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This chapter examines Prime Minister Tony Blair’s proposed third-way reform of the European left, and the resistance to these ideas. The third-way is defined as a commitment to a core set of social-democratic values; a particular diagnosis of economic, social, and political change in the late 1990s; and a set of policy tools aimed at promoting social-democratic values. It is argued that changes undergone by the left in Europe varies from country to country, and is unlikely to converge either on the traditional model of regulated capitalism or on Blair’s ‘third-way’ centrism.

This chapter examines the frequent claim in newspapers that Blair is a ‘Presidential’ leader. It argues that in describing Blair as such, journalists were making a claim about the way New Labour and Blair govern. The ways the Conservatives sought to undermine the political threat posed by New Labour, the way Blair’s political and personal past were used to advance New Labour’s bid for office, and the way in which this image was fought over by the parties are discussed.

The authors analyse the long process of modernization of the Labour party that had its origins in Neil Kinnock's period as a leader of the party between 1983 and 1992 and that culminated in Labour's victory in the 1997 general election. Heath, Jowell, and Curtice draw the conclusion that on the non‐economic issues such as disarmament, Europe, and devolution, Tony Blair's New Labour was merely a continuation of Neil Kinnock's policy. It was Neil Kinnock not Tony Blair who had made the radical break with Labour's recent past. However, on economic issues New Labour made a clearer break with its Old Labour inheritance—on nationalization, unions, government spending, and taxation, New Labour adopted many Thatcherite precepts. The decisive move of New Labour towards the centre on the economic issues, did have major electoral benefits because it squeezed the Liberal Democrats’ share of the vote on the centre‐left, but it also captured ground on the centre‐right from the Conservatives. New Labour's move to the centre also disrupted the usual patterns of vote‐switching; more Conservatives than usual switching directly to Labour rather than to the Liberal Democrats.

After Thatcher and Major Euroscepticism, Tony Blair's UK did a better job at bringing Britain to Europe than Europe to Britain. He achieved the former objective by avoiding being isolated and seeking to give a lead when possible as part of New Labour's modernizing project. Failure to join the Euro — blocked by his Chancellor Gordon Brown — showed limitations to Blair's power. Although he succeeded in promoting an EU defence capability associated with NATO, the Iraq War weakened Britain's influence. While taking an active part in preparing the 2005 constitutional treaty, the UK government failed to sell the treaty to the British public and conceded a referendum Blair was likely to lose. While Britain was seen as somewhat less detached from the EU despite its opt outs, public hostility to integration was not overcome.

The EU's founding Treaties have been characterized by political contestation along two dimensions: a centre‐periphery dimension in which centralization to Brussels is opposed to national sovereignty, and a left‐right dimension pitting a center‐right project of market liberalization against a center‐left project of ‘regulated capitalism’. From the Treaty of Rome through the Maastricht Treaty, the fundamental thrust of the treaties has been neoliberal, focusing on the creation of a unified European marketplace, while side agreements have secured some elements of the regulated capitalism project. In this context, the Treaty of Amsterdam represents an outlier: a Treaty that addresses the central concerns of the regulated capitalism model (e.g. employment, social policy, and the environment), but does so primarily through new regulatory instruments and comparison of best practices rather than binding EU regulations. For good or ill, this ‘Blairite Treaty’ reflects the ‘Third Way’ governing philosophy of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Tony Blair was elected to the House of Commons in 1983 at a time when the Labour Party was committed to withdrawal from the European Community (EC). Following the defeat of 1983 and the election of Neil Kinnock as Labour's new leader, the policy of the party began to change. It has been a feature of British politics that British governments have been favourable to the EC and oppositions much less so. The period from after the 1983 election until 1992 was one in which the commitment of both main parties to making a success of Britain's EC membership gradually converged. Neil Kinnock moved the Labour Party's stance from ‘withdrawal’ through ‘withdrawal as a last resort’ to a commitment to Britain's successful membership. However, as the 1997 General Election approached, hostility to the single currency, and indeed the European Union as a whole, grew in the Conservative Party while Labour's approach became more positive.

A case study of the rhetoric and heresthetics of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, and Gordon Brown. It examines Thatcher's slogans: the free economy, where she succeeded, and the strong state, where she failed. The first changed the universe of political debate; the second destroyed the Conservative Party, as it split into its Europhile and Eurosceptical wings. The most successful heresthetic since 1997 has been Brown's grant of central bank independence within days of taking office.

The decision to invade Iraq is the most controversial of Blair's wars, undertaken without public support, and with significant disquiet among members of his government and political party. At several points it looked as though the decision to go to war could cost the prime minister his job—an incredible turn-around for a politician used to great popularity and colossal parliamentary majorities. Blair did not waver. Once it became clear that the Bush administration was set on its course, strong incentives existed from an alliance maintenance standpoint to join them. Further, Blair, with his Manichean view of international politics, shared much of the analysis of the Bush administration about the threat of weapons of mass destruction, irrational dictators and potential connections with terrorists. Blair's strong internal locus of control led him to downplay the risks in securing support for the war and in the war's ultimate success. Finally, his directive and hands-on decision style ensured that the significant opposition to the policy within his cabinet and foreign office was marginalized at the crucial decision points.

Tony Blair's response to the September 11, 2001 attacks was one of unequivocal support for the United States, a framing of the situation in stark terms of good and evil, and elucidation of an ambitiously proactive foreign policy programme to prevent the re-occurrence of attacks of such magnitude. It was therefore quite consistent with the policy style rooted in Blair's personality traits that had crystallized during the Kosovo war. The period following September 11 saw the prime minister, with his foreign policy approach set, fully engaged on the world stage. He sought simultaneously to rally international support for the US whilst ensuring that the American response was a judicious one. The results did not, however, match his aims, and international support ebbed as concern over the scope and aggression of the US response mounted. Blair's basic strategy was in many ways a rational one of supporting the most powerful state in the system after it had been attacked, yet his instinct to be close to the US during this period sowed the seeds of the disastrous Iraq decisions.

Kosovo and Sierra Leone represent significant episodes in Blair's development as a foreign policy decision maker. His style of setting ambitious goals, proactively pursued, and based upon the stark framing of issues, led him in these episodes into exposed positions that constituted gambles over events he did not control. He committed British forces, backing his own judgment against that of others, and was successful. The successful resolution of the conflict strengthened Blair in the foreign policy style he had adopted, and represents also the highpoint of his ‘doctrine of the international community’. Blair learned additional lessons from Kosovo that would be extremely significant in future crises. United Nations support, he discovered, while having huge ability to legitimize foreign policy actions for the domestic British audience, could not be considered a prerequisite for taking action, and its imprimatur was not ultimately necessary in order to get things done. Blair would later note the irony that many who encouraged him to intervene in Kosovo on human rights grounds despite the absence of UN approval would subsequently condemn him for intervening in Iraq—a future occasion where explicit authorization could not be obtained.

This chapter provides systematic evidence for the claims made about Blair's personality and its distinctiveness in relation to other British prime ministers and other world leaders. It introduces content analysis procedures by which Blair's personality traits are measured, and draws specific hypotheses about the behaviours to which they are linked.

Chapter five is the book's final empirical chapter exploring Britain's foreign policy in the context of the prelude to the war in Iraq, from 2001-2003. The chapter begins by examining the changing world order at that time, arguing that, as the war in Iraq developed, for the first time in the post-Cold War era the US and British governments attempted to redefine what it meant to be allies. It highlights how, in attempting this, two competing ideas emerged: the British government's ‘doctrine of international community’ and the US administration's idea for creating ‘coalitions of the willing’. The Blair government's doctrine of international community enabled his government to replay the same geopolitical role in the special relationship that those of Churchill and Macmillan had done previously. In contrast, the US idea of establishing coalitions of willing had the potential to de-centre the importance of the special relationship (and the British government) within US foreign policy making. Rebalancing much of the media's focus on contemporary decision making and events during the Iraq war, the chapter concludes that these differing visions for the future of the special relationship were the underlying cause of British foreign policy failure in the prelude to the war in Iraq.

This chapter discusses the information provided by the Hutton Report and the Butler Report concerning the bases of the British government's decision to join the U.S. in overturning Saddam Hussein for his alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It suggests that nothing revealed in the reports could bring an agreement to whether British Prime Minister Tony Blair was right in his decision, but those who have read the reports could surely conclude that the government, the intelligence services, and the BBC fell short of what have been expected of them at a time when Britain was on the brink of being taken into a war. It discusses the similarities between the Iraq War and the Suez Canal conflict.

The central argument of this book is that British foreign policy has been decisively shaped by the worldview and leadership style of Tony Blair during his time in office. Simply put, it argues that a convincing explanation of British foreign policy from 1997 to 2007 must take full account of the personality of Tony Blair. The book seeks to answer three crucial questions: What was Blair's foreign policy style and worldview? What difference did the Blair style make to British foreign policy choices during this period? What difference did Blair make to the outcome of events and the policies of others, especially the United States? An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

This chapter presents a critical examination of President Barack Obama's economic philosophy and policy, focusing on the presidential campaign and his first year in office. It is argued that ‘Obamanomics’ represents an appropriately ambiguous placeholder for what remains an elusive economic philosophy, which in practice has oscillated between emergency measures and pragmatic adjustments. The nearest relative to Obamanomics may be the ‘Third Way’ ideology espoused by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair in the late 1990s, which likewise sought to combine an embrace of free-market globalization with social amelioration in domestic policy. In as far as the financial crisis of 2008-9 provided both an impetus and a rationale for a radical reorientation of economic policy in the United States (and internationally), the opportunity for developing a progressive version of Obamanomics may already have been missed. Rather than transcending neoliberalism, this seems to presage a further period of accommodation and adaptation.

Joined-up government is a new term coined in the 1990s for an old administrative doctrine called ‘coordination’. In a general sense, coordination in the old administrative doctrine suggests that all of the parts of the executive government should be interconnected and complementary to one another. The aim of coordination in the government is to be able to present a single face to the people and to operate as a single unit on multiple yet interrelated problems. Historically, the idea and concept of government coordination is hard to trace as it is a nebulous one. It appears in several disciplinary literatures and spans many institutional and social domains. This chapter does not offer a historical outline of the term ‘joined-up term’ or of broader coordination doctrines in the government, rather it presents questions from a comparative-historical questions. The first question examines old and new aspects of the Blair New Labour doctrine of joined-up government. The second query tackles from an historical perspective some of the principal means that have been advanced for the linking of the parts of the executive government. The last question addresses the counter-doctrines to the idea of joined-up government.