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This chapter examines the endgame of British decolonization in the light of the main themes of the book. It begins by returning to the theme of Labour's uneasy relationship with imperial governance. The removal of many of the obstacles to Labour's distinctive policymaking is analysed. It is argued that the material constraints on the Government's Indian policy forced it down a narrowing track to the solution adopted in 1947. That this was not Labour's preferred solution is shown by examining three forgotten alternatives: interest in sponsoring a rival to Congress; the Radical Democratic Party; the plans of Stafford Cripps and Ernest Bevin to use socio-economic development schemes in India to break Congress' hold over the Indian poor; and C. R. Attlee's desire to appeal over the heads of the Congress leaders to a new generation of supposedly less confrontational politicians. These solutions were set aside rather than abandoned through reflection, thereby achieving decolonization without the abandonment of Labour's traditionally-held ideas, beliefs, and assumptions.

This chapter looks at the most successful effort to build an alliance of the kind described in the previous chapter: the anti-fascist alliance built by Jawaharlal Nehru and parts of the Labour left, and the Communist Party of Great Britain, in the late 1930s. Nehru's greater success in alliance-building in Britain is analysed and explained, and the organizational consequences of his approach — in particular the growing strength of V. K. Krishna Menon's India League, and the anti-fascist agreement co-sponsored by Stafford Cripps in 1938 — are traced. The chapter goes on to examine and explain the difficulties Nehru encountered in delivering the Indian side of the bargain in the early years of the Second World War, the failure of the Cripps Mission in 1942, and the consequent fragmentation of metropolitan anti-imperialism.

This chapter examines growing public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war at home and on the battlefield 1940–2. It discusses the features of the public ‘arena of public debate’ peculiar to wartime, and the flood of radical criticism that appeared in books, pamphlets, and the press calling for sweeping reform. One section discusses the growing popularity and rapid growth of the Communist Party once the USSR entered the war against Hitler. The chapter details efforts by radical writers and intellectuals to intervene more directly in politics via by-elections and the Common Wealth Party; it also analyses the politics of workers in factories. It concludes that there was a significant radicalization or ‘swing to the left’ of popular opinion, but that it lacked a unified voice or vehicle. From 1943 the political context changed; radical alternative politics receded, replaced by a return to normal party politics, hitherto in abeyance.

The global economic order that emerged at the end of the Second World War was the work of two men: John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. This chapter describes the tense negotiations between them. Once they had agreed on a final package, however, they worked closely. At an international conference held in Bretton Woods, they convince delegates to create the IMF and World Bank. The ‘third leg’ of the Bretton Woods stool was to be the International Trade Organization (ITO). Negotiations between the main sponsors of the ITO ran into problems early. Will Clayton for the US and Sir Stafford Cripps for the UK, failed to come to an agreement before the Havana Conference, in which the ITO treaty was negotiated. When the resultant ITO charter failed to be ratified, the major trading powers agreed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which saw limited liberalisation of trade. These institutions are the fundamental building blocks of the liberal economic order, designed to ‘make finance the servant, not the master of human desires.’

In August 1940, Master Tara Singh started negotiations with the Congress leaders about whether or not to support the government in its war efforts. Mahatma Gandhi’s response obliged him eventually to resign from the Congress Working Committee. Master Tara Singh supported the programme of the Khalsa Defence of India League formed early in 1941 under the leadership of Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala. In March 1942, Stafford Cripps brought a proposal that appeared to concede Pakistan. His mission failed but Master Tara Singh remained seriously perturbed over the possibility of the Sikhs being placed under perpetual Muslim domination. The Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact enabled Baldev Singh, a non-Akali legislator, to replace Dasaundha Singh as the Sikh minister in the Unionist ministry. Thus, Master Tara Singh’s idea was to strengthen the Sikh position without infringing his formal understanding with the Congress.

The chapter opens with the assassination of Sir Michael O’Dwyer in London and Sir William’s lucky escape. He joins a Ministry of Supply Mission that travels out to stimulate the manufacture of munitions. On his return he writes India’s Fateful Hour. He comes out uncompromisingly on the side of the minorities and, along with Rushbrook Williams, warns of the dangers of the growing calls for a separate Muslim state. There are fears of civil war as Muslims become more resentful at the prospect of Hindu rule. A new War Cabinet is set up including some Indian princes. Sir Stafford Cripps is sent out to India armed with a declaration offering wider representation but it is rejected. He establishes a good relationship with the press and the importance of this is recognised in the appointment of Sir Evelyn Wrench, Sir William’s friend, as American Relations Adviser in Delhi. Mr Jinnah’s character is outlined. Lord Wavell is appointed Viceroy. A Gandhi fast ends, the Japanese advance is halted, and there is a growing feeling in British circles that there are sound economic reasons for a quick handover.

The partition of India into the two independent states of India and Pakistan created strategic anomalies. India lost the advantage of its own geographic position, which had placed it across the Arabian Sea close to the sea lanes leading to the Persian Gulf in the west and astride the Bay of Bengal adjacent to Southeast Asia on the east. Pakistan, divided by one thousand miles of Indian territory, was considered virtually indefensible without a powerful ally—most obviously, the United States. As the Cold War took hold, India’s potential as a great power counted for less than Pakistan’s strategic location close to the oil fields of the Middle East. Nehru believed India’s decision to join the British Commonwealth protected India from sloping too much toward the United States.

Smiths’ products are needed in aircraft, ships, and fighting vehicles. It has two shadow factories under way in 1939 and diverts resources into materiel and other war-related production from the outset of war, as its precision clock- and instrument-making capacity are easily adapted to war purposes. Smiths manufactures for the Ministry of Aircraft Production, to which the newly ennobled Sir Allan Gordon-Smith is conveniently seconded. Highly personal memories provide wry and amusing insights into wartime life. Inadequate planning for sourcing specialist raw materials is illustrated in Smiths’ role in a wider diplomatic smuggling effort involving the British embassy in Berne. The creation of enhanced and precision engineering capacity leads, as early as 1942, to detailed planning for the post-war period, highlighting themes of both future security as well as job creation/preservation. Important post-war relationships, for example, between Allan Gordon-Smith and Stafford Cripps, are forged

This chapter shows that the drive for higher productivity never attained universal popular support, though in government circles it was widely believed that such popular support was absolutely essential to achieve this goal. While most of the productivity drive came from government, it involved, at times, extensive and ambitious publicity campaigning. Hence productivity improvement is a particularly important theme in the overall story of government attempts to shape economic understanding since the 1940s. In both the 1940s and the 1960s, a Labour government placed increasing productivity at the centre of its economic policy agenda, accompanied by extensive publicity aimed primarily at the ‘shop-floor’ worker. But while there were continuities in the propaganda on productivity, there were also differences in approach and tone, which, along with the differences in the methods of propaganda employed, help us to understand the varying resonance the term had in these two decades.