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This chapter argues that there is no reference to facts by means of that-clauses because that-clauses are non-referential parts of speech. Four necessary conditions for an expression to be a singular term are discussed and shown not to apply to that-clauses. It is also argued that the expression ‘the fact that p’ is not a singular term and that the expression ‘is a fact’ is not a predicate. With this, the first condition of the Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment in the argument from nominal reference for facts is shown to be unmet, and the argument as not going through.

In this and the following chapter a fallback position is explored under the assumption that there is, per absurdum, reference to facts via that-clauses taken to be singular terms (against the conclusion of chapter 4). The claim that factive that-clauses refer to facts while non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions is first put to test, to conclude that, even if that-clauses were singular terms, and factive that-clauses referred to facts, the facts in question could only be propositional facts. It turns out that there are no acceptable identity conditions for propositional facts such that we can avoid their collapsing into true propositions. On the basis of a working definition of propositional facts, the identity conditions for propositional facts are critically analysed, and no convincing case is found in favor of accepting propositional facts alongside (true) propositions. Five attempts at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions are shown to be ineffective.

This chapter, like the previous one, assumes per absurdum that that-clauses are singular terms against the conclusion of chapter 4, and discusses a sixth and final attempt at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions. It is here investigated whether certain linguistic evidence, in particular certain uses involving anaphora, can be used to support an acknowledgment of propositional facts as a distinct category of entities alongside propositions. Counterexamples are found to the positive linguistic evidence in question, and, in the presence of a superior alternative explanation, it is concluded that language alone cannot establish a difference between (propositional) facts and (true) propositions. This sixth attempt is, like the other five, judged to be a failure: the claim that propositional facts must be acknowledged alongside propositions is left unsupported by arguments. Even if it were true that that-clauses are singular terms, it would be false to claim that some (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositional facts while other (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositions.