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The ‘Victor of Tannenberg’

Anna von der Goltz

in Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis

This chapter discusses the sudden emergence of the Hindenburg myth after the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914. It shows that the German population played a central role in exalting this little-known ... More

This chapter discusses the sudden emergence of the Hindenburg myth after the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914. It shows that the German population played a central role in exalting this little-known General to mythical heights from below. Once public passion had caught fire, however, the government happily stoked the flames of the cult. The chapter examines popular manifestations of the Hindenburg myth in some detail, including memorabilia and the ‘Iron Hindenburg’ nailing statue erected in central Berlin in 1915. Special attention is also given to the myth's impact on Kaiser Wilhelm II's public standing. While the Kaiser's government actively encouraged Hindenburg's popularity, his myth quickly developed its own momentum; Hindenburg started to eclipse the Kaiser in the eyes of the public, eventually undermining the monarchical idea.Less

Anti‐Democratic Politics

Anna von der Goltz

in Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis

This chapter investigates the fate of the Hindenburg myth during the Weimar Republic's ‘crisis years’. Between 1919 and 1924, right-wing anti-republicans increasingly discovered Hindenburg-worship as ... More

This chapter investigates the fate of the Hindenburg myth during the Weimar Republic's ‘crisis years’. Between 1919 and 1924, right-wing anti-republicans increasingly discovered Hindenburg-worship as a resource of agitation against the despised ‘system’ of Weimar and the Treaty of Versailles. These years generally witnessed a regrouping and intensified mobilization of the militant Right. Hindenburg's public appearances, often accompanied by mass rallies, became increasingly politically charged. Such events provided an inconspicuous cover, not least for voicing anti-Semitic sentiments, and proved to be pivotal in the nationalization of Germany's masses. Hindenburg himself made a decisive contribution to this development by helping to popularise the stab-in-the-back legend, commemorating Tannenberg, and lending his name to other right-wing causes. The author argues that far from playing the integrative role it had done during wartime, the Hindenburg myth now helped to shift the political climate considerably to the right, intensifying the polarization of German politics already underway.Less

Introduction

Gerhard P. Gross (ed.)

in The Forgotten Front: The Eastern Theater of World War I, 1914 - 1915

In the collective memory, the concept of the First World War is pervaded by the trauma of the modern technologized war on the western front, whereas the events and battles on the eastern front of ... More

In the collective memory, the concept of the First World War is pervaded by the trauma of the modern technologized war on the western front, whereas the events and battles on the eastern front of 1914–1915, other than the battle of Tannenberg, have shifted into the background. Thus, the phrase “all quiet on the eastern front” offers a succinct description of the lack of scholarly research on the first two years of the war on the German eastern front. This volume aims to correct that deficiency, presenting essays by professional historians from eight countries discussing the eastern theater of war in terms of operations, mindset, and cultural-historical issues.Less

Bitter Awakening: World War I

Gerhard P. Gross

David T. Zabecki (ed.)

in The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger

Chapter 5 examines the breakdown of German operational thinking in the face of the harsh realities of World War I. In the first weeks of the war, Schlieffen’s and Moltke’s plans for an annihilating, ... More

Chapter 5 examines the breakdown of German operational thinking in the face of the harsh realities of World War I. In the first weeks of the war, Schlieffen’s and Moltke’s plans for an annihilating, decisive victory on the Western front failed as the Germans were repulsed at the Battle of the Marne. For four years, the German General Staff failed to adapt to positional trench warfare, believing that the misrepresented victories of the Battle of Tannenberg and the Romania Campaign affirmed the superiority of the Schlieffen Plan’s dogmatic focus on a concentrated offensive leading to envelopment. In actuality, both of these operations revealed shortcomings in Germany’s strategy. The German Army lacked mobility, effective communication between rival commanders, and a logistical plan to support millions of troops spread across Europe. Ultimately, as American reinforcements arrived in France, the German high command resorted to stubborn, desperate attempts to break through enemy lines, split Allied forces, and force a maneuver-based war. This chapter explores the singlemindedness of German operational thinking in staking everything on a great battle for France, a battle they had lost from the beginning.Less

Commemorating: War Veterans, Ritual and Remembrance, 1923–29

in The German-Jewish Soldiers of the First World War in History and Memory

In 1924, the German government under the Weimar Republic launched a series of initiatives in memory of those who died during World War I, including an official Day of National Mourning ... More

In 1924, the German government under the Weimar Republic launched a series of initiatives in memory of those who died during World War I, including an official Day of National Mourning (Volkstrauertag) and plans for a national war memorial. These initiatives were designed to unite the German people behind the republic, but failed to generate support among the a wide section of the population. More extreme groups, especially war veterans' associations on the political right, began to offer their own narratives that limited the ability of German Jews to participate directly in the remembrance of Germany's war dead. This chapter examines the commemorative rituals introduced by the Weimar state in the mid-to-late 1920s as well as the more exclusive set of narratives developed by war veterans' associations, first discussing the politics of remembrance during the period before turning to local memory cultures. It also considers the Tannenberg memorial and its implications for German Jews.Less

Fruits of Union

Robert Frost

in The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania: Volume I: The Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, 1385-1569

Chapter 10 looks at the war with the Teutonic Knights declared in 1409, the consolidation of Catholicism in the Lithuanian heartland of Aukštaitija, and its effects on relations with the Teutonic ... More

Chapter 10 looks at the war with the Teutonic Knights declared in 1409, the consolidation of Catholicism in the Lithuanian heartland of Aukštaitija, and its effects on relations with the Teutonic Order, considering the causes of the war, the role of Samogitia, and the gradual move in Polish public opinion towards support for war. It gives an account of the great Polish-Lithuanian victory at Tannenberg (Grunwald/Žalgiris) in 1410 and recounts the gradual reorientation of Vytautas’s concerns from the east to the west. It considers the nature of the Teutonic Order’s threat to Lithuania and analyses the reasons for the victory, its military and political aftermath, and its consequences, which established the union state as a major force in central and eastern European politics.Less