and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.Less
An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The book finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that U.S. foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the book notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. It attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. The book's detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. It argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. It investigates America's oversight of national security and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
Desmond King
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292494
- eISBN:
- 9780191599682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829249X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Examines post‐Reconstruction race relations—focusing mainly from 1856–1964—and outlines the legal and political factors permitting its dissemination. King formulates segregation as an arrangement ...
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Examines post‐Reconstruction race relations—focusing mainly from 1856–1964—and outlines the legal and political factors permitting its dissemination. King formulates segregation as an arrangement whereby Black Americans, as a minority, were systematically treated in separate, but constitutionally sanctioned, ways. He examines various laws and policies that condoned segregation ever since the Supreme Court accepted the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine as a justification of segregation in 1896 up until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. King also examines the congressional and presidential politics of race relations under the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.Less
Examines post‐Reconstruction race relations—focusing mainly from 1856–1964—and outlines the legal and political factors permitting its dissemination. King formulates segregation as an arrangement whereby Black Americans, as a minority, were systematically treated in separate, but constitutionally sanctioned, ways. He examines various laws and policies that condoned segregation ever since the Supreme Court accepted the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine as a justification of segregation in 1896 up until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. King also examines the congressional and presidential politics of race relations under the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.
Desmond King
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292494
- eISBN:
- 9780191599682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829249X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Explores segregation in the military and resistance to its abolition ever since the founding of the country and the War of Independence to President Truman's 1947 Committee on Civil Rights and well ...
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Explores segregation in the military and resistance to its abolition ever since the founding of the country and the War of Independence to President Truman's 1947 Committee on Civil Rights and well into the 1960s. King examines original transcripts of testimony before Truman's committee and other investigations into segregation especially prior to and during the Second World War. He also looks at the policies and reports of the American Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army as well as those of Black American soldiers stationed abroad in Britain and Europe. Throughout the chapter, he traces the tensions arising from the war's premise to promote democracy in the new global community while tolerating the suppression of civil rights domestically.Less
Explores segregation in the military and resistance to its abolition ever since the founding of the country and the War of Independence to President Truman's 1947 Committee on Civil Rights and well into the 1960s. King examines original transcripts of testimony before Truman's committee and other investigations into segregation especially prior to and during the Second World War. He also looks at the policies and reports of the American Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army as well as those of Black American soldiers stationed abroad in Britain and Europe. Throughout the chapter, he traces the tensions arising from the war's premise to promote democracy in the new global community while tolerating the suppression of civil rights domestically.
S. David Broscious
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international ...
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Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international anarchy, aggression, and the need to defend against aggression. In short, there was a clash within Truman's mind between the imperatives of the nuclear age and of the anarchic international system within which the nuclear revolution evolved. While hoping that an international control system could eliminate the prospect of nuclear war and foster the peaceful use of the atom, he was also ready and willing to rely on US lead in the field of nuclear energy to contain the horrors inherent in nuclear war. Having defined the Soviet Union as a non‐cooperative partner and as a threat, Truman accepted the need for American nuclear superiority in order to deter Soviet aggression and prevent nuclear war.Less
Although Harry Truman embraced the idea of a ’nuclear revolution’, he also remained convinced that, despite this revolution, other environmental factors still held force – namely, international anarchy, aggression, and the need to defend against aggression. In short, there was a clash within Truman's mind between the imperatives of the nuclear age and of the anarchic international system within which the nuclear revolution evolved. While hoping that an international control system could eliminate the prospect of nuclear war and foster the peaceful use of the atom, he was also ready and willing to rely on US lead in the field of nuclear energy to contain the horrors inherent in nuclear war. Having defined the Soviet Union as a non‐cooperative partner and as a threat, Truman accepted the need for American nuclear superiority in order to deter Soviet aggression and prevent nuclear war.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first ...
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How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.Less
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.
Richard M. Fried
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195043617
- eISBN:
- 9780199853724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195043617.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This book provides an account of the rise and fall of the House Committee on Un-American activities. The book describes the growth of the kind of paranoid and xenophobic anti-communism which ...
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This book provides an account of the rise and fall of the House Committee on Un-American activities. The book describes the growth of the kind of paranoid and xenophobic anti-communism which characterized the HUAC and traces its origins from the New Deal to the post-war periods. Along the way we meet important actors in the Red-baiting drama, including Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, the young Richard Nixon, Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, the Hollywood Ten, and, of course, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. The book, however, also documents the more sweeping and less public effects of McCarthyism on thousands of people, from teachers and lawyers to washroom attendants forced to take loyalty tests. As the book shows, these “insignificant” stories are perhaps the strongest testament to the social and political climate which terrorized many ordinary citizens during the McCarthy years.Less
This book provides an account of the rise and fall of the House Committee on Un-American activities. The book describes the growth of the kind of paranoid and xenophobic anti-communism which characterized the HUAC and traces its origins from the New Deal to the post-war periods. Along the way we meet important actors in the Red-baiting drama, including Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, the young Richard Nixon, Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, the Hollywood Ten, and, of course, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. The book, however, also documents the more sweeping and less public effects of McCarthyism on thousands of people, from teachers and lawyers to washroom attendants forced to take loyalty tests. As the book shows, these “insignificant” stories are perhaps the strongest testament to the social and political climate which terrorized many ordinary citizens during the McCarthy years.
Ken Young and Warner R. Chilling
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501745164
- eISBN:
- 9781501745171
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a “super,” or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are ...
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This book unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a “super,” or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are detailed in a diverse and complete account built on newly released archives and previously hidden contemporaneous interviews with more than sixty political, military, and scientific figures who were involved in the decision. The book presents the expectations, hopes, and fears of the key individuals who lobbied for and against developing the H-bomb. It portrays the conflicts that arose over the H-bomb as rooted in the distinct interests of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Los Alamos laboratory, the Pentagon and State Department, the Congress, and the White House. But as the book clearly shows, once Truman made his decision in 1950, resistance to the H-bomb opportunistically shifted to new debates about the development of tactical nuclear weapons, continental air defense, and other aspects of nuclear weapons policy. What the book reveals is that in many ways the H-bomb struggle was a proxy battle over the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombardment and the role and doctrine of the U.S. Strategic Air Command.Less
This book unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a “super,” or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are detailed in a diverse and complete account built on newly released archives and previously hidden contemporaneous interviews with more than sixty political, military, and scientific figures who were involved in the decision. The book presents the expectations, hopes, and fears of the key individuals who lobbied for and against developing the H-bomb. It portrays the conflicts that arose over the H-bomb as rooted in the distinct interests of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Los Alamos laboratory, the Pentagon and State Department, the Congress, and the White House. But as the book clearly shows, once Truman made his decision in 1950, resistance to the H-bomb opportunistically shifted to new debates about the development of tactical nuclear weapons, continental air defense, and other aspects of nuclear weapons policy. What the book reveals is that in many ways the H-bomb struggle was a proxy battle over the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombardment and the role and doctrine of the U.S. Strategic Air Command.
Wendy L. Wall
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195329100
- eISBN:
- 9780199870226
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195329100.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
In the aftermath of World War II, an array of influential elites launched a wide-ranging effort to recapture the sense of teamwork that had pervaded public discourse during the war. Those engaged in ...
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In the aftermath of World War II, an array of influential elites launched a wide-ranging effort to recapture the sense of teamwork that had pervaded public discourse during the war. Those engaged in this endeavor included social scientists who worried about threats to national cohesion; intergroup activists who hoped to extend their wartime anti-prejudice campaigns; business and advertising executives determined to derail the rising power of labor and to halt or roll back the New Deal; and officials of the Truman Administration who sought to unify Americans behind their emerging Cold War policies. The motives of these elites differed sharply, as did their definition of the values around which Americans should unite. What they shared was a fear of social unrest or upheaval. This chapter explores their efforts, focusing particularly on the activities of the Advertising Council. The council provided a vital link between numerous groups and conducted campaigns on behalf of both free enterprise and intergroup tolerance.Less
In the aftermath of World War II, an array of influential elites launched a wide-ranging effort to recapture the sense of teamwork that had pervaded public discourse during the war. Those engaged in this endeavor included social scientists who worried about threats to national cohesion; intergroup activists who hoped to extend their wartime anti-prejudice campaigns; business and advertising executives determined to derail the rising power of labor and to halt or roll back the New Deal; and officials of the Truman Administration who sought to unify Americans behind their emerging Cold War policies. The motives of these elites differed sharply, as did their definition of the values around which Americans should unite. What they shared was a fear of social unrest or upheaval. This chapter explores their efforts, focusing particularly on the activities of the Advertising Council. The council provided a vital link between numerous groups and conducted campaigns on behalf of both free enterprise and intergroup tolerance.
Richard M. Fried
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195043617
- eISBN:
- 9780199853724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195043617.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
With the onset of the Cold War came a heightened anxiety over the Communist threat at home. Some revisionist historians have argued that the Truman administration paved the way for the second Red ...
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With the onset of the Cold War came a heightened anxiety over the Communist threat at home. Some revisionist historians have argued that the Truman administration paved the way for the second Red Scare. Confrontational foreign-policy rhetoric converged with increasingly harsh treatment of domestic Communists to nudge public opinion toward anti-communism. Some historians have also argued that Truman's 1947 loyalty program prefigured McCarthyism by inventing many of its premises. By the late 1940s, a growing preoccupation with anti-communism had come to be reflected in every niche of American culture. By the end of 1948, views charitable to American (or Soviet) Communists had grown scarce; dissent on foreign policy had declined; Communists and Popular Fronters were increasingly isolated. All that was lacking for a more thoroughgoing Red Scare was a sharper sense of crisis and a leader to focus and dramatize anti-communism.Less
With the onset of the Cold War came a heightened anxiety over the Communist threat at home. Some revisionist historians have argued that the Truman administration paved the way for the second Red Scare. Confrontational foreign-policy rhetoric converged with increasingly harsh treatment of domestic Communists to nudge public opinion toward anti-communism. Some historians have also argued that Truman's 1947 loyalty program prefigured McCarthyism by inventing many of its premises. By the late 1940s, a growing preoccupation with anti-communism had come to be reflected in every niche of American culture. By the end of 1948, views charitable to American (or Soviet) Communists had grown scarce; dissent on foreign policy had declined; Communists and Popular Fronters were increasingly isolated. All that was lacking for a more thoroughgoing Red Scare was a sharper sense of crisis and a leader to focus and dramatize anti-communism.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security ...
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Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security state,” no one has undertaken a systematic analysis of the domestic debates sparked by the war. This chapter first examines the reasons for this gap in the literature. The remainder of the chapter then sets out the book's methodological background: the central individuals and organizations that were engaged in domestic propaganda; how they interacted with the “clubby” yet highly partisan Congress of this era; and the opportunities and difficulties they faced when dealing with a media that, while generally wedded to norms of objective reporting, was a highly complex and diverse entity.Less
Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security state,” no one has undertaken a systematic analysis of the domestic debates sparked by the war. This chapter first examines the reasons for this gap in the literature. The remainder of the chapter then sets out the book's methodological background: the central individuals and organizations that were engaged in domestic propaganda; how they interacted with the “clubby” yet highly partisan Congress of this era; and the opportunities and difficulties they faced when dealing with a media that, while generally wedded to norms of objective reporting, was a highly complex and diverse entity.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter explores the Truman administration's publicity efforts in the first three weeks of the Korean War. Fearful that this new Cold War crisis might escalate into a far bigger conflict with ...
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This chapter explores the Truman administration's publicity efforts in the first three weeks of the Korean War. Fearful that this new Cold War crisis might escalate into a far bigger conflict with the Soviet Union, the president and his senior advisers sought to keep the home front cool. They made few public statements. And what they did say was carefully restrained. Without a vigorous lead from the government, however, the Washington press corps and the Republican opposition soon moved to fill the information vacuum. While reporters often resorted to speculation, partisan politicians sought to place their own spin on the crisis, insisting that it was a product of the Democrats' excessively soft posture toward communism in Asia.Less
This chapter explores the Truman administration's publicity efforts in the first three weeks of the Korean War. Fearful that this new Cold War crisis might escalate into a far bigger conflict with the Soviet Union, the president and his senior advisers sought to keep the home front cool. They made few public statements. And what they did say was carefully restrained. Without a vigorous lead from the government, however, the Washington press corps and the Republican opposition soon moved to fill the information vacuum. While reporters often resorted to speculation, partisan politicians sought to place their own spin on the crisis, insisting that it was a product of the Democrats' excessively soft posture toward communism in Asia.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
As news of battlefield defeats hit home, the administration tried to channel the public debate on how America ought to mobilize in this new, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The instinct of ...
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As news of battlefield defeats hit home, the administration tried to channel the public debate on how America ought to mobilize in this new, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The instinct of Truman and his senior advisers was to remain cautious: they were still keen to stop the domestic mood from overheating, lest this result in overpowering demands to escalate the Cold War, perhaps even by launching a preventive strike against the Soviet Union. But, once again, this low‐key public posture provided Republicans with the opportunity to sharpen their political attacks. Some called for more vigorous mobilization efforts. Others pressed for a stronger stance toward communists inside America. With senior officials in the Pentagon also hinting that they favored a tougher Cold War posture, in August and September Truman moved to regain control of the debate.Less
As news of battlefield defeats hit home, the administration tried to channel the public debate on how America ought to mobilize in this new, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The instinct of Truman and his senior advisers was to remain cautious: they were still keen to stop the domestic mood from overheating, lest this result in overpowering demands to escalate the Cold War, perhaps even by launching a preventive strike against the Soviet Union. But, once again, this low‐key public posture provided Republicans with the opportunity to sharpen their political attacks. Some called for more vigorous mobilization efforts. Others pressed for a stronger stance toward communists inside America. With senior officials in the Pentagon also hinting that they favored a tougher Cold War posture, in August and September Truman moved to regain control of the debate.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The massive Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late November 1950 created a new sense of crisis in Washington. Attempting to learn from the mistakes they had made in June, senior officials ...
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The massive Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late November 1950 created a new sense of crisis in Washington. Attempting to learn from the mistakes they had made in June, senior officials tried to provide a more forceful lead, reaching out to figures from across the political spectrum in order to foster a new sense of unity. But, initially at least, the administration's public efforts were little short of disastrous. The military situation was partly to blame. With events in Korea so murky, officials were unable to provide a clear sense of the scale of the defeat. In Tokyo, MacArthur soon stepped into the vacuum, issuing a string of statements that suggested a major catastrophe was in the cards. In Washington, Truman compounded matters when he told reporters that the A‐bomb was “under active consideration,” a phrase that suggested Korea was about to escalate in a truly terrifying fashion.Less
The massive Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late November 1950 created a new sense of crisis in Washington. Attempting to learn from the mistakes they had made in June, senior officials tried to provide a more forceful lead, reaching out to figures from across the political spectrum in order to foster a new sense of unity. But, initially at least, the administration's public efforts were little short of disastrous. The military situation was partly to blame. With events in Korea so murky, officials were unable to provide a clear sense of the scale of the defeat. In Tokyo, MacArthur soon stepped into the vacuum, issuing a string of statements that suggested a major catastrophe was in the cards. In Washington, Truman compounded matters when he told reporters that the A‐bomb was “under active consideration,” a phrase that suggested Korea was about to escalate in a truly terrifying fashion.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The massive Chinese intervention also led many Americans to question the wisdom of the Korean War: in January 1951, one Gallup poll even found that two‐thirds of the public wanted to withdraw from ...
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The massive Chinese intervention also led many Americans to question the wisdom of the Korean War: in January 1951, one Gallup poll even found that two‐thirds of the public wanted to withdraw from Korea altogether. Although the administration had successfully defused the broader debate over Cold War mobilization, it had far more trouble explaining why it was necessary for Americans to continue fighting and dying in faraway Korea. In fact, the government's mobilization campaign was part of the problem: in the first months of 1951, senior officials spent so much time trying to win the “great debate” that they said very little about Korea. But even efforts to reach out to the mass public by using emotive letters or the power of Hollywood movies largely backfired.Less
The massive Chinese intervention also led many Americans to question the wisdom of the Korean War: in January 1951, one Gallup poll even found that two‐thirds of the public wanted to withdraw from Korea altogether. Although the administration had successfully defused the broader debate over Cold War mobilization, it had far more trouble explaining why it was necessary for Americans to continue fighting and dying in faraway Korea. In fact, the government's mobilization campaign was part of the problem: in the first months of 1951, senior officials spent so much time trying to win the “great debate” that they said very little about Korea. But even efforts to reach out to the mass public by using emotive letters or the power of Hollywood movies largely backfired.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Truman's decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951 initially threatened to make the domestic situation even worse. Indeed, Republicans hoped to exploit the opportunity to challenge the ...
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Truman's decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951 initially threatened to make the domestic situation even worse. Indeed, Republicans hoped to exploit the opportunity to challenge the administration's whole Asian policy, and perhaps even impeach one or two senior officials. Within weeks, however, the MacArthur controversy worked to the administration's benefit. For the first time in months, senior officials engaged in a sustained and coordinated effort to make the case for war. MacArthur was thus outgunned. He was also placed on the defensive, having to rebut the official claim that his vision would result in a disastrous world war. More broadly, crucial figures in Congress, both southern Democrats and internationalist Republicans, rallied behind Truman's position, ending the disastrous prospect that had loomed so large in the winter—the prospect that the broad bipartisan Cold War coalition would soon collapse.Less
Truman's decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951 initially threatened to make the domestic situation even worse. Indeed, Republicans hoped to exploit the opportunity to challenge the administration's whole Asian policy, and perhaps even impeach one or two senior officials. Within weeks, however, the MacArthur controversy worked to the administration's benefit. For the first time in months, senior officials engaged in a sustained and coordinated effort to make the case for war. MacArthur was thus outgunned. He was also placed on the defensive, having to rebut the official claim that his vision would result in a disastrous world war. More broadly, crucial figures in Congress, both southern Democrats and internationalist Republicans, rallied behind Truman's position, ending the disastrous prospect that had loomed so large in the winter—the prospect that the broad bipartisan Cold War coalition would soon collapse.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
With the start of armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951, the Korean War entered a new phase. This chapter explores how officials formulated an information campaign during months of complex and ...
More
With the start of armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951, the Korean War entered a new phase. This chapter explores how officials formulated an information campaign during months of complex and protracted negotiations. At the armistice site, first at Kaesong then at Panmunjom, the military's public information officials had a difficult time trying to divulge enough material to keep the press happy without undermining the government's negotiating position. In Washington, senior officials faced an even more fraught task in trying to justify their stance on POWs. By 1952, the fate of prisoners was the main sticking point in the talks, mainly because Truman adhered to the principle of voluntary repatriation. Although many PR advisers fretted that Americans would not support the continuation of the war over this one esoteric issue, in the spring of 1952 the administration was able to fashion a remarkably effective public position, which helped generate a degree of support for the war, despite a year of stalemated negotiations.Less
With the start of armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951, the Korean War entered a new phase. This chapter explores how officials formulated an information campaign during months of complex and protracted negotiations. At the armistice site, first at Kaesong then at Panmunjom, the military's public information officials had a difficult time trying to divulge enough material to keep the press happy without undermining the government's negotiating position. In Washington, senior officials faced an even more fraught task in trying to justify their stance on POWs. By 1952, the fate of prisoners was the main sticking point in the talks, mainly because Truman adhered to the principle of voluntary repatriation. Although many PR advisers fretted that Americans would not support the continuation of the war over this one esoteric issue, in the spring of 1952 the administration was able to fashion a remarkably effective public position, which helped generate a degree of support for the war, despite a year of stalemated negotiations.
