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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.

The global reality of suffering and death has demanded an authentic theological response in every era and has impelled debate concerning God's relationship to suffering and the conceivability of the suffering of God. In a former age, theology proposed an omnipotent and impassible deus ex machina in answer to this question. However, contemporary theologies have proposed alternatives to this understanding of God in relation to the world. With such theologies, this book proposes that a truly viable response to cosmic suffering is the recognition that God participates in the cruciform existence of the cosmos and its creatures. Informed by the understandings of evolutionary science, grounded within a panentheistic paradigm of the God‐world relationship, and rooted within the Christian theological tradition, this book develops a systematic understanding of the Triune God's intimate involvement with the suffering of the cosmos and its creatures in dialogue with the insights of scientist‐theologian Arthur R. Peacocke. Recognizing that its proposals must demonstrate practical value in response to cosmic and human suffering, the book sets forth a female procreative model of the creative suffering of the Triune God, an ecological ethics based on the midwife model of care, and a pastoral model of threefold suffering in God as steps toward Christian praxis in response to the pain, suffering, and death endemic in cosmic existence and human experience.

Gregory of Nazianzus has long been regarded as the premier teacher on the Holy Trinity in Eastern Christianity. Yet, ironically, for over a century historians and theologians have neglected his work in favor of his fellow Cappadocians Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, while Gregory has long been overshadowed in the West by Augustine. Christopher Beeley's groundbreaking study—the first comprehensive treatment in modern scholarship—examines Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine within the full range of his theological and practical vision. Following an introductory orientation to Gregory's life and theological works, the book traces Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine through a wide range of concerns, from biblical interpretation and language theory to the practicalities of Christian worship, asceticism, and pastoral ministry. It highlights the soteriological nature of Gregory's doctrine, which seamlessly integrates what have more recently been distinguished as dogmatic and ascetical, or doxological and systematic, theology. Unique among modern studies, this book examines Gregory's doctrine across his entire corpus of orations, poems, and letters, giving special attention to its highly rhetorical and contextualized form. It offers new insights in many areas and a major reinterpretation of the famous Theological Orations and Christological epistles (Ep. 101‐102, 202). By comparing Gregory's work with that of his great master, Origen, his Eastern contemporaries, and his Western counterpart, Augustine, the book shows Gregory to be the most outstanding example of the Origenist Trinitarian tradition of fourth‐century Asia Minor. Gregory offered the most powerful and comprehensive Trinitarian doctrine of his age from a distinctively Eastern point of view, largely independent of the work of Athanasius, while also representing the interests of Damasus of Rome and the Italian bishops as the leading pro‐Nicene theologian at the heart of the Eastern empire—a fact which sharply qualifies the long‐accepted dominance of the Athanasian‐Western paradigm as the normative standard for Trinitarian orthodoxy. Long eclipsed in twentieth‐century scholarship, Gregory's doctrine is now brought into full view as the major Greek authority on the Trinity and one of the greatest theologians in the history of the Church.

Hilary of Poitiers (c300–368), who was instrumental in shaping the development of pro-Nicene theology in the West, combined two separate works, a treatise on faith (De Fide) and a treatise against the “Arians” (Adversus Arianos), to create De Trinitate; his chief theological contribution to the 4th-century Trinitarian debates. Scholars have long recognized the presence of these two treatises in Hilary's De Trinitate but have been unable to settle the questions of when and why Hilary did this. This book addresses these questions concerning the structure and chronology of De Trinitate by situating Hilary's treatise in its historical and theological context and offering a close reading of the text. It is argued that De Fide was written in 356 following Hilary's condemnation at the synod of Béziers and prior to receiving a decision on his exile from the Emperor. When Hilary arrived in exile, he wrote a second work, Adversus Arianos. Following the synod of Sirmium in 357 and his collaboration with Basil of Ancyra in early 358, Hilary recast his efforts and began to write De Trinitate. He decided to incorporate his two earlier works, De Fide and Adversus Arianos, into this project. Toward that end, he returned to his earlier works and drastically revised their content by adding new prefaces and new theological and exegetical material to reflect his mature pro-Nicene theology. These revisions and textual alterations have never before been acknowledged in the scholarship on De Trinitate.

The concept of personhood is central to a wide range of contemporary issues, ranging from reproductive rights to the death penalty and euthanasia. We may think that the concept of person is a modern development. In fact, however, this idea does not originate with our discovery of human rights, consciousness, and individuality. This study shows that the fourth-century theologian Gregory of Nyssa developed a very sophisticated concept of the person in the context of his attempts to clarify the paradox of the Trinity—a single God comprising three distinct persons. The book offers the first in-depth analysis of Gregory’s writings about the divine persons. It shows that Gregory understood personhood as characterized by uniqueness, relationality, and freedom. He reasoned that the three persons of the Trinity have distinctive properties that make them individuals, that is, capable of being enumerated and circumscribed. But this idea of individuation, inherited from the neo-Platonists, falls short of expressing a clear notion of personal uniqueness. By itself it would suggest that a person is merely a collection of properties. Gregory’s great contribution was to perceive the importance of relationality to personhood. The three divine persons know and love each other, are in communion with each other, and freely act together in their common will. This understanding adds up to a concept of personal uniqueness much like our modern one. The book not only contributes to our knowledge of the history of Trinitarian theology but can be helpful to theologians who are dealing with issues in contemporary ethics.

This book represents a study of the meaning of "the end" in the writings of Hans Urs von Balthasar, that highlights both the originality and the fruitfulness of his vision of a reciprocal drama between God and the world. The argument of the book can be summed up simply: being -creaturely being and trinitarian being -unveils its final countenance as love in the death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. After setting forth three basic problems inherent in Christian eschatology, Healy introduces Balthasar's trinitarian perspective: eschatology is concerned with the life of the Trinity, as revealed by Jesus Christ, and as the origin and final destiny of the whole created cosmos. The book presupposes that a critical engagement with Balthasar's thought requires attending to the original way he uses philosophy within theology. Thomas Aquinas' analogy of being, fulfilled in the person of Christ, is both the abiding precondition of, and is ultimately disclosed in, the drama between God and the world whose form takes shape within Christ's return to the Father. The ultimate form of the end, and thus the measure of all that is meant by eschatology, is given in Christ's eucharistic and pneumatic gift of himself - gift that simultaneously lays bare the mystery of the Trinity and enables Christ to "return" to the Father in communion with the whole of creation. Insofar as Christ reveals the trinitarian life and the mystery of creation in their dramatic interplay, he establishes the form of eschatology as a participation in God's engagement with the world. Under the sign of the Holy Spirit and the Eucharist, Christian eschatology involves a sharing in Christ's double movement into the world and, together with the world, into God. By developing the metaphysical dimensions of Balthasar's doctrine of the last things, Healy shows that his writings on the eschaton contain unexpected resources for the ecclesial renewal envisaged by the Second Vatican Council and its missionary opening to the world.

This book is a speculative philosophical theology based on three themes: that a version of materialism is a help, not a hindrance, in philosophical theology; that God develops; and that this development is kenotic, an abandonment of power. The materialism considered in this work is non-reductive: of metaphysical necessity, the mental supervenes on the physical. Materialism leads to the thesis that the primordial God is metaphysically necessary, the limiting case of supervenience. It is speculated that the brain-analogue of the primordial God consists of all the possibilities for creation. It is also speculated that God changes. In the beginning there was a God which loved no one and which was not lovable, but was all-powerful and all-knowing. A sequence of acts resulted in a community of divine love, the Holy Trinity, and a world with many creatures who were autonomous agents. God loved us so much that one Divine Person became fully human and was willing to suffer to show us divine love. This is the kenotic development of God from Pure Will to Unbounded Love. In addition, kenosis provides a new resource for understanding evil. The Primordial God is good but in an inhuman way; why should anyone expect otherwise? But as a result of God's kenotic development, God is now like a loving parent, as the great monotheistic religions teach.

The book is a new edition of Eternal God first published in 1988, and contains four new chapters. It offers a defence of divine timeless eternity. After sketching the nature of such eternity in the first two chapters, a number of philosophical objections are considered, such as the argument from personality and from the incompatibility of divine eternity and indexical knowledge. A number of standard objections are discussed, and the account is further developed in the light of these. Among them are the nature of an eternal God's foreknowledge of what happens in time, and its relation to human choice, and how and in what manner such divine foreknowledge differs from fatalism. This leads to a consideration of foreknowledge and human responsibility, the sense in which timeless divine choice is free, and how it is possible to refer to an eternal God. The first of the final four new chapters explores the view of W. L. Craig that God is timeless sans creation but temporal thereafter. This leads to a consideration of timelessness and causation, in connection with creation, and then the importance of the distinction between a timeless God's perspective on his creation and those of agents in time. Assuming that God is triune, the final chapter discusses the relation between the three persons of the divine, first if God is considered to be in time, and then if he is eternal.

Can those who appreciate the explanatory power of modern science still believe in traditional religious accounts of the nature and purpose of the universe? This book is intended for those who care about that question and are dissatisfied with the rigid dichotomies that dominate the contemporary debate. The extremists won’t be interested – those who assume that science answers all the questions that matter, and those so certain of their religious faith that dialogue with science, philosophy, or other faith traditions seems unnecessary. But far more people today recognize that matters of faith are complex, that doubt is endemic to belief, and that dialogue is indispensable in our day. In eight probing chapters, the authors of The Predicament of Belief consider the most urgent reasons for doubting that religious claims – in particular, those embedded in the Christian tradition – are likely to be true. They develop a version of Christian faith that preserves the tradition’s core insights but also gauges the varying degrees of certainty with which those insights can still be affirmed. Along the way, they address such questions as the ultimate origin of the universe, the existence of innocent suffering, the challenge of religious plurality, and how to understand the extraordinary claim that an ancient teacher rose from the dead. They end with a discussion of what their conclusions imply about the present state and future structure of churches and other communities in which Christian affirmations are made.

This book offers an in-depth study of Saint Thomas Aquinas's thoughts on God and evil, revealing that Aquinas's thinking about God and evil can be traced through his metaphysical philosophy, his thoughts on God and creation, and his writings about Christian revelation and the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The book first gives an introduction to Aquinas's philosophical theology, as well as a nuanced analysis of the ways in which Aquinas's writings have been considered over time. For hundreds of years scholars have argued that Aquinas's views on God and evil were original and different from those of his contemporaries. The book shows that Aquinas's views were by modern standards very original, but that in their historical context they were more traditional than many scholars since have realized. The book also provides insight into what we can learn from Aquinas's philosophy.

This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed for this purpose – substance, cause, time, and necessity. Part 2 (Ch. 6 to 10) begins by setting out some of the different ways in which the doctrine that there is a divine individual (an individual with the traditional divine properties) can be developed. There can be more than one divine individual so long as a first such individual is necessarily the cause of the existence of the others. Given the supreme moral goodness of cooperating with one individual in sharing everything with a third individual, it follows that if there is one divine individual, there will be three and only three such individuals; hence the necessity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – that there is one God consisting of three divine persons. One of these persons may choose to become incarnate, i.e. human, and there are reasons why he would do so.

Classical Christian orthodoxy insists that God is Triune: there is only one God, but there are three divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — who are somehow of one substance with one another. But what does this doctrine mean? How can we coherently believe that there is only one God if we also believe that there are three divine Persons? This problem, sometimes called the ‘threeness-oneness problem’ or the ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, is the focus of this interdisciplinary volume. It includes a selection of recent philosophical work on this topic, accompanied by a variety of essays by philosophers and theologians to further the discussion. The book is divided into four parts, the first three dealing in turn with the three most prominent models for understanding the relations between the Persons of the Trinity: Social Trinitarianism, Latin Trinitarianism, and Relative Trinitarianism. Each section includes essays by both proponents and critics of the relevant model. The volume concludes with a section containing essays by theologians reflecting on the current state of the debate.

This book is the first study that presents, in a single volume, the whole of St Maximus the Confessor's thought in the light of unity and diversity. The principle of simultaneous union and distinction forms the core of Maximus’ thought, pervading every area of his theology, and it can be summarized thus: things united remain distinct and without confusion in an inseparable union. The study is divided into five parts. Part I introduces the logical tools and metaphors of Maximian thought. Parts II and III examine the way in which Maximus views unity and difference in the Trinity and in Christ. The distinction between the universal and the particular, expressed in terms of essence (or nature) and hypostasis (or person), proves fundamental for a correct interpretation. Maximus’ dyophysite Christology includes topics on natural difference and number, composite hypostasis, enhypostaton, will, and activity, and it culminates in the notions of ‘union without confusion’ and ‘perichoresis’. Part IV highlights questions of unity and difference in the universe, Scripture, and the Church. God is the principle of unity behind the multiplicity and there is a dynamic in a perspective of eschatological fulfilment, from and through the multiplicity of the visible things to the unity of the invisible. Part V discusses Maximus’ spirituality of the twofold love for God and neighbour, and how this influences the unity (or disunity) of humanity.

This book is a brief introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure (c.1217-74). It focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of this important but neglected thinker, revealing Bonaventure as a great synthesizer. The book's exposition shows in a new and more nuanced way Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while making clear how he was influenced by Aristotle. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text: De reductione artium ad theologiam. Part I is devoted to the definition of Christian Wisdom. In Part II, individual chapters are devoted to Bonaventure's physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. Part III includes chapters on the Trinity, Creation, Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the Last Things.

The book argues that the contemporary theological practice of describing Christian doctrines or beliefs as ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ leads to a non-realistic idea of God, that is, to conceiving God as a story or narrative invented by ourselves. The idea that doctrines are narratives derives from an emphasis on the method of theology, that is, the substitution of a self-reflective description of how we know about God for saying what God is. The aspect of how we know about God upon which descriptive or narrative theologies focus is visual, and hence we characterize such theologies as cinematic or ‘movieish’. The book considers four ways in which narrative theologies replace content with method. Within ecclesiology, Barthian narrative theologians stress our grasp of the resurrected Christ at the expense of the resurrection witnesses. In the context of arguing for God's existence, Thomistic narrativists discuss the rationality of our questioning rather than the evidence for God's existence. Since, therefore, neither Barthian nor Thomistic narrative theologies can assume that the Creator God is metaphysically known, they visualize the problem of evil, presenting it like a melodramatic conflict. Fourthly, the attempt to elucidate the Trinity by means of narration or description tends toward modalism or Sabellianism. The focus of narrative theologies on methodological or epistemic issues entails that they reflect either the faith of the believer (rather than the object of belief) or the reason of the reasoner (rather than its target). This book proposes that theology can bypass this fideism/rationalism axis by making love the basis of theology, and that in four ways: the source of the Church and its scriptures is an act of love; the evidential image on which proofs for the existence of God can be based is the love of mother for child; the appearance of the Trinity in our history is the expression of the love of God; and hence, since its principal object is God's active love, theology refers, not to a melodrama, but to a real drama.