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This chapter develops a conceptual framework for systematic description and analysis of prime-ministerial leadership. It focuses particularly on the issue of the power of prime ministers. The author proposes that to understand that power and its successful deployment demands far more than an institutional analysis of prime ministers’ authority resources, it also requires an understanding of the personality (motives, world views, skills) and styles of individual office-holders, as well as a systematic analysis of how the (political, economic, cultural) context in which they operate shapes and constrains their power chances. The argument is illustrated by a comparative examination of the prime-ministerial leadership of Gordon Brown (United Kingdom), Stephen Harper (Canada), Kevin Rudd (Australia) and John Key (New Zealand) during the Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s.

This chapter applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) to Canada, focusing on the experience of two recent prime ministers, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper. While leadership capital may initially seem less important in the Canadian system, where leaders appear all-powerful with few party or parliamentary restraints, it remains important in explaining how leaders adapt, or fail to adapt, to their circumstances. The chapter contrasts two recent prime ministers, Stephen Harper and Paul Martin, and demonstrates their very different accumulation and spending of leadership capital. Martin came into office with overwhelming popularity, but failed to meet expectations and squandered his leadership capital and projection of authority. Harper began under more modest circumstances but carefully built and husbanded his leadership capital to achieve long-term success.

Chapter 7 assesses how Canada, the production-oriented state most reliant on resource rents, responded to newly accessible stocks of Arctic resources. This chapter demonstrates that Canadian officials responded to the shock with assertive statements promising billions to build ice-hardened patrol ships, new bases, and Arctic training facilities. However, despite the prominent role the Arctic has played in speeches by Canadian leaders, Ottawa has been reluctant to follow through on promises to upgrade its Arctic force structure and military presence. Whereas Russia has backed its rhetoric and commitments by investing in its Arctic force structure and military capabilities, Canada has not. Talk is cheap, but ships and bases are expensive; and, as this chapter shows, Canada was unwilling to back its commitments with costly investments. If the United States is the dog that does not bark, then Canada is the dog that barks but does not bite.

The Canadian position on Cuba since 1959 has proved advantageous for both countries economically, educationally, and culturally. Canadian engagement with Cuba, which has always been constructive, owes much to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. His policy, still in effect today, was to construct “a normal relationship . . . one in which both sides politely agree to disagree on certain policy questions.” Although Canada’s current government, led by Conservative Stephen Harper, initially signaled that it would adopt a new strategy towards Cuba, like its predecessors it has instead chosen engagement over isolation. It is unclear whether this approach will result in the constructive changes that have long been championed by Canadian policymakers, but since 1959 Canada’s approach to Cuba has been remarkably consistent.