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Dublin is just a Sunningdale away

P. J. McLoughlin

in John Hume and the Revision of Irish Nationalism

The political climate in Northern Ireland following Stormont's suspension led to a further greening of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The relative quiescence of the unionist community ... More

The political climate in Northern Ireland following Stormont's suspension led to a further greening of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The relative quiescence of the unionist community after Stormont's suspension misled both Irish nationalists and those in Britain. The SDLP's first published policy document, Towards a New Ireland, revealed how far the party had fallen back on a more conventional nationalism in the aftermath of Stormont's collapse. It also suggested that John Hume and his colleagues still suffered a hangover from the traditional nationalist doctrine fomented by their forebears. In the period that followed Sunningdale's demise, the SDLP showed tremendous resentment towards the British government for its failure to stand against the Ulster Workers' Council strike. The Sunningdale Agreement was the way that the party presented the settlement which so prejudiced unionist opinions, and was premised on the fundamental axiom of revisionist nationalism.Less

The two traditions

P. J. McLoughlin

in John Hume and the Revision of Irish Nationalism

Within a month of the Sunningdale Agreement's demise, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) released a policy statement which made clear that there would be no departure from the party's ... More

Within a month of the Sunningdale Agreement's demise, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) released a policy statement which made clear that there would be no departure from the party's essential political programme. The post-Sunningdale period saw the SDLP hold to its immediate political aims; the party was still convinced of the essential rectitude of its programme. The SDLP appeared to confirm Ian McAllister's opinion that the party was trying to demonstrate an open-mindedness – a willingness to consider any agreement which allowed some form of power-sharing and an Irish dimension. It is noted that John Hume had reverted to the revisionist nationalism of his early political career. The SDLP called upon the British government to assume proper responsibility for Northern Ireland, to take decisive political action to bring about a just settlement and to show that it was prepared to face down the unionist veto over the implementation of such a settlement.Less

Sunningdale for slow learners

P. J. McLoughlin

in John Hume and the Revision of Irish Nationalism

Séamus Mallon famously described ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was based on effectively the same formula as the Sunningdale Agreement – power sharing and an Irish ... More

Séamus Mallon famously described ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was based on effectively the same formula as the Sunningdale Agreement – power sharing and an Irish dimension – and was more comprehensive than Sunningdale in the assurances that it offered to unionists. It provided a commitment to further reform to achieve full social and economic equality in Northern Ireland, and also promised to fulfil the demands that had first led John Hume into political action in the civil rights era. The Hume–Adams dialogue was unavoidably ambiguous on the relationship between unionist consent and Irish self-determination. Through the GFA, northern nationalists can feel that they have attained equality, and that they have exercised their right to self-determination and sovereignty. It can be argued that the GFA broadly vindicates the thinking of Hume, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and revisionist Irish nationalism.Less

Conclusion

Shaun McDaid

in Template for peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-75

This section summarises the key findings of the book, but also engages with one of the key comparative debates surrounding the establishment of the first power-sharing administration. It argues that ... More

This section summarises the key findings of the book, but also engages with one of the key comparative debates surrounding the establishment of the first power-sharing administration. It argues that the 1972 to 1975 period does not represent a ‘lost peace process’. The high levels of violence during this time, and the exclusion of paramilitaries from the power-sharing negotiations, means that this analysis is flawed. However, this conclusion demonstrates that the Sunningdale package - based on power-sharing, an Irish dimension, and the principle of consent - did provide the template for the current on-going peace process in Northern Ireland.Less

Balance? The BBC in Northern Ireland, 1972–1978

Robert J. Savage

in The BBC's Irish troubles: Television, conflict and Northern Ireland

This chapter examines how BBC television at both the regional and national level, addressed the continuing crisis in Northern Ireland. The chapter considers changes in the regional service and the ... More

This chapter examines how BBC television at both the regional and national level, addressed the continuing crisis in Northern Ireland. The chapter considers changes in the regional service and the transition from one Controller, Waldo Maguire to his successor Richard Francis. Maguire carved out a degree of autonomy for BBC NI, moving it out of the shadow of the unionist establishment. The chapter also considers how BBC managers, producers, editors and journalists worked with the new Northern Ireland Office, the department set up after the suspension of the Stormont Parliament to facilitate direct rule. Relations between the BBC and the Northern Ireland Office became strained as programming became more critical of British policy in the province and more interested in broadcasting features about paramilitaries, especially the IRA. The chapter addresses the massive Ulster Worker’s Council strike of 1974: a strike that paralysed the province and forced the collapse of the power-sharing initiative meant to bring a degree of self-government back to Northern Ireland. The BBC was heavily criticised for its coverage of the strike, its critics argued it helped facilitate the strikers who were supported by menacing loyalist paramilitaries. The chapter concludes with a debate written by the Northern Ireland Office to introduce a formal regime of censorship for broadcasting in Northern Ireland.Less

Introduction

David McCann and Cillian McGrattan

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland

The introductory chapter provides a brief contextual overview of the Sunningdale agreement, the ways in which it was interpreted and explained, the lessons that political actors drew from it, and ... More

The introductory chapter provides a brief contextual overview of the Sunningdale agreement, the ways in which it was interpreted and explained, the lessons that political actors drew from it, and questions concerning its ramifications for subsequent political developments in Northern Ireland. It goes on to set out the rationale for the book – namely, the absence of any sustained investigation of how the agreement influenced subsequent (generations of) political actors in Northern Ireland. The chapter outlines the key questions that contributors will explore in greater depth surrounding the implications that the 1973-1974 power-sharing experiment and its failure had for political developments in Northern Ireland. The chapter concludes with a short description of how each chapter develops these themes and how the individual chapters relate to each other.Less

The Ulster Workers’ Council strike: the perfect storm

Gordon Gillespie

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland

In May 1974 a two week long industrial stoppage spearheaded by a little known group of loyalist trade unionists brought about the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive and ended a political ... More

In May 1974 a two week long industrial stoppage spearheaded by a little known group of loyalist trade unionists brought about the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive and ended a political process which had begun two years earlier with the suspension of the Northern Ireland Parliament. A political initiative which was intended to replace an unstable system of government had ended in abject failure after only five months. Given the time, effort and political capital invested by Governments and political parties in the Castle talks and Sunningdale Agreement why had the outworking proved such a failure? The answer to this question lies partly in the fact that the Ulster Workers' Council strike represented a 'perfect storm' in terms of its ability to destroy Sunningdale. It drew together all of the unionist opponents (and to some degree republican opponents as well) of power-sharing and the Council of Ireland and highlighted the flaws and inconsistencies in the arguments and actions of those who supported Sunningdale. The chapter will look at the course of events leading up to, and during, the strike examining the motivations of the main political actors and the pressures on each group. The article will also argue that the UWC strike reflected a particular combination of attitudes and circumstances at a specific moment in time which meant that the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive was an almost inevitable outcome.Less

Understanding aspiration, anxiety, assumption and ambiguity: the anatomy of Sunningdale

Arthur Aughey

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland

Lord Bew has argued in his Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006 that the failure of the power-sharing experiment in 1973-74, and especially on the proposal for a Council of Ireland, was largely ... More

Lord Bew has argued in his Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006 that the failure of the power-sharing experiment in 1973-74, and especially on the proposal for a Council of Ireland, was largely the product of inflated nationalist aspirations encountering raised unionist anxieties amidst exaggerated official assumptions about what was politically achievable. These three As can be said to have fostered a fourth A - ambiguity - which was destructive of the project for political stability. If these four As together constitute a template for instability, there appears at first sight to be an irony. Has not ‘constructive ambiguity’ contributed to the enduring peace since the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement? This chapter suggests that the experience of 1973-74 still applies in Northern Ireland and that it is the absence of ambiguity which makes aspiration, anxiety and assumption institutionally manageable.Less

Sunningdale and the Irish dimension: a step too far?

John Coakley

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland

At least in theory, the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 represented a high point, if not the high point, in institutionalising the relationship between the two parts of Ireland that had been ruptured ... More

At least in theory, the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 represented a high point, if not the high point, in institutionalising the relationship between the two parts of Ireland that had been ruptured in 1921. The planned Council of Ireland, incorporating a Council of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly, represented both an echo of the first Council of Ireland of the 1920s and a precursor of the North-South Ministerial Council of 1998. There were important respects in which the image of the Council represented the Achilles heel of the 1973 agreement: it provided a focal point for unionist anger, which was mobilised effectively to bring the whole agreement down. This paper looks at the significance of the Council of Ireland as a mechanism for reducing the negative consequences of the partition of Ireland, setting it in historical context. It explores changing attitudes towards institutions of this kind, viewed as a threat to their position in the United Kingdom by many unionists, as a “sell-out” that recognises partition by traditional nationalists, and as a sensible functional compromise by pragmatists on both sides.Less

‘1974 – Year of Liberty’? The Provisional IRA and Sunningdale

Henry Patterson

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council Strike and the Struggle for Democracy in Northern Ireland

Towards the end of 1973 republicans were forecasting that 1974 would be the ‘Year of Liberty’ and mark the defeat of British imperialism. In a little over a year the Provisionals agreed a truce with ... More

Towards the end of 1973 republicans were forecasting that 1974 would be the ‘Year of Liberty’ and mark the defeat of British imperialism. In a little over a year the Provisionals agreed a truce with the British. This chapter will examine the strategy of the republican movement in this period . It will consider the thesis put forward by Ed Moloney in history of the IRA that this period was characterised by the organisation being on the military defensive while it was deeply divided over the possibility of negotiations with the British. It will argue that by this time although the IRA was on the defensive in Belfast, its position in rural and border areas, sustained by a developed infrastructure of support in the rest of Ireland made it a more formidable threat than the Moloney thesis allows.Less

From direct rule to power-sharing, 1972–74

Shaun McDaid

in Template for peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-75

This chapter examines developments in Northern Ireland politics following the introduction of direct rule by the British government in the spring of 1972. It analyses the proposals of the region's ... More

This chapter examines developments in Northern Ireland politics following the introduction of direct rule by the British government in the spring of 1972. It analyses the proposals of the region's political parties, both nationalist and unionist, as to how the Northern Ireland should be governed. It demonstrates how the British government forced these parties to accept a solution based on power-sharing with an Irish dimension, culminating in the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973. The events surrounding the formation of the power-sharing Executive are outlined in detail, and the effects of the change of government at Westminster in February 1974 on British Northern Ireland policy are explored. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that the Irish government and nationalist SDLP were not united on policy throughout this period. Archival sources reveal that disagreements were frequent, and the relationship often fraught.Less

The Sunningdale Council of Ireland

Shaun McDaid

in Template for peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-75

Between 1972 and 1975, the issue of cross-border co-operation provoked much political debate. As part of the Sunningdale Agreement, the British and Irish governments agreed to establish an ... More

Between 1972 and 1975, the issue of cross-border co-operation provoked much political debate. As part of the Sunningdale Agreement, the British and Irish governments agreed to establish an all-Ireland with executive functions. The Council was controversial, especially for unionists, many of whom interpreted as a potential stepping-stone to a united Ireland. The Council was thus a focal point for unionist disaffection during the UWC strike. Some recent scholarship has claimed that the Irish government indeed sought to use the Council as means to achieving Irish unity. However, contemporary documents reveal that only one Irish government department, foreign affairs, sought to establish a Council of Ireland with such evolutionary potential. Most Irish departments were ill-disposed to devolve any significant powers to the Council, and its potential to bring about Irish unity was therefore negligible.Less

Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland, 1964–74

S.C. Aveyard

in No Solution: The Labour Government and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1974-79

This chapter provides background and context for Labour’s policies on Northern Ireland when it returned to government in March 1974. It examines the general attitude to Northern Ireland at ... More

This chapter provides background and context for Labour’s policies on Northern Ireland when it returned to government in March 1974. It examines the general attitude to Northern Ireland at Westminster, the bipartisan support for internal reform at Stormont, dissent within the Labour party on bipartisanship, the escalation of the Northern Ireland conflict, the imposition of direct rule and the making of the Sunningdale Agreement. It concludes with a number of blows to Sunningdale prior to the February 1974 general election.Less

A personal perspective

in A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland

This chapter provides a personal perspective regarding first-hand experience during the times of conflicts in Northern Ireland. It affirms that the objective is to provide a different perspective to ... More

This chapter provides a personal perspective regarding first-hand experience during the times of conflicts in Northern Ireland. It affirms that the objective is to provide a different perspective to the accounts of the conflict from the ones already written. The chapter also expresses an understanding of the complexity of human, financial, economic, social or political costs that came about from the conflicts.Less

The politics of compromise: the Sunningdale Agreement (September–December 1973)

Sarah Campbell

in Gerry Fitt and the SDLP: 'In a minority of one'

This chapter deals with the period after the Assembly elections in June 1973 up until the signing of the agreement in December 1973 and examines the relationships that were forged between the main ... More

This chapter deals with the period after the Assembly elections in June 1973 up until the signing of the agreement in December 1973 and examines the relationships that were forged between the main players at the negotiations, highlighting the complexity and intra-party conflict prior to the signing of the Sunningdale agreement and questioning its impact on the final package that was agreed. Using unpublished archival material, the chapter also explores the evolution of the relationship between the SDLP and the Dublin government, underlining the SDLP’s, and in particular John Hume’s, influence and dominance in directing Dublin’s Northern policy during this period. As Hume’s influence within the party became more dominating, Fitt’s had diminished significantly. It was perhaps this distancing by Fitt from the party during this crucial period, that saw the Council of Ireland and the Irish dimension take on the significant role it did during the Sunningdale negotiations. The Sunningdale negotiations also highlighted divisions that existed within the party.Less

The Sunningdale Agreement, 1973

John Coakley and Jennifer Todd

in Negotiating a Settlement in Northern Ireland, 1969-2019

In an early ambitious attempt to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict in 1973–4, there emerged two key proposals that would radically change the form of Northern Ireland political institutions: ... More

In an early ambitious attempt to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict in 1973–4, there emerged two key proposals that would radically change the form of Northern Ireland political institutions: power-sharing (rather than majority rule), and institutionalized links with the Republic of Ireland (rather than a ‘hard’ border). This chapter, centred on a witness seminar where several of those involved recorded their memories and interpretations, explores the thinking of officials—especially on the Irish side—as it evolved in the early 1970s. It also documents their changing views as they attempted to reach new new modes of accommodation with their British counterparts. It examines the process by which an innovative package was agreed in Sunningdale, England, in December 1973, and follows the challenging process of implementation of this package. This initiative was ultimately unsuccessful, as the new institutions collapsed in the face of determined unionist opposition in May 1974.Less

The British dimension: direct rule to the UWC strike

in A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland

This chapter traces the series of events in Ireland under the direct rule of the British that lead to the Ulster Worker's Council (UWC) strike. With the Direct Rule still in effect, the British ... More

This chapter traces the series of events in Ireland under the direct rule of the British that lead to the Ulster Worker's Council (UWC) strike. With the Direct Rule still in effect, the British produced the Sunningdale Agreement in which they allowed for power-sharing in the Northern Ireland Assembly, an assembly that fortified British control, and The Executive, an assembly lead by Brian Faulkner from the Ulster Unionist Party. Soon after the agreement was passed, UWC took the lead in protesting against the sharing of power to Irish nationalists. The UWC wanted sole political power to be given to the Republic of Ireland. The chapter ends stating that little effort was made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his government to support The Executive.Less