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The doctrine of the incarnation is the second most puzzling doctrine in ecumenical traditional Christianity (coming in just behind the doctrine of the Trinity). In order to construct a philosophical account of the incarnation one must be able to explain how one and the same being can count as both divine and human. One general approach to solving the metaphysical problems of the doctrine of the incarnation is kenoticism—the idea that God the Son set aside certain aspects of divinity in order to take on humanity. However, this general model faces some daunting challenges of its own. It must explain how God the Son can divest himself of divine properties during the incarnation while maintaining his divinity. It must allow for an acceptable doctrine of immutability. And it must be combined with a kind of Trinitarian view that leaves someone to mind the store. This chapter sketches an account of the incarnation that is able to satisfy the incarnational desiderata and the requirements of an adequate kenotic view. The price to be paid for this is that the divine kind essence cannot be equated with the exemplification of the standard ‘omni properties’ that are generally thought to compose the divine nature. Along the way the chapter discusses the views of Thomas Morris, Brian Leftow, Eleonore Stump, Stephen Davis, and Ronald Feenstra.

Four captivity narratives set in the Great Lakes region during the second half of the eighteenth century feature scenes in which Native Americans present the authors with books. These book presentations were symbolic interactions, in which the Indians affirmed their recognition of the value of books to the colonists. When the adopted captive James Smith lost his books, he feared for his life; by finding them and restoring them to him, his Kahnawake Mohawk kin paradoxically enabled his immersion in their society. For the diplomat Thomas Morris, who was detained by Miamis, and Thomas Ridout and Charles Johnston, who were both captured by Shawnees, their books facilitated their participation in secular literary culture. For Morris and Ridout, especially, the books furnished striking allegorical parallels to their experiences.

This chapter presents a model of the Incarnation developed on the basis of the Na’vi avatars of the science fiction movie Avatar. The model does not address the metaphysics of the Incarnation; rather, its main concern is with the consciousness of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son. “One-sphere models,” in which the Son while incarnate has a single sphere of consciousness, are examined and found to be unsatisfactory. The avatar model is a “two-sphere model,” in which there exist distinct spheres of consciousness for the divine nature and the human nature, similar to the “two minds” view proposed by Thomas Morris. It is argued that this does not amount to Nestorianism. The possibility of a single person with multiple spheres of consciousness is defended by comparison with the psychological “split-brain” and “multiple personality” phenomena; this way of understanding those phenomena is defended against a contrary view expounded by Tim Bayne.