Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchöe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751426
- eISBN:
- 9780199827190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751426.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Tibetan Mādhyamikas devote considerable attention to debates concerning the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya) in deconstructive Madhyamaka analysis. This chapter argues that this attention is ...
More
Tibetan Mādhyamikas devote considerable attention to debates concerning the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya) in deconstructive Madhyamaka analysis. This chapter argues that this attention is warranted because any account of conventional truth depends upon an account of the object of negation. The chapter focuses on the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa regarding whether the object of negation is intrinsic nature or existence.Less
Tibetan Mādhyamikas devote considerable attention to debates concerning the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya) in deconstructive Madhyamaka analysis. This chapter argues that this attention is warranted because any account of conventional truth depends upon an account of the object of negation. The chapter focuses on the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa regarding whether the object of negation is intrinsic nature or existence.
Georges Dreyfus
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751426
- eISBN:
- 9780199827190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751426.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts ...
More
This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts face: Can the skeptic advance a thesis, or is it merely therapeutic? This chapter argues that Patsab’s approach is similar to that of Sextus in that it offers a radical answer to this question, and the chapter then asks whether his approach is compatible with constructive philosophy.Less
This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts face: Can the skeptic advance a thesis, or is it merely therapeutic? This chapter argues that Patsab’s approach is similar to that of Sextus in that it offers a radical answer to this question, and the chapter then asks whether his approach is compatible with constructive philosophy.
