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This chapter illustrates how the changing roles of intellectual property right regime affected the technological catch‐up of Taiwan, analyzing the case of three semiconductor‐related sectors: IC foundry, DRAM, and IC Design. The study shows that Taiwanese semiconductor firms operated within a framework of institutions, comprised of government agencies including research institutions, inter‐firm linkages, and institutional infrastructure including the IPR regime. Based on a case study of the semiconductor industry, it is argued that, when an industry is far from the technological frontier, weak IPR protection fosters technological development by inducing the path‐following catch‐up, whereas when the industry approaches or already has reached the technological frontier, technological development depends more on spillovers facilitated by global networks of firms rather than on coordination of investment. Consequently, the IPR regime needs to be strengthened and international harmonization becomes necessary.

Includes all relevant information on national elections held in Taiwan since 1947. Part I gives a comprehensive overview of Taiwan's political history, outlines the evolution of electoral provisions, and presents the current electoral legislation in a standardized manner (suffrage, elected institutions, nomination of candidates, electoral system, organizational context of elections). Part II includes exhaustive electoral statistics in systematic tables (numbers of registered voters, votes cast, the votes for candidates and/or parties in parliamentary and presidential elections at both the national and regional level, the electoral participation of political parties, the distribution of parliamentary seats, etc.).

The experience of Taiwan clearly demonstrates, within each of the ‘four channels’ of globalization pressure, the fact that interplay between globalization and localization processes is not necessarily conflictual. This testifies to the nature of Taiwan as a pluralist, dynamic, and adaptable modern society.

This chapter on Taiwanese business groups offers an interesting contrast to the Japanese and Korean cases. Taiwanese groups are loosely coupled networks of firms, positioned in between chaebols and keiretsu in terms of hierarchical control. Because the Taiwanese government uses tax incentives to favor new establishments, Taiwanese groups are more numerous and smaller than Korean chaebols. These groups have grown consistently, particularly since the country liberalized its economy in the 1980s. This liberalization opened key industries previously monopolized by state enterprises, such as banking, telecommunications, and electricity to the private sector, creating opportunities for business groups to expand. The Asian Crisis did not deter the growth of Taiwanese business groups. This chapter suggests that, at least in the short run, these groups will grow further and diversify more to exploit new business opportunities in the Taiwanese economy.

This chapter discusses the long-standing problem of identifying Confucians in China (and East Asia in general) through social science research methods—a problem deeply rooted in the nineteenth-century conceptualization of Confucianism and the overall classification of Chinese religions. It investigates different types of empirical data—national censuses and surveys—from Mainland China, as well as from Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, in order to answer two questions. First is about whether “Confucianism” is a category in religious classifications in these East Asian countries and regions; the second asks about how many people are counted as “Confucians” in China.

This chapter explores the movement of Hong Kong and Taiwanese triads to mainland China. It argues that the members and bosses of foreign triads are present on the mainland, but have not yet emerged as a viable mafia supplying private protection. As in the case of Bardonecchia and Rome, mafiosi did not decide to migrate out of their own free will. Their presence in the new territory is the unintended consequence of police action in their country of origin. Once they found themselves on the mainland, they quickly realized that the new China offered many opportunities to invest some of their gangs' funds, but they have so far failed to establish themselves as viable protectors for legal entrepreneurs.

This chapter traces the process leading to the emergence of changing perceptions of the EU in East Asia following the establishment of an EU—China techno‐political linkage and the proposal to lift the EU arms embargo on China. The first part examines Europe's traditional involvement in East Asian security affairs, including the Taiwan question and cross‐Strait relations. In the second part, this chapter analyses the novelty represented by the promotion of EU space and defence interests in China, including its impact on a regional environment characterized by the security dilemma and balance of power logic. This chapter concludes with a discussion on whether, and to what extent, the promotion of EU space and defence interests in China coupled with the peculiar characteristics of East Asia's international system has made the EU to be perceived as a novel strategic factor in the region.

This chapter examines how, in the post-Cold War era, the United States' alignment with Taiwan and alliance with Japan again have figured prominently among issues affecting U.S.-China security relations. While they are far from being allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are not enemies either, but rather major economic partners who have also cooperated to some degree in addressing an increasing range of international problems. But there are still security tensions between the two sides over issues such as relations across the Taiwan Strait, and both nations practice coercive diplomacy toward the other, sometimes tacitly, sometimes less so. The chapter considers how the legacies of these Cold War alliances—particularly the U.S.–Taiwan relationship and the U.S.–Japan security treaty—have affected U.S.–China relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This chapter extends the discussion of the Asian vanguard by summarizing some of the most salient similarities and differences in death penalty policy in Taiwan and South Korea. In general terms, the most important difference between Taiwan and South Korea concerns what each regards as the defining countries of comparison and contrast. For South Korea, how to relate to North Korea and how to reunify the Korean peninsula remain the central questions for the first decades of the 21st century. At the same time, Japan continues to be a key reference point with respect to a variety of economic, political, cultural, and legal issues. In Taiwan, by contrast, the defining comparisons tend to be with the People's Republic of China, and the most pressing questions about the future concern Taiwan's relations with the PRC. If the first theme of Taiwan's political history is democratization, the second is the persistence of political tensions with China. As for capital punishment in particular, the most salient comparative frame for Taiwan continues to be the PRC, although the United States has been important, too.

This chapter discusses the development of e-learning materials for Yami, an endangered Austronesian language of Taiwan. It outlines their pedagogical model that integrates digital archiving with e-learning with the goal of revitalising and maintaining the endangered language. It argues that computers and the Internet present new opportunities for the preservation and transmission of endangered languages and cultures, both inside the language community and around the world.

This chapter explores Russia's views on Taiwan. It investigates Russian foreign policy toward the China–Taiwan issue. The first section sets forward a chronological account of Russia's interactions with Taiwan and with China on the Taiwan issue. The chapter then briefly evaluates the extent of Russia's bilateral communications with Taiwan and their significance. Finally, the Moscow's perspective on the China-Taiwan issue is reported. It is also argued that Russian foreign policy on this topic exhibits fundamental tensions that are inherent to Russia's overall relationship with China. Topics covered include Sino-Soviet relations and the Taiwan issue, Russia, China and Taiwan in the Yeltsin era, Putin leadership and the Taiwan issue, bilateral ties between Russia and Taiwan, and cross-straits tensions as a positive benefit and their potential dangers to Russia.

This chapter presents a view of China's approach to security multilateralism in Pacific Asia. It argues that the three main challenges that China faces in regional security are the potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula, Japan's politics of military aggressiveness and the meaninglessness of its non-violent constitution, and the Taiwan separatists' denial of ‘One China’. Despite the likely persistence of these problems, the discussion presents some grounds for optimism in building regional security multilateralism, in terms of the modes, fields, and driving forces of cooperation. Nevertheless, it indicates how far the prospect for multilateralism is dependent on the emergence of a consensus between China, Japan, and the USA as to its desirability, capability, and purposes.