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Intrinsic Consequentialism

Steven Sverdlik

in Motive and Rightness

Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value presents a version of consequentialism that can be called ‘intrinsic consequentialism.’ Traditional forms of consequentialism like utilitarianism hold that ... More

Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value presents a version of consequentialism that can be called ‘intrinsic consequentialism.’ Traditional forms of consequentialism like utilitarianism hold that motives are deontically relevant only because of their effects. These can be called versions of extrinsic consequentialism. Hurka agrees that motives can be extrinsically valuable, but he claims that motives can also be intrinsically valuable. He focuses on the intrinsic value of character traits, but his theory also entails that certain desires (and hence motives) have intrinsic value and badness. Hurka's abstract argument for the claim that certain desires are intrinsically valuable is flawed. The ‘desire to produce new knowledge as an end’ is then considered as a test case. It is shown that all the value judgments we are inclined to make about it can be explained by assuming that it is only extrinsically valuable. Extrinsic consequentialism is more plausible than intrinsic consequentialism.Less

The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of ... More

The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.Less

Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa Foot; Humean approaches found in Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; and biologically grounded approaches found in of Elliott Sober and Brian Skyrms. The first two approaches begin with a philosophical view, and seek support for it in biology. The third approach begins with biology, and uses it to illuminate the status of morality. This chapter pursues a version of the third program. A major accomplishment of evolutionary biology has been the explanation of biological altruism, which opens the door to a similar explanation of psychological altruism, or “fellow-feeling.” The chapter conjectures that humans have evolved a capacity for normative governance by socially shared rules. A process of cultural evolution led to the social rules with which we are familiar. This genealogical story poses a challenge, for the idea of moral truth plays no role in it. The story therefore lends support to non-cognitivism or anti-realist expressivism. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of the genealogical story for moral knowledge, moral objectivity, and the idea of moral authority.Less

Virtue

Daniel Star

in Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics

This chapter begins by criticizing accounts of virtue that connect virtue too tightly to the right or the good. Acting virtuously can come apart from both subjective and objective rightness, and ... More

This chapter begins by criticizing accounts of virtue that connect virtue too tightly to the right or the good. Acting virtuously can come apart from both subjective and objective rightness, and virtues are not simply character states the possession of which tends to bring about good outcomes in the world. What is essential to being virtuous is responding well to normative reasons. The virtues themselves can each be analyzed in terms of a non-ethical component and a thin normative component. The account of virtue on offer draws on a way of analyzing virtues provided by Daniel Elstein and Thomas Hurka. Once the account of reasons defended in the previous chapter is added to the new account of virtue, a conclusion about the epistemic basis of the virtues is reached. The chapter ends by considering how best to respond to an objection to the account of virtue defended in this chapter.Less

Objectivism I: Being Attracted, Meriting Attraction, and Promoting Consequences

Thaddeus Metz

in Meaning in Life

Chapter 10 begins the search for the best version of objective naturalism, the view that purely physical ways of living can be meaningful, and not merely because they are the object of propositional ... More

Chapter 10 begins the search for the best version of objective naturalism, the view that purely physical ways of living can be meaningful, and not merely because they are the object of propositional attitudes. This chapter criticizes two of the three major forms of objectivism in the literature, starting with the currently dominant view, namely, Susan Wolf’s theory that meaningfulness is being attracted to what merits attraction. The chapter then takes up consequentialism, especially the utilitarian view, suggested by Peter Singer, that meaning comes from making those in the world better off. Utilitarianism is rejected not only because meaning need not involve promoting well-being, but also because of its consequentialist or teleological structure. There are respects in which promoting well-being, or even excellence ò la Thomas Hurka’s perfectionism, insufficiently captures meaningful conditions. That is, certain ‘agent-relative’ ways of responding to final goodness are shown to be essential for an adequate theory.Less

Agonizing Decisions and Humean Pluralism

Michael B. Gill

in Humean Moral Pluralism

Humean pluralism does a better job than its monistic rivals at explaining the morally significant phenomena of “agonizing decisions,” situations in which a person feels remorse about doing what she ... More

Humean pluralism does a better job than its monistic rivals at explaining the morally significant phenomena of “agonizing decisions,” situations in which a person feels remorse about doing what she thinks is right and that feeling of remorse is an entirely appropriate response. For while monism implies that when a person facing an agonizing decision comes to think that a certain decision really is right she will no longer experience the situation as involving opposing moral forces, Humean pluralism implies that even if someone comes to think that one particular course of action is right she may continue to experience the situation as one that involves conflicting moral forces. This chapter also addresses a number of monistic objections to this argument for pluralism, such as those pressed by Ruth Barcan Marcus and Thomas Hurka.Less