Thomas Robb
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780719091759
- eISBN:
- 9781781706985
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719091759.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward ...
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This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath's government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson's governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.Less
This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath's government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson's governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
Edoardo Campanella and Marta Dassù
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190068936
- eISBN:
- 9780190099619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190068936.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The Brexiteers presented a revived partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of Britain’s new Anglosphere-centered diplomacy. Without the United States, any Anglosphere project would lose ...
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The Brexiteers presented a revived partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of Britain’s new Anglosphere-centered diplomacy. Without the United States, any Anglosphere project would lose meaning, and the future of Britain outside the European Union would be grim. But this chapter argues that the focus on the “special relationship” was based on a delusional national myth. Historically, the specialness, which discounted an enormous gap in terms of power and influence between the two countries, has been more keenly felt in London than in Washington. Since 1945, America’s absolute strength and Britain’s relative weakness has always determined a highly unbalanced relationship. In the eyes of Dean Acheson—Secretary of State in the Truman Administration—British rhetoric surrounding the “special” connection between the two countries reflected nothing more than the UK’s unwillingness to accept its post-imperial status: that of a simple transatlantic intermediary and Anglo-Saxon balancer in European affairs. It has been observed that, from 1945 onwards, the “special relationship” rapidly assumed the character of a “special dependancy”, with Britain being very much the junior partner. Currently, the difference in terms of power and influence between the two countries is as great as in the past—if not even greater, given Britain’s diminished influence in European affairs. On top of that, bridging the policy inconsistencies between “America First” (based on unilateralism and protectionism) and “Global Britain” (based on multilateralism and free markets) might represent an insurmountable obstacle.Less
The Brexiteers presented a revived partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of Britain’s new Anglosphere-centered diplomacy. Without the United States, any Anglosphere project would lose meaning, and the future of Britain outside the European Union would be grim. But this chapter argues that the focus on the “special relationship” was based on a delusional national myth. Historically, the specialness, which discounted an enormous gap in terms of power and influence between the two countries, has been more keenly felt in London than in Washington. Since 1945, America’s absolute strength and Britain’s relative weakness has always determined a highly unbalanced relationship. In the eyes of Dean Acheson—Secretary of State in the Truman Administration—British rhetoric surrounding the “special” connection between the two countries reflected nothing more than the UK’s unwillingness to accept its post-imperial status: that of a simple transatlantic intermediary and Anglo-Saxon balancer in European affairs. It has been observed that, from 1945 onwards, the “special relationship” rapidly assumed the character of a “special dependancy”, with Britain being very much the junior partner. Currently, the difference in terms of power and influence between the two countries is as great as in the past—if not even greater, given Britain’s diminished influence in European affairs. On top of that, bridging the policy inconsistencies between “America First” (based on unilateralism and protectionism) and “Global Britain” (based on multilateralism and free markets) might represent an insurmountable obstacle.
Kenneth Kolander
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780813179476
- eISBN:
- 9780813179483
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813179476.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The U.S.-Israel relationship that most people recognize today, which includes enormous amounts of U.S. military aid to Israel, a powerful strategic alliance, and an American willingness to acquiesce ...
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The U.S.-Israel relationship that most people recognize today, which includes enormous amounts of U.S. military aid to Israel, a powerful strategic alliance, and an American willingness to acquiesce to Israeli occupation of certain Arab territories taken in 1967, came into existence between 1967 and 1975. The U.S. Congress played a key role in shaping American-Israeli relations during this period (as it does today) and, therefore, occupies a central place in this book. No book-length treatment of U.S.-Israel relations focuses primarily on the role of Congress. The imbalance in the scholarly perspective has created a misleading narrative that treats the legislative branch as being incidental to foreign policymaking. But in the years between the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1975 Sinai II agreement, an activist Congress, empowered by the quagmire in East Asia and popular distrust of the presidency, and increasingly influenced by the Israel lobby, played a central role in reworking U.S.-Israel relations, and U.S. relations with the Middle East more generally.Less
The U.S.-Israel relationship that most people recognize today, which includes enormous amounts of U.S. military aid to Israel, a powerful strategic alliance, and an American willingness to acquiesce to Israeli occupation of certain Arab territories taken in 1967, came into existence between 1967 and 1975. The U.S. Congress played a key role in shaping American-Israeli relations during this period (as it does today) and, therefore, occupies a central place in this book. No book-length treatment of U.S.-Israel relations focuses primarily on the role of Congress. The imbalance in the scholarly perspective has created a misleading narrative that treats the legislative branch as being incidental to foreign policymaking. But in the years between the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1975 Sinai II agreement, an activist Congress, empowered by the quagmire in East Asia and popular distrust of the presidency, and increasingly influenced by the Israel lobby, played a central role in reworking U.S.-Israel relations, and U.S. relations with the Middle East more generally.
Daniel W. B. Lomas
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780719099144
- eISBN:
- 9781526120922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719099144.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and ...
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Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.Less
Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.
