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The general process of institutionalization in the European Union is examined from a macro perspective, building on the theoretical materials developed in the earlier book European Integration and Supranational Governance, and examining the extent to which linkages between rule-making (legislation), dispute resolution, and different forms of transnational activity have created a dynamic, inherently expansionary system. The process is evaluated from the standpoint of institutionalist theory by testing specific hypotheses against relatively comprehensive quantitative measures of integration: trading, legislating, litigating, and lobbying within the context of the Treaty of Rome. The main findings are that (1) increasing economic transactions, (2) the construction of the Brussels complex, (3) the capacity of supranational authorities to produce legislation, and (4) the operation of the European Commission (EC) legal system have become linked through a complex set of feedback loops that binds them together in a self-reinforcing system that broadly determines the course of integration. Although the perspective used is a macro one, the authors emphasize actors and agency: as increasing numbers of actors learn how to be effective in the EC, they build and consolidate new arenas for political activity, thereby bolstering the centrality of supranational governance.

The previous chapter showed how transnational activity, the adjudication of the European Community (EC) law, and EC lawmaking had developed symbiotically to determine much of what is important about European integration. This chapter provides a more detailed sectoral account of how the adjudication of one class of trading disputes gradually, but authoritatively, undermined the intergovernmental aspects of the EC, while enhancing the polity's supranational, or federal, character. Assesses the impact of adjudicating the freer movement of goods provisions of the Treaty of Rome on integration and supranational governance, focusing on the problem of non‐tariff barriers, as governed by Arts. 28–30 (EC). Proceeds as follows: first, the treaty rules on intra‐EC trade are examined, hypotheses derived about how the domain could be expected to evolve, and the argument advanced is contrasted with alternatives; second, in a section ‘Judicial Governance and Market‐Building’, the emergence is tracked of the basic doctrinal framework (the Dassonville framework) governing the domain, an analysis made of the aggregate data on adjudication in the sector, and the impact traced of the European Court of Justice's case law on the decision‐making of other actors, including the European Commission and Member State governments; third, the mutation of the framework that occurred in the 1990s is discussed – an event that was heavily conditioned by the endogenous development of the law itself; the chapter concludes with an assessment of the findings in light of the pertinent scholarly debates about the impact of the European legal system on the greater course of market‐building and political integration.

The evolution is charted, through adjudication, of the rules governing sex equality in European Community (EC) law. The first section, ‘The Normative Structure’, provides an overview of the Treaty of Rome rules and secondary legislation that constitute the domain of sex equality, while the second examines how Art. 141 (which provides that male and female workers shall receive equal pay for equal work) evolved once it had been constitutionalized by the European Court of Justice. Section III, ‘Judicialization: The Court and the Legislator’, focuses on the relationship between the Court, its case law on sex equality, and the production of directives by the EC legislator; the impact is also briefly discussed of the Court's rulemaking on national judicial and legislative processes; topics included are indirect discrimination, occupational pensions, pregnancy and maternity rights. In the fourth section, ‘Adjudicating Sex Equality Law’, an analysis is made of the aggregate data on litigation and adjudication in the field, focusing on how precedent‐based lawmaking has organized the development of this area. The conclusion addresses a range of theoretical issues.

Assesses the interaction between developments in EU law and the politics of integration, and is primarily concerned with the impacts of the courts on the evolution of EU institutions (rules and procedures). It gives a broad‐gauge overview of the development of the legal system and considers the impact of adjudicating European law on EU political developments. Stone Sweet then relates both European integration theory and methodology, identifying if, how, and why these theories can help understanding of the evolution of the EU legal system. Proceeds as follows: the first section, Integration and the Courts, examines the sources and consequences of the constitutionalization of the legal system; the second and third sections (The Evolution of the Treaty of Rome, and The Legislative Process) evaluate the role of the courts in the institutional evolution of the EU, and the impact of that evolution on the treaty revision and legislative processes; the Conclusion briefly considers the Europeanization of the law, an important phenomenon implicated in various ways throughout the chapter.

An examination is made of the impact of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the institutional evolution of European Union sex equality policy, following the provision in the Treaty of Rome (Art. 119 EEC, now Art. 141) that men and women would receive equal pay for equal work – a provision aimed at protecting businesses from unfair competition. This same provision now bestows a positive right on individuals throughout the Member States, and is a judicially enforceable right that remains the backbone of an ever-expanding European social-justice policy. Over time, strategic action on the part of litigants and their lawyers and the ECJ’s judicial rule-making capacity has constructed a supranational space in which women can not only demand the right to equal pay but can also receive protection as pregnant workers. This dynamic process is the focus of the analysis presented, and involves an examination of three basic mechanisms of institutional evolution: the process by which self-interested private litigants and their lawyers are able to activate the European Union (EU) legal system through the Art. 177 (now Art. 234) procedure (which allows national individuals to invoke EU law before national courts); the ECJ’s authoritative interpretation of Art. 119 (focusing on how it became directly effective in national legal systems); and the feedback effects of this judicial rule-making in terms of how the litigation environment has been changed, and the EU and national-level policy consequence. In particular, the latter are traced through the development of EU pregnancy and maternity rights.

This chapter initiates the discussion of the legal-historical effort to translate elements of the postwar constitutional settlement into supranational form over the last half-century. The focus here is on the establishment of national executive leadership over the integration process. This development ran contrary to efforts by Jean Monnet to construct, purportedly on the New Deal model, a system of supranational technocratic autonomy in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steal Community. Monnet was ultimately curtailed significantly by the creation of the Council of Ministers in the Treaty of Paris of 1951. The institutional role of the Council of Ministers grew as a consequence of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which established the European Economic Community. The crises of the 1960s further marginalized the Commission as an autonomous technocratic policy maker. But these crises also brought to the fore differing conceptions of national leadership that would play themselves out in the ‘empty chair’ crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise at mid-decade. France, under de Gaulle, favored control by particular national executives exercising a veto over supranational policy making; the remainder of the national executives favored shared oversight via consensus politics in the Council of Ministers. This later position prevailed, and found further expression in the creation of a dense bureaucracy of nationally dominated committees (COREPER, comitology). This process of national-executive ascendancy and shared oversight culminated in the creation of the European Council in 1974, which was to become the central institution of plebiscitary leadership in the process of European integration over the remainder of the century.

An analysis is made of the creation of new European Union (EU) spaces for cooperation in policing and immigration policies. The Treaty of Rome was silent on both topics, and before the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), European Community (EC) states had begun to coordinate their responses to specific problems – such as terrorism, drugs, and asylum seekers – usually on a bilateral basis, with multilateral forms of cooperation fragmented, ad hoc, and outside EC structures. The chapter has three main sections, the first of which briefly describes the institutional landscape in policing and migration in Europe before the TEU. Section 2 assesses the major internal and external changes – the Single Market and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, respectively – that provoked the move toward institutionalizing police and migration cooperation at the EU level; it devotes particular attention to the domestic crisis in Germany resulting from massive migrations from the east, and the policy entrepreneurship of Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Section 3 analyses how the Third Pillar of the TEU, that on Justice and Home Affairs (in which policing and immigration policies were combined) borrowed from existing institutions – most notably the Second Pillar (the Common Foreign and Security Policy); the Amsterdam Treaty (1996) then partially separated policing and migration again – but with a completely different institutional structure within the European Union.

The European Union (EU) started out as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an organization that was set up to control the levels of production in the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. In 1957, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands took a quantum leap forward in integrating their economic policies by agreeing to the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty contained a set of blueprints for ongoing cooperation on issues of trade, labor, capital movements, and monetary policy. It created the European Economic Community (EEC), a permanent organization in Brussels to promote this cooperation. There have also been newer Treaties which have changed several important features of the EU and its decision-making processes. One of the most remarkable things is that almost all European governments of all political persuasions have found the benefits of membership to be positive for their economies.

This chapter identifies the objective of Article 102 through a process of literal and teleological interpretation. The conclusions reached through this hermeneutical process are tested by looking at the travaux préparatoires of the Treaty of Rome. Then, the case law on Articles 101 and 102 and the EU Merger regime are examined. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

An examination is made of the reasons for non‐implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides that member states of the European Community (now the European Union) should progressively abolish restrictions on the movement of capital between themselves in order to ensure a common market. The situation prevailing in the early 1960s and in the early 1980s is analysed, and an assessment made of three possible approaches towards defining a new community policy for European capital markets. These are following consistent macro‐policies, capital market integration, and complete European Monetary Union.

This chapter explores the evolution of trade and development policy, and in particular, recent changes that increasingly seek to incorporate broader concepts of sustainable development into external policy as a whole and to place Union trade and development policy within global development strategies, including the Millennium Development Goals and the Doha Development Round of negotiations within the WTO. It argues that the main challenge for the EU is how to achieve a trade and development policy that can be justified in terms of economic needs, is WTO compatible, and at the same time takes account of the needs of those countries that have become dependent on historical preferences.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the Treaty of Rome, which established the foundations of competition policy in Europe. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters. Fifty years of competition policy in Europe is the story of a success, showing resiliency and capacity of self-reform. Competition policy has become central in the European Union, with the authority of the European Commission firmly established and with an increasingly international leadership role.

This chapter discusses the international regulation of procurement. An international system of procurement regulation refers to a system of regulation which imposes common procurement rules to be applied by a number of countries. These are the rules which apply to regional economic organisations such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, and the European Community (EC). In addition, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has formulated an international system of procurement which is contained in the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). This chapter examines the procurement system of the EC as representing a regional procurement system and the procurement system established by the WTO. The Treaty of Rome and its provisions that are applicable to procurement are discussed, along with various directives of the EC and the history of the GPA.

This chapter focuses on the European Union's adoption of social policy, from which the right to strike is excluded. The setting of social standards in the European Union has been limited by the terms of the Treaty of Rome 1957 which forms the basis of the current Treaty of the European Community (ECT). It was by means of a series of Treaty amendments that competence on social matters was acquired incrementally. However, protection of freedom of association or a right to strike appears to be excluded. Nevertheless, there seem to be consensus within the Union that the right to strike is a ‘core labour standard’ and a ‘fundamental right’. This is evident from the declaratory instruments adopted by the Member States and EU constitutions.

This chapter examines the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy. It shows that the principal determinants that influenced the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy in the European Economic Community (EEC) include the Treaty of Rome and its system of ‘undistorted competition’, which installed a competition regime with a strong, ‘constitutional’ character. The interaction of competition policy and industrial policy was also shaped by the personal characteristics and relationships of individual Commissioners, and by the broader economic context — a factor that became particularly important when it was realized that the plight of certain industries was not only acute but structural as well.

This chapter discusses the history, institutional structure, mandate, procedural characteristics, and agency performance of the EU's competition law system. The competition law provisions of the European Treaty have remained unchanged since the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957. The Treaty is now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Commission is the body primarily responsible for the enforcement of these provisions. Through the initiation of the Competition Directorate, the European Commission investigates, enforces, and adjudicates all issues relating to competition law within its jurisdiction.

This chapter traces its early development until the MacSharry reforms of 1992, commencing with a section on the special status of agriculture. To a considerable degree, this chapter is concerned with the common organizations of the market; but early intimations of a more multifunctional approach are highlighted. Agriculture has always been accorded special status in the European Community. Indeed, such ‘exceptionalism’ was entrenched in the Treaty of Rome as signed in 1957, agriculture being the only sector of industry to be accorded its own title, Title II. This stipulated specific objectives for the Common Agricultural Policy, and its distinctive nature was reinforced by, inter alia, provisions which applied the rules on competition to the production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council. In particular, the Council could authorize the granting of aid for the protection of enterprises handicapped by structural or natural conditions.

This chapter discusses new research concerning the pronouncements of anti-Market pundits including historians C.E. Carrington and Sir Arthur Bryant and economists James Meade and Roy Harrod. It traces the origins of their dissent and differentiates between the intractable sceptics and those whose opposition evolved from a ‘wait and see’ position. This chapter suggests in their analysis these pundits emphasised the political rather than the economic goals of the Treaty of Rome.