VOLOVIK GRIGORY E.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199564842
- eISBN:
- 9780191709906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564842.003.0003
- Subject:
- Physics, Condensed Matter Physics / Materials, Particle Physics / Astrophysics / Cosmology
There are two ways to study quantum liquids. One is the fully microscopic treatment, which can be realised either by numerical simulations of the many-body problem, or for some special ranges of the ...
More
There are two ways to study quantum liquids. One is the fully microscopic treatment, which can be realised either by numerical simulations of the many-body problem, or for some special ranges of the material parameters, analytically. The other is a phenomenological approach in terms of effective theories. The hierarchy of the effective theories corresponds to the low-frequency, long-wavelength dynamics of quantum liquids in different ranges of frequency. This chapter discusses the microscopic (atomic) physics of quantum liquids which is the analog of the Theory of Everything — the Planck scale physics, difference between microscopic particles and emerging quasiparticles, the interplay of microscopic and effective symmetries, the origin of fundamental constants and hierarchy of Planck energy scales in the ‘Theory of Everything’, vacuum pressure and vacuum energy and scenario of vanishing of cosmological constant. These are considered using the model of weakly interacting Bose gas, the model of quantum liquid, and the real liquid 4He.Less
There are two ways to study quantum liquids. One is the fully microscopic treatment, which can be realised either by numerical simulations of the many-body problem, or for some special ranges of the material parameters, analytically. The other is a phenomenological approach in terms of effective theories. The hierarchy of the effective theories corresponds to the low-frequency, long-wavelength dynamics of quantum liquids in different ranges of frequency. This chapter discusses the microscopic (atomic) physics of quantum liquids which is the analog of the Theory of Everything — the Planck scale physics, difference between microscopic particles and emerging quasiparticles, the interplay of microscopic and effective symmetries, the origin of fundamental constants and hierarchy of Planck energy scales in the ‘Theory of Everything’, vacuum pressure and vacuum energy and scenario of vanishing of cosmological constant. These are considered using the model of weakly interacting Bose gas, the model of quantum liquid, and the real liquid 4He.
Robert B. Laughlin and David Pines
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262026215
- eISBN:
- 9780262268011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026215.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explains the ultimate theory of the universe, or the Theory of Everything, as a set of equations capable of describing all phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be ...
More
This chapter explains the ultimate theory of the universe, or the Theory of Everything, as a set of equations capable of describing all phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be observed. It is an approach to the natural world favored by many due to its success in bettering mankind, and remains the central paradigm in physics for the same group of people. One great instance of this approach can be seen in the equation of conventional nonrelativistic quantum mechanics that describes the everyday world of human beings. The less immediate things in the universe are not described by this equation, but these are considered irrelevant to people-scale phenomena. The chapter explores how and why the Theory of Everything is not, in fact, a theory of every thing.Less
This chapter explains the ultimate theory of the universe, or the Theory of Everything, as a set of equations capable of describing all phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be observed. It is an approach to the natural world favored by many due to its success in bettering mankind, and remains the central paradigm in physics for the same group of people. One great instance of this approach can be seen in the equation of conventional nonrelativistic quantum mechanics that describes the everyday world of human beings. The less immediate things in the universe are not described by this equation, but these are considered irrelevant to people-scale phenomena. The chapter explores how and why the Theory of Everything is not, in fact, a theory of every thing.
Peter Achinstein
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190615055
- eISBN:
- 9780190615086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190615055.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
Some scientists and philosophers claim that a “Theory of Everything” (TOE) exists and that scientists should find it. Such a theory will explain everything on the basis of fundamental laws and ...
More
Some scientists and philosophers claim that a “Theory of Everything” (TOE) exists and that scientists should find it. Such a theory will explain everything on the basis of fundamental laws and fundamental constituents of the universe to which everything else is reducible. This chapter clarifies what a TOE is supposed to be and do, and examines arguments in favor of the idea that there is a TOE and it should be found. These arguments involve claims from the history of science, claims about what science presupposes, claims about unification in science, and others. In response, this chapter shows not only that these arguments fail to establish their claims, but also that they fail to establish the desirability of a TOE. Contrary to what TOE enthusiasts insist, the intelligibility of the world does not depend on finding a TOE and using it to explain what scientists want and need to explain. Intelligibility is a local and contextual matter.Less
Some scientists and philosophers claim that a “Theory of Everything” (TOE) exists and that scientists should find it. Such a theory will explain everything on the basis of fundamental laws and fundamental constituents of the universe to which everything else is reducible. This chapter clarifies what a TOE is supposed to be and do, and examines arguments in favor of the idea that there is a TOE and it should be found. These arguments involve claims from the history of science, claims about what science presupposes, claims about unification in science, and others. In response, this chapter shows not only that these arguments fail to establish their claims, but also that they fail to establish the desirability of a TOE. Contrary to what TOE enthusiasts insist, the intelligibility of the world does not depend on finding a TOE and using it to explain what scientists want and need to explain. Intelligibility is a local and contextual matter.
Leslie Stevenson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199778225
- eISBN:
- 9780190267629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199778225.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This essay examines Immanuel Kant’s systematic diagnosis of a certain kind of illusion to which we are prone when we try to think about the world as a whole, an idea reminiscent of what theoretical ...
More
This essay examines Immanuel Kant’s systematic diagnosis of a certain kind of illusion to which we are prone when we try to think about the world as a whole, an idea reminiscent of what theoretical physicists describe as a “theory of everything.” At the beginning of the Antinomy chapter in the Dialectic of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims to show how our naive reasoning leads us into apparently contradictory claims. This essay analyzes Kant’s thought and its implications for contemporary cosmological theorizing, and whether modern science can throw any light on his dark musings. It considers the contradictory propositions in the First Antinomy as well as the arguments for them that Kant offers, specifically about the whole material world, the universe, the sum total of all the matter and energy in space and all the changes occurring in time. It also addresses Kant’s distinction between empirical science and philosophy in his diagnosis of what goes wrong in our antinomial thinking. Finally, it links Kant’s transcendental idealism to the Theory of Everything espoused by theoretical physicists such as Stephen Hawking.Less
This essay examines Immanuel Kant’s systematic diagnosis of a certain kind of illusion to which we are prone when we try to think about the world as a whole, an idea reminiscent of what theoretical physicists describe as a “theory of everything.” At the beginning of the Antinomy chapter in the Dialectic of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims to show how our naive reasoning leads us into apparently contradictory claims. This essay analyzes Kant’s thought and its implications for contemporary cosmological theorizing, and whether modern science can throw any light on his dark musings. It considers the contradictory propositions in the First Antinomy as well as the arguments for them that Kant offers, specifically about the whole material world, the universe, the sum total of all the matter and energy in space and all the changes occurring in time. It also addresses Kant’s distinction between empirical science and philosophy in his diagnosis of what goes wrong in our antinomial thinking. Finally, it links Kant’s transcendental idealism to the Theory of Everything espoused by theoretical physicists such as Stephen Hawking.
Peter Achinstein
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190615055
- eISBN:
- 9780190615086
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190615055.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
Newton urged scientists never to speculate, only to prove by establishing experimental facts. Einstein urged scientists to speculate freely, since only daring speculations, not experimental facts, ...
More
Newton urged scientists never to speculate, only to prove by establishing experimental facts. Einstein urged scientists to speculate freely, since only daring speculations, not experimental facts, can advance science. Who, if either, is right? Is speculating a legitimate part of science, even in the absence of testing? If so, can speculations be evaluated without testing? How? To answer these questions, the book begins with an attempt to define the concept of speculation, a task not usually investigated by those who express strong views about speculation. The basic idea developed in the book is that speculating involves introducing assumptions, under certain “theorizing” conditions, without knowing that there is evidence for those assumptions. This idea is made precise using a concept of “evidence” that Achinstein has introduced in previous writings and also explains here. With this concept, Achinstein defends a view according to which, by contrast with Newton, speculations are crucial in science and, by contrast with Einstein, they are subject to constraints. The latter include pragmatic ones, reflecting the particular aims of the scientist in speculating, and epistemic ones that are subject to a different standard from that of “evidence sufficient for belief.” This viewpoint is illustrated and evaluated by critically examining historical and contemporary speculations in fundamental physics, as well as more general speculations within or about science, including that: nature is simple, and simplicity is a sign of truth (Newton, Einstein); a theory can only be tested “holistically” (Duhem, Quine); and there is and must be a “Theory of Everything” (string theorists, reductionists).Less
Newton urged scientists never to speculate, only to prove by establishing experimental facts. Einstein urged scientists to speculate freely, since only daring speculations, not experimental facts, can advance science. Who, if either, is right? Is speculating a legitimate part of science, even in the absence of testing? If so, can speculations be evaluated without testing? How? To answer these questions, the book begins with an attempt to define the concept of speculation, a task not usually investigated by those who express strong views about speculation. The basic idea developed in the book is that speculating involves introducing assumptions, under certain “theorizing” conditions, without knowing that there is evidence for those assumptions. This idea is made precise using a concept of “evidence” that Achinstein has introduced in previous writings and also explains here. With this concept, Achinstein defends a view according to which, by contrast with Newton, speculations are crucial in science and, by contrast with Einstein, they are subject to constraints. The latter include pragmatic ones, reflecting the particular aims of the scientist in speculating, and epistemic ones that are subject to a different standard from that of “evidence sufficient for belief.” This viewpoint is illustrated and evaluated by critically examining historical and contemporary speculations in fundamental physics, as well as more general speculations within or about science, including that: nature is simple, and simplicity is a sign of truth (Newton, Einstein); a theory can only be tested “holistically” (Duhem, Quine); and there is and must be a “Theory of Everything” (string theorists, reductionists).
Alvaro De Rújula
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- February 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198817802
- eISBN:
- 9780191859366
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198817802.003.0036
- Subject:
- Physics, Particle Physics / Astrophysics / Cosmology
Quantum Mechanics plays a role in our understanding of the extremely large and small realities, Why the measured cosmological constant has such an “unnatural” value. Natural numbers in a physical ...
More
Quantum Mechanics plays a role in our understanding of the extremely large and small realities, Why the measured cosmological constant has such an “unnatural” value. Natural numbers in a physical theory. The numerically largest conundrum in physics. The non-existing Theory of Everything.Less
Quantum Mechanics plays a role in our understanding of the extremely large and small realities, Why the measured cosmological constant has such an “unnatural” value. Natural numbers in a physical theory. The numerically largest conundrum in physics. The non-existing Theory of Everything.
Jennifer Coopersmith
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198743040
- eISBN:
- 9780191802966
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198743040.003.0009
- Subject:
- Physics, Particle Physics / Astrophysics / Cosmology, History of Physics
The Principle of Least Action has near-universal applicability, and the actual path taken by the system is the one that occurs in the flat region of the “space-of-paths.” While the Principle needs a ...
More
The Principle of Least Action has near-universal applicability, and the actual path taken by the system is the one that occurs in the flat region of the “space-of-paths.” While the Principle needs a whole book, maybe a whole library, to explain it, yet any candidate for a “TOE” (Theory of Everything) would share this feature. Teleological questions are dismissed, however the Principle can only be understood if concepts and philosophical implications are examined. It is probable that this must be done from within physics, that is, by a physicist. A comparison with economics is made. Finally, it is asked whether the Principle of Least Action is a necessary theory, that is, does it answer Einstein’s question: “[could] God … have made the world in a different way”?Less
The Principle of Least Action has near-universal applicability, and the actual path taken by the system is the one that occurs in the flat region of the “space-of-paths.” While the Principle needs a whole book, maybe a whole library, to explain it, yet any candidate for a “TOE” (Theory of Everything) would share this feature. Teleological questions are dismissed, however the Principle can only be understood if concepts and philosophical implications are examined. It is probable that this must be done from within physics, that is, by a physicist. A comparison with economics is made. Finally, it is asked whether the Principle of Least Action is a necessary theory, that is, does it answer Einstein’s question: “[could] God … have made the world in a different way”?
Peter Achinstein
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190615055
- eISBN:
- 9780190615086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190615055.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
This chapter provides a summary of the results of this investigation into the meaning, legitimacy, and importance of speculating within and about science.
This chapter provides a summary of the results of this investigation into the meaning, legitimacy, and importance of speculating within and about science.
