Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.Less
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251483
- eISBN:
- 9780191602320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251487.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores the conception of self proposed by Thomas Nagel. It is argued that more must be said to clarify the place of a subjective point of view in the objective world than is said by ...
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This paper explores the conception of self proposed by Thomas Nagel. It is argued that more must be said to clarify the place of a subjective point of view in the objective world than is said by semantic diagnosis. The paper discusses the semantic diagnosis and Nagel’s reasons for finding it unsatisfactory. A metaphysical solution to the problem is presented and the place of subjective point of view in an objective world is explained. It is then analyses whether the austere view of contextual or subjective information can account for information about the qualitative character of experience.Less
This paper explores the conception of self proposed by Thomas Nagel. It is argued that more must be said to clarify the place of a subjective point of view in the objective world than is said by semantic diagnosis. The paper discusses the semantic diagnosis and Nagel’s reasons for finding it unsatisfactory. A metaphysical solution to the problem is presented and the place of subjective point of view in an objective world is explained. It is then analyses whether the austere view of contextual or subjective information can account for information about the qualitative character of experience.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the ...
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This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the (democratic) state. On my institutional luck egalitarian account, what is significant is whether there are global practices and institutions that systemically translate natural and arbitrary facts about persons into significant advantages for some and disadvantages for others. This chapter thus elaborates on the ways in which global institutions and practices turn facts that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” and contingencies into actual social advantages and disadvantages for persons. It points out that the institutional focus prevents global luck egalitarianism from sliding into the absurdity often attributed to it, namely, that global luck egalitarianism has to take on distributive (not just humanitarian) commitments to anyone who so happens to be worse off. Distributive obligations kick in only where there is some institutional order that transforms luck into differential life prospects.Less
This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the (democratic) state. On my institutional luck egalitarian account, what is significant is whether there are global practices and institutions that systemically translate natural and arbitrary facts about persons into significant advantages for some and disadvantages for others. This chapter thus elaborates on the ways in which global institutions and practices turn facts that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” and contingencies into actual social advantages and disadvantages for persons. It points out that the institutional focus prevents global luck egalitarianism from sliding into the absurdity often attributed to it, namely, that global luck egalitarianism has to take on distributive (not just humanitarian) commitments to anyone who so happens to be worse off. Distributive obligations kick in only where there is some institutional order that transforms luck into differential life prospects.
Peter Robinson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199273256
- eISBN:
- 9780191706370
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273256.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century and Contemporary Literature
This chapter outlines aspects of the book's subject by considering the call by the philosopher Thomas Nagel to consider not ‘How should we live, whatever the circumstances?’ but ‘Under what ...
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This chapter outlines aspects of the book's subject by considering the call by the philosopher Thomas Nagel to consider not ‘How should we live, whatever the circumstances?’ but ‘Under what circumstances is it possible to live as we should?’ William Empson's poem, Aubade is discussed as an instance of a ‘self in a situation’ poem, one in which its context has both intensely personal and large historical aspects. The chapter concludes by suggesting that neither of Nagel's questions captures the ethical pressures on experiences of selves in situations that the poems studied in the book evoke.Less
This chapter outlines aspects of the book's subject by considering the call by the philosopher Thomas Nagel to consider not ‘How should we live, whatever the circumstances?’ but ‘Under what circumstances is it possible to live as we should?’ William Empson's poem, Aubade is discussed as an instance of a ‘self in a situation’ poem, one in which its context has both intensely personal and large historical aspects. The chapter concludes by suggesting that neither of Nagel's questions captures the ethical pressures on experiences of selves in situations that the poems studied in the book evoke.
G. A. Cohen
Michael Otsuka (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148700
- eISBN:
- 9781400838660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter considers Thomas Nagel's approach to political philosophy and argues that his various statements about reasonable rejection generate an inconsistency at a politically sensitive point. ...
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This chapter considers Thomas Nagel's approach to political philosophy and argues that his various statements about reasonable rejection generate an inconsistency at a politically sensitive point. Nagel is aware that his endorsement of rich people's opposition to radical redistribution “may seem to authorize pure selfishness,” but, he says, “that is too harsh a word for resistance to a radical drop in the standard of living of oneself and one's family.” That word might be too harsh, but Nagel's verdict that the rich need accept only a moderate (that is, nonradical) drop in their wealth is too soft. Officially, and, in Cohen's view, rightly, he depreciates the moral weight of the status quo, but the status quo seems, in the end, to preponderate in his judgment.Less
This chapter considers Thomas Nagel's approach to political philosophy and argues that his various statements about reasonable rejection generate an inconsistency at a politically sensitive point. Nagel is aware that his endorsement of rich people's opposition to radical redistribution “may seem to authorize pure selfishness,” but, he says, “that is too harsh a word for resistance to a radical drop in the standard of living of oneself and one's family.” That word might be too harsh, but Nagel's verdict that the rich need accept only a moderate (that is, nonradical) drop in their wealth is too soft. Officially, and, in Cohen's view, rightly, he depreciates the moral weight of the status quo, but the status quo seems, in the end, to preponderate in his judgment.
F. M. Kamm
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195119114
- eISBN:
- 9780199872244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195119118.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Examines the question of why death is bad: is it bad for the person who dies, and, if so, why? The question of what the scientific criteria should be for the person who dies is dealt with later in ...
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Examines the question of why death is bad: is it bad for the person who dies, and, if so, why? The question of what the scientific criteria should be for the person who dies is dealt with later in the book. The discussion is based on an assumption that death is painless, not untimely, and involves no afterlife or return to life, only posthumous non‐existence; it also assumes that the concern is with why death is bad for the person who dies rather than any people who remain alive, and that even if everyone died at once, something worse has happened to each person than would have happened if that person and everyone else had lived instead. The approach taken to the question by Epicurus (How can death be bad for anyone at all?) and Thomas Nagel's response to this (his ‘Deprivation Account’) are examined, and then various criticisms of Nagel's approach are presented and discussed. Additional objections to Nagel's approach are considered in the next chapter.Less
Examines the question of why death is bad: is it bad for the person who dies, and, if so, why? The question of what the scientific criteria should be for the person who dies is dealt with later in the book. The discussion is based on an assumption that death is painless, not untimely, and involves no afterlife or return to life, only posthumous non‐existence; it also assumes that the concern is with why death is bad for the person who dies rather than any people who remain alive, and that even if everyone died at once, something worse has happened to each person than would have happened if that person and everyone else had lived instead. The approach taken to the question by Epicurus (How can death be bad for anyone at all?) and Thomas Nagel's response to this (his ‘Deprivation Account’) are examined, and then various criticisms of Nagel's approach are presented and discussed. Additional objections to Nagel's approach are considered in the next chapter.
Lenn E. Goodman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195328820
- eISBN:
- 9780199870172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328820.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her ...
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Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her solution suppositious and her problematic artificial. Ethics, he argues, needs no justification. The dependence of all values on God does not imply an arbitrary authority. Indeed, monotheism finds incoherent the notion that divine authority would be arbitrary. Goodman engages critically with exponents of Jewish legal positivism and with Hare regarding divine command ethics, arguing against the ideas of original sin and the inadequacy of the Mosaic law.Less
Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her solution suppositious and her problematic artificial. Ethics, he argues, needs no justification. The dependence of all values on God does not imply an arbitrary authority. Indeed, monotheism finds incoherent the notion that divine authority would be arbitrary. Goodman engages critically with exponents of Jewish legal positivism and with Hare regarding divine command ethics, arguing against the ideas of original sin and the inadequacy of the Mosaic law.
James Warren
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199252893
- eISBN:
- 9780191601408
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252890.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
An examination of a central Epicurean argument, summarised in Kyria Doxa 2 but also used by Lucretius: death is not to be feared (a) since the dead cannot perceive they therefore cannot be harmed and ...
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An examination of a central Epicurean argument, summarised in Kyria Doxa 2 but also used by Lucretius: death is not to be feared (a) since the dead cannot perceive they therefore cannot be harmed and (b) since the dead do not exist therefore death is never contemporaneous with the potential subject of harm. Criticisms of these arguments, principally those of Thomas Nagel and Fred Feldman are investigated and evaluated. Can there be unperceived harms? And can death be an evil even if it is not contemporaneous with the subject of harm?Less
An examination of a central Epicurean argument, summarised in Kyria Doxa 2 but also used by Lucretius: death is not to be feared (a) since the dead cannot perceive they therefore cannot be harmed and (b) since the dead do not exist therefore death is never contemporaneous with the potential subject of harm. Criticisms of these arguments, principally those of Thomas Nagel and Fred Feldman are investigated and evaluated. Can there be unperceived harms? And can death be an evil even if it is not contemporaneous with the subject of harm?
Tom Martin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195320398
- eISBN:
- 9780199869534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320398.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The aim of this essay is to account for the anti-Semitism harboured and expressed by Danny Balint, the main character in Henry Bean’s film, The Believer. I begin by considering two kinds of ...
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The aim of this essay is to account for the anti-Semitism harboured and expressed by Danny Balint, the main character in Henry Bean’s film, The Believer. I begin by considering two kinds of explanation that Danny himself offers: one focusing on rational argument, the other on non-rational, emotional grounds. I argue that neither of Danny’s expressed accounts, however, emerges as adequate to understanding his hatred of the Jews. Instead, I offer a more fundamental and inclusive account of Danny’s anti-Semitism, one that focuses not just on the accounts he gives, but rather on constructing an account from a number of diverse, even contradictory, claims that he makes. I argue that the thread running through Danny’s anti-Semitic attitudes is the link that, for him, exists between the Jews, Judaism, and various forms of meaninglessness.Less
The aim of this essay is to account for the anti-Semitism harboured and expressed by Danny Balint, the main character in Henry Bean’s film, The Believer. I begin by considering two kinds of explanation that Danny himself offers: one focusing on rational argument, the other on non-rational, emotional grounds. I argue that neither of Danny’s expressed accounts, however, emerges as adequate to understanding his hatred of the Jews. Instead, I offer a more fundamental and inclusive account of Danny’s anti-Semitism, one that focuses not just on the accounts he gives, but rather on constructing an account from a number of diverse, even contradictory, claims that he makes. I argue that the thread running through Danny’s anti-Semitic attitudes is the link that, for him, exists between the Jews, Judaism, and various forms of meaninglessness.
JOSEPH RAZ
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198260691
- eISBN:
- 9780191682148
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260691.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter examines the contemporary philosophical responses of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel to the diversity of opinions, customs, and ideologies prevalent in society. Their responses differ in ...
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This chapter examines the contemporary philosophical responses of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel to the diversity of opinions, customs, and ideologies prevalent in society. Their responses differ in many important respects but share a common attitude marked by three features. First, the response of both thinkers to diversity is basically tolerant. Second, the justification of tolerance is based on the considerations of fairness. Third, these considerations lead them to draw boundaries to the reasons on which governments may act based on epistemic distinctions. The discussion challenges the cogency of reasons offered by both writers for epistemic abstinence.Less
This chapter examines the contemporary philosophical responses of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel to the diversity of opinions, customs, and ideologies prevalent in society. Their responses differ in many important respects but share a common attitude marked by three features. First, the response of both thinkers to diversity is basically tolerant. Second, the justification of tolerance is based on the considerations of fairness. Third, these considerations lead them to draw boundaries to the reasons on which governments may act based on epistemic distinctions. The discussion challenges the cogency of reasons offered by both writers for epistemic abstinence.
Duncan MacIntosh
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
According to a Humean present‐aim theory of rationality, there is no rational requirement of prudence: it is not rationally obligatory to act in light of one's foreseen future desires as well as ...
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According to a Humean present‐aim theory of rationality, there is no rational requirement of prudence: it is not rationally obligatory to act in light of one's foreseen future desires as well as one's current desires. It might therefore seem that on this view the acts of a rational agent could be absurdly incoherent over time. The author rebuts this worry by showing how the present‐aim approach to rationality itself generates rational constraints on the evolution of desires and hence of reasons. More generally, the author argues that reasons, whatever they are, are time‐relative rather than timeless.Less
According to a Humean present‐aim theory of rationality, there is no rational requirement of prudence: it is not rationally obligatory to act in light of one's foreseen future desires as well as one's current desires. It might therefore seem that on this view the acts of a rational agent could be absurdly incoherent over time. The author rebuts this worry by showing how the present‐aim approach to rationality itself generates rational constraints on the evolution of desires and hence of reasons. More generally, the author argues that reasons, whatever they are, are time‐relative rather than timeless.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253050
- eISBN:
- 9780191597282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253056.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take ...
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Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.Less
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250036
- eISBN:
- 9780191597817
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250037.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without ...
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Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without needing to identify oneself as an object in the world. He also provides a prototype of the thought that the ‘I’ cannot be conceived wholly as a disembodied or transcendental pure subject, but must be an active and embodied agent. Schopenhauer's dichotomy of subjective and objective viewpoints is argued to be parallel to the conceptions developed by Thomas Nagel.Less
Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without needing to identify oneself as an object in the world. He also provides a prototype of the thought that the ‘I’ cannot be conceived wholly as a disembodied or transcendental pure subject, but must be an active and embodied agent. Schopenhauer's dichotomy of subjective and objective viewpoints is argued to be parallel to the conceptions developed by Thomas Nagel.
F. M. Kamm
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195119114
- eISBN:
- 9780199872244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195119118.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Examines further the question of why death is bad, but also discusses whether death is worse than prenatal non‐existence: the asymmetry thesis. This is Lucretius's question: if we are not much ...
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Examines further the question of why death is bad, but also discusses whether death is worse than prenatal non‐existence: the asymmetry thesis. This is Lucretius's question: if we are not much disturbed about our non‐existence before our creation, why are we so disturbed about our non‐existence after death. The answers given to the asymmetry problem by Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Derek Parfit are discussed. Objections to Nagel's and Williams's approach are briefly mentioned, but a fuller consideration is given to Parfit's approach (that we seem to care less about what we have already suffered than what we will suffer), with discussion of both objections and defences to these. The final section of the chapter shows how Parfit's insight can be used to modify Nagel's view about why death is bad in a way that helps to explain why death at least seems worse than prenatal non‐existence; this is designated the Nagel/Parfit proposal — that death is bad because it prevents additional goods of life, and from the perspective within life, it seems worse than prenatal non‐existence because we do not care as much about past as future goods.Less
Examines further the question of why death is bad, but also discusses whether death is worse than prenatal non‐existence: the asymmetry thesis. This is Lucretius's question: if we are not much disturbed about our non‐existence before our creation, why are we so disturbed about our non‐existence after death. The answers given to the asymmetry problem by Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Derek Parfit are discussed. Objections to Nagel's and Williams's approach are briefly mentioned, but a fuller consideration is given to Parfit's approach (that we seem to care less about what we have already suffered than what we will suffer), with discussion of both objections and defences to these. The final section of the chapter shows how Parfit's insight can be used to modify Nagel's view about why death is bad in a way that helps to explain why death at least seems worse than prenatal non‐existence; this is designated the Nagel/Parfit proposal — that death is bad because it prevents additional goods of life, and from the perspective within life, it seems worse than prenatal non‐existence because we do not care as much about past as future goods.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
There are well‐known arguments in favour of the idea that explanations of actions are at bottom non‐teleological. Michael Smith's ‘direction‐of‐fit’ argument entails this, and both Davidson and ...
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There are well‐known arguments in favour of the idea that explanations of actions are at bottom non‐teleological. Michael Smith's ‘direction‐of‐fit’ argument entails this, and both Davidson and Thomas Nagel give general arguments that only causal explanations actually explain. In this chapter, it is argued that all these arguments are unsuccessful.Less
There are well‐known arguments in favour of the idea that explanations of actions are at bottom non‐teleological. Michael Smith's ‘direction‐of‐fit’ argument entails this, and both Davidson and Thomas Nagel give general arguments that only causal explanations actually explain. In this chapter, it is argued that all these arguments are unsuccessful.
William J. Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173482
- eISBN:
- 9780199872176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter responds to a variety of objections, including the following: that the account is not really consequentialist; that it gives too much priority to states as the guarantors of human ...
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This chapter responds to a variety of objections, including the following: that the account is not really consequentialist; that it gives too much priority to states as the guarantors of human rights; that it makes human rights too contingent; that it is implausible that there is any formula for equity; that the claim of first-person authority is implausible; that it leaves out important values, such as the badness of domination; and that it requires a division in practical reason that is “repugnant to common sense”. The chapter also explains why he depends on his readers to help detect his fudge factors and theoretical inertia.Less
This chapter responds to a variety of objections, including the following: that the account is not really consequentialist; that it gives too much priority to states as the guarantors of human rights; that it makes human rights too contingent; that it is implausible that there is any formula for equity; that the claim of first-person authority is implausible; that it leaves out important values, such as the badness of domination; and that it requires a division in practical reason that is “repugnant to common sense”. The chapter also explains why he depends on his readers to help detect his fudge factors and theoretical inertia.
Andreas von Hirsch
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199592814
- eISBN:
- 9780191729034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Should it be a crime to fail to rescue someone in immediate danger, if one can do so without substantial risk to oneself? Whilst English law has refused to impose such liability, Germany (and several ...
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Should it be a crime to fail to rescue someone in immediate danger, if one can do so without substantial risk to oneself? Whilst English law has refused to impose such liability, Germany (and several other European countries) do impose it. Much of the debate over duty-to-rescue concerned practical matters of implementation, such as whether the duty would burden citizens' everyday living routines unduly. However, there are also interesting questions of criminalisation theory, and these are addreses in this chapter. The resource or interest which a duty-of-rescue requirement protects falls under the Harm Principle: in this case, protection of the endangered person from physical injury. The problem, however, is not the harm element in itself, but imputing the harm to someone who has not placed the victim at risk, but merely failed to extricate him. German scholarly commentators have characterised the duty of rescue as resting on a notion of solidarity among citizens. The chapter addresses three possible accounts of solidarity, to wit: contractualist solidarity, communitarian solidarity, and altruism. It argues that the first two accounts are not helpful for present purposes because they fail to identify the character of the wrong involved in a refusal to rescue. It then argues why the third account, concerning altruism, is potentially more helpful, drawing upon the conception of altruism developed by Thomas Nagel.Less
Should it be a crime to fail to rescue someone in immediate danger, if one can do so without substantial risk to oneself? Whilst English law has refused to impose such liability, Germany (and several other European countries) do impose it. Much of the debate over duty-to-rescue concerned practical matters of implementation, such as whether the duty would burden citizens' everyday living routines unduly. However, there are also interesting questions of criminalisation theory, and these are addreses in this chapter. The resource or interest which a duty-of-rescue requirement protects falls under the Harm Principle: in this case, protection of the endangered person from physical injury. The problem, however, is not the harm element in itself, but imputing the harm to someone who has not placed the victim at risk, but merely failed to extricate him. German scholarly commentators have characterised the duty of rescue as resting on a notion of solidarity among citizens. The chapter addresses three possible accounts of solidarity, to wit: contractualist solidarity, communitarian solidarity, and altruism. It argues that the first two accounts are not helpful for present purposes because they fail to identify the character of the wrong involved in a refusal to rescue. It then argues why the third account, concerning altruism, is potentially more helpful, drawing upon the conception of altruism developed by Thomas Nagel.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0027
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal ...
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This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal of leading a life in the light of reason, though this is in opposition to the maximization of fulfilment of one’s life. Arguments to the contrary by R. M. Hare, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls are examined and rejected.Less
This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal of leading a life in the light of reason, though this is in opposition to the maximization of fulfilment of one’s life. Arguments to the contrary by R. M. Hare, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls are examined and rejected.
David Papineau
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243822
- eISBN:
- 9780191598166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243824.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist ...
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Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “antipathetic fallacy”: we move from the true premise that phenomenal concepts don’t involve conscious feelings to the false conclusion that they don’t refer to them.Less
Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “antipathetic fallacy”: we move from the true premise that phenomenal concepts don’t involve conscious feelings to the false conclusion that they don’t refer to them.
Anthony O'Hear
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199563340
- eISBN:
- 9780191731303
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563340.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies
There are conceptual tensions in Darwin's own writings on natural selection. It is not clear how far his reading of the theory still has teleological overtones or presupposes a direction of evolution ...
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There are conceptual tensions in Darwin's own writings on natural selection. It is not clear how far his reading of the theory still has teleological overtones or presupposes a direction of evolution towards greater complexity and perfection. What is clear is that in his application of the theory to humanity there is virtually no difference between Darwin himself and what has come to be denigrated as ‘social Darwinism’. It is also suggested that Darwinism may be compatible with a far more ‘anthropic’ reading of creation than interpreters like Monod suggest.Less
There are conceptual tensions in Darwin's own writings on natural selection. It is not clear how far his reading of the theory still has teleological overtones or presupposes a direction of evolution towards greater complexity and perfection. What is clear is that in his application of the theory to humanity there is virtually no difference between Darwin himself and what has come to be denigrated as ‘social Darwinism’. It is also suggested that Darwinism may be compatible with a far more ‘anthropic’ reading of creation than interpreters like Monod suggest.
