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This chapter provides an analysis and summary of the active role of ethnic Chinese in reproducing and perpetuating their ambivalent position as well as in shaping Indonesia’s political, business, and socio-cultural environment in the post-Suharto era. The chapter also suggests that studying the Chinese in Indonesia may direct us to rethink the effect of democratisation on ethnic minorities and the role that those minorities may have in how transformative democratisation can be both for their situation and the betterment of the wider society. Effective enforcement of the rule of law as well as an education system that promotes inter-ethnic understanding and solidarity could promote more open- and reform-minded people, including those from resented, economically dominant minorities, such as the Chinese in Indonesia.

When Suharto began losing support in the military, he tried to shore up popularity by making the Indonesian hajj the largest in the world and dragging his whole family to Mecca to deflect outrage over their business scandals. His gesture put the pilgrimage in play as a legitimate subject for political debate and manipulation. After Suharto’s downfall, the hajj quickly became one of the most attractive battlegrounds for Muslim politicians competing for votes in Indonesia’s new democracy. All the major Muslim leaders have made the hajj–some of them several times–and all have written about their experiences in ways that are calculated to market their political personas. Indonesia’s current debates over the hajj and its meanings are a microcosm of power struggles in the world’s largest Islamic movements, particularly the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama.

To understand the contemporary relationship between the people and state of Indonesia and the Catholic faith, one must analyze the complex history that has given rise to both in the archipelago. Wardaya offers such an analysis by tracing the histories of both Catholicism and Indonesia from the pre-colonial days of the archipelago to today. Wardaya identifies key moments in this history: colonialism and the Dutch East India Company, the arrival of the Society of Jesus and the encounter between the different religions in the area, the end of colonial occupation after World War II, the rise (and fall) of Suharto, the 1965 Tragedy, the rise (and fall) of Sukarno, and the democratically oriented, post-colonial state of Indonesia and its interreligious citizenry. Indonesia is a nation that has prided itself on being a bastion and exemplar of positive democratizing tendencies, given its history; yet, Wardaya notes that Indonesia today is experiencing an increase in inter-religious conflicts. What the results of these conflicts within Indonesia’s democracy will be, and what the future of Catholicism in Indonesia will be, remain open questions for further analysis.

This chapter explains the objectives, theoretical framework, literature review, scope of research, methods of research, and chapterisation of this study. This study adopts a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field as a framework for examining the strategies and tactics that Chinese Indonesians adopt to safeguard their business and personal interests as well as their ethnic and cultural identities in the post-Suharto era. Medan and Surabaya were selected as field sites for this study because both cities are economically and politically significant. Moreover, there are certain interesting contrasts in regard to their Chinese populations. The methods used in this research are library research, individual interviews, and participant observation.

This chapter explores the origins of the ambivalent position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Historically, the Chinese have their ancestral roots in China and do not have particular regions in Indonesia to identify with. During the Dutch period, the colonial regime’s divide-and-rule policy, the granting of economic privileges to the Chinese, and subsequently the emergence of nationalist sentiments oriented towards China in early twentieth-century Dutch East Indies effectively prevented the Chinese from integrating into the wider indigenous population. The Chinese therefore began to be perceived as an alien minority associated with various negative attributes, occupying an ambivalent position in Indonesian society.

This chapter discusses the democratisation process in post-Suharto Indonesia and the role of Chinese Indonesians in the democratisation process. The opening up of democratic politics in the post-Suharto era has offered opportunities for the Chinese to participate directly in electoral politics and run for public office. The relatively liberal socio-cultural environment also allows the Chinese openly to express their ethnic and cultural identities. However, the democratisation process has been marred by poor enforcement of the rule of law, the capture of state institutions and political parties by old and some new predatory interests, and rampant political thuggery. This allows some Chinese to continue gaining wealth through illegal or semi-legal means, and contributes to the continuing, if not growing, ambivalent attitude held towards Chinese Indonesians.

This chapter examines the opening up of the Chinese socio-cultural sphere in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. Chinese Indonesians who strongly support Chinese ethnic and cultural identities have made use of the more liberal environment to establish Chinese-based organisations and Chinese-language newspapers. In general, these organisations and newspapers have made use of intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard Chinese ethnic and cultural identities, thus contributing to multiculturalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. The rise of China as an economic power has also prompted leaders of some Chinese organisations to utilise their intra-ethnic linkages and social networks in China to assist local governments in establishing cultural and business connections with China. Many indigenous Indonesians, however, perceive that the active role of Chinese organisations in promoting Chinese culture indicates an insistence upon separateness. At the same time, there are Chinese Indonesians who favour the integration of the Chinese into the wider Indonesian society and who have established non-ethnic-based socio-cultural organisations to promote cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity. On the whole, however, the socio-cultural activities and endeavours of Chinese organisations and Chinese-language newspapers have reproduced and perpetuated stereotypes of the Chinese as insular, opportunistic, and oriented towards China instead of Indonesia.

This chapter explores the illegal or semi-legal means Chinese Indonesian businesspeople tend to adopt to gain and protect their business and personal interests in the post-Suharto era. These business practices in turn perpetuate and reproduce the corrupt and muddy business environment, as well as the predatory political-business system. They also reproduce and reinforce stereotypes of the Chinese as wealthy, corrupt, and opportunistic, the perfect targets of extortion. Although there are also Chinese businesspeople who refuse to be victims of extortion and choose to fight against these illegal practices, such businesspeople are rare. If one wishes to see more Chinese Indonesian businesspeople who refuse to be extorted and do not get involved in illegal and semi-legal practices, a better-enforced rule of law must be in place.

This chapter focuses on the involvement of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya and how this intersects with their stereotypical position as businesspeople. The opening up of a democratic environment in post-Suharto Indonesia has prompted many Chinese Indonesians to get involved in electoral politics. Some of them become electoral candidates in order to push for reform and positive changes in Indonesia and reject approaches of support for their campaigns in return for political and business favours. But there are also those who become actively involved in politics with the aim of gaining political protection for their business instead of fighting for the interests of the general public. Ironically, the latter often have a higher chance of getting elected, because of the increased cost of campaigning in direct elections introduced during the democratisation process. Their own wealth, or the willingness to accept support from corrupt businesspeople, often Chinese, ensures enough funds to obtain party support and to bribe voters. In this way, Chinese businesspeople continue to establish corrupt and patrimonial relationships with aspiring politicians in exchange for political favours for their business.

This chapter argues that in the crucial six months after the alleged coup of October 1, 1965, Western powers encouraged the army to move forcefully against the Left, facilitated widespread violence including mass killings, and helped to consolidate the political power of the army. In doing so, they helped to bring about the political and physical destruction of the PKI and its affiliates, the removal of Sukarno and his closest associates from political power, their replacement by an army elite led by General Suharto, and a seismic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the West and the capitalist model it advocated. The concerted campaign by foreign powers had three principal elements. The first was a pattern of secret assurances to the army leadership of political support and noninterference in Indonesia's internal affairs. The second was a sophisticated psychological warfare campaign designed to tarnish the PKI and Sukarno, and stir up opposition to them both inside Indonesia and abroad. The third element of the campaign was a carefully calibrated program of material assistance to the army, thereby facilitating and effectively rewarding the army's campaign against the PKI and Sukarno.

This chapter examines the campaign of mass incarceration. This is done with a view to understanding why and how it occurred, how it was related to the mass killings of the same period, and what its consequences were for those detained. It argues that the campaign had three defining features: it was a highly organized program that entailed detailed planning and coordination at the national level; it was initiated and carried out by the army leadership and more specifically Suharto; and it bore striking similarities to campaigns of mass internment in other authoritarian contexts. The chapter also contends that mass incarceration and mass killing were integrally related in two ways: first, in the sense that most of those eventually killed were first detained, and second, that rates of long-term imprisonment were lower where the rates of killing were highest. Finally, it makes the case that in almost every respect, the campaign of mass incarceration was emblematic of the Suharto regime's hypermilitarism and obsession with “order.”

The history of postcolonial Indonesia can therefore be divided into three periods, dominated by different regimes with its own characteristics, during which Islamisation process has continued to evolve. The Sukarno presidency (1945-1965) marks the first period, during which Mayumi established itself as the main Islamic political party. It began with decade of continuing nation building when the young republic was first engaged in armed conflict with the Dutch; experimented with liberal democracy; but then shifted toward ‘Guided Democracy’ and the disbanding of Masyumi. During the same twenty-year period, the unity of Indonesia was also challenged by the Islamist Darul Islam movement. A military coup in 1965 heralded the beginning of the military New Order Regime of General Suharto (1965-1998). Political Islam was kept control and occasionally manipulating it for its own purposes. From the 1970s onward, New Order did make some allowances for Muslim participation in governance, initiating further use of Islam for political purposes between 1983—1993. After the dramatic regime change in 1998, the democratisation process that started in 1999 saw an unprecedented opening-up of the public sphere. This change in Indonesia’s political climate offered new opportunities for socio-political activism across the Islamic spectrum, but also presented a new set of challenges for the world’s largest Muslim nation state. Islamic mass organisations, newly formed political parties, NGOs, think tanks and other platforms began presenting a range of competing Islamic discourses.

This chapter examines how citizen-artists in Indonesia creatively and critically engaged in subjectifying the state through pointedly political art, generating narratives and fantasies both visual and discursive, private and public, and images of past, present, and future during the early period of post-Suharto reformation. It describes several notable works by Indonesian artists including Yuli Kodo's Indonesia Sakit, Alex Luthfi's Kado Reformasi, and Entang Wiharso's Don't Touch Me. The chapter suggests that these works reveal how the transformation of political engagements led to these artists' newfound subjectivity as post-New Order Indonesian citizens capable of publicly critiquing the state as well as reenvisioning, through their paintings, imagined possibilities for a new democratic Indonesian state.

This concluding chapter presents the author's remarks on the changing ideology of development, during an interview. He claimed that development in Jakarta has a history longer than the Suharto regime, which could be traced back to colonial times. Framing the post-Suharto era as a new time opened up ways to conceive many possibilities. For instance, the notion of rakyat (poor people) seemed to be the majority at the time when the middle class found themselves in decline as many of them had lost their jobs following the financial crisis. The remainder of the chapter discusses his opinion on several topics such as: the hierarchies within the category of the poor, and the autonomy of the informal time.

This chapter is an account of the student movement, which traces its fall from political vanguard to “orphans of democracy.” Heir to a long tradition of student struggle, student activists followed a similar path to student movements in other authoritarian societies, leveraging their privileged status to lead the campaign for democracy. From the late 1980s, they challenged the regime, fighting for land rights, organizing workers, and defying the government's bans on leftist political activity. Despite successive waves of repression, it was the students, too, who led the 1998 protests calling for Suharto's resignation and fundamental political reform. Suharto's resignation was, as this chapter argues, undoubtedly a victory for the so-called 1998 Generation. But, having failed to capitalize on the momentum they had generated, students quickly retreated from the political fray, with only the Islamic student movement making a place for itself in the new Indonesia. By 2004, what remained of the left of the student movement had been relegated to margins, while moderate reformists have moved into government or into other social movements, leaving just a few aging activists clinging to the more radical dreams of an earlier age.

This chapter illustrates how the corrupt activities of Suharto, his cronies, and his family fueled antigovernment sentiment, even though the movement itself did not take form until after 1998. The new freedoms of Indonesia's reformasi era, combined with the backing of foreign donors, created space for the formation of new nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with the explicit mandate to oppose corruption. As this chapter explains, these NGOs played a central role in the formation of the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) in 2003 and the defense of it against attacks from 2009. The movement also developed a presence at a local level, in response to the proliferation of corruption as a result of decentralization. These local movements have had mixed success, struggling with a lack of resources. Ultimately, however, the most significant obstacle the anticorruption movement faces is the lack of support from the elite level, because without it the movement remains constrained by a political system that fosters corruption.

Horror film is one of the most popular genres in the new mainstream Indonesian cinema. Dismissed by most critics as cheap and commercialised, this chapter draws on scholarship that links horror cinema to allegorical representations of historical and national trauma. Through an examination of the narrative features of post-1998 horror, this chapter shows how horror films are used by the young generation of filmmakers to suggest and evoke the collective trauma of the New Order regime and its violence, especially the mass killings of 1965-1966 and the urban riots in May 1998. Two decades after reformasi, horror films remain as popular as ever, but have pointed towards more tangible efforts in justice and historical reconciliation.