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This chapter first argues that catch‐up is a complex process and that developing countries rely on diverse means to acquire technologies from advanced countries and build their own capabilities. Then, after briefly describing the history of the patent and other intellectual property right (IPR) system and the TRIPS agreement, the chapter surveys past studies on the role of IPR, particularly in relation to technology transfer. It is emphasized, however, that to understand the role of IPR in catch‐up an in‐depth analysis of individual countries is essential. The chapter then gives a brief account of the long‐term economic growth record of ten countries and one region (Nordic) that are discussed in this book and summarizes briefly each of the following chapters.

This chapter discusses the experience of Israel. At the time of its independence in 1948, its people came from different parts of the world, providing them with international orientation from the beginning. As a result, many of the businesses targeted foreign markets, mainly USA and Europe, and were more concerned with the intellectual property regime in these foreign countries than Israel's own. Together with public support for innovation and military‐related expenditure, some startup firms, mainly in information technologies, grew and succeeded in IPO (initial public offering) or selling themselves. Another successful case is Teva, now the largest generic drug producer. It benefited from the patent law amendment in 1967, which allowed local firms to copy patented drugs if the patent owners did not market them in Israel. This provision was dropped after TRIPS; however, Teva had accumulated process technologies by then.

This chapter discusses India. Following the 1972 patent law amendment that prohibited product patents in pharmaceuticals, new Indian pharmaceutical firms entered and old firms expanded, competing to reverse‐engineer bulk drugs. Also, two government pharmaceutical firms provided a training ground for scientists who later established private firms. Since the 1990s, some firms began to move away from imitation to innovation but, with the 2005 reform of the patent law to comply with TRIPS, the future of the pharmaceutical industry is yet unclear. In software, the growth was supported by the liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s that made the import of hardware and multinationals' investment easier, and by the presence of a large pool of technically trained engineers. Unlike pharmaceuticals, however, patents were generally not a big factor.

This chapter concludes the book by summarizing the country studies to answer three questions. First, what is needed for catch‐up and how can government policies contribute to it? Second, how has the intellectual property right regime, in particular patents, been related to catch‐up and how should it be? And third, how will the process of catch‐up be affected by the TRIPS agreement? The studies suggest that IPR does affect catch‐up but the effects vary significantly across industries, with pharmaceuticals clearly being the industry most affected by patents whereas, in other industries, it sometimes appears that patents hardly matter. IPR is only one of the factors that influence the speed of catch‐up and other policies, such as education policy, industrial policy, and trade and FDI policy, can be more important. Accordingly, TRIPS may affect some industries, most likely pharmaceuticals, in some countries but otherwise may have little effect.

Drawing on a survey of evidence from 1995 to 2007, this chapter highlights a selection of the most striking elements of variation in how developing countries implemented TRIPS. It shows that countries took varying advantage of the legal safeguards and options in TRIPS, particularly in terms of the timing of legislative reforms and the use of key flexibilities in areas such as copyright, patents, and plant variety protection. The chapter proposes a typology of the overall degree to which countries took advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. It concludes that important aspects of variation sit at odds with the predictions of economists and their positions in international IP negotiations, thus making the case for political analysis of the reasons for variation. While some aspects of variation appear to reflect national economic circumstances and changing sectoral interests in developing countries, significant aspects do not. The divergence is particularly in the case of LDCs that adopted TRIPS‐plus approaches to implementation.

This chapter draws together my core arguments about the politics of TRIPS implementation. It summarizes my findings as to why so many countries went beyond TRIPS‐minimum requirements, while some countries did indeed use important flexibilities. In so doing, it considers the reasons why the extent of TRIPS‐plus reforms varied by issue, and why some TRIPS flexibilities were used more than others. Stepping back, it reviews the evolution of developing country perspectives on international IP protection, noting the fragmentation and consolidation of their views in the face of an increasingly complex global IP system. It also previews several of the emerging policy controversies and trends that shape ongoing debates about TRIPS implementation and related IP reforms. It concludes by distilling some practical implications for those working to promote IP‐related policies, laws, and institutions in developing countries advance development goals.

This chapter addresses the genesis and evolution of the patent system, since the first patent statute was issued in Venice in 1471, until the international harmonization pressures of patent regimes at the end of 20th century. The European Patent Office (EPO), which began its activity in 1978, has established a common examination procedure and common standards for patenting all over Europe. The main characteristics of modern patent systems are discussed, which include the subject matter (technical inventions in Europe), priority rule (first to file), inventive step, a statutory duration of twenty years after filing, prior examination of applications before grant, inventive step as minimum degree of novelty, disclosure of the protected invention, and the possibility of various restrictions on patent rights, such as compulsory licensing or working requirements.

This chapter introduces the global debate on IP and presents the core arguments advanced in the book. It begins by placing contemporary global IP debates in the context of long‐standing tensions on IP regulation and the rocky, political road to the conclusion of TRIPS. It then introduces the core elements of variation in developing country approaches to TRIPS implementation, emphasizing variation in timing of IP reforms and in the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The heart of the chapter sets out an analytical framework for explaining TRIPS implementation as a complex political game, involving the interplay of global IP debates, international pressures, and political dynamics within developing countries. The chapter then previews this book's contribution to the international relations literature and global policy debates, and concludes with a note on research methods, sources and the scope of the book.

This chapter traces the evolution of developing country engagement with the international IP regulation through three phases. The colonial era marked the first formal encounters between developing countries, Western concepts of IP, and international IP rules. A second phase began in the late 1960s when a core group of developing countries advanced a reformist discourse on international IP regulation, calling for fairer global rules. While there were some important regional differences among developing countries, local expertise and institutional capacity were generally weak, and former colonial powers continued to dominate many national IP systems. A third phase began in the mid‐1980s, when developing countries faced intense pressures to include strengthened international IP commitments in the multilateral trading system. A North–South standoff persisted throughout the TRIPS negotiations, resulting in a deeply contested final agreement. Dissatisfaction on both sides with the TRIPS deal set the stage for intense struggles over its implementation.

Chapter 5 explores how international pressures on developing countries contributed to variation in TRIPS implementation, describing the kinds of power at play, the players involved, and the tools they deployed. Trade threats and new trade deals served as vehicles for economic power. Alongside, ideational power was asserted through efforts to shape political environment for TRIPS implementation. The chapter shows that there were ‘compliance‐plus’ pressures from the pro‐IP team, and countervailing pro‐development pressures. These included competing efforts to dominate the framing and discourse of global IP debates through monitoring initiatives, research, support for knowledge communities, and media campaigns. Capacity‐building also had a decisive impact on developing country actions and combined both kinds of power. The chapter highlights that the intensity and focus of international pressures varied by country, as did the timing. Even after developing countries had drafted and implemented TRIPS‐related reforms, many faced pressures to repeal, modify, or strengthen their IP laws. They also faced pressures regarding the administration and enforcement of laws, particularly where these related to the practical use of TRIPS flexibilities.

This chapter explains why a group of the world's poorest countries adopted an array of TRIPS‐plus standards. It begins with a review of the colonial influence on IP regulation in francophone African countries and the origins of their distinctive regional approach to IP protection. It then introduces the region's common IP framework, the Bangui Agreement, and shows how the latest revisions exceed TRIPS requirements. The chapter traces the Bangui revision process through three phases, highlighting the limited capacity of national IP offices and the policymaking vacuum on IP issues in the region. It argues that the TRIPS‐plus outcome was a result of pressure from international donors (upon which countries relied for financing and technical expertise) and from their own regional organization, the African Intellectual Property Organization (over which they exercised little effective oversight). Importantly, this case highlights that in lieu of direct economic threats, capacity‐building was a decisive tool for international pressure. Moreover, for countries in a weak position in the international system, the compliance‐plus global political environment was a persuasive intervening factor.

The Development Agenda is premised on the concerns disseminated worldwide about the adverse effects that might stem from upwardly harmonized, “one size fits all” intellectual property rules. The “Agenda” is a serious attempt to bring these concerns into the purview of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in a cross-cutting and permanent manner, a process that has already taken place in other international organizations. The chapter examines the theoretical and factual underpinnings that led to the proposal for the “WIPO Development Agenda” put forward in 2004 and its subsequent adoption in 2007.

This chapter begins by discussing the extent to which human rights can be applied in WTO dispute settlement, finding that they can only be used as an aid to interpreting the ‘covered agreements’. It then takes up that approach and interprets the ‘TRIPS flexibilities’ using the right to access to medicine. It demonstrates that the right serves as a helpful argument for a broad interpretation of the flexibilities, but suffers from the defect that it is merely one argument amongst many and cannot provide developing countries with legal security as to the interpretation of the flexibilities. It is this lack of legal security that discourages developing countries from making use of the flexibilities, particularly in the face of pressure for greater intellectual property protection by the developed world. The chapter also describes the action taken within the WTO to remedy the problem of access to medicines, its legal status, and analyzes whether the action is sufficient.

An account is given of the organizational structure of the WTO (World Trade Organization), which was established as a multilateral trade organization on 1 January 1995 to encompass a modified GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), its sister bodies on services (GATS) and intellectual property (TRIPS), as well as all other agreements and arrangements concluded under the auspices of the Uruguay Round. The sections of the chapter are as follows: Scope, functions and structure of the WTO; Decision‐making; Transparency: notification and surveillance; Accession; The WTO and other international organizations; Nongovernmental actors and the WTO; and Conclusion.

Considers the efficiency effects of intellectual property rights (IPR), with a focus on patent rights. Specifically, it examines the dilemma facing policy‐makers in fostering innovation: how to reconcile the restrictions that intellectual property rights impose on the use of innovations—to encourage their creation by knowledge providers—with society's interest in maximum use of innovative products. First discusses two types of efficiency—static and dynamic—and the different considerations for achieving them. It then examines how IPR can influence the balance between the two types of efficiency. Next, it considers the options available under the TRIPS (Trade‐Related Aspects of International Property Rights) Agreement to increase either or both. Finally, it discusses the possibility of compulsory licensing as a means of increasing static efficiency.

This chapter tries to explain what happens when there is substantive harmonization that lacks proper procedural support. It studies the assertion that even after countries become fully compliant to TRIPS, there will still be a decrease in research and development if the proper procedural techniques are not established. This chapter uses India as an example in order to demonstrate clearly this paradox. It analyzes how research and development may be negatively affected when structural harmonization is separated from procedural mechanisms. It also addresses two main time periods, namely the pre-TRIPS patent regime and the post-TRIPS patent regime.

This chapter provides an overview of international developments since TRIPS that further impact access to medicine. In particular, some countries are now required to adopt higher standards than those required by TRIPS. These “TRIPS-Plus” standards are predominantly implemented as a result of bilateral or regional trade agreements instigated by wealthy countries since the conclusion of TRIPS. Although they are dubbed “TRIPS-Plus,” they have no formal relation to TRIPS. Rather, the term is used to indicate that these requirements go beyond the minimum obligations imposed under TRIPS. The chapter explains common themes among TRIPS-Plus requirements that impact upon the cost of drugs. This thematic approach aims to highlight how drug costs may be impacted, as well as how and why countries adopt such requirements; however, it is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of every enacted or pending TRIPS-Plus requirement.