Search Results

Philosophers often exaggerate the powers of reason, particularly the capacity of initiating and sustaining deep deliberative (System 2) thought as well as powers of self-control and delayed gratification. Those exaggerations are a important source of confidence in moral responsibility. Many factors influence and inhibit the capacity for effective sustained deliberation. Among those factors are differences in self-efficacy, need for cognition, individual locus-of-control, situational influences, and ego depletion. Differences in those factors undercut the plausibility of basing moral responsibility on deliberative reason.

This chapter takes for granted the existence of some sort of real distinction between System 1 and System 2 reasoning processes, and asks how they are realized in the human mind-brain. In contrast with the usual view of the two systems as distinct from one another, it argues that System 2 is partly realized in cycles of operation of System 1. But System 2 is also distinctive in being action based. It is mental rehearsals of action that generate and sustain the cycles of operation of System 1 which constitute System 2. The chapter details a number of advantages of the proposed account, together with some implications for future research.

This chapter argues that the distinction between System 1 and System 2 corresponds to that between subpersonal and personal reasoning. But even if the distinctions do not align in this way, a weaker claim still stands. The distinction between personal and subpersonal reasoning marks one broad binary division in human reasoning, and one that needs to be acknowledged in psychological theory. Indeed, it may be the only such division. Most dual-systems theorists accept that System 1 is actually a suite of systems, and several contributors suggest that System 2 may also fragment in various ways. Indeed, there could be hybrid systems at a subpersonal level, with some System 1 properties and some System 2 properties. Personal reasoning, on the other hand, constitutes a distinct level of mental activity, which can be clearly distinguished from the lower, subpersonal one.

This chapter describes a few influential social-psychological dual-process models and gives an in-depth review of the integrative models. It compares the general characteristics of dual-process models in social psychology with similar models in other areas of psychology, and discusses implications of this comparison for several conceptual issues. Most important is social psychologists' large and productive research investment in implicit measures, which aims to tap the output of associative (System 1) processing in relatively direct ways, at least more directly than conventional self-report measures. Because of the important place held by prejudice, stereotypes, and other negatively regarded phenomena in the social-psychological dual-process literature, research attention has been devoted to the conditions under which implicit attitudes or associations can change. The multiple-roles idea – that a single factor such as the individual's current mood may influence processing in more than one way – also seems important for the dual-process literature more broadly.

Regulative epistemology aims to guide inquiry. But how can abstract epistemological ideals guide people, given that people often don’t live up to their ideals? This chapter explores that question using dual systems psychology, explaining how people can be guided by principles even when they are not consciously reflecting on those principles.