David Scheffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190860639
- eISBN:
- 9780190860660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190860639.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The final months of the search for peace in Bosnia and Croatia left everyone scrambling to reach the next stage of diplomatic and military engagement. Richard Holbrooke reported no progress. The ...
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The final months of the search for peace in Bosnia and Croatia left everyone scrambling to reach the next stage of diplomatic and military engagement. Richard Holbrooke reported no progress. The Principals approved continued NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Planning proceeded for the NATO-led force that would be inserted into Bosnia following a peace agreement. The Deputies bickered over plans for the Bosniaks. The Principals and Deputies strategized how to roll out peace talks, and consultations in Europe prepared the groundwork for the upcoming Dayton peace talks. Kofi Annan consulted in Washington about the U.N. role. Madeleine Albright and Holbrooke clashed over sanctions relief for Serbia. Holbrooke’s memorandum to Warren Christopher illuminated the turbulence in the Dayton talks near their conclusion. Holbrooke concluded that Slobodan Milošević had carried the day in Dayton and that Alija Izetbegović had been the most unreasonable, and, concludes the author, for understandable reasons.Less
The final months of the search for peace in Bosnia and Croatia left everyone scrambling to reach the next stage of diplomatic and military engagement. Richard Holbrooke reported no progress. The Principals approved continued NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Planning proceeded for the NATO-led force that would be inserted into Bosnia following a peace agreement. The Deputies bickered over plans for the Bosniaks. The Principals and Deputies strategized how to roll out peace talks, and consultations in Europe prepared the groundwork for the upcoming Dayton peace talks. Kofi Annan consulted in Washington about the U.N. role. Madeleine Albright and Holbrooke clashed over sanctions relief for Serbia. Holbrooke’s memorandum to Warren Christopher illuminated the turbulence in the Dayton talks near their conclusion. Holbrooke concluded that Slobodan Milošević had carried the day in Dayton and that Alija Izetbegović had been the most unreasonable, and, concludes the author, for understandable reasons.
David Scheffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190860639
- eISBN:
- 9780190860660
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190860639.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The Sit Room brings you into the secretive Situation Room of the White House, the most important deliberative room in the world, during the early 1990s when the author was one of the policymakers who ...
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The Sit Room brings you into the secretive Situation Room of the White House, the most important deliberative room in the world, during the early 1990s when the author was one of the policymakers who framed the Clinton administration’s policy toward the bloody Balkans War. With newly declassified documents and his own notes to draw upon, David Scheffer, who later became America’s first Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, weaves the true story of how policy options were debated in the Situation Room among the highest national security officials. The road to a final peace deal in late 1995 came at the high price of the murderous siege of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing of mostly Bosnian Muslims from their homes and towns. The book relates the inside story about how American policy evolved—often futilely—to try to stop an intractable war and shocking atrocities. Main actors in the Situation Room include the Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, the State Department’s ace negotiator Richard Holbrooke, National Security Adviser Tony Lake, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and White House moralist David Gergen. For three years the Situation Room table was littered with shattered proposals to end the war until armed force backed up diplomacy to compel a fragile peace deal. The book reveals authentic policymaking at the highest levels with a unique journey into the arena of war and peace where spirited debate guided America’s foreign policy.Less
The Sit Room brings you into the secretive Situation Room of the White House, the most important deliberative room in the world, during the early 1990s when the author was one of the policymakers who framed the Clinton administration’s policy toward the bloody Balkans War. With newly declassified documents and his own notes to draw upon, David Scheffer, who later became America’s first Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, weaves the true story of how policy options were debated in the Situation Room among the highest national security officials. The road to a final peace deal in late 1995 came at the high price of the murderous siege of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing of mostly Bosnian Muslims from their homes and towns. The book relates the inside story about how American policy evolved—often futilely—to try to stop an intractable war and shocking atrocities. Main actors in the Situation Room include the Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, the State Department’s ace negotiator Richard Holbrooke, National Security Adviser Tony Lake, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and White House moralist David Gergen. For three years the Situation Room table was littered with shattered proposals to end the war until armed force backed up diplomacy to compel a fragile peace deal. The book reveals authentic policymaking at the highest levels with a unique journey into the arena of war and peace where spirited debate guided America’s foreign policy.
David Scheffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190860639
- eISBN:
- 9780190860660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190860639.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The year 1993 never got close to a peaceful settlement of the Balkans conflict despite the United Nations, European, and American attempts to achieve one. The siege of Sarajevo had begun in 1992 ...
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The year 1993 never got close to a peaceful settlement of the Balkans conflict despite the United Nations, European, and American attempts to achieve one. The siege of Sarajevo had begun in 1992 immediately after the declaration of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1993, a military stalemate persisted in Bosnia as the diplomatic challenge limped along. President Bill Clinton’s cabinet of national security leaders—the Principals Committee—gathered in the Situation Room for the first time on January 28, 1993, and dealt exclusively with the situation in Bosnia. In April 1993, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, delivered a memorandum to the national security adviser recommending use of American air power. The recommendation failed to attract sufficient support, and further diplomatic efforts to end the war also failed. “Assertive multilateralism” took a beating in Situation Room discussions as 1993 wore on.Less
The year 1993 never got close to a peaceful settlement of the Balkans conflict despite the United Nations, European, and American attempts to achieve one. The siege of Sarajevo had begun in 1992 immediately after the declaration of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1993, a military stalemate persisted in Bosnia as the diplomatic challenge limped along. President Bill Clinton’s cabinet of national security leaders—the Principals Committee—gathered in the Situation Room for the first time on January 28, 1993, and dealt exclusively with the situation in Bosnia. In April 1993, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, delivered a memorandum to the national security adviser recommending use of American air power. The recommendation failed to attract sufficient support, and further diplomatic efforts to end the war also failed. “Assertive multilateralism” took a beating in Situation Room discussions as 1993 wore on.
David Scheffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190860639
- eISBN:
- 9780190860660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190860639.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
During 1994, tactics in the Situation Room over America’s role in the Balkans were plagued by procrastination, fear of the unknown, and a futile search for alternatives to bold action. A 1994 journey ...
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During 1994, tactics in the Situation Room over America’s role in the Balkans were plagued by procrastination, fear of the unknown, and a futile search for alternatives to bold action. A 1994 journey by the author and Madeleine Albright to the region demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating U.S. policy with the United Nations and U.S. allies. The February 5, 1994, mortar attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo ignited a long process of efforts to bring the war to an end. The Federation of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats united against the Bosnian Serbs. Goražde became the next battleground of Bosnian Serb pressure to capitulate, but NATO support for its security held firm. Debates in the Situation Room ended with endorsements of the status quo. Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace effort, and all slid back into war. The fate of UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping force, also dominated discussions in the Situation Room.Less
During 1994, tactics in the Situation Room over America’s role in the Balkans were plagued by procrastination, fear of the unknown, and a futile search for alternatives to bold action. A 1994 journey by the author and Madeleine Albright to the region demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating U.S. policy with the United Nations and U.S. allies. The February 5, 1994, mortar attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo ignited a long process of efforts to bring the war to an end. The Federation of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats united against the Bosnian Serbs. Goražde became the next battleground of Bosnian Serb pressure to capitulate, but NATO support for its security held firm. Debates in the Situation Room ended with endorsements of the status quo. Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace effort, and all slid back into war. The fate of UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping force, also dominated discussions in the Situation Room.
David Scheffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190860639
- eISBN:
- 9780190860660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190860639.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
In July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica led to efforts to forge a new peace plan. The Principals received a “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” paper, which proposed shoring up UNPROFOR, pushing for a political ...
More
In July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica led to efforts to forge a new peace plan. The Principals received a “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” paper, which proposed shoring up UNPROFOR, pushing for a political settlement with Slobodan Milošević, supporting Bosnia’s survival if UNPROFOR withdrew, providing additional support to the Bosniaks, and offering sanctions relief to induce Milošević to stay out of Bosnia. Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger initiated strategizing that Madeleine Albright used to “examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.” Albright proposed using air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement and training Federation forces. Bill Clinton endorsed this. The Croatian Army successfully regained their lands in Croatia. Discussions in the Situation Room focused on creation of a post-settlement Peace Implementation Force. Another bombing of the Markale market in Sarajevo unleashed NATO air power, and Milošević began to negotiate seriously.Less
In July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica led to efforts to forge a new peace plan. The Principals received a “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” paper, which proposed shoring up UNPROFOR, pushing for a political settlement with Slobodan Milošević, supporting Bosnia’s survival if UNPROFOR withdrew, providing additional support to the Bosniaks, and offering sanctions relief to induce Milošević to stay out of Bosnia. Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger initiated strategizing that Madeleine Albright used to “examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.” Albright proposed using air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement and training Federation forces. Bill Clinton endorsed this. The Croatian Army successfully regained their lands in Croatia. Discussions in the Situation Room focused on creation of a post-settlement Peace Implementation Force. Another bombing of the Markale market in Sarajevo unleashed NATO air power, and Milošević began to negotiate seriously.
