Christopher D. Kolenda
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- January 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780813152769
- eISBN:
- 9780813154169
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni ...
More
As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.Less
As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.
Christopher D. Kolenda
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- January 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780813152769
- eISBN:
- 9780813154169
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0026
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the initial steps the Coalition Provisional Authority took in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. It shows how these steps – mainly the de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding ...
More
This chapter discusses the initial steps the Coalition Provisional Authority took in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. It shows how these steps – mainly the de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army – alienated Sunni, prompting resistance and solidifying the rift between Sunni and Shia. Once again, the United States became entangled in local power struggles.Less
This chapter discusses the initial steps the Coalition Provisional Authority took in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. It shows how these steps – mainly the de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army – alienated Sunni, prompting resistance and solidifying the rift between Sunni and Shia. Once again, the United States became entangled in local power struggles.
James H. Lebovic
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190935320
- eISBN:
- 9780190937263
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190935320.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The George W. Bush administration showed signs of biased decision-making before and after the 2003 Iraq invasion, which it claimed was necessary because Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. ...
More
The George W. Bush administration showed signs of biased decision-making before and after the 2003 Iraq invasion, which it claimed was necessary because Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. With Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense, the administration focused narrowly on regime change and failed to plan for the aftermath of war. With the fall of Baghdad, the administration expanded US goals under the Coalition Provisional Authority without the capabilities to pursue them. Although the administration adjusted course in 2007, its new “surge” strategy, based on counterinsurgency principles, had the US military pursuing modest goals to suit available capabilities. Then the administration benefited unexpectedly from an alliance with Sunni insurgents (the Anbar Awakening) and the stand-down of the principal Shiite militia opposing US forces. US strategy finally amounted to staying the course through 2011, when the Obama administration chose to leave Iraq rather than seek a negotiated compromise.Less
The George W. Bush administration showed signs of biased decision-making before and after the 2003 Iraq invasion, which it claimed was necessary because Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. With Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense, the administration focused narrowly on regime change and failed to plan for the aftermath of war. With the fall of Baghdad, the administration expanded US goals under the Coalition Provisional Authority without the capabilities to pursue them. Although the administration adjusted course in 2007, its new “surge” strategy, based on counterinsurgency principles, had the US military pursuing modest goals to suit available capabilities. Then the administration benefited unexpectedly from an alliance with Sunni insurgents (the Anbar Awakening) and the stand-down of the principal Shiite militia opposing US forces. US strategy finally amounted to staying the course through 2011, when the Obama administration chose to leave Iraq rather than seek a negotiated compromise.
