Lawrence Mills
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9789888083985
- eISBN:
- 9789882209084
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789888083985.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
Protecting Free Trade is the story of a paradox that both limited and stimulated Hong Kong’s post-war economy. In order to preserve its access to open markets, Hong Kong was obligated by ...
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Protecting Free Trade is the story of a paradox that both limited and stimulated Hong Kong’s post-war economy. In order to preserve its access to open markets, Hong Kong was obligated by international agreements to accept restraints on its exports; and in order to sustain growth, Hong Kong had to subject its largest industry — textiles — to a massive network of restrictions. Protecting Free Trade examines how Hong Kong handled, by negotiation, attempts by developed economies to limit international trade through protective measures. The central argument is that, far from stifling Hong Kong’s industry, restrictive international trade agreements were the stimulus for economic success by creating a sellers’ market in which Hong Kong was the dominant supplier. Lawrence Mills was deeply involved in many of the critical economic issues that Hong Kong faced in the 50 years leading up to its return to China in 1997. In Protecting Free Trade he examines the constitutional paradox of Britain's international responsibility for, but different trading interests from, Hong Kong. He explains why, for the strategic defence of its interests, Hong Kong depended on international trade arrangements and bilateral restraint agreements. Protecting Free Trade also examines the role of the Commerce and Industry Department, which Mills headed, and of its principal advisory boards. It details the bureaucratic systems, including controversial quota controls, that were necessary to give Hong Kong’s businessmen stability and room for manoeuvre in fast-evolving markets.Less
Protecting Free Trade is the story of a paradox that both limited and stimulated Hong Kong’s post-war economy. In order to preserve its access to open markets, Hong Kong was obligated by international agreements to accept restraints on its exports; and in order to sustain growth, Hong Kong had to subject its largest industry — textiles — to a massive network of restrictions. Protecting Free Trade examines how Hong Kong handled, by negotiation, attempts by developed economies to limit international trade through protective measures. The central argument is that, far from stifling Hong Kong’s industry, restrictive international trade agreements were the stimulus for economic success by creating a sellers’ market in which Hong Kong was the dominant supplier. Lawrence Mills was deeply involved in many of the critical economic issues that Hong Kong faced in the 50 years leading up to its return to China in 1997. In Protecting Free Trade he examines the constitutional paradox of Britain's international responsibility for, but different trading interests from, Hong Kong. He explains why, for the strategic defence of its interests, Hong Kong depended on international trade arrangements and bilateral restraint agreements. Protecting Free Trade also examines the role of the Commerce and Industry Department, which Mills headed, and of its principal advisory boards. It details the bureaucratic systems, including controversial quota controls, that were necessary to give Hong Kong’s businessmen stability and room for manoeuvre in fast-evolving markets.
Sean O'Connell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199263318
- eISBN:
- 9780191718793
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263318.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter rejects the notion that low-income consumers were feckless. Such statements emanated from a model of the rational middle-class consumer and frequently made little sense in the context of ...
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This chapter rejects the notion that low-income consumers were feckless. Such statements emanated from a model of the rational middle-class consumer and frequently made little sense in the context of the choices available to the working-classes. The extent to which low-income consumers demonstrated agency is highlighted. It is noted that the operational model of Victorian tallymen continues to work for modern doorstep moneylenders. This is despite recent accusations, by the New Economics Foundation, that their business was amongst the worst excesses of the free market. However, the Department and Trade and Industry concluded that their existence limited the scale of the illegal sector, which is much larger in France and Germany (where interest rate ceilings have prevented the development of a legal sub-prime sector). Different European approaches to sub-prime lending are discussed, as is the possibility of an effective not for profit mutual engagement with low-income borrowers.Less
This chapter rejects the notion that low-income consumers were feckless. Such statements emanated from a model of the rational middle-class consumer and frequently made little sense in the context of the choices available to the working-classes. The extent to which low-income consumers demonstrated agency is highlighted. It is noted that the operational model of Victorian tallymen continues to work for modern doorstep moneylenders. This is despite recent accusations, by the New Economics Foundation, that their business was amongst the worst excesses of the free market. However, the Department and Trade and Industry concluded that their existence limited the scale of the illegal sector, which is much larger in France and Germany (where interest rate ceilings have prevented the development of a legal sub-prime sector). Different European approaches to sub-prime lending are discussed, as is the possibility of an effective not for profit mutual engagement with low-income borrowers.
Helga Drummond
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198289531
- eISBN:
- 9780191684722
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198289531.003.0008
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, HRM / IR
Project Taurus promised to save the equities industry 255 million pounds over ten years, plus the invisible benefits arising from enhanced confidence in the UK stock market. Problems soon arose, ...
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Project Taurus promised to save the equities industry 255 million pounds over ten years, plus the invisible benefits arising from enhanced confidence in the UK stock market. Problems soon arose, however. From mid-1990 onwards, letters began appearing in the press from private investors claiming that Taurus would result in increased costs and make trading more difficult. The proposed abolition of share certificates drew particular malevolence. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) tried to counter the bad publicity by emphasizing the disadvantages of share certificates and reminding private investors that such documents require safe keeping, and that they cost twenty-five pounds to replace if lost. No one was assuaged. Moreover, as early as 1989 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had said that Taurus should be voluntary while the LSE had proceeded on the assumption that listed companies would be legally required to join Taurus. The consultation process confirmed the DTI's original view. The LSE found itself trapped by its own rhetoric.Less
Project Taurus promised to save the equities industry 255 million pounds over ten years, plus the invisible benefits arising from enhanced confidence in the UK stock market. Problems soon arose, however. From mid-1990 onwards, letters began appearing in the press from private investors claiming that Taurus would result in increased costs and make trading more difficult. The proposed abolition of share certificates drew particular malevolence. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) tried to counter the bad publicity by emphasizing the disadvantages of share certificates and reminding private investors that such documents require safe keeping, and that they cost twenty-five pounds to replace if lost. No one was assuaged. Moreover, as early as 1989 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had said that Taurus should be voluntary while the LSE had proceeded on the assumption that listed companies would be legally required to join Taurus. The consultation process confirmed the DTI's original view. The LSE found itself trapped by its own rhetoric.
Helga Drummond
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198289531
- eISBN:
- 9780191684722
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198289531.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, HRM / IR
The first public sign that Project Taurus was in trouble came in January 1991 when implementation was postponed for six months, from October 1991 to April 1992. The delay was blamed upon the ...
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The first public sign that Project Taurus was in trouble came in January 1991 when implementation was postponed for six months, from October 1991 to April 1992. The delay was blamed upon the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) failure to produce the regulations in time. In May 1991, a reduced compensation fund of 100 million pounds was agreed with the DTI and the draft regulations duly published. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) Council had been dissolved and replaced by a board to give the LSE a more commercial ambience. Touche Ross was to undertake the building of Taurus but it was sacked from the project as part of cost-cutting. The delays put project manager John Watson under intense pressure. Chief executive Peter Rawlins also had his doubts and considered stopping the project, but the various reassurances he had received and his preoccupation with other matters led him to act against his better judgement.Less
The first public sign that Project Taurus was in trouble came in January 1991 when implementation was postponed for six months, from October 1991 to April 1992. The delay was blamed upon the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) failure to produce the regulations in time. In May 1991, a reduced compensation fund of 100 million pounds was agreed with the DTI and the draft regulations duly published. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) Council had been dissolved and replaced by a board to give the LSE a more commercial ambience. Touche Ross was to undertake the building of Taurus but it was sacked from the project as part of cost-cutting. The delays put project manager John Watson under intense pressure. Chief executive Peter Rawlins also had his doubts and considered stopping the project, but the various reassurances he had received and his preoccupation with other matters led him to act against his better judgement.
Lewis Johnman and Hugh Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780973893403
- eISBN:
- 9781786944641
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9780973893403.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Maritime History
This chapter charts the process of nationalisation that followed on the heels of the Scott Lithgow merger. It examines the history of the newly merged company in order to identify its increasing ...
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This chapter charts the process of nationalisation that followed on the heels of the Scott Lithgow merger. It examines the history of the newly merged company in order to identify its increasing inability to compete globally; the move into giant tanker construction, which failed to deliver what it intended; the necessity of entering into sophisticated offshore markets; inherited losses; the actions of the 1970 Conservative Government; the shift in Scott Lithgows’ interest to the oil trade; and the financially disastrous submarine cable fault - where Scott Lithgows’ cable insulation failed catastrophically on Chilean submarines. It concludes by summarising the poor situation Scott Lithgow had ended up in over the course of the century so far, and considers the nationalisation efforts a small injection of life into an otherwise struggling company.Less
This chapter charts the process of nationalisation that followed on the heels of the Scott Lithgow merger. It examines the history of the newly merged company in order to identify its increasing inability to compete globally; the move into giant tanker construction, which failed to deliver what it intended; the necessity of entering into sophisticated offshore markets; inherited losses; the actions of the 1970 Conservative Government; the shift in Scott Lithgows’ interest to the oil trade; and the financially disastrous submarine cable fault - where Scott Lithgows’ cable insulation failed catastrophically on Chilean submarines. It concludes by summarising the poor situation Scott Lithgow had ended up in over the course of the century so far, and considers the nationalisation efforts a small injection of life into an otherwise struggling company.
